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Christian Humanism

Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt

Edited by

Alasdair A. MacDonald,
Zweder R.W.M. von Martels
and Jan R. Veenstra

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INTRODUCTION

Alasdair A. MacDonald, Zweder von Martels and Jan R. Veenstra

CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

The reception of classical literature and philosophy in Christian circles was never unaccompanied by frictions and it always required a serious re-evaluation of people's intellectual positions. This was true in the time of Augustine, when Christianity took root in Roman culture and thus became an important vehicle for the survival and transmission of classical learning when the Empire declined. It was also true in the Middle Ages, when scholastic philosophers and theologians rediscovered classical learning and science and not only adapted it to Christian doctrine, but also made theology undergo the further influence of classical thought. Finally, the age of humanism, though generally appreciated for deriving its literary, moral and educational predilections from classical models, likewise strove to maintain its Christian identity rather than give in to the secularising tendencies for which it is commonly praised. The central theme of the present book concerns these frictions between Christian and pagan learning, in a somewhat loosely defined humanist context. Christian humanism, therefore, might seem to be a contradiction in terms, in the sense that the doctrinal, philosophical and scientific interests of scholars from the humanist era accommodated a type of learning that was alien to the Christian religion. On the other hand, the phrase is also quite apt inasmuch as it articulates the project of intellectual reconciliation that made it possible for literate and learned Christians to appreciate the classical literary and intellectual heritage.

Humanism can be defined in various ways. It is commonly recognised that though the educational programme of the *studia humanitatis* and the renewed interest in classical philology form more or less the bases of such definitions, they can easily be taken as points of departure for excursions into politics, morality, history, literature, philosophy, theology and even science. Such excursions do not take us outside the circle of humanism, since it is now generally understood that humanists themselves rarely marginalised these broader fields of inquiry. In the context of this collection of essays, the concept of humanism is applied in a broad sense, encompassing not only 'Renaissance humanism' but also what is sometimes called 'twelfth-century humanism', and – going a step further – also including those intellectual currents that in one way or another contributed to or derived from these humanist movements. Renaissance humanism – with its rejuvenation of classical studies, its love of rhetoric and philology and its educational and moral ideals directed towards shaping the

human soul and mind on the models of classical civilisation – is commonly recognised as having emerged in the wake of a previous classically oriented interest in human nature. The philosophical and scientific developments of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which preceded the rise of humanist studies, were themselves preceded by an earlier strain of speculative thought based on the remnants of classical culture, whereby humankind was deemed part of the natural order and whereby natural man and his capacities, and especially his rational powers, could be studied independently of divine grace. The aversion of later humanists from scholasticism relies just as much on a profound interest in human nature as does scholastic anthropology itself. What some historians refer to as 'twelfth-century humanism' is thus a clear and important antecedent of Renaissance humanism.

The ideals of humanist upbringing and the study of natural man have, ever since the nineteenth century, commonly been considered to dissociate humanism from theological doctrine and religious practice, but 'secular' humanism never lost sight of the *studia divina* and the requirements of the Christian life. Independent of the strictures of ecclesiastical order, humanism found room to create and define its own religious experience, its lay piety, the parameters of the redemption of human nature, and the proper balance between classical and Christian virtues, both in the public and private spheres of life. Additionally, its broader intellectual interests, geared to assimilating the learning of the ancients and thereby incurring the frictions that had characterised the interaction of Christian and pagan thought since Antiquity, were brought in line – sometimes tentatively, sometimes confidently – with the Christian world view. 'Secular' humanism, therefore, can thus be seen to transform into Christian humanism.

The contributions in this volume have been organised into five thematically coherent groups, dealing with the major fields of humanist interest, namely the Christian faith, Stoic morality, philosophy, the arts and sciences, and education. The oscillation between the secularising and Christianising tendencies in humanism is explored in the first section of this book. In a contribution on Coluccio Salutati, Ron Witt demonstrates how civic humanist culture became susceptible to Christian ideals. Through his acquaintance with the earlier representatives of civic humanist culture and through his study of Ovid, Salutati matured as a humanist man of letters. Working as a notary and occupying a position in local politics, his humanist preoccupations were mainly non-religious, based on civic concerns and Stoic morality. Nevertheless, the Christian humanism of Petrarch, with its goal of reconciling Athens and Jerusalem, greatly impressed him and erelong he underwent the influence of the Petrarchan circle, assuming after 1369 a clear Christian context for his thought. The educational and philological interests of the humanists were likewise affected by Christian preoccupations, as is testified by humanist concern over liturgical texts, a topic explored by Volker Honemann. Acting upon the premise that better Latin would lead to more effective texts and hence to better Christians, some of the German humanists (such as Jakob Wimpfeling) took care to purge texts of apocryphal materials. In his contribution on Christian humanism and liturgy, Honemann focuses on the Offices of St. Jerome and St. Anne, an edition of which was prepared by

Heinrich Bebel, Johannes Casselius and Leonhard Clemens and published in 1512.

On the other hand, traditional Christian conceptions could be significantly influenced by classical secular notions, as Berndt Hamm illustrates in a contribution on fame and the afterlife in humanist culture. In the religious turmoil of late fifteenth-century Germany, humanist interest in earthly fame and glory, as exemplified in the *Memoria*-culture of epitaphs and memorials, signalled a strong secularising tendency. Grounded on the works of authors such as Sallust and Cicero, the idea that man's immortal soul and man's immortal fame were closely linked had a great appeal for Christian nobles and urban elites. Christian notions of the afterlife were an implicit (and sometimes an explicit) motive in an otherwise secularising demonstration of *fama* in the fields of the arts, sciences, and virtue as extolled in memorials. Hamm adduces various examples, such as the epitaph for the poet Konrad Celtis, or the *Life* of the poet Helius Eobanus Hessus by Joachim Camerarius, to demonstrate how the emulation of the deceased's qualities was seen in the light of the Christian duty to propagate God-given talent.

Secular humanist tendencies should not be regarded as a threat to Christian theology, since, on the contrary, the former might lend support to the latter. This is argued by Willemien Otten, who makes a case for theology as a humanist discipline in Dutch university life. Theology as an academic discipline in the Netherlands was for a very long time intimately affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church. Currently, however, theology and the study of religion are in danger of going their quite separate ways. Willemien Otten argues for a humanist approach that will endeavour to keep the two together, and she draws attention to the interrelatedness of faith and reason in the western intellectual tradition. A clear tradition can be discerned from Augustine's *exercitatio mentis* and the mystical and negative theology of Dionysius and his medieval commentator Eriugena, through the mental exercise or meditation in which Anselm embedded his rational quest for God, up to what a theologian like Voetius or a philosopher like Schleiermacher denoted as piety and which served as a basis for the 'science of theology'.

Not only faith and reason but also moral instruction and literary exercise can be two sides of the same coin, as is demonstrated by Albrecht Diem in his contribution on John of Wales. John, a thirteenth-century 'classicising' Franciscan scholar, specialised in works of moral instruction and pastoral care. Gathering his materials from classical sources, his work bridges the gap between twelfth- and fifteenth-century humanism. Diem provides an analysis of one of John of Wales' unpublished pastoral texts, the *Breviloquium de virtutibus*, which remained popular for nearly three centuries and takes a middle ground between a mirror for princes and a *florilegium* of classical literary texts. Manuscript evidence suggests that this collection of exempla was actually used and read as an introduction to classical literature rather than as a book of moral instruction. In a way this makes John of Wales a medieval 'humanist' in Southern's sense of the word, but Diem emphasises that John himself probably viewed his work in the context of the pastoral revolution.

John of Wales' book on virtues introduces the second section of the present volume, which deals with the sometimes problematic relation between humanism and stoicism. The essay by István Bejczy on stoicism in a medieval Christian context shows that medieval Christians found it difficult to come to terms with the Stoic notion that virtue is an end in itself. The notion that God is the ultimate goal permeated all medieval ethical thought, but it did so with the exclusion of worldly goods – a notion that was favourable to Stoic thinking and made Stoicism attractive for Christian thinkers. Bejczy gives an interesting overview of the diversity of medieval opinions on this subject. Abelard believed that hope of heavenly rewards is a requirement for moral behaviour. Alan of Lille asserted that only self-interested love of God results in virtue. Peter Lombard came closest to vindicating the Stoic ideal, but many other and later authors, including Renaissance scholars such as Lorenzo Valla and Marsilio Ficino, departed from a pure Stoic ethics in favour of the notion of an ultimate divine end. Even the Aristotle commentators, who through the *Nicomachean Ethics* were introduced to the idea of naturally acquired virtues for the sake of happiness, linked beatitude to the supernatural contemplation of God (thus giving a religious dimension to the idea of natural virtue, to which otherwise theologians would have objected).

In spite of such frictions, Stoic notions readily found their way to the hearts and minds of Christian thinkers and authors. In his contribution on the Scottish humanist Florentius Volusenus, Alasdair MacDonald deals with one of these notions, namely the theme of tranquillity of mind, in particular is relation to Volusenus' *De animi tranquillitate* (1543). The topic is traced back to the Ancients (especially Seneca and Plutarch), and it is shown to resonate in medieval times. In the period of the Renaissance and Reformation the theme became especially urgent, given all the theological, political, social and moral perplexities of the age. Later applications of the topic are also investigated – concerning the genres of the pastoral and the georgic, and in the light of the contemporary tumults (English Civil War, Thirty Years War, Seven Years War). At all stages of the discussion, the general theme is examined in the light of Volusenus' book (a combination of Ciceronian dialogue and dream vision), which testifies to the larger value of the tranquillity topos and the emerging need for a secular ethics.

This theme is further pursued by Jan Papy in his contribution on Justus Lipsius and his concern for Ciceronian ethics. Cicero's qualities as a philosopher were the subject of an ongoing debate since Erasmus, and in general the latter's Stoicism was refuted in favour of Christian Platonism. Cicero the rhetorician was the focus of sixteenth-century philological and historical interest. It seems that with Justus Lipsius' *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam*, the Stoic author was for the first time fully appreciated for formulating a new secular ethics. Lipsius dealt extensively with Cicero's Stoic paradoxes, which he analysed and interpreted through Clement of Alexandria, who had made similar efforts to conflate Christian doctrine and Stoicism. Another humanist from the Low Countries striving to reconcile Christian morality and Stoic ethics was Dirck Volkertszoon Coornhert (1522-1590), the Dutch writer, etcher, and printer who published tracts on theology and ethics, and who was one of the great advocates

of religious tolerance in his age. A passionate debater, he was also a highly controversial thinker in the eyes of many. His opposition to the persecution and killing of heretics caused him to be banished by Alva, while his rejection of original sin and predestination, and his advocacy of man's perfectibility made him equally suspect in Calvinist circles. In their contribution on Coornhert, Hans and Simone Mooij point out that he was not a Stoic, even though he had clear affinities with Stoic ethics; and that likewise he was not a biblical humanist even though he had much in common with Erasmus. A skilled translator and innovator in handling the Dutch language, Coornhert made classical ethical texts (e.g. Philo's little treatise on nobility) available for the moral and intellectual improvement of his readers and of society.

Humanism contributed significantly to the late and post-medieval innovations in the field of rationalism and philosophy, and this is the central topic of the third part of this collection. In her contribution on Vives, Marcia Colish shows how humanist persuasion can aid rational and religious instruction. Juan Luis Vives, coming from a *converso* family, wrote his *De veritate fidei Christianae* for imperfectly Christianised *conversos* and Moriscos and in it he displayed the humanist literary trends of his age; he rejected scholastic speculation, limited himself to practical ethics and presented Christianity as civic duty. His intended audience was sensitive to this type of argument (in humanist vein) since the eleventh- and twelfth-century rise of fundamentalism had left the Muslim community deprived of intellectual leadership and speculative thought; additionally, the Reconquest and the rise of false Messiahs had demoralised the Jewish community. *Conversos* and Moriscos were not merely crypto-Jews or crypto-Muslims; they were in-between groups uncertain about their own traditions and identities. Hence Vives does not argue dogmatically but begins with human nature and a discussion of natural religion. The benevolent God is congruent with human nature and human needs, and this is communicated to man through Christ. Reason aids faith; religious truth is not solely based on reason, or on the senses (one should not trust miracles), or on biblical exegesis. Likewise, Vives' soteriology (Christ's Crucifixion and Resurrection) is exemplary rather than dogmatic.

The rejection of dogmatism could be taken one step further into intellectual doubt. This was one of the new directions of philosophical inquiry that Michel de Montaigne was the first to embark upon, and it is the subject of the contribution by Peter Mack. Within the context of humanist culture, the legacy of the ancients for a thinker like Montaigne mainly consisted in the tradition of scepticism. Mack points out that Montaigne's world view was informed by the materiality of Lucretius and by the understanding of human limitations of Horace. Though he read and admired Latin poetry, Montaigne disliked rhetoric and despised the practice of parroting opinions about the ancients. Far from idealising the classical tradition, Montaigne resorted to scepticism to point to the limitations of reason, even though he never said that rational thought is impossible. Some of this scepticism can be found in Montaigne's religious opinions; he was very sceptical regarding witchcraft beliefs and although he believed in God's intervening power, he did not believe this power was ever imparted to him. Yet,

on the whole, he regarded Christian faith and humanism as two different things. Montaigne was sceptical of the classical tradition, but not of the Christian tradition. Divine revelation and divine grace (e.g. in liturgy and ritual) bring man the joys of the afterlife to which unsupported reason cannot attain. Montaigne favoured a traditional faith, somehow apart from cultural and intellectual concerns; as a consequence he opposed the essential hallmarks of Christian humanism, namely the blend of Stoic morality and Christianity (as with Coornhert), and the practice of philological criticism and Bible study (as with Erasmus and the Reformers).

Another philosopher who was greatly influenced by humanist culture but who did not fall under the sway of scepticism, was Baruch Spinoza. Fokke Akkerman discusses the relation between humanism and religion in the latter's writings. Commonly hailed as a great rationalist philosopher and precursor of Enlightenment thought, Spinoza was well read in the classics, and was in his own right a defender of true (i.e. rationalist) religion. Notably, his discussions of religion and superstition are replete with echoes from Lucretius. For Spinoza superstition derives from religious fear and ignorance, whereas true religion is pure rational comprehension of universal principles. His *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is a plea for freedom of debate in religion and philosophy and displays a clear de-secularising tendency. Spinoza objected to being labelled an atheist.

Rational doubt or confidence did not automatically result in the positions (both extreme and original) of Montaigne and Spinoza. On the whole, rationalism went well with the humanist programme and caused it to be both traditional and innovative at the same time. Both directions are exemplified by the thought of Erasmus, who is the subject of two contributions, the first by Christoph Burger, the second by Han van Ruler. Burger deals with the measure in which Erasmus relied on traditional medieval authors. Erasmus' treatise on free will and divine Grace (*De libero arbitrio*) has much in common with similar works by late-medieval theologians. In general, discussions on free will moved between the extremes of Augustine's notion of a corrupted free will and the determinism of Grace on the one hand, and the Aristotelian notion of man's moral autonomy on the other. Erasmus finds a safe passage between this Scylla and Charibdis by avoiding determinism but at the same time emphasising the importance of Grace. In doing so, Burger points out, Erasmus shows a degree of kinship with medieval authors such as Gregory of Rimini and Hugolinus of Orvieto.

Van Ruler, on the other hand, deals with the innovative dimensions of Erasmus' ethical thought, by outlining Christian humanist interest in Stoicism. Erasmus' *Philosophia Christi* can be seen as a point of departure for a philosophy of moral and mental transformation, where reason and faith are naturally amalgamated and where the moral teaching of Scripture is (re-)interpreted in classical terms, thereby emphasising a dualism of body and soul. Suppression of the carnal should foster the cultivation of the mental, and hence improve moral behaviour (which for Erasmus would automatically mean the Christian life). There were other humanists who strove for such a philosophical felicity, such as Coornhert, whose doctrine of perfectibility merged Stoic and Christian

ideals, or Petrus Geesteranus, who likewise saw the peace and tranquillity of the afterlife in Stoic terms. This conviction, that moral (or philosophical) and theological bliss could be identified, remained *en vogue* well into the seventeenth century. Serious criticism and scepticism were demonstrated by Blaise Pascal and Thomas Hobbes. Pascal questioned the attainability of bliss through reason by emphasising man's fallen state and the fundamental friction between man's will and its abilities. Hobbes went further and rejected moral happiness altogether, along with the time-honoured identification of moral behaviour and mental state. In some ways Christian humanism fostered these new developments, but the project and ideal of Christian humanism itself ended with the rise of modern moral philosophy.

Taking the theme of mental transformation somewhat further into the modern era, Detlev Pätzold studies the autobiographical elements in the writings of two key philosophers, namely René Descartes and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Relating crucial moments in their philosophical development, they produced partly fictional and partly true stories of becoming themselves by finding the principle of selfhood. It is uncertain whether Descartes' story of being alone in a room heated by a stove, where he reflected on his own thoughts and dreams (which led him to the *cogito* argument) is a fable or not, but evidently Fichte's discovery of the first principle of philosophy (the 'I') under very much the same circumstances (in a room warmed by a stove) was modelled on the story told by the earlier man. In the Christian humanist tradition, this quest for a first principle of certain knowledge was inextricably tied up with the notion of God – Descartes would produce several 'proofs' for His existence – but as a consequence of the advent of Enlightenment thought (and Kant's critique) this position was no longer an option for Fichte. Christian humanism as a dominant strain of thought suffered a defeat through the rise of modern moral philosophy, but also, and perhaps even more so, with the loss of God as first principle.

Among humanists, doctrinal, philosophical and scientific considerations were less marginal than pioneers in the field of Renaissance studies, such as Paul Oskar Kristeller, have suggested, in their demarcation and vindication of this important cultural strain in the Renaissance. Several essays in the present volume bear this out, but John North's contribution on the astrology of Ficino and other humanist authors demonstrates especially that too narrow a demarcation of humanism blinds one to the breadth of the humanist intellectual endeavour. North's essay introduces the fourth section of this book, dedicated to the relation between humanism and the arts and sciences, and deals with the inconsistencies in the astrological works of Ficino and Pico. To be sure, later generations imputed inconsistency to the former, and with good cause. In his *De vita* Ficino laboured to present an astrological world view as a natural philosophy whereby a cosmic spirit constituted an organic sympathetic structure in the universe. In earlier writings, however, he had fiercely denounced astrology on the grounds of inconsistency and arbitrariness. A similar vacillation of mind can be found in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who with brilliant rhetorical strength had defended in his *900 Theses* whatever magic or astrology he knew, but who condemned the same in his *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem*.

In spite of later scholarly efforts to explain away these inconsistencies, one should rather accept as a serious fact the intellectual inconstancy that plagued the minds of some of the eminent exponents of Renaissance humanism. In similar vein, modern scholarly appreciation of what 'humanism' is perceived to imply, is frequently found to be inconsistent with Renaissance humanist writings.

That the philological and educational concerns of the humanists should lead them to the study of the liberal arts should come as no surprise, even though this fact has not always been the focus of historians. Many of the intellectual pursuits of the classical and medieval periods remained important for the humanists, as their writings on cosmology, astrology, music and many others disciplines demonstrate. Stephen Gersh deals with one of these time-honoured *artes*-subjects, namely music, not in the humanist, but in the late classical context. His analysis of Augustine's *De musica* explores the philosophical dimensions of the text and outlines the influence of this treatise which, next to Boethius' *De institutione musica*, was one of the basic works on the 'science of mensurating well' (Augustine's own definition). Augustine's moral objections to music as a source of deceptive pleasures are conquered by his conviction that music essentially belongs to the domain of the intellect and has great cognitive value. The study of music is for him the study of the theoretical principles relative to number and ratios in the realm of the intellect. In studying the order of music, one studies the order of the soul and the order of the universe.

The cosmological implications of the study of the *artes* continued to exercise the minds of philosophers and scientists throughout the humanist era. The amalgamation of science and philosophy with humanist methods and ideas can be discerned in the works of many intellectuals from the late-medieval and early modern era. A case in point is Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), one of the most original thinkers of his age. Critical of the Platonic and Aristotelian strains in western thought, his Christian or rather Christ-centred philosophy reconfigured many of the standard ideas about God, man, and cosmos. In his essay on Cusanus' ideas on time and eternity, Matthieu van der Meer not only emphasises the Christian humanist aspect of Cusanus' philosophy, whereby man is the true image of God (thereby offering a philosophical frame for humanist idealism), but also addresses some of the cosmological and metaphysical problems incumbent upon the relation between Creator and creation – such as how Cusa reconciled the omnipotence of God with his concept of the eternity of the world through Christ.

Not only in the field of philosophy but also in the field of science do humanist traits inform the discourse of innovative thinkers, as Marc van der Poel shows in a chapter on Nicolaus Copernicus. The new heliocentric theory of the solar system, which Copernicus expounded in his *De revolutionibus*, met with considerable opposition from scholars and most notably from theologians. Among the latter Melanchthon takes pride of place and he did not shrink from appealing to the authorities to silence the Polish astronomer. In the preface to his book Copernicus defended himself by claiming freedom of scientific inquiry. Van der Poel presents the text of this *praefatio*, which is dedicated to Pope Paul III, and his analysis of its humanist traits shows Copernicus to be on

a par with other revolutionary writers, such as Erasmus and Agrippa of Nettesheim, both of whom had likewise to defend themselves in an age of increasing religious intolerance. Religious pressures may also have motivated Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples to turn his back on one of the more ambitious and daring projects of his earlier scholarship. In his *De magia naturali* he painted the picture of a magus as a combination of philosopher, physician, astronomer and theologian, whose knowledge of numbers, words and sympathetic magic would equip him sufficiently to provide the remedies and harmonies that the age of schism, reformation and critical philosophical and scientific inquiry craved. In his contribution on Lefèvre's *De magia*, Jan Veenstra deals with a number of Hermetic and Kabbalistic passages from Book Two of the treatise. Known chiefly as a humanist and Bible translator, Lefèvre also wrote a number of textbooks on Aristotle, commented on Sacrobosco's *De Sphaera*, and edited several works of the medieval Christian mystics. With other scholars of his day (such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola) he shared a vacillation of mind that made his earlier magical and philosophical interests initial stages in what would turn out to be a study of orthodox mysticism and Scripture-based Christian humanism.

For many historians the proper domain of humanism is philology and education. Hence the fifth and concluding section of this volume is dedicated to humanist interest in history, theological instruction, higher education, and discourse analysis. The first essay in this group is by Peter Raedts and deals with the way Dutch humanists regarded the medieval past. Humanist historiography occasionally took liberties regarding the representation of the past. Hugo Grotius' *Liber de Antiquitate*, which coined the myth of 'Batavian liberty' or 'Gothic freedom' in opposition to Roman oppression, is a case in point. Having unsuccessfully sought for a regent, the States General of the newly created Dutch Republic acted, in an unprecedented way, as their own sovereign authority. In defence of this new state, Dutch humanists and historiographers re-evaluated the medieval past and created the Batavian myth. This myth, as it was claimed, was founded on a (in reality non-existent) States of Holland that from the earlier Middle Ages onwards allegedly functioned as a sovereign governmental body, constituting a force in opposition first to Rome and later, in the early modern era, to Philip II of Spain. The Dutch retained a romantic view of their medieval past, and this is still encountered in such a nineteenth-century figure as Willem Bilderdijk, even though Bilderdijk – a staunch royalist in the post-Napoleonic era – ransacked medieval history with completely different motives, namely to ground governmental legitimacy on monarchical authority.

A similar use of a fictional past is detected by Rudolf Suntrup in his historical survey of the *Schola Carolina* in Osnabrück. Founded in the time of Charlemagne, the Gymnasium Carolinum can boast a 1200-year history. In the sixteenth century its contribution to the *studia humanitatis* helped to pave the way for the Reformation, even though this caused the school to suffer the rivalry of a similar protestant establishment. Ere long the Jesuits made the Carolinum an important educational stronghold in the cause of the Counter-Reformation and in the middle of the seventeenth century, during the Thirty Years War, the

Carolinum was raised to the status of Jesuit University. Its foundation was based on the historical fiction that Charlemagne had been the first to establish an *academia* in Osnabrück, but historical facts bowed to the pressure of political expediency. A year after its official opening, the university was closed down again, as the city, having the misfortune to be in the frontline between warring Protestants and Catholics, suffered the fate of repeated power changes. Nevertheless, the Jesuits retained a dominant influence in Osnabrück until 1773.

That humanism was a powerful presence in the European academies of the early modern era, is emphasised in the contributions by Zweder von Martels and Alexander Broadie. Von Martels discusses the Foundation Edict of the University of Groningen (an *Edictum perpetuum*) which, as he demonstrates, was drawn up by one of the co-founders (in 1614) of the university, Ubbo Emmius, a renowned humanist scholar and historian. Emmius emphasised the value of good education to prepare students for their tasks as administrators in the offices of state and church. Humanism also affected academic discourse and ideas concerning the proper methods of instruction. Broadie deals with sixteenth-century innovations in theology in his discussion of the *Dialogus de materia theologo tractanda*, which the Scottish logician John Mair (c. 1467-1550) published as an introduction to his *Commentary* on Book One of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. The text is a fine illustration of the clashing values of scholastic and humanist theology. The dialogue introduces two interlocutors, David Cranston (who favours scholasticism and disapproves of humanism) and Gavin Douglas (who is in favour of humanism), busy discussing John Mair's *Commentary*, a work which was written in the scholastic vein. As is to be expected, Douglas criticises and Cranston defends Mair's approach. The very presence of the dialogue as an introduction to Mair's book, testifies to the growing influence of humanism in the universities and also shows that a scholastic philosopher like Mair was well aware of the innovative movement.

A collection of essays on humanist culture cannot fail to attend to humanist texts and humanist writing. Four contributions in this volume present text editions (the essays by Marc van der Poel, Zweder von Martels, Alexander Broadie and Adrie van der Laan) and the concluding essays focus specifically on the world of the text and the text as world. The first of these, an essay by Adrie van der Laan, highlights one of the most important fifteenth-century northern humanist writers, Rudolph Agricola Phrisius. Cultivating the *studia humanitatis* and the art of Latin epistolography, Agricola appeared as ghostwriter for, and was among the retinue of, Johann von Dalberg, who as bishop of Worms addressed the newly elected Pope Innocent VIII in 1485 in a speech written by Agricola (Van der Laan presents an edition of that text). Just Niemeijer introduces the theme of reality as text and the mind of man as a means to come to that reality; this was an awareness very much present in the work of the monastic author Isaac of Stella. Writing on the virtue of monastic solitude and the need for instruction, Isaac articulated a sense of human dignity that qualified him – somewhat anachronistically – for the epithet 'medieval humanist'. In his sermons he expressed the need for withdrawal from the world in or-

der to search for the divine light through introspection. Ultimately this light was inaccessible on account of man's limitations, but Isaac's pedagogical adhortations drew his readers to the six books of reality: the Book of Wisdom within the Godhead, the book of the rational mind, the book of creation, the book of the law, of Christ and of the Scriptures.

Later humanist authors would be susceptible to this type of 'literary' thinking as the higher demands of textual perfection shaped not only their discourse but also their worldview. The concluding contributions by Burcht Pranger and Rob Pauls deal with the impact that this had on the theology of the reformers. In a general discussion of Christian humanism, Anselm of Canterbury and John Calvin would deserve a place for their rationalising and classicising tendencies, but Pranger discusses and analyses the essential doctrines of their theologies on a more fundamental level. Anselm's *sola ratione* involves a self-referential discourse, in which God and reality are conflated and Scripture and Christ are absent. Calvin's *sola scriptura* is likewise a self-referential discourse, whereby Scripture is intrinsically compacted into a *testimonium Spiritus internum*. In his contribution on Melanchthon, Pauls signals a similar self-referentiality. Melanchthon's *Loci communes* of 1521 are an example of practical didactic theological literature, of which the main aim is the transformation of the Christian mind. Melanchthon relates the essential Reformation doctrine of sin and grace to the human affects which are then, in turn, made identical with the theology of the *Loci*. Thus the *Loci* present a self-contained and self-referential system of theology which in its pragmatic but reductive and narrowing delineations comprises – or aims at comprising – all of reality: the world *as* sin and grace. These post-modern readings serve to problematise Christian theological discourse on God and Scripture but (rather than exercising historical and philosophical criticism) they also show themselves as a means of redeeming the humanism of theology, and so in their own way enhancing and representing the Christian humanist tradition.

ARJO VANDERJAGT: CURRICULUM VITAE

Professor Arjo Vanderjagt is an internationally-known scholar in several areas of scholarship, of which philosophy, history, philology, religion, humanism are the fields in which he has built up his formidable academic reputation. Some readers, however, may be surprised to hear that his very first publication was in a quite different area of research – zoology! Arjo's breadth of intellectual curiosity, and his passionate commitment to, and talent for, sharing his interests and learning with students and colleagues are among his outstanding characteristics. The editors therefore found it difficult to settle upon a single suitable theme for the present Festschrift, and they can only hope that the choice of Christian Humanism – as a topic that brings together a broad sweep of contributions dealing *inter alia* with the Early Church, the age of the Cathedrals and the Schools, the rise of Renaissance humanism and its impact upon the crisis of faith at the time of the Reformation – will be found representative of at least some of the intellectual interests of the *honorandus*.

His friends know him as an American; not so many are aware that Arjo Vanderjagt was in fact born in the Netherlands (in 1948). Shortly thereafter, the family returned to the USA, and Arjo spent his childhood and youth in that country. He attended Prattsburgh Central School and then Franklin Academy in upstate New York, before enrolling as a student at the University of Rochester. It was at Rochester that he wrote that article on zoology.

As a child, Arjo had always been keenly interested in the world at large, and in 1966 he embarked upon a long journey that would take him through most of Europe, a large part of the Middle East and West Asia, and also to Africa. When he arrived in the Netherlands in 1968, he cannot have suspected that he would come to stay permanently in that country. But so it proved, and it was in the Netherlands that he formed his strongest friendships and put down roots.

His first professional position (1968-76) was at a Teacher Training College in the city of Groningen, where he gave lessons in English, History and Didactics. In 1971 he registered as a student of Philosophy, History, and Semitic Studies at the University of Groningen, where in 1974 he graduated in Philosophy (under Professor Bernard Delfgaauw) and in 1976 in Medieval History (under Professor A. G. Jongkees). Between 1976 and 1979 he was a lecturer in Philosophy at the Catholic University of Nijmegen (the present Radboud University), where he specialised in medieval philosophy. His next appointment was as Associate Professor at the University of Groningen, where he gave Introduction to Philosophy lectures to audiences that regularly ran into hundreds. Under the leadership of his mentor, the renowned polymath Professor John North, Arjo also taught a wide range of subjects, particularly in the area of the history of pre-modern philosophy. In 1981 he successfully defended his doctoral thesis, at Groningen, with Professor Jongkees and Professor Willem Noomen as his *promotores*. This thesis comprised an examination of ideas of nobility and civilisation current in the Duchy of Burgundy in the fifteenth century. Late-medieval Burgundy would remain a topic to which he would return

in many subsequent publications. From the beginning of his university career, Arjo's remarkable pedagogical talent was in evidence, and his classes were always packed with enthusiastic students: indeed, in 2007 he would be voted 'Teacher of the Year'. Nor was he deficient in administrative skills: he was closely involved with the affairs of the Faculty of Philosophy, and in activities organised jointly with colleagues in the Faculty of Arts. In addition, he was the chair of the 'Studium Generale' at Groningen (1985-91), and also of the Dutch Society for Philosophy (1995-2001). In honour of his achievements in teaching, research and administration, he was appointed by the University of Groningen in 1994 to a special chair in the history of ideas.

Except for two years (1984-85 and 2005-06) spent at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies, where he developed fruitful (and long-lasting) research contacts that would prove particularly beneficial to his own projects, the University of Groningen would remain his academic base. However, there can be few academics who have been so willing to travel all over the world to participate in academic conferences, symposia and other meetings concerned with scholarship. The size of Arjo's circle of colleagues, friends and acquaintances is impressive, and this is something from which the University of Groningen has greatly benefited, in many ways. This was perhaps most conspicuously the case consequent upon his appointment as Academic Director of the Netherlands Research School for Medieval Studies (1999-2005). This position, whereof an important aspect involved stimulating and facilitating applications for research subsidies, brought six Dutch universities (and later also three in Flemish Belgium) into a cooperation agreement; links were also forged with universities in other countries: these included Münster and Tübingen (Germany), Cambridge and Oxford (England), Notre Dame (USA), Odense (Denmark), Lecce and Palermo (Italy), as well as with the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Vienna). Such joint projects have given a great fillip to medieval studies within the Netherlands, and a multitude of published collections of articles by academics working at Dutch and other universities are the permanent and visible result. Arjo has long been active in the world of scholarly publication in other ways too: he is the founding editor of Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, and an associate editor of Brill's Studies in the History of Christian Thought; he is one of the two editors-in-chief of the series Mediaevalia Groningana; he is on the editorial boards of *Fifteenth-Century Studies*, of *Groningen Studies in Cultural Change*, and has been a corresponding member of the *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* (Leuven).

Arjo Vanderjagt has always managed excellently to accommodate his busy agenda of national and international gatherings with his scholarly activities and duties at Groningen and with his family life at Venlo. His contribution to the University of Groningen has been remarkable, both in the scholarly and the social senses. By his friends and colleagues he is appreciated for his culture and learning, for his loyal friendship, for his sedulous care for good English prose style, for his keen eye for administrative detail, for his infectious enthusiasm for all aspects of medieval studies, and not least for his humour. As a result of his scholarly contributions over some four decades, more is known and under-

stood about Burgundy, St Anselm, the humanist writers of the Northern Netherlands, and the learned luminaries of the early years of the University of Groningen. Very recently, he has added a more exotic interest to his collection – the study of the botanical gardens of Indonesia and their origins: this development may indicate a recursion to his youthful fascination with all aspects of biology. The present Festschrift is offered as a tribute from a selection of Arjo's colleagues and friends, in recognition of a highly learned Christian humanist.

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IV: Reviews

Arjo Vanderjagt has published reviews in the following scholarly journals:

Algemeen Nederlands tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte
Arthuriana. The Quarterly for the International Arthurian Society
Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Cistercian Studies Quarterly
Filosofie Magazine
Geschiedenis van de Wijsbegeerte in Nederland
Groniek. Gronings historisch tijdschrift
The Journal of the Historical Association
Medieval History
Millennium. Tijdschrift voor Middeleeuwse studies
Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis
Nederlands theologisch tijdschrift
Renaissance Quarterly
Speculum
Tijdschrift voor filosofie
Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis
Tijdschrift voor theoretische geschiedenis

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The editors record the sad news of the death in late 2008 of Professor John D. North. Within and without the University of Groningen he is remembered with great affection, and his contribution to the present volume is particularly appreciated.

CHRISTIANITY AND HUMANISM

COLUCCIO SALUTATI IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE ANCIENTS

Ron Witt

Francesco Petrarch deserves the title "Father of Italian Humanism" in that, first, his compelling writings, dramatised by a life self-consciously lived and publically reported, served to win support for humanism among the rich and powerful; and, second, in these writings he clearly formulated humanism's spiritual goal as a moralising force within contemporary Christian society. If, however, the title is meant to claim that he was the first to approach antiquity in a new way, the first to follow in the footsteps of the ancients, a claim that Petrarch himself made, then the title is undeserved.

Driven by a passion for fame, one which he castigated in the *Secretum*, Petrarch presented himself to his generation as the pioneer in the return to the ancients. As he declared in his *Collatio laureationis* on the Capitoline hill in receiving the laurel crown in 1341:

> I have not been afraid to furnish leadership on such a trying and, to me, even dangerous path, and many, I think, are ready to follow after me.[1]

Late in life, he declared himself "the first of all who now in our time labour in these studies".[2] In 1372, Boccaccio, in a letter to Jacopo Pizzinga, emphatically endorsed Petrarch's claim to precedence when he described Petrarch's coronation oath of 1341 as having, after a thousand years of neglect, "opened the way for himself as well as for those who wished to ascend after him".[3] Doubtless in-

[1] "Me in tam laboriosi et michi quidem periculoso calle ducem prebere non expavi, multis (multos *ms*.) posthac, ut arbitror, secuturis [...]": C. Godi, "La *Collatio laureationis* del Petrarca nelle due redazioni", *Studi petrarcheschi*, n.s. 5 (1988), p. 41, as well as comments by M. Feo, "Le 'due redazioni' della *Collatio laureationis*", *Quaderni petrarceschi* 7 (1990), pp. 186-203.

[2] "[…] omnium senior qui nunc apud nos his in studiis elaborant": *Seniles*, 17.2, in Francesco Petrarca, *Francesco Petrarca: Prose*, ed. G. Martellotti, P. G. Ricci, E. Carrara, and E. Bianchi (Milan, 1955), p. 1144. The passage is cited from S. Rizzo, "Il latino del Petrarca e il latino dell'umanesimo", *Il Petrarca latino e le origini dell'umanesimo*, *Quaderni petrarcheschi* 9-10 (Florence, 1996), p. 350. Evidence that Petrarch was acquainted with at least a portion of the writings of his humanist predecessors Lovato and Mussato is given in my *"In the Footsteps of the Ancients": The Origins of Humanism from Lovato dei Lovati to Leonardo Bruni* (Leiden, 2000), pp. 235-236.

[3] The sentence reads: "Post hunc vero eque florentinus civis, vir inclitus Franciscus Petrarca preceptor meus, neglectis quorundam principiis, ut iam dictum est, vix poeticum limen attingentibus, vetus iter arripere orsus est tanta pectoris fortitudine tantoque

fluenced by Bocaccio's judgement, Leonardo Bruni celebrated Petrarch in his *Vita di Dante e di Petrarca* as "the first who called back to light the gracefulness of the lost and extinguished ancient manner of writing".[4] This legend of Petrarch the pioneer has remained a part of scholarship on humanism down to the present day.

Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406) never knew Petrarch personally. His effort to establish a regular correspondence with the great man, when Salutati was working in the papal court at Rome in 1368-1370, failed. Yet there can be no question that Salutati's opportunity to read the writings of Petrarch brought by members of the papal *curia* from Avignon, especially by Francesco Bruni, a papal secretary, served to revolutionise Salutati's thought. From that time on Petrarch was for Salutati a greater literary artist than either Cicero or Virgil or, when challenged, his fallback position: Petrarch was greater in poetry than Cicero and greater in prose than Virgil.[5] Nevertheless, Salutati never accepted the position that Petrarch had been the founder of what was becoming a flourishing intellectual movement. The younger humanist had a clearer understanding of the progress of humanism than did Boccaccio, an understanding which he failed to transmit to Bruni and that was to be lost until Roberto Weiss revived it in the mid-twentieth century.[6] In 1395, in a letter to the Paduan Bartolomeo Oliari, Salutati wrote:

> The study of letters emerged to a degree in our century: the first cultivator of eloquence was Mussato of Padua, your fellow countryman, and there was Geri

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mentis ardore atque ingenii perspicacitate, ut nulla illum sistere impedimenta quirent vel itineris terrere impervia, quin imo, amotis vespribus arbustisque quibus mortalium negligentia obsitum comperit restauratisque aggere firmo proluviis semesis rupibus, sibi et post eum ascendere volentibus viam aperuit": Giovanni Boccaccio, *Opere latine minori*, ed. A. F. Massèra (Bari, 1928), p. 195. For the influence of Boccaccio on Bruni's assessment, see H. Baron, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* (Princeton, 1965), p. 262.

[4] "Francesco Petrarca fu il primo, il quale ebbe tanta grazia d'ingegno che riconnobbe e rivocò in luce l'antica leggiadria dello stile perduto e spento": *Leonardo Bruni Aretino. Humanistisch-philosophische Schriften mit einer Chronologie seiner Werke und Briefe*, ed. H. Baron (Wiesbaden, 1928), p. 65. Giannozzo Manetti echoed Bruni in his *Vita Francisci Petrarchae*, in *Vite di Dante, Petrarca e Boccaccio*, ed. S. Baldassari (Palermo, 2003), p. 140: "In his igitur divinarum et humanarum rerum studiis per varia et diversa loca quemadmodum diximus versatus, usque adeo profecit, ut inter ceteros praecipuos laborum suorum fructus dicendi primus elegantiam iam supra mille annos pene defunctam".

[5] I discuss Salutati's shifting opinion on Petrarch's literary status in *"In the Footsteps of the Ancients"* (as in n. 2), pp. 415-416. In the second part of the *Dialogi*, Bruni represents Niccolo Niccoli as making a similar assessment comparing Petrarch to the ancients in his feigned defence of Petrarch's superiority: *Dialogi ad Petrum Istrum*, in *Prosatori latini del Quattrocento*, ed. E. Garin (Milan, 1952), p. 94.

[6] R. Weiss, *The Dawn of Humanism in Italy* (London, 1947; repr. New York, 1970).

> d'Arezzo, the greatest imitator of the orator Pliny the Second […].[7]

He returned to the history of pre-Petrarchan humanism in a letter to Francesco Zabarella in 1400 in which he praised the same two men as lawyers

> who in style and eloquence brought light to this fourteenth century: the one, that is, your compatriot Albertino Mussato, whose histories we admire and whose poetry we have; the other was Geri d'Arezzo, whose verses, letters, and prose satires we lavishly praise.[8]

Salutati knew, then, that Petrarch had not been the first to revive ancient letters. Although he apparently remained ignorant of Lovato's pioneering role, he knew that Mussato of Padua and Geri d'Arezzo had preceded Petrarch in the endeavour. Salutati's first humanism was itself pre-Petrarchan, the secular, civic variety espoused by these earlier scholars that Petrarch endeavoured to transform into a Christian humanism by reconciling what he considered the best elements of pagan culture with Christianity. Educated by teachers, principally the Florentine exile Convenevole da Prato, who

> ridiculed the Psalms of David (compared to which no writing is more meaningful), and the whole text of the sacred page, as not being other than tales of old women,

Petrarch was well-aware of the danger posed to the faith by the study of the ancient Latin writers and he strove to convince himself and others that Athens and Jerusalem were not only compatible, but that the former reinforced the teachings of the latter.[9]

Salutati only succumbed to the attractions of Petrarch's Christian humanism at Rome in his late thirties after protracted contact with the latter's writings. Elements of the older humanism would remain in Salutati's work even then, but they would appear outside of their original context. How did Salutati come by this civic, pre-Petrarchan humanism? An analysis of Salutati's formal education offers some explanation.

Coluccio Salutati was born in February 1331, in the small rural commune of Buggiano in the village of Stignano in the Valdinievole on the border between

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[7] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, ed. F. Novati, 4 vols. (Rome, 1891-1911), vol. 3, p. 84: "Et primus eloquentie cultor fuit conterraneus tuus Musattus Patavinus, fuit et Gerius Aretinus, maximus Plinii Secundi oratoris".

[8] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 3, pp. 408-410: "[...] qui stilo et eloquentia hoc quartodecimo seculo claruerunt; unus, scilicet, compatriota tuus Albertinus Mussatus, cuius admiramur hystorias et habemus poemata; alter fuit Gerius aretinus, cuius versus et epistulas satirasque prosaicas non mediocriter commendamus".

[9] The quotation is from Francesco Petrarca, *De otio religioso*, ed. G. Rotondi (Vatican City, 1958), p. 103: "[...] sed eos qui psalterium daviticum, qua ulla pregnantior scriptura est, et omnem divine textum pagine non aliter quam aniles fabulas irriderent". Although Convenevole taught Petrarch the principal ancient Latin authors, his own writings and Petrarch's comments on his learning suggest that he was a man of modest literary attainments: see my *"In the Footsteps of the Ancients"* (as in n. 2), pp. 233-235.

Florence and Lucca.[10] As the result of a Ghibelline victory in the commune a few months after his birth, Salutati's family fled to Bologna where it remained until 1350 or 1351 when, on the father's death, Salutati returned with his mother and siblings to Buggiano. We can say, consequently, that Salutati received all his formal schooling in the university city.

Of his teachers in Bologna, Salutati names only Pietro da Moglio (d. 1384).[11] Da Moglio's skill as a rhetorician [he was called "Pietro della retorica"] would by 1362 merit a chair in the Paduan *studio* and later one in Bologna. Da Moglio had very likely been a student of the first Bolognese humanist, Giovanni del Virgilio (d. 1326), whose writings included a series of commentaries on ancient and medieval literary texts and an exchange of poetic letters with Dante that constituted the first classicising bucolic poetry of the Renaissance.[12] The fact that da Moglio wrote a commentary on these poems indicates that he taught them in the classroom. His late commentary on Petrarch's *Bucolicon carmen* shows as well that he liked to mix contemporary literary works with ancient texts in his university courses.[13]

Salutati's work with da Moglio, however, occurred earlier when da Moglio was teaching at the secondary level. Judging from chronological indications given by Salutati in discussing this period, Salutati entered da Moglio's classroom at the beginning of his adolescence, that is, in 1345 or 1346, when he was fourteen or fifteen, and he remained there until beginning notarial studies in the fall of 1348. Although it would seem, given da Moglio's surviving writings, that the master would have taught Salutati grammar as well as rhetoric during this three- or four-year period, a poem by Salutati describing the content of da Moglio's teaching appended to a letter, sent to his former master from Buggiano in 1360/61, suggests that da Moglio's courses on rhetoric centred on medieval *ars dictaminis*. In this poem the young man warmly expressed his gratitude for his master's teaching him "the power of the letter".[14]

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[10] For the early years of Salutati's life, see my *Hercules at the Crossroads. The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio Salutati* (Durham, NC, 1983), pp. 3-107.

[11] Salutati describes Pietro da Moglio as "meus in adolescentia […] premonitor": *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 1, p. 115. On da Moglio, see G. Billanovich, "Giovanni del Virgilio, Pietro da Moglio, Francesco da Fiano", *Italia medioevale et umanistica* 6 (1963), pp. 203-234 and idem, 7 (1964), pp. 279-324, and G. Billanovich and C. M. Monti, "Una nuova fonte per la storia della scuola di grammatica e retorica nell'Italia del Trecento", *Italia medioevale et umanistica* 17 (1979), pp. 367-412. Da Moglio's two ten-line poems, each containing one-line summaries of the ten Senecan tragedies and doubtless used for mnemonic purposes in the classroom, reveal his allegiance to the fundamental author of early humanism: Billanovich, "Giovanni del Virgilio", *Italia medioevale et umanistica* 7 (1964), pp. 293-298.

[12] G. Lidonnici, "La corrispondenza poetica di Giovanni del Virgilio con Dante e il Mussato, e le postille di Giovanni Boccaccio", *Giornale dantesco*, n.s. 21 (1913), pp. 232-233; and his "Polifemo", *Bullettino della Società dantesca italiana*, n.s. 18 (1911), p. 204.

[13] Billanovich, "Giovanni del Virgilio" (as in n. 11), 6 (1963), pp. 205-234.

[14] The letter to da Moglio is found *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. l, pp. 3-5. The poem is published in B. L. Ullman, "Additions to Salutati's Letters from

To judge from two late letters that da Moglio sent to Petrarch in the 1360s, it would have been inconceivable for Pietro to have taught Salutati any other epistolary style in the 1340s. In these letters of the 1360s da Moglio's effort to imitate Petrarch's familiar style was so painful as to be funny. The two letters fully justify Guarino's scathing pronouncement on da Moglio's verbal artistry: "He speaks so ineptly, obscurely, and strangely that he seems not so much to speak as to bellow".[15]

We cannot know what Latin literature, if any, da Moglio taught in his secondary school classroom. Most of his students were prospective notaries and lawyers. As a teenager with a career in the notariate before him, Salutati, like his fellow classmates, would have considered the attainment of epistolary eloquence according to the highly formulaic method of *ars dictaminis* the culmination of an education in the arts. He could be expected, consequently, to single out this aspect of da Moglio's teaching.

Salutati tells us that he was converted to literature only when later resident in the Valdinievole. Consequently, if, as is likely, da Moglio taught some Latin literature at the secondary level, what Salutati learned of it would probably not have figured greatly in his memories of the master's instruction. Nonetheless, da Moglio, an ambitious scholar interested in keeping up with current literary and scholarly trends, could not have failed to have at least referred to contemporary authors in his teaching and in this way he provided Salutati with an initial recognition of the names of contemporary authors such as Mussato and Geri d'Arezzo whose works he would later seek out for study.

His notarial course completed in the fall of 1350, Salutati and his family returned to Stignano, where notarial documents in his hand show that the young notary almost immediately embarked on earning a living. If we are to believe Salutati, it was only in the Valdinievole, about 1355, that his humanistic interests emerged independently of any teacher. Relatively unresponsive to literature when in school, his attitude suddenly changed during a day spent reading Ovid. He tells us this in the *De laboribus Herculis*, written late in life, in a passage recounting the origin of his love of literature. As he explains the change, the love of literature came on suddenly, directly inspired "as if by a divine gift",

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the Turin Manuscript and Correspondence with B. Moglio", *Studies in the Italian Renaissance* (1973[2]), pp. 296-297. According to his former student, da Moglio taught:

"[...] quid epistola posset,
Quo modo danda salus, quo sint exordia iure'
Instituenda modo, qui fit narratio recta,
Poscere quid licitum, et que sit conclusio digna,
Denique quid faceret pulcrum et sine sorde politum
Dictamen, que detque sonoros regula cursus,
Et que signari debeat distinctio puncto?"

[15] Guarino's remark is found in R. Sabbadini, *La scuola e gli studi di Guarino Guarini* (Catania, 1896), p. 176: "Vidi epistulam Pe[tre] Ve. de Muglo; adeo enim inepte obscure et inusitate dicit, ut non tam loqui quam mugire videatur. Cf. Billanovich, "Giovanni del Virgilio" (as in n. 11), 7 (1964), p. 322. See the letters, ibid., pp. 283-284 and 287-288.

when he was reading Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in a manuscript which he had purchased after returning to the Valdinievole. He writes:

> I owe many things to him [Ovid], who served as a door and teacher when in the last part of my adolescence [that is perhaps at 22-24] I was first as if divinely kindled and inspired to this study. For with no instructor guiding and listening to no teacher at all, I read all the poets by myself and, after our Sulmonian came into my possession, as if given a gift by God, I understood them.[16]

Not coincidentally about this same time, in October 1355, when he was 24, Salutati purchased four manuscripts, Priscian, Virgil, Lucan and Horace. About the same time the study of Priscian's monumental text awakened him – again, according to Salutati, under divine influence – to the importance of orthography.[17]

Perhaps the earliest surviving manuscripts in Salutati's possession was British Museum *Add.* 11987. It is the only one of the surviving collection that he copied himself, and was doubtless written when he was too poor to commission a professional amanuensis.[18] Its contents establish the young scholar's connection with Padua: the manuscript begins with the complete *Tragedies* of Seneca, the core ancient text for Paduan humanists, and ends with Mussato's *Ecerinis* and *Somnium*. Marginal and interlinear annotations testify to Salutati's continued use of the manuscript for philological and stylistic study.

The references to Geri d'Arezzo as co-author with Mussato of the revival of interest in antiquity suggest that Salutati was well-acquainted with what appears to have been a large corpus of letters, poems, and prose satires by the Aretine writer.[19] Unfortunately, only a metric epistle, a dialogue between Geri and *amor* dedicated to the Florentine lawyer and writer, Francesco da Barberino, and six prose letters, of which five are in classicising style and the sixth in *dictamen* survive.[20]

After 1355, although we have a wealth of documentation showing Salutati busily engaged as a notarial official in a variety of communes on Florence's western frontier, working as a private notary, and as the leading politician of his

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[16] *De laboribus Herculis*, ed. B. L. Ullman, 2 vols. (Zurich, 1951), vol. 1, p. 215: "Multa quidem sibi [Ovid] debeo, quem habui, cum primum hoc studio in fine mee adolescentie quasi divinitus excandui et accensus sum, veluti ianuam et doctorem. Etenim nullo monitore previo nullumque penitus audiens a memet ipso cunctos poetas legi et, sicut a deo datum est, intellexi, postquam noster Sulmomensis michi venit in manus". Cf. B. L. Ullman, *The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati* (Padua, 1963), pp. 44-45.

[17] Ullman, *The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 16), pp. 108-109 and 167.

[18] Ullman, *The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 16), p. 197 and Witt, *Hercules at the Crossroads* (as in n. 10), pp. 55-56.

[19] For Salutati's comments on Geri, see R. Weiss, *Il primo secolo dell' umanesimo* (Rome, 1949), pp. 106-107. See as well "Lineamenti per una storia del primo umanesimo fiorentino", *Rivista storica italiana* 60 (1948), p. 359. Two older contemporaries of Salutati, Benvenuto da Imola and Lapo da Castiglionchio also refer to Geri's letter collection: Weiss, *Il primo secolo*, p. 108.

[20] Weiss, *Il primo secolo dell' umanesimo* (as in n. 19), pp. 109-132.

home-commune of Buggiano, he nevertheless made amazing progress in his scholarly and literary studies. By the summer, possibly of 1359, but more probably of 1361, he apparently felt that he was ready to break into Petrarch's circle of friends in Florence. His campaign began in July with a letter introducing himself to Francesco Nelli, one of Petrarch's closest friends in the city.[21]

We have a second letter to Nelli, written a month later.[22] It is found in the *copialettere* of Francesco Bruni, papal secretary at Avignon, that dates to 1363/64. There it finds its place among letters written by both eminent Florentines and non-Florentines. Included in the collection are letters from Nelli, Zanobi da Strada, Lapo da Castiglionchio, and Bruni himself. Apparently struck by the eloquence of the young Tuscan notary, Nelli had sent a copy of Salutati's July letter to Bruni, and Bruni, impressed as was Nelli, included it in his collection of epistolary models.[23]

Salutati's introduction into Petrarch's Florentine circle in the early 1360s gave him greater access to Petrarchan manuscripts, but his formation in an older humanistic tradition proved highly resistant to change. I have called the earlier humanism, essentially Paduan humanism, 'secular' and 'civic'. Although he suddenly converted to Christianity in the last two years of his life (1328-1329), Mussato's writings up to this point exhibited no particular religious interest.[24] Indeed, in 1315-1316 his poetic works were the subject of intense criticism by the Dominicans in Padua. While civic concerns have no presence in Geri's surviving writings, Geri's poetry and prose, like the works of Mussato until the last years of his life, are consistently secular in character.

Essentially these early humanists, beginning with Lovato, had grafted their classicising effort onto a literary tradition, common to the northern half of the peninsula, that had been almost exclusively secular in character. Since its inception in the early decades of the twelfth century, *ars dictaminis* had remained innocent of religious concerns, while, apart from liturgical performance, poetic composition in the area had been predominantly secular.[25] It was this tradition in which the young Petrarch himself had been educated that the mature Petrarch sought to Christianise.

How do Salutati's writings before 1369 reflect his allegiance to this earlier humanism? From his first surviving letters of 1359-1361, written in Stignano,

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[21] The letter is published in *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 4, pp. 619-621 (July 20).

[22] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 4, pp. 241-245 (August 19). I assign these two letters, as well as the first two published by Novati (Epistles 3-6) to 1360-1361: Witt, *Hercules at the Crossroads* (as in n. 10), p. 62 n. 21.

[23] Francesco Bruni's *copialettere* forms the first part of Biblioteca nazionale Firenze, MS *Magl.*, 1439. Salutati's letter is found on fols. 4v-5v. Novati did not himself see the manuscript or he would have mentioned the other humanist letters.

[24] See Witt, *"In the Footsteps of the Ancients"* (as in n. 2), pp. 156-161.

[25] The secular character of prose and poetry in the Kingdom of Italy, roughly the northern half of the Italian peninsula, from the early twelfth century is one of the topics of my forthcoming *The Italian Difference: The Two Latin Cultures of Medieval Italy, 800-1250*.

until late in his stay in Rome at the papal curia in 1369, Salutati's writings, like those of the first two generations of humanists, dealt with a restricted range of themes: the importance of friendship, the love of country, the constant threat posed to human happiness by fate and fortune, and in the face of those forces, the need for strong self-control.[26] Petrarch too dealt with some of these same themes: the major difference in treatment was that Petrarch's discussion usually had a religious dimension while those of Mussato, Geri, and the young Salutati were purely secular.

From his earliest letters Salutati identified the essential character of morality as involving a conflict between human virtue and "envious", "cruel", "treacherous", and "deceptive" fortune, which, now alluring, now raging, threatened the government of our emotions. Despising in proper Stoic fashion the ignorant mob, always vulnerable to the whims of fortune, Salutati praised the sage, who knew that he had nothing to fear from afflictions of the body. Although even the sage at the first assault of fortune might falter, he would quickly resume control of his emotions, realising that not even death was an evil.[27] Embracing a generically Stoic moral position, difficult to trace to any specific source, Salutati made no effort to establish a relationship between his moral conceptions and Christian doctrine.

The patriotic character of Salutati's letters written before his departure from Stignano in mid-1367, first to Todi, and then in 1368 to Rome, accorded badly, however, with an ethic emphasising detachment from worldly objects. Like Lovato and Mussato, Salutati was passionately attached to his local commune in whose service he employed his eloquence. For sixteen years, while practicing as a private notary or working as chancellor in nearby communes, Salutati participated vigorously in local government. His occasional patriotic utterances, consequently, were rooted in his own practical experience. The individual, he wrote, had obligations to parents, wife, children, relatives, and friends, but, because it contained all those relationships, the *patria* was owed the deepest respect and commitment to service:

> We owe reverence to parents, love to children, equality to brothers, affection to relatives, obedience to prelates, chastity to a wife, and benevolence to all. However, we owe all these things and ourselves to the patria. For it contains at the same time parents, children, brothers, relatives, friends, prelates, wife, associates, and ourselves. It created us and protects us. From it, because it is primary, we have our origin. Wherefore, it is ours to care for before all things.[28]

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[26] A discussion of the issues concerning the Paduan humanists, see my *"In the Footsteps of the Ancients"* (as in n. 2), pp. 98-99 and 105-112.

[27] My *Hercules at the Crossroads* (as in n. 10), pp. 63-65.

[28] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 1, pp. 26-27: "Debemus parentibus reverentiam, filiis dilectionem, fratribus equalitatem, cognatis amorem, prelatis obedientiam, uxori castitatem, et cunctis benivolentiam: patrie autem hec omnia et nosmetipsos debemus. Habet enim illa simul parentes, filios, fratres, agnatos, amicos, prelatos, coniugem, socios et nos ipsos. Illa nos creavit, illa nos tuetur; ab illa, quod primum est, originem trahimus; quare pre cunctis nobis esse cure debet". See as well *Epistolario*, vol. 1, p. 21.

Presumably in Salutati's case the *patria* would have been his own rural commune. In 1366, he bombastically exclaimed:

> If it would serve to defend or extend the homeland, we should not consider it a distasteful and hard task to thrust an axe into one's father's head, mangle our brothers and deliver the unborn child from one's wife's womb with a sword.[29]

Although he referred to patriotism as *caritas*, the word for him had no explicitly theological association at the time. He applied the term freely to both Christian and pagan love of country (*caritas patriae*).[30]

He considered humanistic learning the ally of duty and morality in general. The gift of eloquence that it bestows nourishes and intensifies moral resolve. Because the distinctive human faculty is the power of speech, the individual who best realises the human essence is the eloquent orator, in whom moral virtue and mastery of language meet. While effectively setting forth precepts of morality in compelling words, the orator testifies to their truth by the conduct of his life. Through him, eloquence serves as the vital force in society, stirring men, neglectful of virtue and borne down by bad habits and concern for the body, to seek a better life. For his own guidance, however, the orator must turn to the ancients:

> For who, I ask, without the writings of the ancients, with nature alone as a guide, will be able to explain with sufficient reason what is honourable, what useful, and what this battle of the useful and honourable means? Doubtless nature makes us fit for virtues and secretly impels us to them, but we are made virtuous not by nature but by works and learning.[31]

There is no indication in Salutati's writings in the course of 1369 or afterwards that he himself perceived any shift of his ground. Yet, by September 1369 he had left the former naturalistic, secular framework behind and assumed a Christian context for his thought.

Evidence for a decisive change is found in the letter of consolation sent that month to Ugolino Orsini consoling him on the death of his father. Describing to Orsini the heaven where the deceased, having given his soul to Christ, surely dwelt, he added:

> We live with the indulgence of nature and this is common to us and other animals; to live well, however, is peculiar to a human being and is the mark of a good and virtu-

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[29] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. l, p. 28: "[…] si pro illa tutanda augendave expediret, non videretur molestum nec grave vel facinus paterno capiti securim iniicere, fratres obterere, per uxoris uterum ferro abortum educere [...]".

[30] On *caritas* in the Middle Ages and in Salutati's writing in this period, see Witt, *Hercules at the Crossroads* (as in n. 10), pp. 73-75.

[31] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 1, p. 106: "Quis enim obsecro, sine veterum documentis, natura sola duce, sufficienti ratione enucleabit quid honestum, quid utile ac de pugna utilis et honesti? Reddit proculdubio ad virtutes natura nos aptos et ad illas latenter impellit; sed virtuosi non natura sed operibus efficumr et doctrina".

> ous man. This capacity is not within our power but we acquire this by ourselves, through the cooperating grace of God, by means of virtues and a good disposition of mind.[32]

Salutati's conversion at Rome in the final months of 1369 was to be permanent and justifies considering his humanism as Petrarchan. Less balanced intellectually than Petrarch, however, less given to nuanced thinking, Salutati's commitment to Christianity by his last years led him to assume positions, which, if seriously meant, would have discredited the worth of pagan literary culture fundamental to Petrarch's humanistic enterprise.[33]

[32] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (as in n. 7), vol. 1, p. 110: "Vivere enim nature indulgentia est et nobis commune cum animantibus ceteris; bene autem vivere solum hominis, et boni atque virtuosi hominis est. Illud in potestate nostra constitutum non fuit; hoc a nobis ipsis, cooperante gratia Dei, virtutibus et animi bona compositione nanciscimur". For a contrast, compare Salutati's description of heaven in his letter of consolation to Lapo da Castiglionchio with that he gave on the death of the Florentine astrologer Paolo Dagomari in 1366: *Epistolario*, vol. 1, p. 19.

[33] Witt, *Hercules at the Crossroads* (as in n. 10), pp. 403-405.

CHRISTLICHER HUMANISMUS UND LITURGIE: HEINRICH BEBEL, JOHANNES CASSELIUS UND LEONHARD CLEMENS VERFASSEN OFFIZIEN ZU DEN FESTEN DES HEILIGEN HIERONYMUS UND DER HEILIGEN ANNA

Volker Honemann

I.

Daß Humanisten sich mit Fragen der Liturgie beschäftigen und selbst Texte zur Feier derselben verfassen, könnte, wenn man von einem engen, vor allem den Bezug zur Antike in den Blick nehmenden Humanismusbegriff ausgeht, überraschen. Besonders für den südwestdeutschen Humanismus des späten 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhunderts ist aber dessen enge Bindung an die Kirche, an die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Text der Bibel und den Schriften der Kirchenväter, aber auch und in ganz besonderem Maße mit Heiligenverehrung und Liturgie charakteristisch. Für deren Förderung und Verbesserung besaßen gerade die Humanisten eine – zunächst aus ihrer Sicht – entscheidende Qualifikation, nämlich die Beherrschung eines an den Autoren der Antike, vor allem an Cicero geschulten Lateins. Gerade daran aber fehlte es, wiederum aus der Perspektive der Humanisten, vielen mittelalterlichen liturgischen Texten. Die "Bemühungen" der Humanisten "um die Verbesserung der liturgischen Texte"[1] verfolgten damit ein klares Ziel: durch besseres Latein bessere, und damit wirkungsvollere Texte zu schaffen, die einen gewichtigen Beitrag dazu leisten sollten, die Gläubigen zu besseren Christen zu machen. Diese Bemühungen konnten, aus der Sicht eines reformorientierten Klerus, als Teil der Bestrebungen zu einer Erneuerung des kirchlichen Lebens in umfassendem Sinne, damit des Frömmigkeitshandelns der Vertreter der Kirche wie der Gläubigen, angesehen werden.[2] Ebendieser Klerus aber konnte sich auch mit einem weiteren Element humanistischer Bemühungen um "bessere" geistliche Texte identifizieren, der

[1] Ich zitiere hier den Titel der Studie von R. Donner, *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen um die Verbesserung der liturgischen Texte* (Mainz 1976). – Für gern gewährte Unterstützung danke ich herzlich insbesondere Nikolaus Henkel, der so freundlich war, diesen Beitrag einer kritischen Lektüre zu unterziehen, weiterhin Sabine Griese, Peter Johanek, Peter Rückert und Uta Goerlitz.

[2] Vgl. dazu grundsätzlich V. Honemann, "'Spätmittelalterliche' und 'humanistische' Frömmigkeit: Florian Waldauf von Waldenstein und Heinrich Bebel", in *Tradition and Innovation in an Era of Change / Tradition und Innovation im Übergang zur Frühen Neuzeit*, Hgg. R. Suntrup, J. Veenstra (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), S. 75-97, hier S. 89 zur *Historia horarum canonicarum*; S. 96f. Faksimilia des Titelblattes (Ir) und des Inhaltsverzeichnisses (Iv) der *Historia*.

deutlichen Ablehnung aller "apokryphen" Überlieferungen, also all dessen, was sich im Hinblick auf den *cultus divinus* und besonders die Verehrung der Heiligen *nicht* auf die Bibel oder die *patres* (zu denen natürlich auch die großen Theologen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts zählten) zurückführen ließ.

Manche Humanisten nahmen sich dieser Aufgabe nur punktuell an, so z.B. Sebastian Brant, der wohl 1494 einen Einblattdruck herausbrachte, der – neben einem Holzschnitt – einen Hymnus zum Fest des heiligen Ivo, des Schutzpatrons der Juristen bot.[3] Besonders nachdrücklich aber engagierte sich, wie Rainer Donner gezeigt hat, einer der Stammväter der deutschen Humanisten, Jakob Wimpfeling, für die Besserung liturgischer Texte: Bereits 1491 ließ er in Speyer bei Peter Drach ein *Officium de compassione beatae Mariae virginis* erscheinen[4]; im gleichen Jahr wurde, sicher unter intensiver Mitarbeit Wimpfelings, in Straßburg bei Johannes Grüninger ein gegenüber der Vorlage von 1478 (Speyer, Peter Drach 1478, GW[5] 5464) massiv überarbeitetes Speyrer Brevier publiziert (GW 5465).[6] Um 1499 folgte eine Schrift *De Hymnorum et Sequentiarum auctoribus generibusque carminum, quae in Hymnis inveniuntur brevissima eruditiuncula*,[7] womit nun auch die Ebene der theoretischen und literarhistorischen Reflexion über die liturgischen Gesänge erreicht war. Im folgenden Jahr verfaßte Wimpfeling dann *Castigationes locorum in canticis ecclesiasticis et divinis officiis depravatorum*, die schließlich 1513 in Straßburg bei Johann Schott gedruckt wurden (VD[8] 16] W 3348).[9] Dabei betraf für Wimpfeling "das Bemühen um Vollkommenheit der liturgischen Texte [...] zum einen die rein sprachliche Seite"; sie ist am Maßstab der *Romana antiquitas*, der *Latina elegantia* zu messen. Zum anderen aber dürfen die liturgischen Texte für ihn nur "aus den Quellen der Wahrheit, der Heiligen Schrift und den Werken der Väter und großen Theologen" geschöpft werden; der Gebrauch "apokrypher

[3] J. Knape, "Brant, Sebastian", in *Deutscher Humanismus 1480-1520. Verfasserlexikon*, Hg. F. J. Worstbrock, Bd. 1, Lfg. 1 (Berlin, 2005), Sp. 247-283, hier Sp. 262. Zum Einblattdruck siehe F. Eisermann, *Verzeichnis der typographischen Einblattdrucke des 15. Jahrhunderts im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation: VE 15*, 3 Bde. (Wiesbaden, 2004), hier Bd. II, B-76: "De sancto Iuone aduocato Pauperum hymnus: sub melodia Ut queant laxis" – womit auch die (sehr berühmte) Melodie gleich angegeben wurde.

[4] Druck: L. Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum, in quo libri omnes ab arte typographica inventa usque ad annum MD. typis expressi ordine alphabetico vel simpliciter enumerantur vel adcuratius recensentur*, 4 Bde. (Stuttgart, 1826-1838), *12001.

[5] GW = *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke*, Hg. Komission für den Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke, Bd. 1- (Leipzig, 1933-).

[6] Siehe Donner, *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen* (wie Anm. 1), S. 4-25 (zum Marienoffizium) und S. 45-53 (zum Brevier von 1491).

[7] Druck: Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum* (wie Anm. 4), *16175 und *16176; zum Text siehe Donner, *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen* (wie Anm. 1), S. XIV.

[8] VD 16 = *Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachbereich erschienenen Drucke des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Hg. Staatsbibliothek in München in Verbindung mit der Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, 3. Bde. (München, 1983-2000).

[9] Zu Entstehung und Inhalt des Werkes siehe Donner, *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen* (wie Anm. 1), S. 55-93.

Berichte" ist "unsittlich und deshalb schärfstens zurückzuweisen".[10] 1504 ließ Wimpfeling dann noch ein *Officium de sancto Joseph* folgen, das in diesem Jahr in Straßburg bei Johannes Wehinger herauskam. Sowohl dieses wie das *Officium de compassione* erlangte für die Diözese Speyer offizielle Geltung; das *Officium de sancto Joseph* auch für die Diözese Straßburg, wobei es in einer durch Jodocus Gallus überarbeiteten Fassung in das Speyerer Brevier von 1509 aufgenommen wurde.[11]

Die Intensität, mit der sich Wimpfeling über lange Jahre des Themas der Verbesserung der liturgischen Texte annahm, läßt erkennen, wie wichtig ihm diese war. Seine Bemühungen sind dabei nicht nur vor dem Hintergrund zu sehen, daß er – wie viele Humanisten – selbst Kleriker war, sondern auch vor dem, daß mit der Erfindung der Druckkunst und damit dem Druck liturgischer Bücher einerseits die "Bereitstellung fehlerfreier" liturgischer "Texte grundsätzlich leichter" geworden war, "andererseits [...] aber auch die Reichweite der bei der Herstellung einmal übersehenen Fehler zugenommen" hatte.[12] Es hatte dies zur Folge gehabt, daß sich die meisten Diözesen ebenso wie die religösen Gemeinschaften rasch um eine Vereinheitlichung der in ihrem Bereich verwendeten Liturgica auf dem Wege der Druckkunst bemühten (zum Teil unter expliziter Außerkraftsetzung der bisher verwendeten handschriftlichen Exemplare), daß die neuen gedruckten Bücher aber auch immer von neuem zu überarbeiten waren, um den neuesten liturgischen Entwicklungen Rechnung zu tragen und Fehler auszumerzen – dies alles im übrigen in einer Situation, in der der Mangel an liturgischen Bücher vielstimmig beklagt wurde.[13]

[10] Zitate Donner, *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen* (wie Anm. 1), S. 66.

[11] Zum Text siehe Donner *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen* (wie Anm. 1), S. 41f. Der vollständige Titel des Druckes lautet: *Officium ex evangelio et probatis doctorum Bernardi: Petri de Heliaco: et Johannis Gerson: sententiis absque apocrifis [!] collectum de sancto Joseph nutritore Christi: cuius festum. XIX die martii celebrandum*, siehe C. Schmidt, *Répertoire bibliographique Strasbourgeois jusque vers 1530*, IV (Straßburg, 1893), S. 14; VD 16 (wie Anm. 8) B 8094.

[12] Donner, *Jakob Wimpfelings Bemühungen* (wie Anm. 1), S. 47.

[13] Zum Mangel an liturgischen Bücher siehe K. Schlager und T. Wohnhaas, "Eine Offizien-Ausgabe von 1512. Einsichten in einen Ratdolt-Druck mit einem Hieronymus- und einer Anna-Historia", *Jahrbuch des Vereins für Augsburger Bistumsgeschichte* e.V. 29 (1995), S. 292-316, hier S. 293f. – Näher zu untersuchen wäre der Fall der frühesten gedruckten Liturgica des Zisterzienserordens, mit deren Erstellung der Orden 1482 den Baumgartener Zisterzienser Nikolaus Salicetus beauftragte; siehe die Drucke GW (wie Anm. 5), 5198-5200 und Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum* (wie Anm. 4), 11279 sowie V. Honemann, "Salicetus, Nikolaus", in *Verfasserlexikon. Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters*, Hgg. K. Ruh *et al*., ab 9 von B. Wachinger *et al*., 13 Bde. (Berlin, 1978-2007^2), hier 8 (1992), Sp. 511-515.

II.

Welche Formen das Engagement christlicher Humanisten für die Verbesserung der Liturgie und der liturgischen Bücher, damit zugeich auch für eine angemessene Verehrung bestimmter Heiliger annehmen konnte, zeigt der Fall des Hieronymus- und Anna-Offiziums, das von einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft miteinander befreundeter Humanisten erstellt und 1512 in Augsburg bei Erhard Ratdolt, dessen Offizin unter anderem auf den Druck von Liturgica spezialisiert war, gedruckt wurde (VD 16 B 1184[14]). Der Fall ist inzwischen in einigen Bereichen gut erforscht, doch harren eine Reihe von Aspekten einer genaueren Betrachtung.[15] Für Heinrich Bebel war die Beschäftigung mit Hymnen zu dieser Zeit nichts Neues: bereits 1501 hatte er bei Johann Otmar in Tübingen einen *Liber hymnorum in metra nouiter Redactorum* herausgebracht (VD 16 B 1093, B

[14] Die Titelaufnahme des VD 16 (wie Anm. 8) (B 1184) gibt als Erscheinungsdatum an: "M.D. XII. Quinto decimo Kalendas Octobres"; dies steht auch im Zürcher Exemplar (Zentralbibliothek Gal. Tz. 2o), worauf mich Sabine Griese (Zürich) freundlich aufmerksam macht. Das seit kurzem als Digitalisat zur Verfügung stehende Exemplar Rar. 438 der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München hat hingegen: "Kalendas Nouembres". Das mir in Kopie vorliegende Münchner Exemplar (auf das sich alle folgenden Ausführungen beziehen) 2 Liturg. 33 p, hat ebenfalls "Novembres"; ebenso die bei K. Schottenloher, *Die liturgischen Druckwerke Erhard Ratdolts* (Augsburg, 1922), S. XIX mit Tafel 65-72, hier S. 70 faksimilierte letzte Seite des Druckes. P. Geissler, "Erhard Ratdolt", in *Lebensbilder aus dem bayerischen Schwaben*, 9 (München, 1966), S. 97-133 gibt in seiner Bibliographie der Drucke Ratdolts (S. 150, Nr. 247) – dem Eintrag im VD 16 entsprechend – den 17. 9. 1512 als Erscheinungsdatum an; bei [Georg Wilhelm] Zapf, *Heinrich Bebel nach seinem Leben und Schriften* (Augsburg, 1802), S. 266, ist (wie im VD 16) zu lesen: "Quinto decimo Kalendas Octobres". Es gibt also zwei Druckzustände (Ausgaben) der *Historia*. Sie wären auf Abweichungen (Verbesserungen?) hin zu untersuchen. Ob mit der Existenz zweier Ausgaben auch die für mich rätselhafte Bemerkung von W. D. Oschilewski, "Erhard Ratdolt, ein deutscher Frühdrucker", in: *Imprimatur. Ein Jahrbuch für Bücherfreunde* N.F. I (1956-1957), S. 49f. Anm. 15, zu tun hat, die *Historia* nenne den Namen Georg Ratdolts, also des Sohnes von Erhard Ratdolt, der "zumindest seit 1496" in der väterlichen Offizin gearbeitet habe? Das mir vorliegende Exemplar nennt nur den Namen Erhards. – Dem Münchener Exemplar Rar. 438 kommt besondere Bedeutung zu, weil es ein Widmungsexemplar Bebels an den Pollinger Propst Johannes Zinngießer ist; siehe den diesbezüglichen, zweifellos von Bebel herrührenden Eintrag auf dem Titelblatt: "R'do in xpo patri. Dn. Joanni zingiesser | pręposito pollingensi [...] | Dono mittit | Henricus Bebelius Justingensis Poeta | et Cosmopolites". Die handschriftlichen Korrekturen dieses Exemplars dürften so wohl von Bebel selbst stammen.

[15] Zum Druck siehe vor allem Schottenloher, *Die liturgischen Druckwerke* (wie Anm. 14); grundlegend E. Stolz, "Bebeliana", *Theologische Quartalschrift* 113 (1932), S. 320-385, hier S. 330-347 und 350f. (mit Klärung der Funktion und Beschreibung der Anteile der drei Autoren sowie Abdruck von Bebels Hieronymus-Sequenz); Schlager und Wohnhaas, "Eine Offizien-Ausgabe von 1512" (wie Anm. 13) (mit Charakterisierung des Druckes, Inventar sowie Analyse der einzelnen Texte und Auflistung der tonalen Struktur derselben nach den Kirchentonarten). Der Aufsatz von Stolz ist Schlager und Wohnhaas leider nicht bekannt geworden.

1097), der 1511 und 1517 in Leipzig und Hagenau nachgedruckt wurde; er bot "155 leicht überarbeitete, grammatisch und metrisch verbesserte Hymnen des Breviers und 5 laut Bl. jjjv eigene Dichtungen Bebels über Georg, Anna [(!)], Barbara und die Immaculata sowie Thomas".[16]

Erarbeitet wurde die *Historia horarum canonicarum de Sancto Hieronymo [et] de Sancta Anna* (im folgenden: *Historia* oder Hieronymus- bzw. Anna-Offizium; vollständige diplomatische Wiedergabe des Titels s.u.) zur Hauptsache durch den Tübinger Humanisten Heinrich Bebel, der an der dortigen Universität seit 1496 eine "ordentliche Lektur für Redekunst, Morallehre und Dichtkunst" innehatte,[17] weiterhin durch den Zwiefaltendorfer Pfarrer Leonhard Clemens[18] und den Geislinger Erzpriester Johannes Casselius.[19]

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[16] D. Mertens, "Bebel, Heinrich", in *Deutscher Humanismus 1480-1520* (wie Anm. 3), Bd. 1, Lfg. 1 (2005), Sp. 142-163, hier Sp. 147f. und 158; dort auch zu den Nachdrucken.

[17] Zu Bebel siehe jetzt grundlegend Mertens, "Bebel" (wie Anm. 16), Zitat Sp. 144. Charakterisierung der *Historia* dort Sp. 158. – Verwiesen sei auf die von Dieter Mertens inaugurierte Bebel-Datenbank (Sonderforschungsbereich 541, Teilprojekt B5; Stand: 1. 12. 2003 mit späteren Aktualisierungen), die neben einem Verzeichnis der Schriften Bebels mit detaillierten Angaben zu deren Überlieferung Regesten zu den Schriften (v.a. den sehr zahlreichen Beigaben) und "Biogramme" zu den mit diesen verbundenen Persönlichkeiten (Widmungsnehmer etc.) bietet; im folgenden zitiert mit Mertens, Bebel-Datenbank. – Letzter Zugriff 10.10. 2007.

[18] Zu ihm siehe Stolz, "Bebeliana" (wie Anm. 15), S. 333 mit Anm. 1 und vor allem W. Ludwig, "Graf Eberhard im Bart, Reuchlin, Bebel und Johannes Casselius", *Zeitschrift für württembergische Landesgeschichte* 54 (1995), S. 33-60, hier S. 36f. Clemens stammte aus Ulm. "Er immatrikulierte sich 1482 in Erfurt. Bebel, mit dem er befreundet war, schrieb Gedichte an ihn; Clemens lieferte ihm wie Casselius Material für seine Fazetien" (S. 37). Nach Stolz, *l.c.* wurde er 1504 als *plebanus* an der Universität Tübingen immatrikuliert; er starb 1514. Auf Clemens gehen die Fazetien I,7 und 89 sowie III, 162, 168, 169, 178 zurück, siehe *Heinrich Bebels drei Bücher Fazetien*. Hg. G. Bebermeyer (Leipzig, 1931), S. 196 (Register). Die Bücher I und II der *Fazetien* erschienen im Druck 1508; wohl seit 1507 arbeitete Bebel an deren drittem Buch (Bebermeyer S. XXVIII), das 1512 zusammen mit den beiden ersten erstmals gedruckt wurde. In Fazetie I,7 nennt Bebel den Clemens "hospes meus alpestris et iisdem musis mecum initiatus" (S. 8); in den weiteren wird er durch Namensnennung als Urheber der Erzählungen bezeichnet. Die Fazetie III, 169 zeigt Bebel, Casselius und Clemens im Gespräch über den Inhalt der Erzählung; die Fazetie III, 178 erwähnt einen Aufenthalt Bebels in Zwiefalten(dorf) im Sommer 1511: "Cum diebus vacationum canicularium anno domini MDXI secessissem a Tubinga Zvifuldam atque ibi Leonhartum Clementem facetias concludere vellem [...]"; dies ist für die Frage nach den Entstehungsumständen der *Historia* von Interesse. Zu Clemens siehe weiterhin W. Ludwig, "Eine unbekannte Variante der *Varia Carmina* Sebastian Brants und die Prophezeiungen des Ps.-Methodius", *Daphnis* 26 (1997), S. 263-299, hier S. 264-269, wo Clemens' Verbindung mit Sebastian Brant erläutert (Abdruck zweier Gedichte) und eine Invektive des Clemens gegen die Türken erwähnt wird. Clemens hatte 1498 erstmals und noch einmal um 1500-1506 eine "Elegia ob victoriam Turci" als Einblattdruck publiziert, siehe dazu Eisermann, *Verzeichnis* (wie Anm. 3), C-31 und 32; Brants Gedicht "Thurcorum terror et potentia" reagierte darauf.

[19] Zu ihm siehe Stolz, "Bebeliana" (wie Anm. 15), S. 333 mit Anm. 2, besonders aber Ludwig, "Graf Eberhard" (wie Anm. 18). Danach wurde er um 1463 in Geislingen

Da wir fast alles, was wir über das gemeinsame Unternehmen wissen, dem in Bezug auf Informationen über seine Entstehung ungewöhnlich expliziten Druck verdanken, sei dieser knapp beschrieben, wobei für unseren Zusammenhang wichtige Angaben kurz kommentiert und die Texte der Beigaben abgedruckt seien.[20] Dabei werden die Angaben des Druckes bezüglich der Entstehung der Texte zusammengeführt (III) Informationen zur Entstehung und Gestaltung des Druckes (IV) und zur spezifischen Intention der drei Urheber, insbesondere zu ihrer Frömmigkeitshaltung (V) folgen andernorts. Auf Angaben zur musikalischen Gestaltung, die außerhalb meiner Kompetenz liegen, kann verzichtet werden, da Schlager / Wohnhaas (siehe Anm. 13) sich hiermit einläßlich beschäftigt haben.

Um einen Überblick über den Inhalt des Druckes zu geben, sei zunächst dessen Inhaltsverzeichnis (unter Beifügung der Seitenzahlen, auf denen die entsprechenden Texte stehen) wiedergegeben:

[IIr] Historia horarum canonicarum De | Sancto Hieronymo vario carminum | genere contexta. confirmata: et in | dulgentijs dotata á Reuerendis- | simo Archiepiscopo Moguntinensi ‖ [VIr – XIXv] Historia horarum canonicarum De Sancta Anna | etiam vario carminum genere composita. [XXIr – XXXIVva] ‖
Hymni Sapphici |
De sancto Georgio martyre. [XXXIVva – b] |
De sancta Barbara virgine et martyre [XXXIVvb] |
De Conceptione immaculata beatae virginis. [XXXIVvb – XXXVra] |
De sancto Thoma apostolo. [XXXVra – XXXVva] |
De sanctis Cosma et Damiano. cum eorundem succincta | historia elegiaco carmine descripta. [XXXVa – XXXVIra] |
De sancto Leonharto confessore. [XXXVIra – XXXVIva] |
De sancto Beato confessore. [XXXVIva – vb] |De eodem hymnus duobus aschlepiadeis. Pherecra- | tio et Gliconico versu compactus. [XXXVIvb – XXXVIIra]. ‖

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an der Steige geboren, immatrikulierte sich 1478 in Heidelberg, wo er Wimpfeling hörte, mit dem er später in Verbindung blieb. 1488 kehrte er als Priester nach Geislingen zurück, wo er später auch unterrichtete. Er starb 1517 in Geislingen, nachdem er bereits 1495 – wohl auf der Basis von Informationen Wimpfelings – von Johannes Trithemius in seinen *Catalogus illustrium virorum Germaniae* [...] aufgenommen und 1506 in der *Epistola excusatoria ad Suevos* als einer von sieben "oratores atque poetae Suevi" aufgeführt worden war. Bebels *Opuscula nova*, gedruckt 1509 enthalten ein "heiteres Gedicht Heinrich Bebels [...], das Kessler in einem Freundeskreis mit Bebel, Dr. iur. utr. Johann Sträler bzw. Streler aus Ulm und Leonhart Clement genannt Clemens [...] zeigt"; siehe Ludwig, "Graf Eberhard" (wie Anm. 18), S. 33-36. Abdruck, Übersetzung und Kommentierung des Gedichtes dort S. 38-40. Ein bisher unediertes Gedichtbuch des Casselius ist in der Handschrift Wien, ÖNB cod. 9889 erhalten; zu diesem siehe ebd. S. 42-60; als Adressat mehrerer Gedichte erscheinen hier Leonhard Clemens und Heinrich Bebel (S. 47). – Zu zwei Gedichten des Caselius auf den Abt Berthold Dürr von Adelberg siehe W. Ludwig, "Zwei Epigramme des Joahnnes Casselius für den Abt Berthold Dürr", *Hohenstaufen, Helfenstein. [Zeitschrift des] Geschichts- und Altertumsvereins [Göppingen], Kunst- und Altertumsvereins [Geislingen/Steige]* 7 (1997), S. 192-194.

[20] Abkürzungen werden aufgelöst; Zeilenenden durch |, Absätze durch ‖ markiert, Druckfehler und Zweifelhaftes angemerkt.

Neben den ausführlichen Offizien der Heiligen Hieronymus und Anna enthält der Druck also noch Hymnen und weitere Gedichte Bebels (so auf S. XXXIV-va) zu Ehren mehrerer Heiliger, wobei die Urheber der *Historia* anscheinend besonders stolz auf den letzten, ebenfalls dem Bekenner Beatus gewidmeten Hymnus waren, dessen komplizierte Bauform das Inhaltsverzeichnis aufführt: *De eodem hymnus duobus aschlepiadeis. Pherecra | tio et Gliconico versu compactus*.[21]

Nicht einzeln aufgeführt werden im Inhaltsverzeichnis des Druckes dessen Beigaben, die in einer – auch für eine humanistische Produktion – ungewöhnlichen Fülle Aufschluß über Entstehung und Intention desselben bieten. Es sind dies für die *Historia de Sancto Hieronymo* im einzelnen:

a) ein Hexastichon des Johannes Brassicanus an Konrad Peutinger (IIr)
b) ein Schreiben Heinrich Bebels (Tübingen, 9. 11. 1511) an den Abt des Prämonstratenserklosters Adelberg, Leonhard Dürr, dem ein Tetrastichon Bebels an denselben folgt (IIv – IIIr)
c) ein Antwortschreiben dieses Abtes (Adelberg, 15. 11. 1511) an Bebel (IIIv)
d) ein Schreiben Bebels (Tübingen, 10. 11. 1511) an Konrad Peutinger (IIIv)
e) ein Schreiben Bebels (Zwiefalten, 24. 8. 1509) an den deutschen Klerus (IIIIr)
f) ein Distichon des Leonhard Clemens über den Anteil der drei Autoren an der *Historia* (IIIIr)
g) die Konfirmationsbulle des Mainzer Erzbischofs Uriel von Gemmingen (Augsburg, 11. Mai 1510) für die Hieronymus-*Historia* (IVv – Vr)
h) Gedichte des Heinrich Bebel und des Leonhard Clemens zum Preise des Mainzer Erzbischofs (Vva)
i) ein Gedicht des Leonhard Clemens auf Ludwig Nauklerus (alias Vergenhans) (Vva-b)
j) ein Gedicht desselben auf Konrad Peutinger (Vvb)
k) ein Tetrastichon Bebels auf Peutinger (Vvb).

Auch die *Historia de Sancta Anna* wird durch texterschließende Beigaben eingeleitet:

l) ein Distichon Bebels über die Arbeitsverteilung zwischen ihm und Clemens (XXr)
m) ein Oktostichon, mit dem Clemens die *Historia de Sancta Anna* dem Abt Georg [Fischer] von Zwiefalten widmet

[21] Schlager und Wohnhaas, "Eine Offizien-Ausgabe von 1512" (wie Anm. 13) machen S. 296 zurecht darauf aufmerksam, daß für die "Hymnendichtungen in sapphischen Strophen" sowie für die Texte auf die heiligen Cosmas und Damian sowie den heiligen Beatus (Distichen und andere Metren) "im Titel der Hinweis auf die Gesänge entfällt, denn diese Dichtungen sind ohne Melodien notiert", weshalb sie wohl eher als "Lesetexte in kunstvollen Strophenformen" zu verstehen seien (oder fehlen die Melodien, weil sie – so vermutet Henkel – ohnehin bekannt waren?). Auf diesen Teil der *Historia*, der die Seiten XXXIVva – XXXVIIrb einnimmt, gehe ich im folgenden nicht ein. Wie es scheint, hat Bebel hier eigene Hymnen als "Lückenfüller" beigefügt, da der Text der Anna-*Historia* auf XXXIVva, Z. 9, damit mitten in der Spalte, endete.

n) ein Schreiben Bebels (Zwiefalten, pridie nonas Martias. Anno M. [sic]) an alle Verehrer der heiligen Anna (XXv).

Beschlossen wird der Druck auf Seite XXXVIIr durch

o) das Kolophon des Druckers Erhard Ratdolt sowie
p) eine kurzes Gedicht (Inc. ***Si uis Saluus esse***), das zu einem weisen, auf Höheres gerichteten Leben auffordert und
q) Tabulae, die den Inhalt der *Historiae* "De Sancto Hieronymo" und "De Sancta Anna" erschließen (Folioangaben für die Gesänge der einzelnen Horen).

Wann und in welcher Reihenfolge die Texte des Bandes entstanden, ist nur in Teilen erschließbar. Frühestes datiertes Stück ist Bebels Schreiben an den deutschen Klerus (e), dem er die Hieronymus-*Historia* anempfiehlt (24. 8. 1509); das Schreiben (Abdruck siehe unten) führt aus, daß er am Fest des heiligen Hieronymus (30. September - ob 1508?) ***in pago Zuifuldensi*** mit Clemens und Casselius zusammengekommen sei, und sie dort die Arbeit an der Hieronymus-*Historia* aufgenommen hätten. Sie müßte sich dann längstens bis zum 24. 8. 1509 hingezogen haben. Nächstes "festes" Datum ist die Datierung der Konfirmationsbulle des Mainzer Erzbischofs für die Hieronymus-*Historia* (g), die in Augsburg am 11. Mai 1510 ausgestellt wurde. Fast eineinhalb Jahre später widmete Bebel in einem auf den 9. 11. 1511 datierten Tübinger Schreiben die *Historia* – sowohl die Hieronymus- wie die Annen-Historia; das auf den Text folgende Tetrastichon Bebels spricht von ***historias*** – dem Adelberger Abt Leonhard Dürr (b). Am darauffolgenden Tag, dem 10. 11. 1511 schrieb Bebel an Konrad Peutinger (d) und freute sich darüber, daß dieser die Publikation der *Historia* beschlossen habe. Am 15. 11. 1511, also nur sechs Tage nach Bebels Schreiben, dankte Abt Leonhard Dürr in einem Schreiben für die Zueignung der *Historia*; er nennt explizit sowohl die Annen- wie die Hieronymus-*Historia* (c). Die Entstehungszeit der Annen-*Historia* läßt sich nicht präzis fassen: Das Oktostichon, mit dem Bebel diese dem Abt Georg Fischer widmet (m), ist nicht datiert, das Schreiben Bebels an alle Verehrer der heiligen Anna ist, wie oben gezeigt, aus Zwiefalten ***pridie nonas Martias. Anno M.***, also unvollständig datiert. Das Oktostichon des Leonhard Clemens, mit dem dieser die ***Historia de Sancta Anna*** dem Abt Georg Fischer widmete (m) erklärt zur Entstehungszeit, die Annen-*Historia* sei schon seit längerer Zeit fertig (***pridem***). Es könnte deshalb sein, daß diese zuerst, also vor der Hieronymus-*Historia* entstand.[22]

Die Anteile der drei Autoren bei der Erarbeitung der *Historia* sind in dem 1512 erschienen Druckes derselben sehr genau bezeichnet:[23] Zum Anna-Offizium erklärt Bebel in einem Distichon (XXr, j): ***Hymnos et laudes. hanc quęque sequentia fertur | Bebelius. Clemens cętera cuncta facit***. Bebel hat also Hymnen, Laudes und die Sequenz des Offiziums, Clemens aber alle übrigen Teile (also z.B. die Antiphonen und Responsorien) verfaßt; sein Schreiben an die Verehrer der heiligen Anna (n) erläutert die Entstehungsumstände noch weit

[22] So Stolz, "Bebeliana" (wie Anm. 15), S. 335.
[23] Siehe zum folgenden vor allem Stolz, "Bebeliana" (wie Anm. 15), S. 335f.

genauer (s.u.). Beim Hieronymus-Offizium war die Verteilung ähnlich, hier informiert ein Distichon des Clemens (IIIIr, f) darüber, daß "Bebel die Hymnen und die Sequenz, Casselius die Laudes und er selbst das übrige gefertigt habe",[24] selbdritt hätten sie das Werk zustandegebracht: ***Bebelius, Clemens, Casselius edidit. ille | Hymnos atque sequens. laudes hic. cętera Clemens***. Der Weg von den Anfängen des Werkes (Herbst 1508 [?]) bis hin zu seinem Druck (Herbst 1512) war also augenscheinlich sehr lang, wobei die Bemühungen um eine Approbation der Hieronymus-*Historia* verhältnismäßig schnell zum Erfolg gelangten; weit schwieriger war es anscheinend, die *Historia* zum Druck zu bringen.

III A) DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER ANNEN-HISTORIE

Die *Historia de Sancta Anna* (XXr – XXXVv) wird, im Anschluß an deren Titel (***DIVAE ANNAE | SACRVM***) und das bereits oben zitierte Distichon Bebels über die Arbeitsverteilung zwischen ihm und seinen Mitstreitern, durch ein Widmungsgedicht des Leonhard Clemens an Abt Georg Fischer eingeleitet:

> Octostichon Leonharti Clementis Archipresbyteri
> ad dominum Georgium Abbatem Zuifuldensem
>
> Piscatore sate o abba venerande Georgi.
> Cęnobii regimen qui Zuifuldensis alacri
> Virtutis studio dispensas. prędia. census
> Structurę et priscę facies quod relligionis
> Iam reparata docet per te. tu suscipe gratus
> Officium sanctę. pridem quod lusimus. Annę
> Ipse ego Bebeliusque. tibi sic gratificantes.
> Denique nos commendatos age semper habeto.

Der 1474 zum Abt von Zwiefalten gewählte Georg Fischer war – ungeachtet der "Zuwendung" seines Konvents zu Österreich – vielfach in den Diensten der württembergischen Herzöge Eberhard (I.) und Eberhard II. tätig.[25] In der Mitte April 1498 verabschiedeten zweiten württembergischen Regimentsordnung, in der "deutlich der Einfluß der Äbte, insbesondere Abt Georgs zu erkennen" ist, stehen "an erster Stelle Fragen der Klosterreform".[26] Man wird Abt Georg, wie dem Abt von Adelberg, deshalb ein persönliches, auch seine Abtei einschließendes Reformengagement unterstellen dürfen, wie es Clemens in seinem

[24] Stolz, "Bebeliana" (wie Anm. 15), S. 336.

[25] Neuere Forschungsliteratur zu Zwiefalten im 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhundert, damit auch zur Frage einer Klosterreform fehlt fast völlig; einiges wenige bei W. Setzler, *Kloster Zwiefalten. Eine schwäbische Benediktinerabtei zwischen Reichsfreiheit und Landsässigkeit* (Sigmaringen, 1979), zu Georg Fischer siehe hier v.a. S. 124-127 (zu Fischers Streit mit dem Landgrafen Eberhard d. Jüngeren) und 154-160 (zu Wahl, Gefangennahme und erzwungener Resignation Fischers) sowie S. 193 (Register).

[26] Setzler, *Kloster Zwiefalten* (wie Anm. 25), S. 127.

Oktostichon klar zum Ausdruck bringt, wenn er davon spricht, daß Abt Georg *alacri studio virtutis* seine Abtei in wirtschaftlicher (*praedia, census, structurae*) wie geistig-geistlicher Hinsicht (*priscae facies* [...] *relligionis*) erneuert habe (*iam reparata*).[27] Für einen "reformierten" liturgischen Text, wie ihn die *Historia* bot, war der Reformabt jedenfalls der richtige Adressat. Dabei ist anzunehmen, daß das Gedicht des Clemens bereits etliche Zeit vor der Drucklegung der *Historia* geschrieben wurde: Als sie am 17. 9. 1512 (erstmals) erschien, war der Abt von Zwiefalten bereits seit einigen Monaten (genauer seit dem 6. Juli) Gefangener des ihm von Anfang an ablehnend gegenüberstehenden württembergischen Herzogs Ulrich, der ihn festgesetzt hatte, weil der Abt sich weigerte, dem Herzog – erneut – Geld zu leihen (und diesem geantwortet hatte, "der Herzog solle seine Finanzen so verwalten, daß auch Zwiefalten seine Ordnung halten könne"[28]).

Daß Bebel den Abt von Zwiefalten zu dieser Zeit seit längerem gut kannte und schätzte, läßt sich nachweisen: Bebels "Fazetien", deren erste beiden Bücher 1508 im Druck erschienen waren (1512 folgte ein drittes Buch) nennen in einer ganzen Reihe von Erzählungen den Abt Georg von Zwiefalten als Gewährsmann (I, 97; III, 18, 28, 98, 183) und dessen Schreiber Bernardus Husslin (I, 77; II, 83, 134).[29] Die Art, in der Bebel hier von Abt Georg spricht, zeigt, daß er öfters in Zwiefalten zu Gast war und den Abt einen guten Freund nennen durfte: In I, 77 heißt es beispielsweise einleitend: *Cum nuper in monasterio ad Duplices Aquas, vulgo Zvifulda, mentio facta fuisset de variis mortalium fortunis* [...], was Bebels Anwesenheit einschließt; I, 87 beginnt mit den Worten *Interrogavi nuper quendam rusticum in pago Zvifuldensi* [...], in I, 89 sucht der Herr des *vicus Zvifulda*, der *eques auratus Iohannes Speth* einen weiteren Adeligen; die Fazetie wird von Leonhard Clemens referiert (*Haec Leonartus Clemens presbyter*). In II, 12 ist Bebel in Zwiefalten anwesend (*me praesente in Zvifulda*), in III, 29 erwähnt Bebel einen *conviva Iohannes Bittel Zvifuldae*. In III, 178 schließlich steht die bereits erwähnte Nachricht über den Abschluß der Arbeiten an den Fazetien bei Leonhard Clemens in Zwiefalten 1511. Die Fazetie I, 97 ist in diesem Zusammenhang besonders aufschlußreich. Bebel beginnt sie mit den Worten: *Dixit mihi olim abbas et dominus meus Zvifuldensis pro*

[27] Für Fischer wie für Abt Leonhard Dürr von Adelberg scheint mir auszuschließen, daß sie die Reform ihrer Konvente als "Maske" zur Erreichung anderer, z.B. finanzieller oder machtpolitischer Ziele betrieben; zu einem derartigen Vorgehen siehe die vorzüglichen einleitenden Bemerkungen bei D. Mertens, "Der Humanismus und die Reform des Weltklerus", *Rottenburger Jahrbuch für Kirchengeschichte* 11 (1992), S. 11-28, hier S. 12f.

[28] Setzler, *Kloster Zwiefalten* (wie Anm. 25), S. 156-159, hier S. 158. Hinzukommt, daß Abt Georg offenbar die (antiösterreichische) württembergische Partei in seinem Kloster ausgeschaltet hatte. Siehe hierzu und zu der erzwungenen Resignation Abt Georgs ebd. S. 157-159.

[29] V. Honemann, "Heinrich Bebel und seine >Fazetien<", in *Germanistische Mediävistik*, Hgg. V. Honemann und T. Tomasek (Münster, 2000[2]), S. 255-276, hier S. 269, siehe weiterhin *Heinrich Bebels Fazetien* (Anm. 18), S. 201 (Register: Nennungen Zwiefaltens und des Abtes Georg).

mensaria recreatione talem fabulam [...], was eine gesellige Tischgemeinschaft aufruft, bei der der Zwiefaltener Abt eine Fazetie erzählt (was auch für die Fazetien III, 28 und 98 – hier tritt der Hofnarr des Abtes auf – zutrifft). Eine Dedikation der *Historia de Sancta Anna* an Abt Georg lag damit mehr als nahe.

Auf die Widmung derselben an Abt Georg Fischer folgt im Druck ein Schreiben Bebels an alle Verehrer der heiligen Anna, das "aus Zwiefalten" datiert ist, was den oben dargestellten Arbeitszusammenhang bestätigt und die Entstehung der Annen-*Historia* im Detail nachvollziehen läßt:

> (n) [XXv] HENRICVS BEBELIVS IV | STINGENSIS POE | TA LAVREA | TVS OMNIBVS SAN | CTAE ANNAE VE | NERATORI | BVS SALV | TEM
> CVm iampridem religiosissime et plus solito. cęperit coli et venerari per totam | Germaniam beatissima mater christiparę virginis Marię sancta Anna. no- | tam ob filiam Mariam nepotemque Christum. quam ob vitę sanctimoniam innumerabi | liaque miracula. quę ab eadem fieri prędicantur. cum in multis passim sacellis. | tum maxime in Dyren Iuliacensi oppido. Eam ob rem moti sunt Reuerendus | in Christo pater dominus Georgius Abbas Zuifuldensis. eiusque fratrum congregatio tota | vt eam solenniter propriaque historia venerarentur. Inuenerunt itaque duas eius | historias. antiquo charactere scriptas. quibus musicus cantus deesset. quas | nostro Leonharto Clementi. vtriusque musicę tractatori non pęnitendo. offeren | tes rogauerunt. ut cantum et musicas notas. quas uocant. adderet. Ego eo tempore | illius hospitio vsus. ut alias multa parte anni peculiariter. cępi cum eo pelle | gere et relegere. quas dixi historias. Vbi cum inuenissemus nil nisi crassam | barbariem. Obsoletas voculas sententiasque obstrusas. salebrosas. conscisas. et | ut medium et finis consonarent. quos ipsi rhythmos vocant. neglectam esse | latinitatem atque constructionem. et ut paucis dicam. prorsus. absurdas. veramque | historiam non exprimentes. propterea. multis nos ambo beneficiis. summaque et[30] | inaudita humanitate affecti ab eodem Abbate atque eius fratribus. vt grati | ficaremur eisdem. hoc non grauate suscipientibus. cępimus historiam veram car / minibus describere. Leonharto etiam modos et cantum addente. ea tamen | verborum et constructionum facilitate. vt quilibet facile intelligat. Quam mon- | achi nunc cantant. Sed quia illi duodecim vtuntur lectionibus. nos ut sę- | culares sacerdotes possent uel congrue hanc assumere. etiam in nouem rede | gimus. Vos igitur omnes. qui sanctę Annę estis deuoti. si caretis idonea hi- | storia. suscipite hanc nostram. quam et nobis et omnibus religionis cultori / bus conscripsimus. non vana gloria ducti atque ambitione. verum. et religio | nis et diuę Annę amore. atque vt amicis nostris gratificaremur. Valete. Et qui- | bus hęc placeant legant et in honorem sanctissime matris legant. relegant et cantent. quo illius matris cultum adiuuent et se patrocinio ipsius recommendent. Iterum | valete Ex Zuifulda pridie nonas Martias Anno M.[31]

Wenn Bebel zu Beginn seines Schreibens ausführt, die Verehrung der heiligen Anna habe im ganzen Reich stark zugenommen, dann entspricht dies den Tatsachen: Sie, die "Mutter der Gottesgebärerin", wurde "im Spätmittelalter zu einer der am meisten verehrten Heiligen überhaupt", was zur Entstehung einer

[30] Das (gedruckte!) "et" (als: &) außerhalb des Satzspiegels stehend. Das Münchener Exemplar Rar. 438 (siehe oben Anm. 14) bietet an dieser Stelle eine anscheinend handschriftlich nachgetragene et-Abbreviatur.

[31] So der Druck, der hier offenbar unvollständig ist.

beträchtlichen Zahl lateinischer wie volkssprachlicher Legenden führte.[32] Bebels Erwähnung der Anna-Verehrung in Düren verweist auf den (dubiosen) Erwerb des sogenannten "Annahauptes", das vorher in der Mainzer Stiftskirche St. Stephan aufbewahrt worden und dort im Jahre 1500 durch einen Steinmetz gestohlen wurde, der es nach Düren in das Kloster der Franziskanerobservanten verbrachte, wo eine spontane "Volksbewegung" den Verbleib der Reliquie erzwang; schon im Sommer 1501 sind erste Wallfahrten nach Düren bezeugt; 1510 (also zu einer Zeit, als die *Historia* bereits im Entstehen war) will der Metzer Bürger und Chronist Philippe de Vigneulles "auf der großen Straße nach Düren" "schätzungsweise 50.000 Personen" begegnet sein, von denen "auf den Feldern und bzw. im Walde [...] 18.000 – 20.000 Menschen übernachtet haben".[33]

Wichtig ist in unserem Zusammenhang, daß insbesondere die Humanisten sich der Verehrung der heiligen Anna annahmen[34]: Bereits 1494 hatte Johannes Trithemius auf Bitten mehrerer Humanistenfreunde sein *De laudibus sanctissime matris Annae* verfaßt (Erstdruck Mainz: Peter Friedberg 1494)[35]; schon vorher hatte Rudolf Agricola ein – bald reich überliefertes – Gedicht *Anna mater* verfaßt (1484; GW 483 und 484).[36] Bebel und seine Freunde folgten also geradezu einer Mode, wenn sie an ihre Hieronymus-*Historia* eine solche zur Verehrung der heiligen Anna anschlossen. Sie folgten damit aber auch, wie Bebel ausführt, einer Bitte des Abtes Georg Fischer und seines Konvents (*congregatio*), die ihrer Anna-Verehrung einen liturgisch adäquaten Ausdruck verleihen wollten.

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[32] Zusammenstellung bei F. Roolfs, "Anna", in *Verfasserlexikon* (wie Anm. 13), 11 (2000), Sp. 99-107, Zitate ebd. 99f. Zur Verehrung der heiligen Anna siehe allgemein M. Lechner, "Anna", in *Lexikon der christlichen Ikonographie* 5 (1973), Sp. 168-184; hier Sp. 169 der Hinweis, daß die "Hereinnahme des Anna-Tages in das römische Kalendarium 1481 durch [Papst] Sixtus IV. (OFM)" wesentlich für den weiteren Aufschwung der Anna-Verehrung am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts war. Siehe weiterhin E. Gatz, "Zur Geschichte der Annaverehrung", in *St. Anna in Düren*, Hg. E. Gatz (Mönchengladbach, 1972), S. 149-160.

[33] Siehe die Darstellung bei E. Gatz, "Die Dürener Annaverehrung bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts", in Ders., *St. Anna* (Anm. 32), S. 161-190, besonders S. 161-169; Zitate S. 172.

[34] Siehe die Zusammenstellungen bei A. Dörfler-Dierken, *Die Verehrung der heiligen Anna in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Göttingen, 1992), S. 280-326. Zu Trithemius hier S. 287-289, zu Rudolf Agricola S. 282 und 291.

[35] Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum* (wie Anm. 4), 15632.

[36] Roolfs, "Anna" (wie Anm. 32), Sp. 101, siehe weiter Dörfler-Dierken, *Die Verehrung der heiligen Anna* (wie Anm. 34), S. 280-326 mit einem Verzeichnis des gedruckten Annaschrifttums von 1477-1530. Zu dem durch Trithemius organisierten Annenpreis, an dem sich neben ihm Celtis, Dietrich Gresemund der Jüngere, Rudolf von Langen, Jodocus Badius, Rudger von Venray, Dr. Jodokus Beissel, Adam Werner von Themar und Johannes Herbst beteiligten, siehe G. Bauch, "Aus der Geschichte des Mainzer Humanismus", in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Universitäten Mainz und Gießen*, Hgg. J. R. Dieterich und K. Bader (Darmstadt, 1907), S. 3-86, hier S. 27. Gresemund war (wie Clemens) auch Musiker, siehe ebd. S. 35.

Bebels weitere Ausführungen bieten dann einen tiefen Einblick in Arbeits- und Vorgehensweise reformorientierter Kleriker wie humanistischer Gelehrter: Die Zwiefaltener Mönche suchen in ihrer Bibliothek (oder in der wohl in der Kirche aufbewahrten Sammlung liturgischer Bücher? – der Text hat nur: *Inuenerunt*) nach Texten zur Anna-Verehrung. Sie finden dort auch tatsächlich zwei Annen-*historiae*, die in altertümlicher Schrift gehalten sind und keine Musiknotation aufweisen. Der Zwiefaltener Konvent bittet darauf Leonhard Clemens, einen *tractator* (Komponisten) beider Arten von Musik (also sowohl der weltlichen wie der geistlichen), den gefundenen Texten *cantum et musicas notas* (einen Gesang mit seinen Noten) beizufügen. Hier nun kommt Bebel ins Spiel: Er ist bei Clemens zu Gast und beginnt, zusammen mit diesem die beiden *Historiae* zu studieren. Als sie in diesen Texten aber nichts als krasse Barbarei, veraltetes Vokabular, unelegante, holprige und unvollständige Sätze finden, die *latinitas* und Grammatik (*constructionem*) vernachlässigen, um im Metrum zu bleiben, als sie überdies entdecken, daß die Texte der *Historiae* die wahre Geschichte der heiligen Anna nicht wiedergeben (*veram historiam non exprimentes*), da beschließen die beiden Freunde, wegen der Wohltaten (*beneficiis*) und der unerhörten *humanitas*, die ihnen Abt und Konvent von Zwiefalten entgegengebracht haben und -bringen, die wahre Geschichte der heiligen Anna in Gesängen niederzuschreiben (*historiam veram carminibus describere*). Dabei liefert Bebel die Texte (die so gestaltet seien, daß ein jeder sie verstehen könne), Clemens *modos et cantum*, also die Singweise, die in einer bestimmten (Kirchen-)Tonart gesetzt ist.[37] Eben diese neue *Historia de Sancta Anna* (die also zunächst handschriftlich an den Zwiefaltener Konvent gegeben worden sein muß!) sängen die Mönche jetzt.

Gab es, wie in Bebels Brief behauptet, mittelalterliche Anna-Offizien, und lassen sich diese in den heute vorhandenen Zwiefaltener Handschriften auffinden? Hierzu ist zunächst zu bemerken, daß die *Analecta hymnica* eine große Zahl von liturgischen Anna-Reimoffizien des 12.-15. Jahrhunderts publiziert haben,[38] hinzu treten nicht weniger als zehn Anna-Sequenzen,[39] 31 Anna-

[37] Siehe dazu Wohnhaas und Schlager, "Eine Offizien-Ausgabe von 1512" (wie Anm. 13), S. 307f.: Zusammenstellung der Kirchentonreihen; "Leonhart Clemens folgte bei der Wahl der Kirchentöne dem verbreiteten Brauch, die Antiphonen und Responsorien jeweils in eine mit 1 beginnende, aufsteigende Reihe der Kirchentöne zu setzen". Siehe hierzu auch das ebd. S. 298-306 gebotene Inventar, das für jeden Text dessen Initium, die metrische Bauform, die Melodie mit ihrem Ambitus und die Kirchentonart angibt, wodurch sich der ungemeine Reichtum der *Historia* anschaulich erschließt.

[38] *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi 25. Historiae Rhythmicae. Liturgische Reimoffizien des Mittelalters*, Fünfte Folge, Hgg. C. Blume und G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1897), hier die Nrr. 18-30, siehe weiterhin ebd. *5*: *Liturgische Reimoffizien*, Hg. G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1889), Nrr. 34-39.

[39] *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi 9: Sequentiae ineditae*, Hg. G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1890), Nrr. 122-131. Die Texte entstammen, ihrer Überlieferung zufolge, dem späten 14. bis 16. Jahrhundert.

Hymnen des 12.-16. Jahrhunderts[40] sowie acht Anna-Reimgebete.[41] Sichtet man die Überlieferung derselben, so fällt auf, daß die meisten Texte sehr spät überliefert sind, von ihrer Entstehung her also mit der Annen-Verehrung des 15. Jahrhunderts zusammenhängen dürften. In älteren Handschriften (12.-13. Jahrhundert) stehen Annen-Texte nicht selten als Nachtrag. Ein Vergleich der Initien der in den *Analecta hymnica* edierten Annen-Texte mit denen des Annenoffiziums unserer *Historia* ergab dabei keinerlei Übereinstimmung; Bebel und seine Mitstreiter haben sich also allenfalls von einzelnen Aspekten der mittelalterlichen Texte inspirieren lassen, ihre Texte ansonsten aber tatsächlich neu geschaffen.

In den Zwiefaltener Handschriften der Stuttgarter Landesbibliothek finden sich zwar Annengebete und -suffragien, so in dem Cod.brev. 110, der allerdings erst im 16. Jahrhundert nach Zwiefalten gelangte, wo Nachträge (darunter die eines Anna-Suffragiums, 154vff., siehe auch ebd. 90v ein weiteres Anna-Suffragium) vorgenommen wurden, die Anna-Sequenz *Anna, pia mater ave* steht im Zwiefaltener Stundenbuch Cod.brev. 116 (1. H. 15. Jh., nach 90v), ein Anna-Hymnus findet sich in Cod.brev. 117 (1. H. 16. Jh.!), 74r.[42] Anna-

[40] *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi 4: Liturgische Hymnen des Mittelalters.* Hg. G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1888), Nrr. 122-141 und *52: Thesauri Hymnologici Hymnarium*, 2. Teil, Hg. C. Blume (Leipzig, 1909), Nrr. 101-111.

[41] *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi 33: Pia dictamina*, 6. Folge, Hgg. C. Blume und G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1899), Nrr. 34-41; Nr. 34 (12. Jahrhundert, alle anderen Stücke erst im 15. Jahrhundert überliefert).

[42] *Die Handschriften der Württembergischen Landesbibliothek Stuttgart: Codices Breviarii (Cod.Brev. 1-167)*, beschrieben von Virgil Ernst Fiala und Wolfgang Irtenkauf (Wiesbaden, 1977), S. 140-143, 149-151. – Reimoffizien zur Verehrung der heiligen Anna finden sich in Stuttgart in zwei Deutschordens-Brevieren, siehe die Handschriften HB I 165 (14. Jh., mit Nachträgen), 365ra: AH 25 Nr. 18 plus Hymnen AH 52 Nr. 101 und 102 sowie HB I 166 (Anfang 14. Jh.), 159vb: AH 25 Nr. 18, 2. Vesp. und: "O deus qui b. Anne vt mater s. genitricis effici mereretur", siehe *Die Handschriften der ehemaligen Hofbibliothek Stuttgart 1: Codices ascetici 2 (HB I 151-249)*, beschrieben von V. E. Fiala und H. Hauke [...] (Wiesbaden, 1970), S. 24-32, besonders S. 27 und 31. Auch das Deutschordens-Diurnale HB I 190 (nach 1505) bringt entsprechende Annentexte, siehe 236v-249v: AH 52 Nr. 101, 102 sowie AH 25 Nr. 18, siehe ebd. S. 71-73, besonders S. 72. Das "Monastische Vollbrevier" HB I 110 (aus Weingarten, 1. H. 14. Jahrhundert) enthält unter den Nachträgen des 15. Jahrhunderts auf 571va-577vb: S. Anne matris virginis Marie das Sonder- und z.T. Reimoffizium AH 25 Nr. 18, siehe *Die Handschriften der ehemaligen Hofbibliothek Stuttgart 1 Codices ascetici 1 (HB I 1-150)*, beschrieben von J. Autenrieth und V. E. Fiala (Wiesbaden, 1968), S. 204-206, hier S. 206. Ein weiteres Deutschordens-Vollbrevier, HB I 123 hat f. 322va ff. "Hymnen zu Ehren der hl. Anna AH 52, Nr. 106, AH 4, Nr. 136", siehe ebd. S. 224-226, besonders S. 226. Ein Vollbrevier der Zisterzienser von Schöntal, HB I 124 (um 1366) bietet 272vb-276vb unter dem Titel "Incipit hystoria [!] beate Anne matris virginis Marie" die Hymnen AH 52 Nr. 103, 101, 102, siehe ebd. S. 226-228, hier S. 228; das Deutschordensbrevier HB I 125 (v.J. 1445) aus der Diözese Würzburg hat auf 219rb ff. das Anna-Reimoffizium AH 5, Nr. 38, siehe ebd. S. 228-231, hier S. 230. Entsprechendes muß es in Zwiefalten gegeben haben, doch ist davon weder unter den in Stuttgart noch in Tübingen vorhandenen Zwiefaltener Handschriften etwas zu finden. Unklar ist mir geblie-

Reimoffizien Zwiefaltener Provenienz scheinen heute jedoch nicht mehr zu existieren.

III B) DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER HIERONYMUS-*HISTORIA*

Das früheste datierte Zeugnis für ihre Abfassung ist ein Schreiben Bebels an den Klerus des Deutschen Reiches, in dem er für die Verwendung der Hieronymus-*Historia* wirbt; es ist *ex Zuifulda* auf den 24. 9. 1509 datiert.

> (e) [IIIIr] VNIVERSIS PER GERMANIAM ORDINIS ECCLE | SIASTICI MODERATORIBVS ARCHIEPISCO | PIS EPISCOPIS ATQVE CVIVSCVNQVE | RELIGIONIS PRIMORIBVS HEN | RICVS BEBELIVS IVSTIN | GENSIS POETA | .S. D.
>
> SI de re aliqua profana. uiri et patres Reuerendissimi. essem ad uos scripturus. iudici- | umque et consilium meum interponerem vobis[43] tot uiris clarissimis. atque amplissimis. possem non | iniuria temeritatis accusari. Sed de religione omnibus[44] christianis communi tractatu- | rus. publicęque honestatis causam acturus: non vereor iudicium meum improbari. Proinde | historiam diui Hieronymi vobis commendaturus. hanc veniam a vobis peto: vt quod | nullus apud nos hactenus tentauit: mihi facere liceat: quod non superbe et arroganter | sed iuste et pie est a me factum. Nam diuus ille Hieronymus. tam illustris ecclesię do | ctor qui. vt pauca dicam: preter vitę sanctitatem: qua paucos sibi pares habuit. tam | fideliter: tam strenue in vinea domini est versatus. vt eius laboribus et vigiliis reli- | gio christi vniuersa non sit mediocriter adiuta: defensa et illustrata[45]. ille inquam cum propria | careat historia. festumque eius non secus ac de alio simplici confessore peragatur. quis | non pietatis opus existimabit. quod[46] eius laudes peculiari carmine et historia sim prose- | cuturus? Cuius presertim. vt superioribus suffragium prebeam. tot sunt in ecclesiam | fidemque christianam beneficia in transferendis sacris litteris. inqua profligandis tot mon | strosis hęreticę prauitatis auctoribus. quot merita Herculis in genus humanum ob | monstra passim domita prę dicantur a poetis. Propter quę cum hic sit a vana gentili- | tate immortales diuinosque honores consecutus. non video. cur noster ille pater Hie | ronymus

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ben, ob evtl. die *Expositio hymnorum* des Zwiefaltener Klosterschulmeisters Bernardus Ott von 1567 (Stuttgart, Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. poet. et phil. 4° 45, siehe die Beschreibung: *Codices poetici et philologici*, beschrieben von W. Irtenkauf und I. Krekler [Wiesbaden, 1981], S. 114f.) Erläuterungen zu Anna-Hymnen (und evtl. eine Rezeption unserer *Historia*?) enthält. Von Otts liturgischem Gesamtwerk, das im Cod. theol. et phil. fol. 260 überliefert ist, gibt es anscheinend keine moderne Beschreibung, weshalb offenbleiben muß, ob er evtl. die *Historia* rezipiert hat.

[43] Dieses Wort handschriftlich am rechten Rand mit Verweiszeichen zugefügt, so auch im Münchener Exemplar Rar. 438 (wie Anm. 14) (dort vielleicht von Bebels Hand [Henkel]).

[44] Der Druck hat: “omibus”.

[45] Zwischen “defensa” und “illustrata” ein nicht genau identifizierbares Zeichen, das wie eine in Handschriften übliche et-Abbreviatur aussieht; die beiden Wörter erscheinen zu einem Wort zusammengedruckt.

[46] Nicht sicher zu lesen; der Druck hat nur eine – anscheinend beschädigte – q-Type; in München Rar. 438 (wie Anm. 14) intakt.

non debeat non singulariter a christi fidelibus. et pręsertim studiosis litte- | rarum venerari. Quod si quis dixerit coli eum per totam ecclesiam libere concedo. Sed | cum apud germanos multi venerentur sancti. quorum nec vitę sanctimonia (vt suspica- | mur) nec publica merita possint vllo[47] modo cum nostro comparari. dolendum est illos | (quibus tamen non inuideo) propria historia esse honestatos. hunc cum aliis multis | simplicibus confessoribus illa carere Huic ergo rei medendum existimantes. Leon- | hartus Clemens Vlmensis Iohannes Casselius Geislingensis presbyteri et ego: cum in | solennitate Hieronymi in Zuifuldensi[48] pago conuenissemus. suscepimus istius historię | componendę prouinciam. adiunxit et Leonhartus numeros et melodiam. vt est ho- | mo in vtraque musica liberaliter edoctus. vt tantum doctorem venerari cupientes: ha | beant affluentem materiam. Vos igitur ecclesiastici reges. quibus pietatem et cultum | diuinum tueri et iudicare officium est. committite quęso vt vestro ductu et auspicio | tantus doctor et tam fulgidum ecclesię lumen. sacrarumque litterarum antesignanus. lit- | teratorumque patronus religiosius colatur. Quod tunc fiet: dum propriam illi histori- | am consecrabitis. atque vestris sacerdotibus (illis saltem. qui litterarum atque tanti docto - | ris studiosi fuerint) legendam confirmabitis sperantes non mediocrem a summo op- | timo maximo deo. pietatis auctęque religionis mercedem. singularemque diui patris Hie | ronymi honorati apud deum intercessionem. Valete in christo. atque diui Hieronymi | laudes posteritati commendate. Ex Zuifulda nono kalendas Septembris. Anno domini Mille- | [si][49] mo quingentesimo nono

Mit diesem Text, auf den das bereits oben referierte Distichon des Leonhard Clemens über die Arbeitsverteilung zwischen ihm, Bebel und Casselius bei der Anfertigung der Hieronymus-*Historia* folgt (f), wendet sich Bebel als *Iustingensis poeta* an alle geistlichen Großen des Reiches – Erzbischöfe, Bischöfe und *primores*. Er tut dies in angemessener Weise: wenn er sich in einer weltlichen Angelegenheit an sie wenden würde, könne man ihn nicht der Überhebung beschuldigen, wenn er hier aber geistliche Dinge behandle und ihnen eine *historia diui Hieronymi* anempfehle, dann müsse er um Nachsicht bitten; er handle nicht hochmütig, sondern in frommer Gesinnung. Bebel skizziert dann die hohe Bedeutung des heiligen Hieronymus, um dann festzustellen, daß er bisher eines eigenen Offiziums entbehre, weshalb sein Fest nicht angemessen gefeiert werden könne.[50] Da aber von (weltlichen) Dichtern die Verdienste des

[47] Der Druck hat "yllo".

[48] Das "Z" im Druck hier und beim gleichen Wort am Ende des Textes spiegelverkehrt.

[49] Fehlt im Druck.

[50] Hierin irrte Bebel: Schlager und Wohnhaas, "Eine Offizien-Ausgabe von 1512" (wie Anm. 13), S. 295, machen darauf aufmerksam, daß der Augsburger Benediktiner Veit Bild 1504 von Konrad Moerlin, dem Abt von St. Ulrich und Afra, die "Anweisung erhalten hatte, eine Vita des hl. Hieronymus zu schreiben". Sie wurde 1508 erstmals im Chorgebet gesungen (ebd.), gelangte aber nicht zum Druck, weshalb Bebel keine Kenntnis von ihr hatte. – Daneben existierten natürlich mittelalterliche, meist dem 15. Jahrhundert entstammende Hieronymus-Leselieder, siehe AH 33 (Anm. 37), Nrr. 105-109, einige Hymnen, siehe AH 52 (Anm. 36), Nr. 220. Dieser in Brevieren des 15. Jahrhunderts reich überlieferte Hymnus ("Ecce, qui Christi decoravit aulam") war "Ad vesperas" zu singen. Weitere liturgische Hymnen siehe AH 4: *Liturgische Hymnen des Mit-*

Herkules um das Menschengeschlecht besungen würden, und dieser so unsterbliche Ehren erlangt habe, könne er nicht sehen, warum "dieser unser Vater" Hieronymus nicht besonders von den Christgläubigen und besonders den *studiosis litterarum* verehrt werden könne. Da aber bei den Deutschen viele Heilige verehrt würden, die weder hinsichtlich der Heiligkeit ihres Lebens noch ihrer öffentlichen Verdienste mit dem heiligen Hieronymus verglichen werden könnten, sei es zu beklagen, daß erstere mit einer eigenen *Historia* geehrt würden, letzterer aber – zusammen mit vielen einfachen Confessores – einer solchen entbehre. Um dem abzuhelfen, hätten sich die Priester Leonhard Clemens von Ulm, Johannes Casselius von Geislingen und er selbst, als sie am Fest des heiligen Hieronymus im Zwiefaltener Gau [also wohl in der Pfarre des Clemens in Zwiefaltendorf] zusammengekommen seien, die Aufgabe auf sich genommen, eine Hieronymus-*Historia* zu verfassen (*componendae*). Leonhard (Clemens) habe die Tonarten (? - *numeros*) und die Melodie beigefügt, ein Mensch, der in beiden Arten von Musik gebildet sei. Zum Abschluß seines Textes wendet sich Bebel dann erneut an seine Adressaten: Sie, deren Aufgabe es schließlich sei, den *cultus divinus* zu fördern, möchten doch auch dafür sorgen, daß ein so bedeutender *Doctor*, ein so strahlendes Licht der Kirche (wie Hieronymus) frömmer (*religiosius*, d.h. mit tieferer Andacht als bisher) verehrt werde. Dies könne geschehen, wenn die Kirchenoberen die nun vorliegende *Historia* dem religiösen Gebrauch anheimgäben (*consecrabitis*) und ihren Priestern (wenigstens den litterati unter ihnen und denen, die sich mit dem heiligen Hieronymus beschäftigt hätten – Bebel weiß um die mangelhafte Bildung nicht weniger Priester) zur Lektüre (*legendam*) anempföhlen. Dafür würden sie, durch die Interzession des heiligen Hieronymus, reichen Lohn empfangen.

Bebels Schreiben, das der Konfirmationsbulle für das Hieronymus-Offizium vorangestellt ist, versucht damit, unter Verweis auf einen – aus seiner Sicht – gravierenden Mangel in der Verehrung der Heiligen durch das Kirchenjahr hindurch, für die *Historia* und deren Gebrauch zu werben, indem er sich an eine größtmögliche geistliche Öffentlichkeit im Reich wendet. Auffällig ist, daß Bebel sich bezüglich dieses Gebrauchs auf ein *legendum* beschränkt, eine gesangliche Wiedergabe aber nicht explizit erwähnt – ist dies ein Zugeständnis an die vielfach bescheidenen realen Möglichkeiten?

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telalters, Hg. G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1888), Nrr. 280-282, alle aus Breviarien von Hohenfurt und Třebon, also aus Böhmen. Hinzu treten eine Reihe von Reimoffizien, siehe *Liturgische Reimoffizien des Mittelalters*, 6. Folge, Hg. G. M. Dreves (Leipzig, 1897), Nrr. 33-40. Dies entstammen überwiegend gedruckten Breviarien des späten 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts, wobei Schwerpunkte der Verbreitung in den Niederlanden und Belgien sowie in Österreich und Böhmen liegen; südwestdeutsche Breviarien oder andere liturgische Texte finden sich nicht darunter, weshalb Bebel und seine Freunde offensichtlich keine Kenntnis dieser Texte erlangten. Von deren Initien her ergaben sich keine Übereinstimmungen mit den Texten der *Historia*.

III C) DIE KONFIRMATION DER HIERONYMUS-*HISTORIA* DURCH DEN MAINZER ERZBISCHOF URIEL VON GEMMINGEN

Eine regelmäßige, über den Kreis Bebels und seiner geistlichen Freunde hinausgehende liturgische Verwendung der *Historia* bedurfte der Approbation bzw. Konfirmation durch einen der geistlichen Fürsten des Reiches; erst sie ließ – beispielsweise – einen Druck des Werkes sinnvoll erscheinen. Auch über die diesbezüglichen Bemühungen und deren Ergebnis informiert der hier analysierte Druck. Dabei fällt auf, daß eine solche Konfirmation lediglich für die Hieronymus-*Historia* versucht und erlangt wurde. Es spricht dies dafür, daß Bebel und seine Freunde sich erst im Zuge der Drucklegung entschlossen, dieser eine (wohl längst bei ihnen liegende) Anna-*Historia* beizufügen.

Erstes Zeugnis für die Bemühungen um eine Konfirmation der Hieronymus-*Historia* ist hier ein – im Zusammenhang mit der Drucklegung der ‚Historia' analysiertes und abgedrucktes – Schreiben (d) Bebels an Konrad Peutinger vom 10. 11. 1511, in dem er erwähnt, dieser habe zunächst die Konfirmation der *Historia* besorgt (*illius* [sc. *Hieronymi*] *historiam prius confirmari procurasti*).

Peutingers Aktivität bezüglich der Approbation (bzw. Konfirmation) der *Historia* erhellt im übrigen aus zwei auf Seite Vv stehenden kurzen Gedichten des Leonhard Clemens und des Heinrich Bebel an Peutinger. Hier heißt es:

> (j) Idem [sc. Leonhartus Clemens Archipresbyter] ad Conradum Peutingerum | iurisconsultum ac Archigram | mateum Augustensem
> Tu quoque non expers nostri es Conrade laboris
> Peutinger. doctis annumerande viris
> Qui rem pontifici commendas. illius acer.
> Promotor. damni et non nihil inde capis[51]
> Hinc studiosorum communi gratificaris
> Patrono dignum qui tibi retribuet.

Bebel fügt dem ein Tetrastichon bei; es lautet:

> (k) Ad eundem tetrastichon Bebelii
> Peutingere decus patrię. gentisque sueuę
> Et studiosorum gloria magna Virum
> Barbati patris historia[52] hęc a pręsule magno
> Confirmata viget sedulitate tua

Die beiden Gedichte machen, jedes auf seine Art, ganz deutlich, daß Peutinger der "Promotor" der Konfirmation der *Historia* war (Clemens, Z. 3f.: Du, der

[51] Hier ist wohl gemeint, daß Peutinger durch die Förderung und Erlangung der Konfirmation einen gewissen Aufwand (also Kosten) hatte.

[52] Mit dem "pater barbatus" ist sicherlich Hieronymus gemeint, der "(überwiegend) als weißhaariger, bärtiger Greis" dargestellt wird, siehe R. Miehe, "Hieronymus", in *Lexikon der christlichen Ikonographie*, Hg. E. Kirschbaum, Bd. VI (Rom, 1974), Sp. 519-529, hier Sp. 519.

die Angelegenheit dem Pontifex – dem Mainzer Erzbischof – empfohlen hast und ein fleißiger Förderer derselben warst; Bebel: Daß die *Historia* des bärtigen [Kirchen-]vaters nun vom Praesul – also dem Erzbischof – konfirmiert existiert, ist deinem Eifer zu verdanken).

Daneben aber gab es offensichtlich noch eine "geistlich-politische" Vermittlung. Den beiden soeben zitierten Gedichten steht nämlich auf der gleichen Seite Vv ein weiteres des Leonhard Clemens an Ludwig Naukler (Vergenhans) voraus, das diesen als Propst von Stuttgart anspricht:

> (i) Idem [sc. Leonhartus Clemens] ad Ludouicum Nauclerum. | alias Vergenhans. prępositum Stutgardensem
> Tu nostra merito caneris Ludouice Thalia
> Nauclere. o raros inter habende viros
> Te doctique colunt omnes. quorum ipse patroni
> Non segnis causę sollicitator eras
> Nam proprio tandem clares Hieronyme quod (?) nunc
> Officio. minima[53] haud pars Ludouicus erat
> Quem commendatum tibi cunctis cum studiosis
> Nomi[ni]s ipse tui semper habere velis[54]

Ludwig Nauclerus (Vergenhans, um 1425/30-18.11.1512)[55], der jüngere Bruder des Gründungsrektors und späteren Kanzlers der Universität Tübingen, Johannes Nauclerus, Dr. utriusque iuris, war von 1481-1496 württembergischer Kanzler, verlor diese Amt aber bald nach dem Amtsantritt Graf Eberhards II. 1496. Er trat danach in die Dienste König Maximilians (königlicher Rat 1497-1512); auf Druck Maximilians konnte er "noch die Propstei in Stuttgart behalten". Naukler "galt als ein bedeutender Gelehrter; er war befreundet mit Johannes Reuchlin, mit dem Florentiner Marsilius Ficinus stand er in brieflichem Kontakt". Enge freundschaftliche Beziehungen bestanden auch "zwischen Nauclerus und Bebel". Daß dies auch für Leonhard Clemens zutrifft, läßt sich nur vermuten. "An der Dichterkrönung Bebels in Innsbruck (Pfingsten 1501) hatte Naukler als Förderer und Patron [...] entscheidenden Anteil gehabt".[56] Naukler dürfte, obschon seit langem in habsburgischen Diensten, auch zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung der *Historia* in Schwaben noch immer ein mächtiger Mann mit vielfältigen Verbindungen sowohl zu den weltlichen wie geistlichen

[53] Der Druck hat "minia".

[54] Der Druck hat versehentlich: "yelis". Der Text des Gedichtes scheint im Druck nicht ganz fehlerfrei.

[55] Siehe zu ihm Mertens, Bebel-Datenbank (wie Anm. 17), Biogramm Nr. 161; das folgende danach. Siehe weiterhin O. Auge, "Zur Rolle der Stuttgarter Stiftskleriker im Württemberg vorreformatorischer Zeit", *Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte* 66 (2007), S. 81-112, hier S. 81-86 sowie S. 109 und passim. Siehe weiters S. 105-107 zu den intensiven kulturellen und mäzenatischen Bestrebungen etlicher Stiftskleriker; zu Naukler besonders S. 106 Anm. 118.

[56] Wie eng die Verbindung Bebels zu Naukler war, zeigt die Tatsache, daß er ihn nicht nur in seinen 1496 veröffentlichten *Carmina* pries, sondern ihm 1501 auch die Komödie *Dialogus de optimo studio iuvenum* widmete (ebd.).

Großen seiner Zeit gewesen sein, der die *causa* der drei Humanistenfreunde, die Konfirmation und Publikation der *Historia* durchaus, wie von Clemens behauptet, kräftig gefördert haben könnte – vielleicht durch unmittelbare Kontakte zum Mainzer Erzbischof?

Den Mainzer Erzbischof Uriel von Gemmingen, von dem schließlich die Konfirmation der *Historia* erlangt wurde, preisen sowohl Bebel wie Clemens in zwei dem Abdruck der Bulle nachgestellten Gedichten. Bebel schreibt:

> (h) [Vv] HENRICVS BEBELI | VS IVSTINGENSIS | poeta laureatus. in laudem domini Vrielis Reue- | rendissimi Archiepiscopi Mo- | guntinensis principis ele- | ctoris etc.
> Splendor pontificum. splendor et Vriel
> Romani imperii. qui pius et bonus
> Et virtutis amans. quo duce legimus
> Sacratam historiam diui Hieronymi.
> Neglectus fuerat presbyteris prius
> Barbatus pater et gloria maxima
> Doctorum. modo quem laudibus: et piis
> Hymnis concelebrat tota alemannia.
> Merces a superis hinc tibi maxima
> Debetur. pariter te studiosius
> Laudabit. colet et carmine concinet
> Doctorum cuneus. viue. vale pater[57]

Der Mainzer Erzbischof wird also, unter Anspielung auf die Bedeutung seines Namens (Uriel = "[Mein] Licht ist Gott"), dafür gepriesen, daß man dank seiner Erlaubnis nun die "geheiligte Geschichte des göttlichen Hieronymus" lesen könne. Dieser, der *barbatus pater* (s.o.) sei bisher von den Priestern vernachlässigt worden; jetzt aber werde er in ganz Deutschland mit Laudes und Hymnen verehrt, wofür Uriel göttlicher Lohn zuteil werden werde.

Der Erzpriester Leonhard Clemens schließt sich auf der gleichen Seite des Druckes diesen Ausführungen mit einem eigenen Preis Uriels an:

> (i) Leonhartus Clemens Archipre | sbyter in laudem eiusdem
> Ipse mogunciacę sedis qui sceptra gubernas
> Pontificum princeps imperiique sacri.
> Impare cuius erit versu non dicere nomen.
> Syllabaque prima est longa. suprema simul
> Etsi archangelicus illud conplectitur ordo
> Consueuit quarto ponier inquam loco
> Salue perpetuum diui doctoris honore
> Nacte decus fulget quo ille fauore tuo
> Illius officium proprii nam robore sancis
> Auspicii et donas munere gratuito.
> Vnde patrocinium tibi quęritur eius. vbique
> Iam fiet nomen clarius atque tuum

[57] Der Druck hat "yiue" und "yale", siehe oben Anm. 50.

Nach einer Würdigung der geistlichen Position des Mainzer Erzbischofs geht Clemens auf Aussprache und Bedeutung von dessen Namen (Uriel ist der vierte der Erzengel) ein, um dann dessen Konfirmation der *Historia* klar anzusprechen: *Illius officii proprii nam robore sancis | Auspicii. et donas munere gratuito*. Seitdem (und deshalb) werde nun von überallher (beim Mainzer Erzbischof) um ein (Hieronymus-) Patrozinium nachgesucht (was eine der üblichen humanisischen Übertreibungen sein dürfte).

Die Approbationsbulle selbst, für die ich keinen weiteren Abdruck ermitteln konnte, hat den folgenden Wortlaut:

> (g) (IVv) Sequitur exemplar confirmationis | et approbationis eiusdem histo | rie per Reuerendissimum dominum | Archiepiscopum Moguntinensem | cuius archetypus in ar | chiuo Zuifuldensis ce | nobij reconditus | seruatur
>
> Uriel dei gratia sancte Moguntinensis sedis Archiepiscopus: Sa- | cri Romani imperij per Germaniam Archicancellarius: prin- | ceps elector: vniuersis et singulis per prouinciam nostram Moguntinensem | constitutis. et presertim Reuerendis in christo patribus. dominis. | Reinharto Uormaciensis. Laurentio herbipolensis. Gabrieli Eistetensis. | nostro et ecclesię nostrę Moguntinensis cancellario. Philippo Spirensis | Uuilhelmo Argentinensis. Henrico Augustensis. Hugoni Constantiensis. Joanni | Hildesemensis. Simoni Paderbornensis. Paulo Curiensis. Ernesto Hal- | berstatensis. N. Uerdensis ecclesiarum episcopis. amicis nostris charissimis | Salutem et sincerę dilectionis nostrę affectum. Eruditionis christia- | nę vbertas. quę ex diuine institutionis fonte emanauit. influente in ec- | clesię principes spiritu sancto. summam nobis et perpetuam fęlicitatem adpa- | rauit. Ob quam vniuersaliter quidem in omnium sanctorum commemorationem | non solum lętandum. verum in eorum excellentia. quos dei gratia in tantum | apicem ecclesię prouexit. nobis summopere gloriandum sit. Ex quorum | numero sacri cardinei ordinis diuinus. Hieronymus. patria Stri- | donius. hęreticorum oppugnator. ecclesięque defensor acerrimus. ob | merita incomparabilesque virtutes suas. se patrię cęlesti. vnde descen- | derat. vt ea fęlicitate perpetua frueretur. restitutit. Nosque vt idem age- | remus: disciplina: vita: moribus .exemplisque suis sępenumero adhor- | tatus est. Cum autem fragilitate nostra peccatis depressi. nisi specialium | patronorum orationibus et dei misericordia adiuti. ad eam conscendere | poterimus minime. Occasione hac deuoti. nostri dilecti Henricus | Bebelius Justingensis poeta. Leonhartus Clemens Ulmensis. et Jo- | annes Casselius geislingensis sacerdotes. ex singulari eorum deuotione. | quoue diuum Hieronymum. vt pro nobis erga maiestatem diuinam in - | tercedat. oremus commodius et collaudemus frequentius. historiam [Vr] canonicarum horarum et officij diuini ediderunt. eandemque nobis por- | rigi ac humiliter supplicari fecerunt. quatinus illam videre et pon- | derare ac per alios huic negocio aptos et idoneos. an rite edita sit | videri et ponderari dignaremur. cuius quidem historię tenor sequitur. | Historia infra sequitur.[58] Nos igitur deuote illorum petitioni more ge- | rere volentes. eandemque historiam diligenter vidimus et ponderaui- | mus. et per alios huic negocio aptos et ideoneos videri et ponderari | fecimus.[59] illamque nostra et illorum sententia rite ad sancti Hierony- | mi laudem et orthodoxorum salutem editam inuenimus et iudicaui- | mus. vnde fuit nobis pro parte prędatorum. Henrici et Leonharti et | Joannis humiliter iterato supplicatum. quatinus prędinsertam histo- | riam auctoritate nostra metropolitica admittere.

[58] So der – sicher fehlerhafte – Wortlaut.

[59] Der Passus wiederholt teils wörtlich kurz zuvor gesagtes; auch hier dürfte ein Fehler vorliegen.

approbare et con- | firmare et eo modo per terminos prouincię nostrę Moguntinensi ob- | seruari posse concedere dignaremur. Justis ergo ac pijs prędatorum | supplicantium votis inclinati eandem historiam. iuxta formam prędin- | sertam per terminos prouincię nostrę seruari posse admisimus et ap- | probauimus. admittimusque et approbamus per prędentes. Omnes ergo et singulos spirituales eiusdem prouincię nostrę. et prędertim prefa | tos episcopos. amicos nostros charissimos in christo iesu. qui est | omnium vera salus. adhortantes. quatinus eandem historiam in festiui- | tate sancti Hieronymi. ac alias totiens quotiens deuotio quempiam | ad illius obseruationem mouerit impuleritque per terminos diocędium | suarum publice et priuatim pro subditorum suorum deuotione legi et | decantari faciant. quo facilius eiusdem sancti Hieronymi. Omniumque | aliorum sanctorum meritis et intercessione adiuti. fęliciter in ędterna pa | tria cum domino congaudere valeant. Ut etiam prędatum officium | dicentes siue decantantes et obseruantes maiori prędmio se affectos | sentiant. de omnipotentis dei misericordia. Beatissime virginis Ma | rię ac sancti Martini patroni nostri: eiusdemque sancti Hieronymi | meritis et intercessionibus confisi. omnibus et singulis vere confessis | et contritis. qui prędatum officium decantauerint: dixerint. vel illius[60] | decantationi a principio vsque in finem interfuerint: vel etiam manus| adiutrices: vbi illud institui contigerit. ad eius obseruationem prorrexe | rint. totiens quotiens id fecerint. quadraginta dies indulgentiarum | de iniunctis eis penitentijs misericorditer in domino relaxamus. Jn | cuius rei testimonium prędentes litteras sigilli nostri appensione roborandas | duximus. Datum Augustę die vndecima mensis May. ab anno na- | tiuitatis domini nostri iesu christi millesimo quingentesimo decimo.

Die Deutung dieser Bulle ist in einigen Details nicht ganz einfach. So dürfte der Vermerk, daß der *archetypus* der Bulle sich im Archiv von Zwiefalten befinde, wohl nicht auf deren Original beziehen, sondern so zu interpretieren sein, daß das Kloster Zwiefalten eine Abschrift der Bulle besaß, die dann als Vorlage des Ratdoltschen Abdruckes diente.[61] Größere Schwierigkeiten bereitet die Beantwortung der Frage, warum die Bulle am Ende Augsburg als Ausstellungsort angibt. Hat Uriel sie dort, eventuell bei einem Besuch Augsburgs im Zuge einer Bereisung seiner Erzdiözese, ausgestellt? Auf diese Weise fiele der Ausstellungsort mit dem Wohnort des Hauptpromotors der Konfirmation der *Historia*, Konrad Peutingers, zusammen. Wichtig ist in diesem Zusammenhang, daß sich die Konfirmationsbulle augenscheinlich nur auf die *Historia Sancti Hieronymi* bezieht; die der heiligen Anna gewidmete wird (obwohl sie doch zuerst entstand) mit keinem Wort erwähnt. Eine Konfirmation der Annenhistorie (wie der übrigen Hymnen des Druckes, also aller auf den Seiten XXr – XXXVIv stehenden Texte) wurde dementsprechend also anscheinend weder beantragt noch wurde sie erlangt. Die Annenhistorie war demnach, worauf die oben abgedruckten, sie einleitenden Texte hinweisen, nur eine private Auftragsarbeit des Zwiefaltener Abtes Georg Fischer an Bebel und seine Freunde. Von Interesse ist weiterhin, wie die drei Urheber der *Historia* in der Konfirmationsbulle angesprochen werden: Heinrich Bebel als *poeta*, Clemens und Casselius als Priester; alle drei sind *deuoti nostri dilecti*. Inwieweit sich hieraus eine genauere Vorstellung des Mainzer Erzbischofs von Bebels Persönlichkeit und Werk ableiten

[60] Danach ein (abbreviiertes) *que*, das handschriftlich getilgt wurde.
[61] Freundlicher Hinweis von Peter Johanek (Münster).

läßt, ist kaum zu sagen. Im weiteren wird der Vorgang der Prüfung der *Historia* auf Rechtgläubigkeit hin beschrieben (mit der oben erwähnten textlichen Dublette), sie wird für rechtgläubig erklärt (*rite*), die drei "Antragsteller" wiederholen ihre Bitte um Approbation (*supplicatum*), worauf Erzbischof Uriel den Gebrauch der *Historia* in Lesung (*legi*) und Gesang (*decantari*) in den Grenzen seiner Erzdiözese gestattet. Wer an Lesung oder gesanglicher Darbietung, also dem liturgischen Vollzug der *Historia* von Anfang bis Ende teilnimmt oder den Gebrauch der *Historia* unterstützt (*manus adiutrices*), erhält vierzig Tage Ablaß.

Die Konfirmationsbulle läßt nicht erkennen, ob der Mainzer Erzbischof hier nur einer von wichtigen Standesvertretern vorgebrachten Bitte entsprach, oder ob er das Anliegen Bebels und seiner Freunde, durch (sprachlich wie inhaltlich) verbesserten Kirchengesang die Verehrung des heiligen Hieronymus, damit aber das Glaubensleben insgesamt zu fördern, teilte. Zu vermuten ist dies: Der in Paris und Padua ausgebildete Jurist (1488 Promotion zum Dr. iuris utriusque) bemühte sich seit seinem Amtsantritt 1508 bis zu seinem Tode 1514 um eine "bessere Priesterausbildung, Reinigung der Liturgie und Abstellung des Konkubinats".[62] Bereits 1505 (gedruckt 1507) hatte der (damals in Mainz ansässige) Humanist Johannes Rhagius Aesticampianus (Sommerfeld) in seinen *Epigrammata* gerühmt: "Ihm wird das Lob gespendet, daß er Ruhm aus dem Studium erstrebe und ein gründlicher Kenner des Rechts sei; die ihm untergebene Geistlichkeit hatte er in strenger Zucht und Ordnung".[63] Uriel dürfte also, ohne auf diesem Gebiet selbst tätig geworden zu sein, dem von hochmögender Seite an ihn herangetragenen Vorhaben Bebels und seiner Freunde positiv gegenüber gestanden haben.

[62] A. Gerlich, "Uriel von Gemmingen", in *Lexikon des Mittelalters* 8 (1997), Sp. 1297f. Siehe weiterhin A. Ph. Brück, "Uriel von Gemmingen", *Neue deutsche Biographie* 6 (1971), S. 180. Deutliche humanistische Interessen sind für Uriels Bruder Georg (gestorben 1511 als Dompropst von Speyer) nachweisbar (Korrespondenz mit Trithemius), siehe F. Jürgensmeier, "Gemmingen-Michelfeld, Uriel von", in *Die Bischöfe des Heiligen römischen Reiches 1448-1648. Ein biographisches Lexikon*, Hg. E. Gatz (Berlin, 1996), S. 217-219, hier S. 217f.; ebd. S. 218 zu Uriels Reformbemühungen und zu der – unsicheren – Nachricht, er habe Reuchlin in seinem Streit gegen Pfefferkorn unterstützt. Zu Georg von Gemmingen siehe F. Falk, "Der Dompropst Georg von Gemmingen, Wimphelings Freund", *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* 121 (1898), S. 869-886 und jetzt besonders H. von Seggern, "Zur Kirchenreformdiskussion in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts im Bistum Speyer", *Archiv für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte* 53 (2001), S. 197-231, hier S. 215.

[63] Bauch, "Aus der Geschichte des Mainzer Humanismus" (wie Anm. 36), S. 50-60, Zitat S. 52. Die Epigramme wurden 1507 in Leipzig gedruckt, siehe ebd. S. 50 Anm. 149.

III D) DIE WIDMUNG DER *HISTORIA* AN ABT LEONHARD DÜRR VON ADELBERG

Einen besonderen Rang unter den Beigaben des Druckes nimmt das Widmungsschreiben Bebels an den Abt Leonhard Dürr von Adelberg ein; es ist, zusammen mit den aus ihm hervorgehenden kurzen Texten, diejenige Beigabe, die dem Druck der *Historia* zeitlich am nächsten steht. Bebels Prosatext wird, um den Angesprochenen besonders zu ehren, durch ein Tetrastichon beschlossen. Die Datierung des Schreibens (9. 11. 1511; Druck: 17. 9. 1512) zwingt zu der Annahme, daß Bebel und seine Freunde dem Abt ein handschriftliches Exemplar der *Historia* überreichten – vielleicht, um finanzielle Unterstützung für den Druck derselben zu erlangen? – Bebels Schreiben hat den folgenden Wortlaut:

(b) [IIv-IIIr] REVERENDO IN CHRISTO | PATRI ET VIRO VNDE | CVNQVE DOCTISSI | MO ATQUE VTRI | VSQUE IVRIS DO / ctori. Leonharto Abbati Adelbergensi. | ordinis premonstratensis per Sueuiam | Bauariam: heluetiorumque terram visi | tatori: hoc est pręsidi et Epi- | scopo meritissimo. Hen- | ricus Bebelius | Iustingensis.
S. P. D.
BEne ageretur cum litteris. et litteratis Reuerende obseruandissimeque | pater: si omnibus primoribus. atque tam sacrarum quam Prophanarum | rerum rectoribus eadem mens esset: quę tibi: ita enim crescerent litterę. et | studiosi sua sibi aliquando studia responsura sperarent. Tu enim homo do- | ctissimus: atque non solum Iuris: sed et omnium honestarum artium consultissi | mus mira quadam humanitate singularibusque beneficiis prosequeris studi | osos et doctos: inter quos me non silendum duco. Verum inter primos con- | numerandum: cui te patronum pręstas liberalissimum. Sed de multis tibi similibus | longe aliena mens est. et vite institutio: Pauci enim docti in vtraque re publi | ca sunt. multo pautiores doctorum studiosi: atque amatores: vnde non parum | negliguntur litterę. atque peruerse tractantur tam res seculares quam ecclesiasti- | cę imperitorum libidine dum doctorum nulla habetur ratio. sed hęc parua | sunt ad ea que sum nunc dicturus. Optime et multo ominium [!] saluberrime con- | suleretur non solum religioni: sed vniuerse etiam ecclesię: si omnibus ecclesi- | arum regibus eadem mens esset que tibi: multi enim sunt qui res propha- | nas. apros [! – ob agros?]. prędia. census et id genus similia diligenter procurant. Vtiliterque rebus gerendis pręsunt. Verum pauci simul religionem. et omnia quę per- | tinent ad cultum diuinum tanto impendio et ardore promoueant. Tu vero | (citra adulationem rem omnibus notam profero) non solum verbo: et con- | [IIIr] silio: corpore: et animo bona monasterii tutaris prouide: augensque etiam in- | dies honestissime: cunctaque ędificia vel collapsa. vel ruinam minitancia instau | ras: nouaque subinde construis non pauca. Verumetiam tanto studio rebus | diuinis soles intendere: seruitioque dei consulere. Vt nichil antiquius ducas | nichilque coneris ardentius: quam tuum monasterium: omniaque tibi commissa ad | antiquorum et sanctorum patrum vitam: disciplinam regularem: frugalita | tem: deuotionemque (vt dicitur) et religionem reuocare. Quod ut salubri- | ter facere possis: assistat tibi precor deus optimus: maximus. Quibus ego | causis motus Reuerende pater: atque patrone omnium obseruantissime tibi no- | minatim hasce nostras historias dicaui: vt non solum eas in tuo monasterio | facias decantari: sed et in omnibus etiam locis: qui tuę industrię et prouisi- | oni sunt commendati: atque vt tuo exemplo prouocati: plures ecclesiarum prę- | positi: atque

gubernatores ęmulationis studio idem faciant. Dum in vtranque | partem: bonam et malam magni Auctores post se magnam trahant turbam. | Vale: et me commendatum habe patrone omnium obseruantissime. Ex Tubin- | ga die nono Nouembris. Anno M.D.XI.

Ad eundem tetrastichon eiusdem.
Accipe pacato vultu doctissime patrum
Historias: tibi quas nostra thalia dicat
Bebeliique tui memor esto: relligionis
Ordinis atque tui spes honor. atque decus.

Mit dem hier abgedruckten Schreiben (aus Tübingen, datiert auf den 9. November 1511) und dem darauffolgenden Tetrastichon widmet Bebel dem Abt des Prämonstratenserklosters Adelberg, Leonhard Dürr die *Historia*.[64]

Dürr, der in Tübingen studiert hatte und später anscheinend den Grad eines *Doctor utriusque iuris* erreichte, war seit 1501 Abt von Adelberg, um dessen Reform er sich in vielfältigster Weise verdient machte. Er ließ die Gründungsgeschichte von Adelberg neu abschreiben und bei Johann Prüss in Straßburg zwei Breviarien und ein Missale für den Prämonstratenserorden drucken.[65] Daneben betrieb Dürr offenbar energisch die wirtschaftliche Festigung seines Klosters und dessen künstlerische Ausgestaltung. "In den ersten Jahrzehnten des 16. Jahrhunderts war er die Führungsgestalt des württembergischen Prälatenstandes" und als solcher auch vielfach politisch tätig. "Freundschaftliche Kontakte verbanden Dürr nicht nur mit Heinrich Bebel, sondern auch mit anderen württembergischen Humanisten, so beispielsweise mit Johannes Kessler (Casselius), der selbst Epigramme auf den Abt verfaßte, oder mit Konrad Celtis, der des öfteren in Adelberg beherbergt wurde". Bebel verfaßte – wohl auf Dürrs Wunsch – ein Epitaphium des (erst 1538 gestorbenen) Abtes, das "eine Würdigung des Lebens und der Verdienste des Abtes darstellt". Ihm, der zumindest mit zweien von deren drei Urheber befreundet war, die *Historia* zu widmen, lag deshalb sehr nahe; dies vor allem wegen Dürrs explizitem Engagement für die Ordens- und Klosterreform. Bebels Widmungsschreiben rühmt zunächst den Abt als Förderer und Patron der *litterae*, um dann festzustellen, es gebe zwar viele Kirchenfürsten, die sich die Förderung der weltlichen Angelegenheiten (*praedia*, *census* etc.) sehr angelegen sein ließen, nur sehr wenige aber, die sich gleichermaßen der Förderung der *religio* annähmen. Dürr habe nicht nur die *bona* seines Klosters beschützt und vermehrt und die zusammengebrochenen Gebäude wiederhergestellt, sondern er nehme sich mit gleichem Eifer der *res diuinae* an. Er erstrebe nichts brennender, als sein Kloster und alles ihm anvertraute *ad antiquorum et sanctorum patrum vitam: disciplinam re-*

[64] Zu Dürr siehe Mertens, Bebel-Datenbank (wie Anm. 17), Biogramm Nr. 160; danach das folgende.

[65] Zum Brevier siehe GW (wie Anm. 5) 5232: Straßburg [Johann Prüss] 1500, 8°. Der GW (wie Anm. 5) bemerkt hierzu, daß das Brevier die besonderen Feste des Prämonstratenserstiftes Adelberg, Diözese Konstanz berücksichtige. Das Missale erschien bei Prüss um 1510, siehe VD 16 (wie Anm. 8) M 5647.

gularem: frugalitatem: deuotionem (ut dicitur) et religionem reuocare. Deutlicher läßt sich Dürrs Engagement für die Reform Adelbergs in weltlicher wie vor allem geistlicher Hinsicht kaum formulieren. Erstrebt wird die Rückkehr zu den Tugenden der "Väter", also der eigenen Frühzeit: Befolgung der Regel, Einfachheit (d.h. Vermeidung jeder Art von Luxus), Frömmigkeit, Gottesverehrung. Eben dies, so fährt Bebel fort, sei der Grund, warum er Dürr die *Historia* (*nostras historias*) namentlich zueigne, auf daß dieser die Offizien nicht nur in seinem Kloster singen lasse, sondern in allen ihm anvertrauten "Orten" – was darauf anspielen dürfte, daß Dürr "mehrmals in Folge zum Visitator der bayerischen und schwäbischen Zirkarie der Prämonstratenser bestellt" wurde.[66] Die Reform der Liturgie durch Schaffung neuer und besserer Texte, die bisher liturgisch nicht gewürdigte Heilige einbezog, erscheint hier als genuiner Teil einer Reform von Kloster und Kirche in umfassendem Sinne.

Auf Bebels Schreiben, dem die *Historia* in handschriftlicher Form beigefügt gewesen sein dürfte, reagierte der Adelberger Abt nur wenige Tage später mit einem Schreiben an Heinrich Bebel:

> [IIIv] (c) Leonhartus Abbas adelber | gensis suo Heinrico | bebelio
>
> Salutem dicit. Non imprudenter facis bebeli charissime: qui dum adolescen- | tiorem etatem exercitasti / facecijs / hilarioribusque studijs / atque felicius pro | gressus: Lingue latinę apud germanos / non mediocriter consuluisti: qui nunc vi- | rili etate / Jllustrandę germanię / prouinciam suscepisti: super[67] omnium optime abs- | te factum est: quod rebus ecclesię / et pietatis / carmen tuum accomodasti. Proinde | non possumus te non laudare: jmo et amare plurimum: dum S. annę. Jllustrissi- | mique doctoris Hieronymi / meritam laudem et Historiam / omnibus religionis stu- | diosis proposuisti. Quod igitur ad nos attinet / tuo pio / religiosoque proposito / libenter | sumus assensuri: atque non tam nostros subditos / quam nobis amicos omnes / ad hoc | opus piissimum suscipiendum celebrandumque cohortabimur: Uale et nos ama: atque | relictis secularibus litteris: tuum studium post hac / deo rebusque diuinis / deuo- | ueas: Ut cępisti feliciter. Jterum vale Ex ęde nostra Adelbergensi die decima | quinta Nouembris. Anno Millesimo quingentesimo vndecimo.

In seinem Antwortschreiben lobt Dürr Bebel dafür, daß er nun, nach den weltlichen literarischen Übungen seiner "Fazetien" und der Förderung des Lateinischen in den Jahren seiner Adoleszenz, in männlichem Alter sein *carmen* (seine dichterische Gabe) den *rebus ecclesiae et pietatis* widme. Er müsse Bebel dafür loben und liebe ihn noch mehr als bisher, weil er die *Historia* verfaßt habe. Er stimme Bebels Vorschlag (nämlich die *Historia* im eignen Kloster singen zu lassen), gerne zu und wolle auch all seine Freunde dazu anhalten. Dürr schließt mit einer neuerlichen Mahnung an Bebel, er möge nun, nachdem er die *litterae saeculares* hinter sich gelassen habe, seine weiteren Studien konsequent den *rebus diuinis* widmen.

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[66] Mertens, Bebel-Datenbank (wie Anm. 17); Biogramm Nr. 160.

[67] Das Münchener Exemplar Rar. 438 (wie Anm. 14) korrigiert handschriftlich (Bebel?) zu "Jnsuper".

Nachrichten darüber, ob die *Historia* in Adelberg (und anderen, von Dürr visitierten Konventen?) tatsächlich verwendet wurde, scheinen zu fehlen, doch wird man angesichts der großen Zahl der Druckexemplare derselben zumindest eine gewisse Verbreitung annehmen dürfen.

RÜHMENDE MEMORIA
DER ZUSAMMENHANG VON VERDIESSEITIGUNG UND RELIGIOSITÄT IN DER GEDÄCHTNISPFLEGE DER HUMANISTEN

Berndt Hamm

Im Zusammenhang eines Zeitalters, das durch intensivierte Frömmigkeit, größte religiöse Erregung, fundamentale theologische Konflikte und Bekenntniseifer gekennzeichnet ist, bedeutet das Eindringen des Humanismus in Deutschland seit dem späten 15. Jahrhundert zweifellos einen bemerkenswerten Säkularisierungsschub. Er zeigt sich besonders auffallend in jener Erinnerungs- und Gedächtniskultur, wie sie von den humanistischen Gelehrten in ihren städtischen Zirkeln propagiert und praktiziert wurde. Die Texte der Antike, die für sie zur Orientierungsnorm ihrer vielseitigen Bildungsbestrebungen wurden, vermittelten ihnen eine stark diesseitsbezogene Memoria-Konzeption, die auf den unvergänglichen Ruhm (*gloria, fama*) im Gedächtnis der Nachwelt zielt.

Maßgebend war in dieser Hinsicht vor allem der damals bestens bekannte Sallust (C. Sallustius Crispus, 86-34 v. Chr.), der erste römische Geschichtsschreiber, der sich programmatisch und wegweisend zum Zweck einer schriftlich und bildlich tradierten Totenmemoria äußert. Seine beiden berühmten Werke *Catilinae coniuratio* und *Bellum Iugurthinum* eröffnete er jeweils mit grundsätzlichen Überlegungen zum sinnstiftenden Wert der *memoria* oder *fama*,[1] in deren Dienst auch sein eigenes literarisches Schaffen treten soll: Als Geschichtsschreibung vergegenwärtigt es die erinnerungswürdigen Taten der Vergangenen und zugleich lässt es den Autor selbst im Gedächtnis der Nachwelt fortleben. Über diese Zielbestimmung der Memoria schreibt Sallust:

> Alle Menschen, die danach trachten, den anderen Lebewesen überlegen zu sein, sollten mit aller Kraft danach streben, dass sie ihr Leben nicht in der Stille vergehen lassen wie das Vieh, das die Natur gekrümmt und dem Bauche hörig gebildet hat. All unsere Kraft liegt hingegen im Geist und im Körper: den Geist verwenden wir mehr zum Herrschen, den Körper mehr zum Dienen; das eine haben wir mit den Göttern gemeinsam, das andere mit den Tieren. Um so richtiger scheint es mir zu sein, mit den Kräften des Geistes statt mit denen körperlicher Stärke Ruhm (*gloria*) zu erwerben und, da ja das Leben selbst, das wir genießen, kurz ist, dem Andenken an uns (*memoria nostri*) möglichst große Dauer zu verleihen. Denn der

[1] Vgl. Sallust, *Catilinae coniuratio*, 1-4; *Bellum Iugurthinum*, 1-4.

> Ruhm des Reichtums und der Schönheit ist unbeständig und gebrechlich, die Tugend (*virtus*) dagegen ist ein strahlender und ewiger Besitz.[2]

Entfaltet Sallust hier den Wert des Andenkens prospektiv in die Zukunft, so kann er im Blick auf die Dauer der Tugend den gleichen Gedanken auch retrospektiv entfalten: Schaut man die aus Wachs hergestellten Bilder der Ahnen an, dann wird der Geist vorzüglicher Männer durch die Erinnerung (*memoria*) an ihre Taten zur Tugend (*virtus*) entflammt, und dieses nacheifernde Streben kommt nicht eher zur Ruhe, bis ihre Tugend dem Nachruf und Ruhm (*fama atque gloria*) der Vorfahren gleichkommt.[3] Die vergegenwärtigende Erinnerung an vergangene Vortrefflichkeit spornt also die Erinnernden an, durch entsprechende Tugend für den eigenen Ruhm im Gedenken der Nachgeborenen zu sorgen. Aus diesen programmatischen Gedanken Sallusts konnten die deutschen Humanisten vor und nach 1500 ihre eigene retrospektive und prospektive *memoria*/*fama*-Konzeption herauslesen. Schon bei Sallust stießen sie auch auf eine ihnen unmittelbar einleuchtende metaphysische Begründung und Legitimierung des Strebens nach dauerhaftem Nachruhm, die aus der Verbindung römischen Denkens und griechischer Philosophie hervorging: Es ist die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, die auch die edlen Handlungen des Geistes unsterblich macht.[4] Wenige Jahre vor Sallust hat ihm Cicero diese Argumentationsweise vorgegeben, indem er in seiner philosophischen Schrift *Cato maior de senectute* schreibt: "Wäre es nicht so, dass die Seelen unsterblich sind, so würden nicht die Seelen gerade der Edelsten am meisten nach unsterblichem Ruhm streben".[5] Im gleichen Zusammenhang taucht bei Cicero die – von Humanisten ebenfalls gern rezipierte – Vorstellung auf, die unsterblichen Seelen berühmter Männer

[2] Sallust, *Catilinae coniuratio*, 1.1-4: "Omnis homines, qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus, summa ope niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri oboedientia finxit, sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est. Quo mihi rectius videtur ingeni quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere, et quoniam vita ipsa qua fruimur brevis est, memoriam nostri quam maxume longam efficere; nam divitiarum et formae gloria fluxa atque fragilis est, virtus clara aeternaque habetur".

[3] Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*, 4.5f.: "Nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maxumum, P. Scipionem, praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, quom maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissume sibi animum ad virtutem accendi; scilicet non ceram illam neque figuram tantam vim in sese habere, sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius sedari, quam virtus eorum famam atque gloriam adaequaverit".

[4] Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*, 2.2: "At ingeni egregia facinora sicuti anima immortalia sunt". Vgl. 2.3: "Animus incorruptus aeternus, rector humani generis, agit atque habet cuncta neque ipse habetur".

[5] Cicero, *Cato maior de senectute*, 23.82: "Quod quidem ni ita se haberet, ut animi immortales essent, haud optimi cuiusque animus maxime ad immortalitatem et gloriam niteretur".

bewirkten nach deren Tode, dass das ehrende Andenken an sie auf Erden fortdauert.[6]

Für die Humanisten fügte sich diese geistige Memoria-Konzeption der römischen Autoren problemlos in ihren traditionellen christlichen Glauben an das unsterbliche Weiterleben der Seele nach dem Tode ein. Religiöse Jenseitsvorstellung und diesseitsbezogenes Ruhmverständnis gehen in ihrer gelehrten Gedächtniskultur eine unlösbare Verbindung ein – ähnlich wie in der gleichzeitigen kirchlichen Memorialkultur des Bürgertums oder auch des Adels Pflege der weltlichen Ehre und Gottesverehrung zusammengehören. Aus der Sicht der Humanisten ist die ethische Vortrefflichkeit der *virtus* etwas Geistig-Dauerhaftes, der einzige wirklich unsterbliche, letztgültige Besitz des Menschen, der ihm nach Gottes Willen sowohl ehrenden Nachruhm auf Erden als auch den Lohn der himmlischen Seligkeit einbringt. Die Wirkungen der Tugend, die immer auch christlich als Wirkungen der Tugenden Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe verstanden werden können, sind sowohl irdisch als auch jenseitig von verdienstvoller Konsequenz.

Im Sinne einer derartig integrativen *Memoria*-Pflege führt Kaiser Maximilian I. (1459-1519) in seinem – von einem humanistisch gebildeten Redaktor ausgearbeiteten – Prosaroman *Weißkunig* folgendes Gespräch:

> Weiter sprach der kunig zu demselben herrn: "Sag mir ains: Was beleibt dem menschen lenger, das guet oder die gedächtnus"? Darauf gab der herr die antwort: "Wann ein mensch stirbt, so volgen ime nichts nach dann seine werk" [Zitat aus Apok. 14,13: ***Beati mortui, qui in Domino moriunter […]: opera enim illorum sequuntur illos***]. Auf sölichs redet der kunig: "Du redest recht; wer ime in seinem leben kain gedachtnus macht, der hat nach seinem tod kain gedächtnus und desselben menschen wird mit dem glockendon [d. h. mit dem Verklingen des Begräbnisgeläutes] vergessen; und darumb so wirt das gelt, so ich auf die gedechtnus ausgib, nit verloren, aber das gelt, das erspart wird in meiner gedachtnus, das ist ain undertruckung meiner kunftigen gedächtnus, und was ich in meinem leben in meiner gedächtnus nit volbring, das wird nach meinem tod weder durch dich oder ander nit erstat".[7]

[6] Cicero, *Cato maior de senectute*, 22.80 (innerhalb eines von Cicero frei übersetzten Zitates aus Xenophon, der diese Worte dem sterbenden Kyros in den Mund legt): "Nec vero clarorum virorum post mortem honores permanerent, si nihil eorum ipsorum animi efficerent, quo diutius memoriam sui teneremus". Vgl. Xenophon: *Kyropädie*, 8.7. Zur Rezeption dieser Passagen aus Ciceros *Cato maior de senectute*, c. 22 und 23, vgl. z.B. den Ulmer Stadtarzt Wolfgang Reichart in einem Brief vom 26. Juli 1535: "Grandis fuit apud philosophos disceptatio de immortalitate animarum, nec, me hercule, legi pulchriora argumenta quam apud Marcum Tullium Ciceronem in libro de senectute, ubi adfirmat animas esse immortales, quoniam posteritatem et memoriam sui curarent […]". Vgl. auch die weiteren Ausführungen Reicharts, zit. von W. Ludwig, "Der Ulmer Humanist Rychardus und sein totes Kind. Humanismus und Luthertum im Konflikt", *Daphnis* 24 (1995), S. 263-297: hier S. 272-275.

[7] Zitiert nach J.-D. Müller, *Gedechtnus: Literatur und Hofgesellschaft um Maximilian I.* (München, 1982), S. 82.

Dieser Textabschnitt macht deutlich, dass sich die kostenaufwendigen literarischen und künstlerischen Pläne Maximilians, Aufträge an humanistische Autoren vor allem geschichtlicher Werke und an die "grossen kinstler der malerey und schnitzerey",[8] primär und vordergründig nicht auf den Lohn im Jenseits, sondern auf irdisches Andenken bei der Nachwelt "im Sinne einer humanistischen Ruhmesideologie" richten.[9] Die humanistische Gedächtnis-Konzeption schließt aber, wie ich zeigte, den transzendenten Bezugspunkt der Unsterblichkeit und ewigen Seligkeit durchaus ein, oft nur stillschweigend-implizit, aber sehr häufig auch ausdrücklich, wie bei Maximilian das Zitat aus der biblischen Offenbarung des Johannes (14:13) zeigt, das auch in der damaligen Liturgie von Totenmessen enthalten war. Eine Deutung des humanistischen Ruhmesdenkens als Ausdruck eines völlig säkularisierten und profanisierten Selbstverständnisses verbietet sich, wie ich meine, generell.

Der Stolz der Humanisten, an den sie ihre Hoffnung auf *fama* und *gloria* in der Nachwelt besonders knüpfen, sind ihre literarischen Werke, ihre selbst verfassten oder von ihnen übersetzten und herausgegebenen Bücher, Schriften und Gedichte. Diese Produkte verstehen sie im Sinne der *bonae litterae* oder *bonae artes* als gute Werke des Geistes, die durch ihre sprachliche Eleganz und den edlen Inhalt der ethischen Bildung des Menschen dienen. Sie sollen ihn zu einer an den Bildungsnormen der Antike geschulten tugendhaften Lebens- und Sterbekunst im Sinne wahrer *humanitas* und *pietas*, *doctrina* und *sapientia* führen. Mit dieser Zielsetzung sind die Bücher selbst Bestandteil einer zugleich diesseits- und jenseitsorientierten geistigen Tugendhaltung, also auch gute Werke im transzendenten Sinne. Dieses integrative säkular-religiöse und pagan-christliche Verständnis des literarischen Werks kommt besonders auf den Grabdenkmälern humanistischer Gelehrter nördlich der Alpen zum Ausdruck, wie sie Ute Verstegen untersucht hat.[10] Auffallend ist auf den ersten Blick, dass diese Epitaphien die Verstorbenen nicht mehr wie damals üblich als Betende kniend vor einer Andachtsszene, etwa der Kreuzigung, dem Schmerzensmann, der Gregorsmesse, dem Gnadenstuhl oder Maria als Schutzmantelmadonna, zeigen, sondern statt dessen das mit Inschriften versehene Porträt des Verstorbenen in halbfigürlicher Ansicht zum beherrschenden Bildthema machen. Schon darin ist ein säkularisierender Zug zu erkennen. Er wird durch die Betonung der Gelehrtenleistung in Gestalt der literarischen Werke unterstrichen. Die Memoria konzentriert sich auf die Bücher, die der verstorbene Autor in der Hand hält oder auf denen er seine Hände ruhen lässt. Entsprechend legen die Inschriften großen Nachdruck auf seine Verdienste und heben hervor, dass er durch den Ruhm seiner gelehrten Werke, seine Bildung und Tugend weiterlebt.

[8] Müller, *Gedechtnus* (wie Anm. 7), S. 80.

[9] Müller, *Gedechtnus* (wie Anm. 7), S. 82.

[10] U. Verstegen, "Die Grabdenkmäler der humanistischen Gelehrten – Antikenrezeption im Norden", in *Wege zur Renaissance. Beobachtungen zu den Anfängen neuzeitlicher Kunstauffassung im Rheinland und in den Nachbargebieten*, Hgg. N. Nußbaum, C. Euskirchen und S. Hoppe (Köln, 2003), S. 285-325.

Stets aber ist auch die religiöse Dimension präsent. Dies zeigt beispielhaft ein berühmtes Epitaph in gedruckter Holzschnittfassung, das einen stilbildenden Einfluss auf die Gattung humanistischer Epitaphien ausübte: das sogenannte Sterbebild des Konrad Celtis (1459-1508), das der Dichter in Vorahnung seines nahenden Todes bereits 1507 durch Hans Burgkmair in Augsburg anfertigen ließ und an seine Gelehrtenfreunde verschickte (Abb. 1).[11] Hier begegnen wir auf einer Inschrift unterhalb der Bücher des Autors wieder dem Vers aus der Johannesoffenbarung (14:13) und der Totenliturgie: "[…] denn ihre Werke folgen ihnen nach" (*opera eorum sequuntur illos*). Das bedeutet, dass der Dichter, wie die weiteren Inschriften des Holzschnitts verdeutlichen, in zweifacher Dimension über den Tod hinaus fortlebt: „Er ruht in Christus" (*Hic in Christo quiescit*), zugleich "spricht er, auf dauerhafte Weise lebendig, durch seine Schriften zu gelehrten Männern" (*longum vivus in aevum conloquitur doctis per sua scripta viris*). Von dieser Doppelseitigkeit her ist auch das Motto zu verstehen, das sich als Pentameter auf einem Schriftband über Celtis' lorbeerbekränztes Haupt spannt: "Der Tod ist der Prüfstein der Taten. Wer gut gehandelt hat, besitzt" (*Exitus acta probat.*[12] *Qui bene fecit habet*), d.h. er *besitzt* das Fortleben in himmlischer Seligkeit, im Gedächtnis Gottes, und zugleich das ruhmvolle Fortleben auf Erden im bleibenden Gedächtnis der Menschen. Darin liegt die Unsterblichkeit der Tugend, wie sie sich auch – und für Humanisten besonders – in den literarischen Leistungen dokumentiert.

Immer wieder fällt auf den Humanisten-Epitaphien die Kombination profaner und religiöser, paganer und christlicher Symbolik auf. So zeigt das steinerne Epitaph, das für Celtis (seinem Testament gemäß) an der Außenwand des Wiener Stephansdoms angebracht wurde (Abb. 2),[13] die bekrönende Gestalt des Poeten mit seinen Büchern und darunter in zentraler Position einen Lorbeerkranz, in dessen Mitte ein Kreuz mit den Buchstaben des Wortes *VIVO* die Botschaft religiöser Heilserwartung vermittelt: *Vivo in cruce*.[14] Oder noch ein an-

[11] Vgl. Verstegen, "Die Grabdenkmäler" (wie Anm. 10), S. 291-295 (Abb. 2). Es gibt drei Fassungen des *Sterbebildes*, zwei mit dem (vorgegriffenen, falschen) Todesjahr 1507, das dritte mit der postum korrigierten Angabe 1508. Zum Folgenden vgl. auch besonders F. J. Worstbrock, "Konrad Celtis. zur Konstitution des humanistischen Dichters in Deutschland", in *Literatur, Musik und Kunst im Übergang von Mittelalter zur Neuzeit*, Hgg. H. Boockmann u.a. (Göttingen, 1995), S. 9-35: hier S. 16-24; ergänzend dazu D. Mertens, "Oberrheinische Humanisten im Bild. Zum Gelehrtenbildnis um 1500", in *Bild und Geschichte. Studien zur politischen Ikonographie, Festschrift für Hansmartin Schwarzmaier*, Hgg. K. Krimm und H. John (Sigmaringen, 1997), S. 221-248.

[12] Zitat aus Ovid, *Heroides* 2.85; Nachweis bei Worstbrock, "Konrad Celtis" (wie Anm. 11), S. 20, Anm. 37, mit dem Kommentar: „Was Celtis als Maxime zitiert, wird bei Ovid im Munde der unglücklichen Phyllis gerade bestritten". Die Fortsetzung des Schriftbandes war nicht als Zitat nachzuweisen.

[13] Vgl. Verstegen, "Die Grabdenkmäler" (wie Anm. 10), S. 287-291 (Abb. 1).

[14] So die meines Erachtens plausible Deutung von D. Wuttke, *Dazwischen. Kulturwissenschaft auf Warburgs Spuren*, Bd. 1 (Baden-Baden, 1996), S. 374 (Wiederabdruck des Aufsatzes "Dürer und Celtis" von 1980); gegen Worstbrocks Ausgrenzung des Religiösen und Christlichen aus Celtis' Dichtungsprogrammatik – vgl. Worstbrock, "Konrad Celtis" (wie Anm. 11), S. 23f.

deres Beispiel: Im Augsburger Domkreuzgang befindet sich das Epitaph des humanistisch gebildeten Arztes Adolph Occo (1447-1503) (Abb. 3).[15] Über der Inschrift, die den Ruhm seiner poetischen und medizinischen Gelehrsamkeit preist, zugleich aber im Sinne der traditionellen Frömmigkeit ein *Memento mori* anstimmt, sieht man den Arzt mit einem aufgeschlagenen Buch in der rechten und einer *Paternoster*-Gebetszählschnur (die erst später "Rosenkranz" genannt wurde) in der linken Hand. *Eruditio* und *pietas* verbinden sich in der Memorialkultur eines christlichen Humanismus, der durchaus Wert auf die kirchlichen Kultformen des Totengedenkens legt.[16]

Insgesamt aber ist im Vergleich mit der spätmittelalterlichen Verquickung von religiöser Memoria und standesgemäßer Repräsentation im Bereich der Kirche eine stärkere Hinwendung der Humanisten zur innerweltlich-profanen Erinnerung erkennbar. Das kirchliche Erinnern der Bürgergemeinde gerät in den Jahrzehnten vor der Reformation häufig in den Sog einer Faszination forcierter Christlichkeit, die frömmer, sittenstrenger, verinnerlichter, seelsorgerlicher und tröstender als bisher sein will. Das kann zwar durchaus auch das Anliegen von Humanisten sein. Auffallend aber an der humanistischen Gedächtniskultur ist besonders eine gegenläufige Faszination mit verdiesseitigender Tendenz. Was Humanisten vor allem zu faszinieren pflegt, ist nicht eine intensivierte Jenseitsfrömmigkeit und ein entsprechender Memoria-Kult, sondern der innerweltlich weiterwirkende, unsterbliche Ruhm tugendhaften Wirkens und ingeniöser Leistungen der Künste und Wissenschaften. Dass dabei, wie ich zeigte, der umgreifende Sinnhorizont religiöser Glaubensorientierung erhalten bleibt, ändert nichts an der epochalen Akzentverschiebung der Prioritäten.

An einem schönen Beispiel frühneuzeitlich-humanistischer Biographik kann das noch einmal veranschaulicht und präzisiert werden. Im Jahre 1553 publizierte der Melanchthonschüler Joachim Camerarius d. Ä. (1500-1574), humanistischer Philologe und Befürworter einer "milden", irenischen Reformation im Geiste des Humanismus, eine Lebensbeschreibung des Dichters Helius Eobanus Hessus (1488-1540).[17] Er wollte damit in der Tradition einer panegyrisch geformten Memorialrhetorik seinem Humanistenfreunde und zugleich einer früheren Phase des Renaissancehumanismus in Deutschland ein rühmendes Denkmal setzen. Seine Würdigung gewinnt so gleichsam den Charakter einer verspäteten Begräbnisrede, wie er es selbst am Ende gegenüber Adam Krafft, dem hessischen Reformator und Marburger Theologieprofessor, dem er die Schrift widmete, anklingen lässt:

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[15] Vgl. Verstegen, "Die Grabdenkmäler" (wie Anm. 10), S. 305-307.

[16] So regelte Celtis in seinem Testament vom 24. Jan. 1508 die liturgische Memoria im Wiener Stephansdom durch Totenmessen am 1., 7. und 30. Tag; vgl. *Der Briefwechsel des Konrad Celtis*, Hg. H. Rupprich (München, 1934), S. 604, 26-30.

[17] Vgl. die zweisprachige Edition *Joachim Camerarius: Narratio de Helio Eobano Hesso, comprehendens mentionem de compluribus illius aetatis doctis et eruditis viris (1553). Das Leben des Dichters Helius Eobanus Hessus mit Erwähnung mehrerer seiner gelehrten und gebildeten Zeitgenossen*, Lateinisch und deutsch, Hgg. G. Burkard und W. Kühlmann (Heidelberg, 2003); vgl. in dieser Ausgabe auch die Literaturübersicht zu Camerarius, Eobanus Hessus und ihrem Umkreis S. 14-19.

> Das war es, Adam, was ich über unseren Eobanus erzählen zu müssen meinte. Ich habe ihm diesen Dienst zwar später erwiesen, als du wolltest und als es meine Pflicht gewesen wäre, aber doch mit größter Gewissenhaftigkeit und Sorgfalt, und so habe ich gleichsam eingelöst, was einer Begräbnisfeierlichkeit geschuldet wird.[18]

Die ganze Schrift ist nichts anderes als ein einziger Lobpreis auf den unvergänglichen Ruhm (*fama*, *gloria*, *splendor nominis*, *claritas sempiterna*), den sich ein Mensch wie Eoban dank seiner Naturanlage, seiner Erziehung und seines Lerneifers durch die Perfektion poetischer Kunstfertigkeit erwarb. Zwar geht Camerarius auf die besondere Lebensumstände und Charaktereigenschaften des Verstorbenen ein, aber was er an ihm lobt und worin er die Grundlage des über den Tod hinaus weiterwirkenden Ruhms des Poeten sieht, sind stereotype Prädikate, die ebenso auch auf andere Personen des Erfurter, Leipziger oder Nürnberger Humanistenkreises angewandt werden: eine Sprachbildung im Umgang mit dem Lateinischen und Griechischen, die zum Tor einer tugendhaften Lebensformung, der *virtus*, wird, d.h. einer religiös grundierten Vortrefflichkeit des geistigen Wesens, die sich in gütiger Menschenfreundlichkeit (*humanitas*), Weisheit (*sapientia*), Lauterkeit (*integritas*), Treue (*fides*), Freimütigkeit und Freigebigkeit (*liberalitas*), Wahrheitsliebe (*veritas*) und Fähigkeit zu geselliger Freundschaft und Gastlichkeit erweist, nicht zuletzt aber in der Frömmigkeit und im *cultus religionis*. Es ist dieser humanistische Tugendkanon im Geiste antiker, teils platonisch, teils stoizistisch gefärbter, Lebensweisheit, der das Grundgerüst für die Memoria an einen Menschen bildet, der allen Widrigkeiten seiner Existenz zum Trotz höchste Sprachgewandtheit und ethische Vortrefflichkeit zu einem Lebenskunstwerk zu verbinden wusste. Wie sehr dabei im Sinne Eobans[19] ebenso wie in der Leitperspektive des Camerarius alles auf das Weiterleben des Verstorbenen in der rühmenden Erinnerung der Nachwelt zielt, heben die beiden krönenden Epitaphgedichte zu Ehren des "Dichterfürsten" hervor, die Camerarius in lateinischer und griechischer Sprache seinem Lebensrückblick angefügt hat.[20] Als literarische Totengedächtnismale rücken sie die ganze Schrift vollends an die Stelle eines Nachrufs, der

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[18] "Haec habui, Adame, quae ducerem narranda esse de Eobano nostro, cui serius quidem, quam tu voluisti et ego debui, sed fide et diligentia maxima hoc officium praestiti et quasi iusta funeris persolvi". *Joachim Camerarius* (wie Anm. 17), S. 138f. In der Interpunktion, Schreibweise und Übersetzung weiche ich hier und im Folgenden gelegentlich, wo mir eine Korrektur geboten erscheint, von der Editionsfassung ab.

[19] Vgl. Eobans große Elegie "An die Nachwelt" (*Eobanus posteritati*), die seinen Zyklus der *Heroidum libri tres* (III.9) abschloss; dazu K. Enenkel, "Autobiographisches Ethos und Ovid-Überbietung. Die Dichter-Autobiographie des Eobanus Hessus", *Neulateinisches Jahrbuch* 2 (2000), S. 26-38.

[20] *Joachim Camerarius* (wie Anm. 17), S. 142-145: das lateinische Epitaphium mit der Überschrift "HELIO EOBANO HESSO, viro optimo, principi poetarum, amico suavissimo" (Für Helius Eobanus Hessus, den besten Mann, den Dichterfürsten, den liebsten Freund); das griechische Epitaphium mit der Überschrift: ΗΛΙΩ ΕΩΒΑΝΩ ΕΣΣΩ *ἀνδρὶ βελτίστῳ καὶ ποιητῇ ἐμμελεστάτῳ* (Für Helius Eobanus Hessus, den besten Mann, den elegantesten Dichter).

am Grabe des Freundes und über das Grab hinaus auf die Unvergänglichkeit seines glänzenden Dichterruhmes verweist: Sein Leben lang habe er den Lohn gesucht, den seine Muse verdient. Jetzt aber wird ihm der Lohn postum, von Tag zu Tag wachsend, zuteil.[21] So schließt das lateinische Epitaph mit den Distichen:

> Illi etiam eximiae famae praeconia mundus
> Hesso, donec erit, splendidiora feret.
> Hoc satis est. Hessi busto sepelitur in isto
> Corpus, in aetheria spiritus arce manet.
> Per terras bona fama volat, speciosaque laudis
> Nomina Pieria testificata manus.
>
> [Ihm also auch wird die Welt, solange sie stehn wird, ein immer größeres Rühmen gewähren, glänzender preisen den Mann. Das ist genug. Hessus' Leib ist in diesem Grab bestattet, aber sein Geist weilt in der himmlischen Burg. Durch alle Lande fliegt sein guter Ruf, und die Musen unterschreiben mit eigener Hand das Lob, das seinen Namen erhöht.][22]

Die Jenseitsperspektive der Unsterblichkeit der geistigen Seele ist durch den Hinweis auf die ***aeteria arx*** (des himmlischen Jerusalem) präsent, so wie auch das griechische Epitaph auf die Seligpreisung zuläuft:

> Ὄλβιος ὃς κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι λελοιπὼς
> κεῖθεν ἐς οὐρανίους εὐθὺ βέβηκε δόμους.
>
> [Glücklich, wer einen herrlichen Ruf unter den Menschen zurückließ und dann sogleich zu den himmlischen Behausungen emporstieg!][23]

Diese Erwähnung der religiösen Jenseitsdimension ist keine Nebensächlichkeit und nicht nur eine Pflichtübung des Autors, sondern tritt auch in der Lebenserzählung wiederholt hervor, am deutlichsten dort, wo Camerarius auf die Krönung des Eoban'schen Lebenswerks in Gestalt seiner lateinischen Psalmendichtung, einer Übertragung des gesamten Psalters in elegische Distichen, eingeht:

> Aber Eobanus hat in seinem ganzen Leben nichts Größeres oder Besseres geleistet, als dass er die Psalmen Davids religiös und gebildet in die Form lateinischer Elegien übertrug: zuerst in Erfurt, dann nochmals und mit noch größerer Sorgalt und Unermüdlichkeit in Marburg, wo er auch den einzelnen Psalmen ganz deutliche Inhaltsangaben in jeweils vier Versen vorangestellt hat, so dass dann das wahrhaft heilige Werk in jeder Hinsicht vollendet hervortrat. Dadurch rühmte der durch Frömmigkeit ausgezeichnete Mann mit reinem Herzen und religiösem Eifer den ewigen Gott und bot allen, die nicht gottlos [***non profanus***] und verblendet sind, eine Gelegenheit, über die göttlichen Dinge mit Lust und Liebe zu meditieren. Das bedeutet bei Gott die höchste Form des Gottesdienstes und bei den

[21] Vgl. die Formulierungen des lateinischen Gedichts (S. 142f.), insbesondere den Vers: "Inque dies melior fama sepulta redit" (Und von Tag zu Tag größer kommt der Ruhm vom Grabe zurück).

[22] ***Joachim Camerarius*** (wie Anm. 17), S. 142f.

[23] ***Joachim Camerarius*** (wie Anm. 17), S. 144f.

> Menschen die größte Frucht. Das also ist das Werk und das die Arbeit, durch die sich Eobanus eine außergewöhnliche Anwartschaft auf Gottes Gnade und Wohlwollen erworben und der Nachwelt Bewunderung und Liebe hinterlassen hat. Alle Späteren, von Schuften und Barbaren abgesehen, lieben und verehren ihn gerade aus diesem Grund.[24]

Dieser Kulmination der Lebensleistung im *sacrosanctum opus* der Psalmendichtung lässt Camerarius das Lebensende des Dichters entsprechen, indem er es in das religiös verklärende Licht des geistlichen Aufstiegs der Seele zu Gott taucht: Eobanus

> begann plötzlich am 5. Oktober [1540] nach langem Schweigen unversehens zu sprechen und sagte, er wolle zu seinem Herrn emporsteigen [*adscendere*]. Das billigten die Anwesenden, weil sie meinten, er wolle sich mit seinem Landesherrn [dem Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen] treffen, und versicherten ihm, das werde den Fürsten freuen. Eobanus sagte nichts darauf, sondern beschloss bald darauf sein irdisches Leben mit einem sanften Ende und wanderte, wie er angedeutet hatte, in den Himmel hinauf zum ewigen Gott, seinem Herrn, dem er getreu gedient und dessen Dienste er unverdrossen auf sich genommen hatte mit dem Fleiß und dem Geschick, die ER ihm reichlich geschenkt hatte.[25]

Man wird der biographischen Gesamtkonzeption des Camerarius nur gerecht, wenn man zwischen dieser religiösen Jenseitsperspektive und der Diesseitshoffnung auf irdischen Ruhm keinen Gegensatz sieht, sondern ein Verhältnis der wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit – einem integrativen humanistischen

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[24] "Sed nihil est, quod in tota vita sua praestiterit maius aut melius, quam quod Psalmos Davidicos religiose et erudite in Latinas elegias transtulit: primum quidem Erphordiae, sed denuo et maiore cum cura et assiduitate Marpurgi, ubi et praeclara argumenta quaternis versibus comprehensa praeposuit singulis Psalmis, ut prodierit tum vere sacrosanctum opus, omnibus, ut dicitur, numeris absolutum. Quo vir pietate insignis et casto pectore et religioso studio celebravit aeternum Deum, et omnibus non profanis neque vaecordinis occasionem de rebus divinis cupide et ardenter commentandi praebuit. Qui est ad Deum cultus summus et maximus ad homines fructus. Hoc igitur opus et hic labor est, quo Eobanus sibi spem singularem gratiae et benevolentiae divinae comparavit et admirationem sui ac caritatem reliquit posteris. Quorum nemo est nisi improbus et malus aut imperitus et barbarus, qui non illum hoc potissimum nomine amet et veneretur". *Joachim Camerarius* (wie Anm. 17), S. 122f. Eobans *Psalterium universum* erschien in Marburg 1537, ein Jahr später mit beigefügten *argumenta* (ebd. S. 160, Anm. 103); vgl. G. Huber-Rebenich, "Der lateinische Psalter des Eobanus Hessus und das Ideal der *docta pietas*", in *Die Musen im Reformationszeitalter*, Hg. W. Ludwig (Leipzig, 1999), S. 289-303.

[25] "Propemodum igitur anno toto magis languoribus quam aegrotatione confectus tandem III. Nonas Octobris, quum diu tacuisset, de improviso voce emissa se velle ad Dominum suum adscendere dixit. Idque iis qui aderant approbantibus, quod arbitrarentur in animo ipsi esse congressum cum principe, et affirmantibus principi id gratum fore Eobanus nihil ad haec, sed paulo post placido fine conclusit vitam in terris suam et in coelum, ut significarat, hinc commigravit ad aeternum Deum Dominum suum, cui fideliter servierat et cuius ministeria sedulo obierat, ea gnavitate et solertia, quam ille idem ipsi fuerat largitus". *Joachim Camerarius* (wie Anm. 17), S. 130f.

Vorstellungsmodell gemäß, das man etwa so skizzieren kann: Gott zeichnet manche Menschen durch ein besonderes Ingenium wie das der poetischen Sprachkraft aus und will, dass solche Menschen ihre Begabung durch zielstrebiges Studieren der *bonae artes* entwickeln und in den Dienst der vollkommenen Tugend stellen, die sich dem Wohl des Gemeinwesens und der Veredelung des Menschen im Sinne wahrer *humanitas* verpflichtet weiß. Einer solchen Sprachgelehrsamkeit, Humanität und Tugendhaftigkeit wird von ihrem Ursprung her immer ein Drang zu Gott innewohnen,[26] so wie Gott ihre Diener auch im Jenseits reichlich belohnen wird. Zugleich aber will Gott, dass die so vorzüglich Begabten, die mit ihren geistigen Pfunden wuchern, auch auf Erden höchsten Ruhm genießen und so als leuchtende Vorbilder ihre Zeitgenossen und über den Tod hinaus auch die künftigen Generationen zur Nachahmung ihrer Kunstfertigkeit, Gelehrsamkeit und Tugend anspornen. Der Jenseitsglaube bildet also einen Rahmen oder Bogen, der sich vom göttlichen Begabtsein bis zum Lohn der ewigen Seligkeit spannt und dem gesamten Leben die spirituelle Tiefendimension der Unvergänglichkeit im Geiste verleiht.

Dieser geistige Transzendenzbezug bleibt prinzipiell für das Selbstverständnis und den Lebensentwurf der zahlreichen humanistischen Gelehrten gültig, die in der Darstellung des Camerarius den Lebensweg Eobans auf seiner homerischen *peregrinatio* kreuzen. Auffallend aber und typisch für die humanistische Umorientierung ist, wie stark insgesamt in dieser Dichterbiographie der religiöse Horizont zurücktritt und wie dominant sich das Verlangen nach dem fortdauernden weltlichen Ruhm in den Vordergrund der Darstellung schiebt. Von seiner evangelischen Gesinnung lässt Camerarius in der gesamten Schrift nichts erkennen. Er nimmt ganz den Standpunkt des über den Glaubenspartien stehenden und ihre Feindseligkeit ebenso wie ihren Rückfall in die Unbildung beklagenden Humanistengelehrten ein; und in dieser Rolle preist er die erinnerungsstiftende Kraft der herausragenden Lebensverdienste Eobans, will er selbst durch sein rühmendes Erzählen und seine Epitaphdichtungen die Eobanus-Memoria erhöhen[27] und damit nicht zuletzt als ehrgeiziger Autor auch für den eigenen literarischen Nachruhm sorgen. Wo das Jenseits zur Sprache kommt, ist es innerhalb der Gesamtkonzeption der Schrift ganz der innerweltlichen Ruhmesperspektive untergeordnet, ja man kann sagen, dass die Erwäh-

[26] Vgl. Camerarius' Bemerkung über die Griechischstudien, die ihn und Eobanus in Erfurt verbanden: "Nos quidem certe ita statuebamus hanc esse viam virtutis atque sapientiae et iter directum quum pietatis et religionis, tum humanitatis et laudis in hac vita et in terris" ["Wir beide jedenfalls setzten uns in den Kopf, dies sei der Zugang zur Tugend und Lebensweisheit und der gerade Weg zur Frömmigkeit und Religiosität ebenso wie zur Menschlichkeit und zur Ehre in diesem Leben auf Erden"]. *Joachim Camerarius* (wie Anm. 17), S. 30f.

[27] Was Camerarius über Eobanus schreibt, gilt auch für sein eigenes literarisches Bemühen in der Eobanus-Biographie: "Is enim erat Eobanus, qui merita aliorum non modo tegendo non obliterare, sed praedicando etiam amplificare soleret" ["Das nämlich war Eobanus, der die Verdienste anderer nicht nur nicht zu verschweigen und damit der Vergessenheit anheimzugeben, sondern rühmend auszusprechen und damit auch zu vergrößern pflegte"]. *Joachim Camerarius* (wie Anm. 17), S. 102f.

nung von *religio*, *pietas* und *cultus*, Gott und Unsterblichkeit wie schon in der Antike dazu dient, Wert und Legitimität eines Strebens nach dauerhaftem Nachruhm zu begründen.[28] Zur vollendeten Ruhmestauglichkeit Eobans gehört aus humanistisch-christlicher Perspektive dazu, dass sein Charakter und seine Lebensleistung durch ehrfürchtige Frömmigkeit gekrönt wurden: das macht ihn vollends zum vorbildhaften Poeten, dem der Glanz des unvergänglichen Namens gebührt.

Indem so das ganze Gewicht der Biographie und der Epitaphien auf die fortdauernde *fama* und *gloria* des Verstorbenen auf Erden fällt, wird paradigmatisch deutlich, in welchem Sinne man von einer Verdiesseitigung oder einem Säkularisierungsschub in der Memorialkultur des Renaissance-Humanismus sprechen kann. Gegenüber der kirchlichen Erinnerungskultur des Spätmittelalters mit ihrer immensen Fülle der Donationen und Stiftungen, die auf eine Verbesserung der Jenseitsaussichten des Menschen zielten, vollzog sich hier zwar keine völlige Profanisierung der Memoria, aber doch ihre weitgehende Verweltlichung. In gewisser Hinsicht wurde damit eine partielle Tendenz der spätmittelalterlichen Gaben- und Stiftungsfrömmigkeit aufgenommen und weitergeführt, sofern sich mit ihr unübersehbar ein starkes weltliches Ehr- und Repräsentationsbedürfnis der Reichen und Vornehmen verband.[29] Die Religiosität der Oberschichten hatte eben neben vielen anderen Facetten auch diese Seite der prestigebezogenen Öffentlichkeitswirkung im Bereich der Kirchen und Klöster. Es konnte daher seit dem ausgehenden Mittelalter sehr leicht zu einer Symbiose von kirchlichem Gedenken und humanistischer Gedächtnispflege kommen. Die in Kirchenräumen angebrachten Epitaphien humanistischer Gelehrter sind dafür ein gutes Beispiel. Wenn man den folgenden Zeitraum bis ins 18. Jahrhundert überblickt, zeigt sich langfristig, etwa in der Ausgestaltung der Grabmäler, Epitaphien und Leichenreden, ein immer stärkeres Hervortreten des irdischen Ehrgedenkens im Blick auf die ständische und berufliche Stellung, die Leistungen und Tugenden der Verstorbenen, während die religiös-eschatologische Dimension bis zum Verschwinden zurücktritt.[30] Die *fama*- und *gloria*-Perspektive der

[28] Vgl. das oben bei Anm. 4-6 zu Sallust und Cicero Gesagte.

[29] Vgl. B. Hamm, "Zeitliche Güter gegen himmlische eintauschen" – vom Sinn spätmittelalterlicher Stiftungen", in: *Geben und Gestalten. Brauchen wir eine neue Kultur der Gabe?*, Hgg. U. Hahn, Th. Kreuzer, S. Schenk, G. Schneider-Ludorff (Münster, 2008), S. 51-65; C. Schleif, *Donatio et Memoria. Stifter, Stiftungen und Motivationen an Beispielen aus der Lorenzkirche in Nürnberg* (München, 1990); S. Rüther, *Prestige und Herrschaft. Zur Repräsentation der Lübecker Ratsherren in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Köln, 2003).

[30] Vgl. exemplarisch A. Zaijc, *"Zu ewiger gedächtnis aufgericht". Grabdenkmäler als Quelle für Memoria und Repräsentation von Adel und Bürgertum im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit. Das Beispiel Niederösterreichs* (Wien, München, 2004); *Macht und Memoria. Begräbniskultur europäischer Oberschichten in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Hg. M. Hengerer (Köln u.a., 2005); K. Raschzok und D.-H. Voges, *"[…] dem Gott gnädig sei". Totenschilde und Epitaphien in der St. Georgskirche in Nördlingen* (Nördlingen, 1998); R. Lenz, *Leichenpredigten. Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Marburg, 1980);

Renaissance-Kultur des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts war daher die Etappe eines jahrhundertelangen Weges, die aus dem Leitbild der Antike eine spezifische Schubkraft empfing.

Die Reformation hingegen bedeutete gegenüber dieser langfristigen Tendenz einer verweltlichenden Memoria eine Unterbrechung, die gewissermaßen quer steht zwischen Spätmittelalter und Neuzeit. Wo sich die Reformation öffentlich durchsetzte, legten ihre entschiedenen Anhänger, ob Lutheraner oder Reformierte, offensichtlich großen Wert darauf, das Verlangen nach weltlichem Ehrgedenken auf Totengedächtnismalen stark zu domestizieren und völlig hinter der religiösen und biblisch normierten Aussage zurücktreten zu lassen. So klagte der Ulmer Stadtarzt und Humanist Wolfgang Reichart (Rychardus), dass die *Lutherani* "beinahe das ganze Gedächtnis an die Toten vernichtet haben".[31] Das Ulmer Kirchenregiment verbot dem Arzt, sein Wappen und dazu umfangreiche Epitaph-Gedichte am Grab seines Sohnes anzubringen.[32] Längere Texte auf Totengedächtnismalen, die etwa biographische Reminiszenzen enthalten, blieben in Ulm wie auch andernorts in evangelischen Gegenden Deutschlands noch lange, bis ins 17. Jahrhundert hinein, verbannt. Die zugelassenen Epitaphien bieten nur einen kurz gefassten Text mit wenigen Lebensdaten und einer christlich-biblischen Aussage, ohne ehrende Prädikationen auszuschließen. Als Beispiel mögen zwei Distichen eines Epitaphgedichts gelten, die in der Schwäbisch Haller Michaelskirche an die 1548 verstorbene Margarethe Brenz, die Frau des berühmten württembergischen Reformators Johann Brenz (1499-1570), erinnern (Abb. 4):

> Margaris eximii coniunx generosa mariti
> hic posuit corpus, spiritus astra tenet.
> Brentius hanc habuit, sed habet nunc Christus in ulnis,
> quem sancte coluit[33] iustificante fide.
>
> [Margarethe, die edle Frau eines herausragenden Mannes,
> legte hier ihren Körper nieder, ihr Geist ist bei den Sternen.
> Brenz hatte sie, jetzt hat Christus sie in den Armen,
> den sie fromm in rechtfertigendem Glauben verehrte.][34]

Leichenpredigten als Quelle historischer Wissenschaften, Hg. R. Lenz, Bd. 4 (Stuttgart, 2004).

[31] "Imo totam ferme defunctorum deleverunt memoriam demolientes sarcophagos, tumbas atque tabulas una cum epitaphiis" ([…], indem sie die Sarkophage, die Grabsteine und die Holztafeln zusammen mit den Epitaphien [im Sinne von Gedenk-Inschriften] zerstörten). Zitiert von Ludwig, "Der Ulmer Humanist Rychardus" (wie Anm. 6), S. 263-297: hier S. 273f. Wieweit Reicharts Aussagen über die Zerstörung des Totengedenkens die realen Vorgänge in Ulm während der frühen dreißiger Jahre, die unter zwinglianischem Einfluss standen, polemisch überzeichnet, sei nicht weiter erörtert; vgl. jetzt G. Litz, *Die reformatorische Bilderfrage in den schwäbischen Reichsstädten* (Tübingen, 2007).

[32] Vgl. Ludwig, "Der Ulmer Humanist Rychardus" (wie Anm. 6), S. 287-289.

[33] Vgl. das oben bei Anm. 4-6 zu Sallust und Cicero Gesagte.

[34] Zitiert von Ludwig, "Der Ulmer Humanist Rychardus" (wie Anm. 6), S. 295. Unter dem Gedicht steht die Subscriptio: "D[octor] Ioannes Brentius iunior chariss[imae]

Nicht auf Begabung, Stellung, Lebensleistung und Tugend der Verstorbenen blicken diese Distichen, auch wenn sie kurz an die Generosität der Verstorbenen als Gattin eines bedeutenden Mannes erinnern, sondern das Gewicht liegt ganz auf ihrer himmlischen Verbundenheit mit Christus, dem sie schon auf Erden durch ihren rechtfertigenden Glauben verbunden war. Ein rechtfertigender, heilsamer Glaube aber ist nach lutherischem Verständnis ein Vertrauen, das sich völlig dem Erbarmen Gottes anheimgibt und alles rühmende Erinnern an eigene Begabungen und Verdienste ausschließt. Wo im Humanismus ein Harmoniemodell von irdischem Ruhm und ewiger Seligkeit, Lebensleistung und Gottes Güte, weltlichem und religiösem Gedenken entfaltet wird, entsteht in der Reformation eine Haltung, die zwar im weltlichen Bereich *coram hominibus* Repräsentationsbedürfnis und Ehrgedenken zulässt, aber in der kirchlichen Memoria *coram Deo* die irdische *fama*- und *gloria*-Dimension zurückdrängt. Das bedeutet aus der Sicht der Reformatoren die Reinigung des christlichen Gedenkens vom Heidentum,[35] während humanistische Poeten wie Konrad Celtis oder noch deutlicher Eobanus Hessus gerade auf eine Synthese von paganer und christlicher Gedächtnispflege zielen.[36]

matri suae f[aciundum] c[uravit]". So ebd. S. 295, Anm. 65. Der hier genannte Sohn, der das Epitaph für seine Mutter setzte, war Dr. theol. Johannes Brenz d. J. (1539-1596). Das gesamte Epitaph besteht aus der Inschrift und dem Bildnis darunter, einem Steinrelief, das Margarethe Brenz kniend und betend vor dem Kruzifix darstellt. – Herr Dr. Henning Jürgens (Mainz) hat mir das von ihm aufgenommene Photo dankenswerterweise zur Verfügung gestellt.

[35] Vgl. S. Hendrix, *Recultivating the Vineyard. The Reformation Agendas of Christianization* (Louisville, Kentucky, 2004).

[36] Vgl. W. Ludwig, "Eobanus Hessus in Erfurt. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Humanismus und Protestantismus", *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* 33 (1998), S. 155-170, etwa S. 156: Eobans Huldigung an "Christus Apollo". Vgl. zu einer derartigen Synthese z.B. auch die Apologie des Strebens nach der "boni nominis gloria" durch den Humanisten Enea Silvio Piccolomini (1405-1464, seit 1458 Papst Pius II.) in der *Praefatio* seiner während der letzten Lebensjahre verfassten Memorien; dazu Z. von Martels, "Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini und die zwiefaltige Lust: Die hedonistischen Linien in seinem Leben und die Auswirkungen des Älterwerdens auf seine Sicht vom Paradies", *Neulateinisches Jahrbuch* 8 (2006), S. 177-199: hier S. 195f.

Abb. 1: Hans Burgkmair, Sterbebild des Konrad Celtis (gest. 1508), Holzschnitt 1507, hier in der dritten (postumen) Fassung von 1508



Abb. 2: Epitaph des Konrad Celtis (gest. 1508),
Wien, Aussenwand des Stephansdoms

Abb. 3: Epitaph des Adolph Occo (gest. 1503),
Augsburg, Domkreuzgang, Gregor Erhart zugeschrieben

Abb. 4: Epitaph der Margarethe Brenz (gest. 1548),
Schwäbisch Hall, Michaelskirche

RELIGION AS *EXERCITATIO MENTIS*: A CASE FOR THEOLOGY AS A HUMANIST DISCIPLINE

Willemien Otten

THEOLOGY BETWEEN PULPIT AND LECTERN

The academic study of theology as pursued today in most Dutch universities is heavily tailored to the demands of the ministry of the country's national protestant church. While that may be a pragmatic decision of sorts, as the vast majority of Dutch theology students training at public universities continue their career as pastors in the Dutch Reformed Church, the intellectual motives behind this operative view of academic theology betray a rather more complex history, calling for a reconsideration of the *status quo*. For one, this history is remarkably more recent than one would suspect in the case of such an established field of study. To trace its origins we must go back to the days of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who rehabilitated religion as a valuable object of study just when it had come under heavy fire from Enlightenment critics. Intent on overcoming their arguments, he regarded it as his task to confront not only Kant's epistemological scepticism but also the Romantic reaction that arose in response and that may in the end have posed an equally dangerous threat to the study of religion by replacing the divine with the natural universe. Let us look at the opening sentences of the first speech of his collection *On Religion. Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (*Reden über die Religion*), fittingly called an apology:

> It may be an unexpected undertaking, and you might rightly be surprised that someone can demand from just those persons who have raised themselves above the herd, and are saturated by the wisdom of the century, a hearing for a subject so completely neglected by them. I confess that I do not know how to indicate anything that presages a fortunate outcome for me, not even the one of winning your approval of my efforts, much less the one of communicating my meaning and enthusiasm to you. From time immemorial faith has not been everyone's affair, for at all times only a few have understood something of a religion while millions have variously played with its trappings with which it has willingly let itself be draped out of condescension [...] You have succeeded in making your earthly lives so rich and many-sided that you no longer need the eternal, and after having created a universe for yourselves, you are spared from thinking of that which created you.[1]

[1] See F. D. E. Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*, ed. R. Otto (Göttingen, 1967[6]). My quotation follows the English text of Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion. Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, ed. R. Crouter (Cambridge, 1988).

It is striking how Schleiermacher assumes an immediate connection between religion and faith here, positing the latter as the driving force behind the former and using them more or less as interchangeable terms.[2] The apologetic nature of the passage is clear not only from its *captatio benevolentiae* but also from the ease with which the author distinguishes the cultured elect from the uneducated masses, not unlike Marx a few decades later. His affinity with religion's cultured despisers is obvious, even as he recruits them for his religious cause, instilled as he was with a profound sense of piety due to his Moravian background. Schleiermacher's new niche for religion in his *Speeches* is based on the centrality of faith, as he ensures its intellectual independence both from the field of ethics, to which it seemed to become relegated, and from the epistemology moved to the foreground of the debate by Kant. The domain of "pious feeling" became religion's new anchor, grounding its legitimacy in a non-doctrinal way, as Schleiermacher located the essence of religion in a kind of universal human "sense of utter dependence" (*schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*). Although tempting, it is anachronistic to fault him for applying a subjectivist definition here. With his combined *Speeches* offering both religion's adherents and its critics adequate grounds for rational exchange, the debate on religion soon became dominated by his terms.[3]

As for Dutch Protestantism, however, Schleiermacher was not the first to seek the essence of religion – and consequently, of theology – in a profound sense of piety. We must credit Gisbertus Voetius, first president of Utrecht University and its most famous theologian to date, with this feat. His 1634 inaugural address "On the need to connect piety with science" (*De pietate cum scientia coniungenda*) defended the strictest of connections between piety (*pietas*) and the science of theology,[4] which he deemed a "practical" one. As an effect of Voetius's practical vision of theology the pulpit became the icon of

[2] See his third sentence, my italics: "From time immemorial *faith* has not been everyone's affair, for at all times only a few have understood something of a *religion*, while millions have variously played with its trappings […]".

[3] For the pervasive influence of Schleiermacher on the modern debate about the study of theology and religion, see F. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Religion: A Contested Site in Theology and the Study of Religion", *Harvard Theological Review* 93 (2000), pp. 7-34. For a translation of his advice to the Dutch situation, see W. Otten, "Theologie of Utopie? Een visie op de studie van theologie en religie in de eenentwintigste eeuw", *Kerk en Theologie* 56 (2005), pp. 176-194.

[4] See *Gisberti Voetii Ta askētika sive exercitia pietatis in usum juventutis academicae nunc edita; addita est, ob materiae affinitatem, Oratio de pietate cum scientia conjungenda, habita anno 1634* (Gorinchem, 1664). In the Dutch lecture that I gave on March 26, 2007, on the occasion of the *dies natalis* of Utrecht University and on which the present article is based, I gave an incorrect title for this treatise, see W. Otten, *Exercitatio mentis: religie als denkoefening* (Utrecht, 2007), p. 4. I am grateful to my colleague Willem van Asselt for correcting me on this point. On this lecture and Voetius's insistence not just to connect piety and science but to bring piety directly to bear on all the sciences, see A. J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676). Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre* (diss. Utrecht, 2007), p. 52. Beck argues that with this lecture Voetius unveiled his theological programme for the next 42 years (p. 428).

Dutch theology, aided by the fact that for nearly four centuries Dutch theological faculties were the designated seminaries for ministers in the Dutch Reformed Church. Their ecclesial affiliation, which ended only on January 1, 2007, influenced these faculties' self-image to no small extent, as the academic fields and interests pursued there tended to reflect the reigning confessional regime. Whereas the study of other religions occupied an important place in the liberal theological curriculum around 1900 and again in the 1960s and 70s, the threat to the protestant establishment posed by secularism and the rise of Islam caused theological faculties in the late 1990s to guard their ecclesiastical mission more carefully and to organise the field of religious studies in separate programme of study, if they continued them at all.

The Protestant tradition is too wide-ranging in scope and nationally diverse in nature, however, to warrant the conclusion that in it science must by definition cede to piety. The following conversation between a senior fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and its Master William Whitaker (1548-1595) speaks eloquently to its inherent breadth. When informed about the two conditions that new fellows had to meet, i.e., learning and religion, the senior fellow asked whether the College would be better served with a "religious dunce" or a "learned rakehell". In the ensuing discussion he advocated the latter option, on the two grounds that 1. Religion can be counterfeited, whereas learning cannot, and 2. There is more probability of "a rakehell's improvement unto temperance, than of a dunce's conversion into a learned man, seeing such a man, radicated and habituated, is unchangeable without miracle". If ever a valid historical defence of the lectern as the proper icon for all academic sciences, including theology, needs to be found, this anecdote from the annals of Cambridge University recorded by Thomas Fuller makes a compelling case.[5]

EXERCITATIO MENTIS AS A HUMANIST PRACTICE

To come to a viable alternative for the pulpit that builds on the Christian tradition but embeds it in a wider humanist frame, I propose to focus on the concept of *exercitatio mentis*. For an analysis of this term I go back to Augustine of Hippo who, according to James O'Donnell's biography, is the actual inventor of Christianity.[6] Intended to shake up conventional wisdom, O'Donnell's provocative statement underscores the enormous extent of Augustine's influence on the Christian religion, making it virtually impossible to study him – or Christianity, for that matter – without first having to scrape off many layers of subsequent historical development. When doing so nonetheless, one can hardly fail to notice how, long before the formal birth of academic theology, it was the rapidly evolving office of bishop that was home to Christianity's most impor-

[5] See T. Fuller, *The History of the University of Cambridge and of Waltham Abbey with the Appeal of Injured Innocence*, new ed. J. Nichols (London, 1840), p. 143 (from *The History of the University of Cambridge*, Section VI. A.D. 1505-1536, pp. 18-23).

[6] See J. J. O'Donnell, *Augustine. A New Biography* (New York, 2005), pp. 171-208.

tant leaders, lending this upstart religion a respectable social image while enhancing its intellectual profile.[7] It is as bishop of Hippo Regius that Augustine also made his mark.

Prior to being ordained bishop in 395 CE, Augustine pursued the career of a Roman orator. Influenced by Cicero's lost treatise *Hortensius* to search for the right combination of eloquence and wisdom, he grew increasingly close to his mother's religion of Christianity, although it took a decade of detours before he formally converted in 386 CE. Soon after, however, he was ready to sacrifice his worldly career, withdrawing to the estate of Cassiciacum to pursue the life of the mind, the so-called *otium liberale*.[8] In the company of Monica and various close friends, he there explored themes common to ancient philosophical debate: eudemonism in *De beata vita*, the freedom of the will in *De libero arbitrio* and the status of the soul in *De immortalitate animae* and *De quantitate animae*.

Although Augustine undertook his quest for wisdom from a Christian perspective that was to become ever more exclusive, this did not guarantee a smooth course for his research endeavours. His *Soliloquia*, another early treatise in which he pursued the knowledge of God and the soul as the only two objects really worth knowing,[9] are filled with echoes of occasional frustration. Augustine's counterpart in the dialogue is the unknown Reason (*Ratio*), whose voice may be his own or someone else's, as Augustine professes not to know. Following a literary rather than a psychological analysis, I would caution against identifying Reason's stance too quickly with the author's own, even though he evidently applies the same interrogation techniques as Augustine in his other dialogues.[10] Reason himself explains their preference for this semi-internalised dialogue form out of their desire to make progress through the question-and-answer method without being derailed by external emotions, as when a real discussion partner might feel ashamed upon being proven wrong.[11] In line with this, Robin Lane Fox has recently suggested that Augustine wrote down this dialogue himself instead of dictating it, as was his usual practice.[12]

Despite their concentrated efforts the dialogue partners seem to travel down a circuitous road, gradually arousing Augustine's irritation. A few isolated

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[7] See on this especially P. Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 10-13, 54-80.

[8] See P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo. A Biography* (London, 1967), pp. 115-127.

[9] See *Soliloquies* I.II.7. The *Soliloquies* are critically edited by W. Hoermann (*Soliloquiorum libri duo; De inmortalitate animae; De quantitate animae*, Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 89 [Vienna, 1986]). I here cite the Hoermann text with an English translation from *Saint Augustine. Soliloquies and Immortality of the Soul*, ed. G. Watson (Warminster, 1990).

[10] See H.-I. Marrou, *St Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris, 1958[4]; reprint 1983), p. 314.

[11] See *Soliloquies* (as in n. 9), II.VII.14.

[12] See R. Lane Fox, "Augustine's *Soliloquies* and the Historian", in *Studia Patristica vol. XLIII, Augustine, Other Later Writers*, ed. F. Young, M. Edwards and P. Parvis, (Leuven, 2006), pp. 173-189.

phrases towards the end of the treatise signal the gist of Augustine's discontent and of Reason's defence to us:

> Augustine: […] The first thing that disturbs me is that we have taken such a roundabout in the chain of reasoning which we were following, when the whole thing could have been laid out in the concise form we have just observed. So it upsets me that our conversation has been wandering around as if the aim were always to sidetrack us […].[13]
>
> Reason: But you can see that it was not for nothing that our reasoning followed such roundabouts. For we were asking what is the truth, and I see that we have not been able even yet to track it down in this wood we are in, even though we have wandered down nearly all the paths. But what are we to do […]?[14]
>
> Reason: You're asking something which only the purest can see and which you are not sufficiently trained to have sight of. The whole purpose of all these roundabouts has been to train you so that you may be fitted to see it […].[15]

Apparently these frustrating detours help to make Augustine's soul fit for contemplation. They serve the purpose of *exercitatio mentis*, in other words, by engaging him in an intellectual training programme of sorts. Finding the truth cannot be done without accurate preparation and short-term results are hence not to be desired, let alone that they can be expected. This path to knowledge may have been a perspective largely overlooked by those like Augustine on the late antique career track of politics, law and rhetoric, but the practice of mental exercises itself was deeply rooted in ancient philosophy. Its structure and details have been extensively studied by Pierre Hadot,[16] while Henri-Irenée Marrou applied the notion of *exercitatio mentis* to Augustine even earlier.[17] Underlining its great benefit, Augustine himself entitled the knowledge which it

[13] See *Soliloquies* (as in n. 9), II.XIV.25, transl. Watson p. 107: "A. […] Nam primum me movet, quod circuitu tanto usi sumus, nescioquam rationum catenam sequentes, cum tam breviter totum, de quo agebatur, demonstrari potuerit quam nunc demonstratum est. Quare me sollicitum facit, quod tam diu quasi ad insidiandum obambulavit oratio".

[14] See *Soliloquies* (as in n. 9), II.XIV.26, transl. Watson p. 107: "R. Vides, quam non frustra tantos circuitus egerit nostra ratiocinatio. Quaerebamus enim, quid sit veritas, quod ne nunc quidem in hac silva rerum omnibus paene callibus oberratis video nos investigare potuisse. Sed quid facimus […]"?

[15] See *Soliloquies* (as in n. 9), II.XX.34, transl. Watson p. 123: "R. Hoc quaeris, quod videre nisi mundissimus non potest et ad cuius rei visionem parum es exercitatus; neque nunc per istos circuitus aliud quam exercitationem tuam, ut illud videre sis idoneus, operamur".

[16] See P. Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (Paris, 1981) and its English translation *Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. and intr. A. Davidson (Oxford, 1995). On the continuity of Greek and Christian exercises of the self, see esp. pp. 49-70 and 126-144.

[17] See Marrou, *St Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (as in n. 10), pp. 299-327.

yielded as *sapientia* rather than *scientia*, a kind of combination of truth and wisdom only to be acquired by the purest, i.e. the most trained mind.[18]

But what exactly did *exercitatio mentis* entail? Perhaps it is best to see it as a series of mental exercises geared towards the mind's preparation for contemplation. In religious terms we may accurately describe the resulting contemplation as (the product of) a protracted process whereby the effort to know God slowly transmogrifies into the encounter with God. In secular terms, one may simply describe it as rational progress, since Augustine reserves the actual *visio Dei* consistently for life after death. Whether or not the encounter with God really takes place is ultimately inconsequential for the actual training practice; that is to say, it neither adds to nor detracts from the usefulness and the intellectual substance of the thinking exercise *per se*. The aim of this thinking exercise is geared towards its own continuation, therefore, based on the expectation that fostering such an attitude can yield a deepening of the awareness of the self and of the world surrounding the self.[19] It is in this training character then that I see a theology arise which is fundamentally open to and deeply impregnated by what may be called a humanist approach.[20]

As a result of Augustine's powerful influence the concept of *exercitatio mentis* was to have a profound impact on the broader intellectual structure and development of western thought patterns and reading practices.[21] This is not equivalent to saying that the exercise's provisional character allowed one to sit idly by, with no results to show. On the contrary, Augustine's own case demonstrates the enormous productive power that such mental exercises were to unleash.[22] And yet, while his many commentaries, sermons, and exegetical treatises make him one of the most productive writers of late antiquity, with the present day authority of his texts approximating biblical status, he himself would probably regard them all as mere training exercises.

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[18] See Marrou, *St Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (as in n. 10), pp. 357-385. Although *sapientia* is the higher knowledge, it is important to stress that the difference between *scientia* and *sapientia* is not one between clerics and laypersons.

[19] See Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (as in n. 16), pp. 206-213. Hadot takes Foucault to task for failing to see the universalising power inherent in the spiritual exercises.

[20] My ideas about humanism are borrowed from R. W. Southern's definition of medieval humanism with its symptoms of dignity (of human nature), order (of nature), reason and intelligibility. See his *Medieval Humanism* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 29-60, esp. pp. 29-33. I have modified Southern's view in light of my own study of twelfth-century thought, in W. Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm. A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 2-44.

[21] See on this B. Stock, *After Augustine. The Meditative Reader and the Text* (Philadelphia, 2001).

[22] Hadot focuses on the therapeutic effect of writing in this regard. See *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (as in n. 16), pp. 126-144 and 206-213.

EXEGESIS BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON

Coming out of a post-Schleiermacher tradition of theological practice with the pulpit as its icon, one may ask why mental exercises are actually needed. After all, do Christians not have direct access to divine revelation through the Bible, their infallible source of truth? While this is the all but exclusive view in Protestantism, the Bible has a comparable status in Catholicism. For a different answer to this problem let us turn to the late-antique mystical treatise *On the Celestial Hierarchy* by the mysterious figure Dionysius the Areopagite. While Dionysius's pseudonymous name portrays him as the pupil of St. Paul mentioned in Acts 17:34, modern research has identified him as a Neoplatonically trained Syrian monk writing in the early sixth century. That his influence lasted far into the western Middle Ages, allowing me to cite him here, springs from the fact that his confusion with the French patron saint St. Denis gained him instant acclaim, which was further enhanced when the Byzantine emperor gave Louis the Pious a codex containing all his works. With the full support of the Frankish monarchy behind him, Dionysius was held in constant high esteem until Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus revealed his identity to be forged.[23] However, rather than on Dionysius himself, I focus here on his early-medieval translator Johannes Scottus Eriugena (810-877 CE), who wrote a commentary on his *On the Celestial Hierarchy*. Faced with Dionysius's puzzling characterisation of theology as "artless", Eriugena decided to translate it in keeping with his tradition of negative theology as "highly artificial" (*valde artificialiter*) instead,[24] drawing an interesting parallel between theology and poetry to explain his interpretation:

> Just as the art of poetry through fictitious fables and allegorical similitudes composes a moral or physical doctrine to exercise the human minds (*ad humanorum animorum exercitationem*) – for this is the proper quality of heroic poets who praise the deeds and manners of brave men –, so theology, as if it were some kind of poetry, by means of fictive imaginations, adapts Holy Scripture to the inquiry of our mind and the impressions of the exterior corporeal senses, as though from some imperfect childhood, to a perfect knowledge of intelligible things, a kind of adulthood of the interior man. For the human mind is not created on account of divine scripture, of which it would have no need had it not sinned, but Holy Scripture is patched together of diverse symbols and doctrines so that through its introduction our rational nature,

[23] This did not immediately put an end to his influence, as is made clear in K. Froelich, "Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century", in *Pseudo-Dionysius. The Complete Works*, transl., ed. C. Luibheid and P. Rorem (New York, 1987), pp. 33-46.

[24] It remains a remarkable case of Eriugenian insight that he chose to translate the Greek hapax *atechnoos* as *valde artificialiter*, thus underscoring his correct understanding of Dionysian negative theology as the practice of bringing out God's superiority by describing him in negative terms. Dionysius's earlier translator Hilduin had failed to understand him. See the essay "Valde artificialiter: le sens d'un contresens" by R. Roques in his *Libres sentiers vers l'érigénisme* (Rome, 1975), pp. 45-98, especially p. 51.

> which by its own transgression fell from the contemplation of truth, can be restored to its earlier height of pure vision.[25]

While the final goal is again contemplation here, i.e., pure understanding, Eriugena pushes the element of exercise substantially further in this passage by making it the purpose of all exegesis. Augustine had already prepared the connection between mental exercise and biblical study when he was finally reconciled to reading the Bible, locating biblical reading at the centre of all culture and learning in his *On Christian Doctrine*. Acting for a long time more as an impediment than an invitation to Christianity, the Bible rose above its poor style only when he felt that pulsating underneath there was the divine addressing his heart. The famous conversion scene in Book VIII of the *Confessions* artfully evokes this lure of divine command in external form – not unlike Reason's mysterious entry in the *Soliloquies* – when the singsong voice of a child tells him: "Pick up and read, pick up and read" (*Tolle, lege*)![26] Although Eriugena is certainly more outspoken than his episcopal predecessor in seeing mental exercise as the goal of exegesis, his forthrightness is no reason to suspect a Gnostic source behind his view. It rather seems as if from Augustine to Eriugena – and far beyond the medieval period – the Christian religion was home to the same deeply humanist interpretation, in which the reading of the Bible served to train the human mind, providing the soul with adequate sustenance on its journey to God.

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[25] See *Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem*, ed. J. Barbet, CCCM 31 (Turnhout, 1975), cap. 2.1.24: "Quemadmodum ars poetica per fictas fabulas allegoricasque similitudines moralem doctrinam seu physicam componit ad humanorum animorum exercitationem – hoc enim proprium est heroicarum poetarum, qui virorum fortium facta et mores figurate laudant – ita theologica, veluti quaedam poetria, sanctam scripturam fictis imaginationibus ad consultum nostri animi et reductionem a corporalibus sensibus exterioribus, veluti ex quadam imperfecta pueritia, in rerum intelligibilium perfectam cognitionem, tanquam in quamdam interioris hominis grandevitatem conformat. Non enim animus humanus propter divinam scripturam factus est, cuius nullo modo indigeret si non peccaret, sed propter animum humanum sancta scriptura in diversis symbolis atque doctrinis contexta, ut per ipsius introductionem rationabilis nostra contemplationis reducetur altitudinem". See further my comment on this passage in W. Otten, "Between Damnation and Restoration. The Dynamics of Human Nature in Eriugena's *Periphyseon* and Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus*", in *From Athens to Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau*, ed. H. Westra (Leiden, 1992), pp. 329-349 at 344.

[26] See *Confessions* VIII.12.29. On the hermeneutical importance of Augustine's conversion on the basis of reading rather than hearing the divine command, or rather: reading as if hearing it, see B. Stock, *Augustine the Reader. Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996) and C. Hallisey, "The Surprise of Scripture's Advice", in ed. J. Frishman, W. Otten and G. Rouwhorst, *Religious Identity and the Problem of Historical Foundation. The Foundational Character of Authoritative Sources in the History of Christianity and Judaism* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 28-44.

On a deeper level, viewing religion as mental exercise may allow us to see faith and reason as intimately connected rather than fundamentally opposed, thereby discarding the need for a 'third way' between them, a position long advocated by the Utrecht church historian Gilles Quispel and more recently adopted by his pupils Van den Broek and Hanegraaff to explain the rise of heterodox movements.[27] For much of the early Middle Ages faith and reason stretched their efforts as amiable companions, collaborating on the building of a single intellectual *corpus*. Sources from diverse traditions were mixed in with remnants of ancient cultural heritage, thus sprouting forth new and exciting patterns of what was to become medieval culture.

The practice of *exercitatio mentis* reached its cultural climax in the *Proslogion* written by Anselm of Canterbury in 1078 CE. A schoolmaster at the Benedictine monastery of Le Bec in Normandy prior to his elevation to episcopal office, Anselm wrote this work at the behest of his students, who wished to prove the existence of God with the help of reason alone. Its fame hinges on its so-called proof for the existence of God, laid out in chapters 2 through 5. Its lesser known opening chapter, however, is entitled *Excitatio mentis ad contemplandum Deum* and consists in a long prayer – not unlike the *Soliloquies*, which opened with one and the entire *Confessions*, which are set as one – from which I quote its lyrical beginning:

> Come now, O insignificant man, flee a while from your busy tasks, put aside for a moment the confusion of your thoughts, discard now your distracting cares and postpone your busy labours. Free yourself a little for God, and rest a while in him. *Enter into the little chamber* of your mind, exclude everything, besides God and what can be of help in seeking him, and *close the door* to seek him out. Speak now, *my* whole *heart*, Say now to God: *I seek your face, For your face, O lord, I search*.[28]

Breathing the familiar Augustinian atmosphere of the quest for the beatific vision, Anselm's writing is interspersed with biblical quotations and allusions, e.g., to the Song of Songs. The fame of this latter biblical book extended especially to monastic circles, where the relationship between a lover and his beloved became allegorically applied to the relationship between God and the soul of the individual monk.[29] While modern thinkers feel amazement at

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[27] See *Gnosis and Hermeticism from Antiquity to Modern Times*, ed. R. van den Broek and W. J. Hanegraaff (New York, 1988), pp. vii-viii.

[28] Anselm's works are critically edited by F. S. Schmitt, *Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia* (reprint Bad Canstatt, 1968). I here quote text and translation from G. Schufreider, *Confessions of a Rational Mystic. Anselm's Early Writings* (West Lafayette, 1994), pp. 314-315: "Eia nunc, homuncio, fuge paululum occupationes tuas, absconde te modicum a tumultuosis cogitationibus tuis. Abice nunc onerosas curas, et postpone laboriosas distentiones tuas. Vaca aliquantulum deo, et requiesce aliquantulum in eo. *Intra in cubiculum* mentis tuae, exclude omnia praeter deum et quae te iuvent ad quaerendum eum, et *clauso ostio* quaere eum (Mt 6:6). Dic nunc, totum *cor meum*, dic nunc deo: *Quaero vultum tuum; vultum tuum, domine, requiro* (Ps 26:8)".

[29] See E. Ann Matter, *The Voice of My Beloved. The Song of Songs in Western Medieval Christianity* (Philadelphia, 1992). Although the direct reference here to the inner

Anselm's daring experiment, as he proves the existence of God with the help of reason alone (*sola ratione*), he appears to relativise his earlier attempt in the *Monologion* as a mere meditation.[30]

In the light of the historical background laid out above it is remarkable how often the tenor of Anselm's work has been misunderstood. With the Reformation placing great emphasis on the notions of *sola gratia* and *sola Scriptura*, Anselm's choice for a theology *sola ratione* strikes us somehow as irreverent, if not irreligious. This may well be the reason why his thought is perhaps subjected more to philosophical than to theological analysis, with Kant coining its designation as "ontological proof". When contemporary theologians turn to Anselm for support, on the other hand, they usually confine themselves to seeking refuge with the (Augustinian) maxim that is the work's alternate title *fides quaerens intellectum* ("faith seeking understanding") to defend the legitimacy of their faith-based starting-point. Lifted out of the cultural practice of mental exercise as its natural intellectual home, however, this Augustinian-Anselmian motto can only yield rather skewed interpretations.[31] Without an awareness of its integral ties with the wider search for God (*quaerens*), his thought experiment seems to invite his modern readers *first* to embrace a post-Schleiermacher reductionistic reading of faith (*fides*), in order *next*, i.e., after a mysterious trick on Anselm's part called his 'ontological proof', to impose on them the kind of rational understanding (*intellectum*) that excludes faith, heeding the rules of propositional logic alone.[32]

In hindsight we should perhaps attribute the confusion concerning the precise status of the Christian religion not only to tensions between Catholic and Protestant reconstructions of the past, however substantive and real these may be, or to any substantive shortage of historical evidence, as important sources were deleted or suppressed by church leaders. Rather, complementing and underlying such factors there seems to be a structural lack of courage and vision on the part of modern interpreters to study the historical tradition of western theology with an eye to its inherent humanist dimension,[33] that is, without rely-

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chamber is to the gospel of Matthew, there is an audible echo of the Song of Songs as well.

[30] See the work's *Prooemium*, where Anselm states that he called his *Monologion* originally an *exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei* and the *Proslogion* originally *Fides quaerens intellectum* (Schufreider [as in n. 28], pp. 312-313). Anselm's meditations are novel in that they give original thought rather then reflecting on Scripture.

[31] See for some examples and for their adequate refutation, J. McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics. A Re-interpretation of the* Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh, 1954), pp. 1-54, esp. his discussion with Karl Barth on pp. 32-38.

[32] See also J. McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics* (as in n. 31), pp. 38-39. This is not to say that there are no grounds for analysing Anselm in this way, as is done by R. J. Campbell, *From Belief to Understanding: A Study of Anselm's Proslogion Argument on the Existence of God* (Canberra, 1976).

[33] I mean to be especially critical of those attempts which out of ignorance or disinterest leave the early-medieval period out of their analysis of the history of Christianity. By jumping from Chalcedon, possibly through John of Damascus, straight to Aquinas or

ing either on their confessional faith or on the guidance of modern reason alone for additional support.

FROM EXERCITATIO MENTIS TO INGENIUM

It seems hard to fault Peter Abelard, the twelfth-century monk and philosopher who spent part of his career as an academic theologian, for any perceived lack of intellectual courage. Due in part to the changing context of theological teaching, which, soon after Anselm, moved from the rural monasteries to the cathedral schools, the practice of *exercitatio mentis* underwent considerable changes. As these are reflected in his writings, they allow us an interesting inside view of the development of theology, especially his semi-autobiographical *Historia calamitatum*. Having embarked on his theological study at a later date than his peers, the *Historia* reveals Abelard's mounting frustration at the lectures of the famous master Anselm of Laon, whose words he judged to be empty and vacuous of meaning.[34] Unconcerned with his precise criticism of master Anselm, who may well deserve more praise than he received, I am particularly intrigued by the chain of reactions that Abelard sets in motion. His first choice was to stay away from Anselm's lectures, as a result of which his peers began to accuse him, a newcomer to theology, of arrogance. In response Abelard asks why they need the master's lectures at all, if they can read the Bible by themselves with the aid of the Church Fathers and other documents. This suggestion provokes them to engage him in a bet to see if he can do a better job. Accepting their challenge, Abelard demands that his class meet the very next day. When his students suggest more preparation time, for they had selected a difficult passage from the prophet Ezekiel for him, he flatly refuses, arguing "that it is not my custom to proceed through experience but through intelligence (*ingenium*)". [35]

This scene seems to offer us a description of *exercitatio mentis* as a practice in disarray, with the fragmented and disconnected teaching of Anselm of Laon reflecting its deplorable but perhaps inevitable decline. We are reminded of how, centuries before, Reason and Augustine became lost in a similar forest of questions and partial answers. Apparently, the cumulative weight of a contemplative tradition expanding *ad infinitum* thwarted rather than stimulated intellectual progress. It is a tribute to Abelard's courage that he wished to break out

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the Reformation, they fail to take account of the embeddedness of Christianity in western culture, which has much to do with its rootedness in the tradition of the spiritual exercises.

[34] Abelard, *Historia calamitatum*, ed. J. Monfrin (Paris, 1962[2]), p. 68, lines 169-170: "Verborum usum habebat mirabilem, sed sensum contemtibilem et ratione vacuum". The entire incident which Abelard relates and to which this paragraph goes back is found in *Historia calamitatum*, ed. Monfrin, p. 69 lines 164-221. For an English translation, see B. Radice, *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise* (London, 1974), pp. 62-64.

[35] See Abelard, *Historia calamitatum* (as in n. 34), p. 69, lines 208-209: "non esse mee consuetudinis per usum proficere sed per ingenium".

of this stalemate by accepting the challenge to do without tradition, and a testimony to his talent (*ingenium*) that he came out victorious. As a result, his classes were soon more popular than Anselm's, who had him expelled from Laon as a moonlighting junior colleague. While we no longer know on which Ezekiel passage Abelard lectured, his *Sic et Non* contains the intellectual decision rules with which he enabled his students to give their own coherent interpretation of tradition, followed by a collection of 158 patristic case studies to which to apply them. Framing these rules is the famous statement that "only through doubt shall we be inspired to investigate and only though investigation can we be able to find the truth".[36]

But how can we be sure that my historical sketch of the development of *exercitatio mentis*, progressing from reflective meditation to scholastic analysis, is actually correct? Are we not at risk of stereotyping theology once more as a branch of pious learning, the only difference being that this time we approach it from the perspective of those wishing to shed rather than to embrace its restraints? Peter Abelard fits the bill in that he has often been claimed as a strident rationalist *à la* Voltaire, a view fuelled by his famous controversy with the Cistercian abbot Bernard of Clairvaux. For a provocative example we may point to the doubt that he cast on the identity of the aforementioned Dionysius, just when Abelard had been warmly accepted in the monastery of St Denis shortly after his castration.[37] With equal inelegance he bluntly states in his *Historia calamitatum* that he would rather live among the Saracens than among his own brethren in the monastery of St Gildas de Ruys, where he was abbot, as they may respect morality more.[38] Yet such outbursts can only project a partial image, isolating his rational talent from the overall attitude permeating his works, which was still firmly embedded in the practice of *exercitatio mentis*. Far from using his rational talent against the tradition, Abelard wanted to be in search of support of it.[39] Instead of being those of a medieval Voltaire, Abe-

[36] See Abelard, *Sic et Non. A Critical Edition*, ed. Blanche B. Boyer and R. McKeon (Chicago, 1976-1977), Prologus, p. 103, lines 338-339: "Dubitando quippe ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus". Abelard holds that patristic divergences should generally be resolved according to the motto *diversa, sed non adversa*.

[37] Abelard did not doubt the authority of Dionysius as such, but his reading of Bede informed him that Dionysius was bishop of Corinth rather than of Athens. This observation proved abbot Hilduin of St Denis mistaken in his identification of Dionysius of Athens with the Parisian martyr. Given that Abelard had just been kindly received at St Denis, voicing doubt about the identity of its patron saint and undercutting the authority of its founding abbot was not a wise move. See *Historia Calamitatum* (as in n. 34), pp. 89-90, lines 941-981; transl. Radice, pp. 85-86.

[38] See on this W. Otten, "Authority and Identity in the Transition from Monastic to Scholastic Theology: Peter Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux", in ed. Frishman, Otten, Rouwhorst, *Religious Identity* (as in n. 26), pp. 349-368. See p. 356 with reference to *Historia calamitatum* (as in n. 34), lines 1221-1225, 1229-1234; transl. Radice, p. 94.

[39] Despite their many differences there is an interesting parallel between Abelard's hermeneutical strategy and that of Eriugena, see G. d'Onofrio, "The *Concordia* of Augustine and Dionysius: Toward a Hermeneutic of the Disagreement of Patristic

lard's works portray a complex western intellectual who does not want to follow Aristotle if this should force him to sacrifice St. Paul and Christ.[40] Together with Plato and Aristotle the two latter are part of one and the same civilisation. Just as we should not presume Augustine and Anselm to present Christian teaching in undiluted form, therefore, so we need not assume Abelard to depart from it, thereby unjustly marginalising his role in the Christian tradition. He was among the most reputable of twelfth-century teachers, whose dissenting voice may have irked his opponents but did not dissuade his students,[41] while his *Theologia Christiana* made him the inventor of our current usage of this term.

THEOLOGY IN AND BEYOND THE MIDDLE AGES: SOME CONCLUSIONS

Following the success of Augustine, Anselm, Abelard, and Aquinas, theology came to reign supreme as "queen of the sciences" at the new medieval universities. Those times are long past, however, and it is evident that theology has undergone many changes since then, as my comments on Schleiermacher and Voetius have indicated. If we take a *pars pro toto* look at contemporary Dutch religion, not only is it true that monasteries no longer deck out the European landscape like a "white garment of churches", as Rodulfus Glaber once painted the Christian revival around the year 1000 CE, but their disappearance is offset by the building of mosques, gradually taking their place.[42] It is an open question how these changing social and cultural circumstances of Christianity will affect the position of theology at Dutch universities. Given the decline of the institutional churches in the Netherlands, the prevalent attitude is one of nostalgia, driven by the impulse to revive the heyday of "classical theology". This may explain the interest in Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther and Calvin on both sides of the confessional aisle, alongside the unrelenting emphasis placed by Dutch protestant ministerial training programmes on historical-philological Bible study.

A greater worry than secularism itself, however, may well be that it hits the future of theology as a double-edged sword. As the combined effect of both its impact and its opponents' efforts to stop it, it may cause the practice of *exerci-*

Sources in John the Scot's *Periphyseon*", in *Eriugena: East and West*, ed. B. McGinn and W. Otten (Notre Dame, 1994), pp. 115-140, esp. 120-121.

[40] On this 'Abelardian' comment from his *Confessio fidei ad Heloisam*, see M. T. Clanchy, *Abelard. A Medieval Life* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 117-118.

[41] See D. E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (London, 1969).

[42] At the moment there are approximately 4000 religious buildings in the Netherlands. It is expected that in the next ten years about 25 percent of all Protestant and Roman-Catholic churches will close down. In 15 years there will be only a few monasteries left as opposed to 150 at present. Only 50 of the 150 synagogues are currently still in service as houses of worship. The number of mosques is rising and stands at present at 450.

tatio mentis, which characterised the theological quest for so long, to disappear from among its goals. On the one hand, we see how among theologians' secular colleagues there is growing fascination with the multitude of youngsters from a reformed or a Catholic background who cheer on the pope or visit evangelical meetings. European churches monitor global evangelical movements closely, meanwhile, especially on the North American continent, trying to duplicate their large followings at home by offering potential students a non-threatening course of study. On the other hand, most university attempts to update the theological curriculum favour a concentration on the study of world religions, gradually phasing out Christianity. Based on my view of theology as a humanist endeavour, I have the following reasons for seeing these divergent developments as unsatisfactory.

The fragmenting effect of the division of the small body of students of theology-and-religion into even smaller bodies of students of religion and students of theology may forebode a wider fracturing of the field, which without a common core will be brought perilously close to non-existence. While a division into theology and religious studies reflects a legitimate need for growing expertise in the field of religious studies, I cannot but think that it also reflects mounting pressure from the institutionalised Christian end to limit the wider ramifications of *exercitatio mentis* and replace this older theological tradition with a novel version of "revelation without probing".

My alternative proposal is to try and hold the field of religious and theological studies together, approaching it from the perspective of *exercitatio mentis* as a humanist endeavour and focusing on a variety of religious traditions.[43] It is informed by the three following motives with which this essay concludes.

1. From the perspective of the past, keeping the field together allows us to do better justice to the ties that bind the religion of Christianity, including its revelatory aspects, to the culture of antiquity in which it originates as well as to the new cultures that it propagated and with which it still finds itself connected as part of the same civilisation, including that of modern atheism and Islam. In protestant theology as much as in the larger paradigm of the humanities, moreover, the uncontested acceptance of the definition of and scholarly standards set by renaissance humanism has had the detrimental effect of elevating one historical period with one set of ideals above others, thereby limiting access to other religious and cultural resources within that same civilisation.

2. Informed in part by the ideals of renaissance humanism, the modern focus on religious faith and piety has further skewed our ideas of western Christian religion and culture, thereby short-changing the Middle Ages in particular. This has made it hard to pursue the discussion of the period's religious codes in tandem with its intellectual achievements rather than with its mystical or spiritual attitudes, for example, as underscoring its obligatory otherness. It is my

[43] See also the recent issue of the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 74 (2006), pp. 1-211 for a plethora of positions. My own position comes closest to that of N. K. Levene, "Sources of History: Myth and Image", pp. 79-101.

hope that bringing in an awareness of the medieval dimensions of the term humanism may allow us to reach a more nuanced insight in medieval religion and achieve a less essentialist reading of that period in western history and culture.

3. Turning my eye toward the future, I deem it of the highest importance that theology, in good medieval fashion, remain in close conversation with philosophy and the humanities to participate in the continued pursuit of *exercitatio mentis*. With religious studies focusing increasingly on the religions of the non-western world and theology in danger of being auctioned off to the churches to serve their apologetic needs, there is little guarantee that the tradition of *exercitatio mentis* will remain in place or be seen as having an inherent religious aspect to it. Given certain developments in contemporary philosophical thought, the fact that thinking is associated with exercise at all is in danger of being overshadowed by what Alfred N. Whitehead once labelled "the fallacy of mistaken concreteness", thus doing away with cogitation in the Anselmian sense. Treasuring the awareness of its humanist origins, from which it has served the university so well in the past, theology as *exercitatio mentis* can continue to be of service to the wider intellectual community by fostering a sense of wholeness in the academic endeavour.

A CLASSICISING FRIAR AT WORK
JOHN OF WALES' *BREVILOQUIUM DE VIRTUTIBUS*

Albrecht Diem[*]

The *Breviloquium de virtutibus antiquorum principum et philosophorum*,[1] a collection of exempla, was written between 1260 and 1270 by the Franciscan scholar John of Wales or Johannes Guallensis († c. 1285). Jenny Swanson who has produced the most important study on John of Wales and his works,[2] counts

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[1] I quote the *Breviloquium* from John of Wales, *Summa de Regimine Vitae Humane* (Venice, 1496), fols. 239vb-259vb, reprint from microfilm (Ann Arbor/London, 1980), here indicated with the siglum V. Reproduced passages are collated with the manuscripts Paris, BN, MS lat. 3241 (s. XIII-XIV), sigl. P, and Milano, Ambros., MS A 23 Sup (s. XIII[3]), sigl. M, two manuscripts representing the two main branches of the early textual transmission, and additionally with Vatican, MS Vat. Lat. 5957 (s. XIII), sigl. Vat. On the stemma of the earliest manuscripts, see A. Diem and M. Verweij, "*Virtus est via ad gloriam?* John of Wales and Michele da Massa in disagreement", *Franciscan Studies* 63 (2005), pp. 215-269, at pp. 237-251. To indicate a specific exemplum, I refer to the list provided in the appendix. On the *Breviloquium*, see A. Kehnel, "The narrative tradition of the medieval Franciscan friars on the British Isles. Introduction to the sources", *Franciscan Studies* 63 (2005), pp. 461-530, at p. 481; R. Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular* (Turnhout, 1993), pp. 131-132; W. A. Pantin, "John of Wales and medieval humanism", in *Medieval Studies, presented to Aubrey Gwynn SJ*, ed. J. A. Watt, J. B. Morrall and F. X. Martin (Dublin, 1961), pp. 297-315, at pp. 299-300; J. Swanson, *John of Wales. A Study of the Works and Ideas of a Thirteenth-Century Friar* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 41-62.

[2] On the life and career of John of Wales, see Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 4-14; Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), pp. 297-298 (with further references); M. Rappenecker, "Johannes Guallensis", in *Biographisch-bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon* 3 (Hamm, 1991), cols. 385-387.

more than 140 manuscripts of the Latin text, and her list is far from complete.[3] The *Breviloquium* has been translated into at least six other languages,[4] and printed several times in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[5]

John of Wales, a master at the Franciscan house in Oxford and later a master of theology at the University of Paris, produced almost exclusively works on pastoral instruction and moral education. He was, to use an expression of Beryl Smalley's, one of the first "classicising friars", starting a tradition of (mostly Franciscan) scholars in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England who combined scholastic background with classical tradition and literature in order to produce texts suitable for education, moral instruction and pastoral care as well as to show the value of classical literary tradition for this pastoral education.[6] William Abel Pantin describes John of Wales as a thinker who in his way of using the heritage of antiquity bridges the gap between twelfth-century and fifteenth-century humanism.[7]

John of Wales' *Breviloquium* belongs to his earliest works; it is followed by the *Communiloquium* (a handbook for preaching and pastoral conversation), the *Compendiloquium* (an collection of exempla forming a history of ancient phi-

[3] See Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 233-257. Additional lists of manuscripts are provided in C. Guardiola, "Juan de Gales, Cataluna y Eiximenis", *Antonianum* 64 (1989), pp. 330-365; V. Doucet, "Maîtres Franciscains de Paris", *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 27 (1934), p. 551; B. Roest, *Franciscan Literature of Religious Instruction before the Council of Trent* (Leiden, 2004), p. 319, note 17, and especially the *In principio* database (incipit: *Quoniam misericordia*). The following manuscripts (found by I. Bejczy and R. Newhauser) are not mentioned in any of these lists: Eton, College Library, MS 119; Göttingen, SUB, MS Theol. 140; Graz, UB, MS 248; New York, Hispanic Society of America, MS B 2710; San Marino (California), Huntington Library, MS 1345; Venice, Biblioteca dei Padri Redentoristi, MS 50; Florence, BNC, MS Conv. Soppr. F.VIII.1225. I myself found Koblenz, Staatsarchiv, MS Best. 701, Nr. 260; New York, Public Library, MS Spencer Collection 76. See also Morton W. Bloomfield *et al.*, *Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices, 1100-1500 A.D.* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), no. 4971. The text also appears with the incipit *Nam misericordia et veritas* (no. 3156), *Quoniam unica est veritas* (no. 5038) and *Quoniam, ut dicit Salomon* (no. 5070).

[4] See Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 205-209; R. Tuve, "Notes on the Virtues and Vices", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 26 (1963), pp. 264-303, at pp. 264-265 and 272-273; Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues* (as in n. 1), p. 131. The Catalan version is edited by N. D'Ordal, *Joan de Gal·les, Breviloqui* (Barcelona, 1930).

[5] See Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), p. 290.

[6] B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 51-52, 74; eadem, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning from Abelard to Wyclif* (London, 1981), pp. 197-201; Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), p. 299; B. Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210-1517)* (Leiden, 2000), pp. 272-289; N. F. Palmer, "Das Exempelwerk der Bettelmönche", in *Exempel und Exempelsammlungen*, ed. W. Haug and B. Wachinger (Tübingen, 1991), pp. 137-172, at pp. 138-139.

[7] Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), p. 302.

losophy), the *Breviloquium de sapientia sanctorum* (a collection of hagiographic exempla), the *Legiloquium* (a commentary on the Ten Commandments), the *Monoloquium* (a preaching aid based on virtues and vices) and several other works.[8]

Unlike John's later texts, the *Breviloquium* deals almost exclusively with material on classical topics. It consists of about 230 exempla on the deeds and sayings of famous rulers, philosophers and other prominent figures, ordered according to the four virtues *iustitia*, *prudentia*, *temperantia* and *fortitudo*. The treatise begins with a short prologue announcing a text for the instruction of rulers[9] and ends with a short but very dense epilogue on the question whether non-Christian morality existed, whether excellent deeds of the *antiqui* could be judged as virtuous despite their ignorance of Christian revelation, and whether they could be regarded as useful for Christian education.[10]

This article discusses two sets of questions. First, how did this "classicising friar" actually work; to which material did he have access; how did he edit his material and how did he legitimise the use of classical texts dealing with non-Christian heroes for Christian moral instruction? Can he indeed be seen as a "medieval humanist", aiming at re-introducing the classical literary heritage or "humanist values"?[11]

The second set of questions targets the reception of the text. How was it used and understood, and for which purpose was it written? Both approaches aim at contributing to the general question of what role classical literature and role models played in the period between the two "renaissances" of the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, and especially in the "pastoral revolution", the

[8] On John's writings, see Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 10-11, 63-196 and 200; Kehnel, "The narrative tradition" (as in n. 1), pp. 482-484; Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), pp. 299-302; R. Galle, "Eine geistliche Bildungslehre des Mittelalters", *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 31 (1910), pp. 523-555; P. L. Schmidt, "Das *Compendiloquium* des Johannes Vallensis – die erste mittelalterliche Geschichte der antiken Literatur?" in *From Wolfram and Petrarch to Goethe and Grass. Studies in Literature in Honor of Leonard Forster*, ed. D. H. Green, L. P. Johnson and D. Wuttke (Baden-Baden, 1982), pp. 109-123. A complete list of works ascribed to John of Wales is provided by Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 229-230. See also Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), pp. 298-302.

[9] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), Prol.1-2, ed. Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), p. 252.

[10] For an analysis and edition of prologue and epilogue (which is preserved in different versions), see Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1).

[11] Richard Southern's still thought-provoking essay, "Medieval Humanism", in idem *Medieval humanism and other studies* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 29-60 makes a distinction between humanism as a revival of classical literature and humanism as proclaiming "humanist" ideals. Putting an emphasis on the latter aspect, he clearly regards the thirteenth century as a period of humanism.

movement of popular moral instruction emerging from the fourth Lateran council in 1215.[12]

A third general aim of this article is to provide a detailed description of this work and its structure, which may – for the time being – compensate for the lack of a modern critical edition. For this purpose the appendix to this article contains a complete list of all exempla of the *Breviloquium* including a short description of their content and a reference to the original source as far as it has proved identifiable.

1. THE *BREVILOQUIUM* AND THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

For both sets of questions the *Breviloquium* is an especially suitable starting point because the text is rooted in classical traditions on three different levels: its topic, its structure and the material used. For the theme, the cardinal virtues, the classical roots are obvious but also ambivalent. In his *Politeia*, Plato links σοφία, σωφροσύνη, ανδρεία and δικαιοσύνη both with the partitions of the soul and with the division of society.[13] Aristotle's system of virtues developed in his *Nicomachean Ethics* used the four virtues, yet without giving them a more prominent role than other virtues.[14] *Iustitia*, *prudentia*, *temperantia* and *fortitude*, for their part, entered the Latin world mainly via the Stoic tradition, appearing prominently in the works of Cicero, Seneca and Macrobius. Patristic theologians, especially Augustine, Jerome and Ambrose (who invented the expression *virtutes cardinales*) adopted the cardinal virtues as universal categories of morality and gave them a place in Christian theology.[15]

In the twelfth century the cardinal virtues with their double roots in classical philosophy *and* in patristic theology were regarded as especially suitable touchstones for discussions on the value of non-Christian classical tradition and of the question whether there is a universal morality independent of Christian revelation.[16] During the thirteenth century treatises on the cardinal virtues

[12] See Roest, *Franciscan Literature* (as in n. 3); Smalley, *English Friars* (as in n. 6); L. E. Boyle, *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law, 1200-1400* (London, 1981); A. Diem, "Zielzorg met de zeven deugden. Thomas of Chobham, Robert Grosseteste en de rol van deugden in pastorale teksten", *Millennium* 19 (2005), pp. 115-135; idem, "Virtues and vices in early texts on pastoral care", *Franciscan Studies* 62 (2004), pp. 193-223.

[13] See R. E. Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues: Aquinas, Albert and Philip the Chancellor* (Toronto, 2004), pp. 9-13.

[14] See Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues* (as in n. 13), pp. 13-16.

[15] Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues* (as in n. 13), pp. 16-38; S. Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum. Die Kardinaltugenden in der Geistesgeschichte der Karolingerzeit* (Cologne/Vienna, 1969); J. Bovendeert, *Kardinale deugden gekerstend: de vier kardinale deugden vanaf Ambrosius tot het jaar 1000*, PhD Thesis University of Nijmegen (Nijmegen, 2007).

[16] See Diem, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), pp. 232-235; I. P. Bejczy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue", in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, ed. I. P. Bejczy and R. G.

played a similar role for reconciling Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, especially in the works of Thomas Aquinas.[17]

John of Wales' *Breviloquium* does not aim at providing an original contribution to these discussions, since it is first and foremost a collection of exempla simply using the cardinal virtues as a framework. The attempt to legitimise the use of examples showing non-Christian virtuousness as it is expressed especially in the epilogue, however, shows John's familiarity with discussions of his time on the role of classical definitions and classifications of virtues within Christian discourses.[18]

The second "root" of John of Wales' work in the classical traditions concerns the structure of the treatise. This aspect already points to John's techniques of working. All moral treatises based on a limited catalogue of traditional and rather theoretical key virtues or vices require systems of subdividing them into virtues or vices that are at least somewhat closer to life and human imagination.[19] For the cardinal virtues we have especially two classical texts providing this service of defining and breaking down the virtues. They developed into the most widely used statements on the cardinal virtues:[20] Cicero's *De inventione*[21] and Macrobius' *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis*.[22]

John of Wales knew and used both systems and combined them occasionally with definitions and subdivisions used in the *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, a short but influential treatise based on the catalogue of the cardinal virtues, written in the twelfth century.[23] The central part of this treatise discusses

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Newhauser (Leiden, 2005), pp. 133-154; O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e^ et XIII^e^ siècles*, 6 vols. (Louvain, 1942-1960), vol. 3, pp. 99-150.

[17] See Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues* (as in n. 13), pp. 64-82.

[18] Diem, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), pp. 217-226.

[19] On using cardinal virtues and capital vices as an "umbrella" for all virtues and vices, see Diem, "Zielzorg" (as in n. 12).

[20] See Tuve, "Notes" (as in n. 4), pp. 268-272; Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), p. 46; Diem, "Zielzorg" (as in n. 12), pp. 125-126; Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* (as in n. 16), vol. 3, pp. 151-194.

[21] Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53-54/159-164, ed. T. Nüßlein (Leipzig, 1998), pp. 318-324 with the following subdivisions: *Prudentia*: *memoria*, *intellegentia*, *providentia*. *Iustitia*: *religio*, *pietas*, *gratia*, *vindicatio*, *observantia*, *veritas*. *Fortitudo*: *magnificentia*, *fidentia*, *patientia*, *perseverantia*. *Temperantia*: *continentia*, *clementia*, *modestia*.

[22] Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.8.7, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1963), p. 38: "Prudentiae insunt ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, doctilitas, cautio; [...] fortitudo praestat magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem: [...] temperantiam sequuntur modestia, verecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia: [...] de iustitia veniunt innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas".

[23] J. Holmberg, ed., *Das Moralium dogma philosophorum de Guillaume de Conches* (Paris, 1929), pp. 12-52. See also Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), pp. 302-303. The *Moralium dogma philosophorum* is used as a structuring text in the *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.6.1; 2.6.1; 2.6.3; 2.6.4. Moreover John of Wales quoted one exemplum from this text in 2.5.1.

the cardinal virtues from an almost entirely non-Christian perspective and elaborates on the definitions and subdivisions of Cicero and Macrobius.

Though using the *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, John of Wales had a clearly different approach to the cardinal virtues than had this work and many other philosophical treatises from the twelfth and the early thirteenth century. Instead of discussing them from a philosophical point of view as was done in twelfth-century humanism or aiming to give them a space in Christian theology, he merely used them to build a bridge between classical literature and Christian morals,[24] or, more simply, as a tool to organise his material. The fact, that he was inspired by the Ciceronian and Macrobian list of virtues, however, does not mean that John of Wales slavishly followed his ancient ordering systems. On the contrary, both the structure and the number of exempla related to a specific virtue show that the framework of the cardinal virtues did not keep John of Wales from developing his own emphases. Though he spreads his exempla more or less equally over the four cardinal virtues,[25] he shows a clear preference for some specific virtues, especially *continentia* (as part of *temperantia*) with 39 exempla, and *patientia* (as part of *fortitudo*) with 36 exempla. Almost a third of the treatise deals with these two virtues. For most other virtues John of Wales gives no more than ten exempla. Similar attempts at "stretching the structure" can be found in many other treatises on virtues or vices. Especially an over-proportional emphasis on aspects of sexual morality is a normal feature in moral treatises.[26]

Besides this strong emphasis on his personal choice of virtues, John of Wales took, at least in the beginning, some liberty in structuring his work. After announcing a collection of exempla for the education of rulers (in the prologue), his part on *iustitia* seems to be designed especially for this purpose. Half of the exempla on *iustitia* appear in chapters on *De iustitia in possidendo*, *De iustitia in statuendo leges iustas*, *De observatione legum*, *De providentia circa rem publicam* and *De iustitia erga inimicos*. The remaining 26 exempla related to *iustitia* appear in a long chapter *De partibus iustitie*, which is subdivided on the basis of Macrobius' *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis*. For the rest of his work, he mostly followed the subdivisions offered by Cicero. John's rather pragmatic way of using Cicero's system is not unique. Thomas of Chobham's († before 1236) *Summa de arte praedicandi*, a preaching handbook on the basis of the cardinal virtues, also uses Cicero's sub-virtues, but only for *temperantia*, *iustitia* and *fortitudo*; his section on *prudentia* is not influenced by

[24] See Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), pp. 302-304.

[25] *Iustitia*: 57 exempla; *prudentia* 39; *temperantia* 57; *fortitudo* 69.

[26] A good example is Thomas of Chobham's *Summa confessorum*, ed. F. Broomfield (Louvain, 1968). The section on vices is based on a variation of the list of capital vices but half of the text deals with *luxuria* and *ira*.

Cicero at all. Here as well, a classical model is used just as long as it appears to be suitable.[27]

Medieval moral treatises based on "great concepts" such as the cardinal virtues, the theological virtues (*fides*, *spes* and *caritas*), the seven deadly sins, the Ten Commandments can be roughly divided into two groups. Some focus indeed on the respective virtues, vices or commandments. Others (the larger group) merely use these concepts as a means to organise their (usually pastoral or didactic) material while at the same moment profiting from their authority and reputation. John of Wales' treatise clearly belongs to the second group.

2. JOHN OF WALES' LIBRARY[28]

The third "classical" root of the *Breviloquium* consists of the exempla themselves. In the prologue, John of Wales gives a very short explanation for the fact that his exempla are exclusively related to classical antiquity: there is already enough literature based on biblical material.[29] This might refer to collections such as Étienne de Borbone's († c. 1261) *Tractatus de diversis materiis predicabilibus*,[30] or to Guillaume Peraldus' († c. 1261) eminent *Summa de virtutibus* – the longest and, with more than 400 manuscripts, the most widespread medieval treatise on virtues, which contains both classical and Christian material.[31]

The fact that John of Wales tells stories related to classical antiquity does not mean that he exclusively used classical literature as a source. About a fifth of his exempla derive from patristic and medieval Christian texts, most notably from Augustine's *De civitate Dei* (13 exempla), which also serves as an important patristic witness on the role of pre-Christian history, philosophy and moral-

[27] Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte praedicandi*, ed. F. Morenzoni, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio mediaevalis 82 (Turnhout, 1988). See Diem, "Zielzorg" (as in n. 12), pp. 124-127.

[28] On Franciscan libraries in general, see Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education* (as in n. 6), pp. 197-215.

[29] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), prol. 3, ed. Diem/Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), p. 252.

[30] Étienne de Borbone, *Tractatus de diversis materiis predicabilibus*, partly ed. J. Berlioz and J.-L Eichenlaub, CCCM (as in n. 27) 124, Exempla Medii Aevi 1 and 3 (Turnhout, 2002 and 2006). See M. Mostert, "De samenleving", in *De middeleeuwse ideeënwereld. 1000-1300*, ed. M. Stoffers (Hilversum, 1994), pp. 267-294.

[31] William Peraldus' work is available in numerous early editions. I used the edition Lyon, 1554. See also M. Verweij, "The manuscript transmision of the *Summa de virtutibus* by Guillielmus Peraldus. A preliminary survey of the manuscripts", *Medioevo* 31 (2006), pp. 103-297.

ity, and from Augustine's Letter 138 (3 exempla).[32] In addition, John incidentally quotes from other treatises, letters and sermons of Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose and some medieval Christian authors, implicitly using them as evidence of the legitimate use of classical, non-Christian exempla in Christian moral education.

John's main source of inspiration, however, was Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia* (first century A.D.), a systematic collection of exempla organised mostly by virtues and vices.[33] Almost a third (73) of all John's exempla come from this collection. John of Wales probably browsed Valerius' texts systematically in order to quote every single useful story with references to the respective book of Valerius' work.

John of Salisbury and Gerald of Wales, John's predecessors in collecting classical exempla, used Valerius Maximus to a much lesser extent. Both quoted him less literally and without a detailed source references.[34] Because of that, Beryl Smalley could describe John of Wales as "a new Valerius Maximus, brought up to date, vastly elaborated and expanded" and argue that it was in fact John of Wales who made Valerius Maximus popular to medieval readers.[35]

John of Wales' second-most important source is not a classical text but the most important previously written "classicising" florilegium: John of Salisbury's *Policraticus, sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum*, completed in 1159. [36] The way John of Wales used the *Policraticus* has caused misunderstandings. The *Breviloquium* contains seventeen exempla ascribed to a "Policraticus" as author, usually with correct references to John of Salisbury's work. For another twenty exempla clearly derived from John of Salisbury's work, John of Wales indicated his source as *De nugis philosophorum*. When in 1855 Eduard Woelfflin attempted to reconstruct a classical exempla collection called *De nugis philosophorum* and ascribed to a certain Caecilius Balbus,[37] one of his sources was a *Codex Lindenbrogii* containing seventeen fragments. Eight of these seventeen fragments appear to be exempla quoted almost literally

[32] Augustine, *Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher, Sancti Aureli Augustini opera, sect. II, pars 3; Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 44 (Vienna, 1904), *Epistula* 138, pp. 126-148.

[33] Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, ed. J. Briscoe, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1998).

[34] Gerald of Wales' *De principis instructione liber* uses only five exempla from Valerius Maximus. None of the exempla is quoted literally. John of Salisbury uses Valerius Maximus 75 times in his *Policraticus*, which is more than ten times longer than the *Breviloquium*.

[35] Smalley, *English Friars* (as in n. 6), pp. 52-54.

[36] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, ed. C. Webb, 2 vols. (London, 1932). Book 1-4 is edited by K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, CCCM (as in n. 27) 118 (Turnhout, 1993).

[37] Cecilius Balbus, *De nugis philosophorum*, ed. E. Woelfflin (Basel, 1855). The information given in Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), p. 216 is erroneous. Woelfflin's more than doubtful reconstruction is available online on www.intratext.com/X/LAT0406.htm.

in the *Breviloquium* (indicated there as coming from *De nugis philosophorum*). It is therefore likely that one of the main sources of Woelfflin's reconstruction was in fact John of Wales' work, who quoted John of Salisbury.[38] Since most of the other material in Woelfflin's edition appears to be taken directly from John of Salisbury's work, there are good reasons to assume that Caecilius Balbus and his work are entirely an invention of the nineteenth century.[39]

John of Salisbury's impact on the *Breviloquium*, however, goes further than these 37 exempla ascribed to "Policraticus" or marked as coming from *De nugis philosophorum*. John of Wales had the habit of providing the reference to a presumed original author whenever he quoted exempla from the *Policraticus* for which John of Salisbury himself had given a source reference.[40] A comparison with John of Salisbury's text shows that John of Wales used material from the following authors via the *Policraticus*: Vegetius' *Epitome*,[41] Ovid's *Epistulae ex ponto*,[42] Jerome's *Contra Iovianum*,[43] Suetonius' *De vita Caesarium*,[44] Petronius' *Satyricon*[45] and Ausonius' *Epistula* 7.[46]

[38] All exempla marked as *De nugis philosophorum* in the *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1) are clearly traceable to John of Salisbury's work, usually referring accurately to the relevant section and providing rather literal quotations. Most of them likewise appear in Woelfflin's edition in different sections, often very similar to the text of the *Breviloquium*.

[39] Caecilius Balbus was probably born in the *Breviloquium* itself. In one of his exempla, John of Wales quotes John of Salisbury and links a person called Cecilius Balbus to *De Nugis Philosophorum*, though in fact not as the author of the work. *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 2.4.4: "Et ideo ait Cecilius Balbus, prout legitur libro iii De Nugis Philosophorum: 'Egregie imperator Auguste, maxime elucet prudentia tua, quod isti, scilicet adulatores, nondum te insanum omnino reddiderunt […]'". Cf. *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 3.14: "Egregie quidem Caecilius Balbus: 'Imperator, inquit, Auguste, tum in multis, tum in eo maxime elucet prudentia tua, quod isti nondum te omnino insanum reddiderunt […]'".

[40] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.4.10, quoting Heliand via *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 4.11.

[41] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 2.1.1 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 4.2 quoting Vegetius, *Epitoma*, 1.praef.

[42] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 3.2.9 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 4.8 quoting Ovid, *Epistulae ex ponto*, 1, carmen 2.21-2. John of Wales uses the source reference (Ethnicus) provided by John of Salisbury.

[43] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 3.1.35 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 5.17, quoting Jerome, *Contra Iovianum*, 2.14, quoting from Juvenal's *Satires*.

[44] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.6.2 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 5.7, quoting Suetonius, *De vita Caesarium*, *Titus*, 8.1. Cf. also *Breviloquium*, 1.6.7; 3.1.7. John of Wales gives as source *Gesta Romanorum*.

[45] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.6.12 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 3.7, quoting Petronius, *Satyricon*, 76.

[46] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 3.2.25 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 5.17, quoting Ausonius, *Ep*. 7.

For two of John of Wales' sources the role of the *Policraticus* is not entirely clear. Eutropius' *Breviarium*[47] provides four exempla all of which appear in the *Policraticus* as well. In three cases, however, John of Wales' version stands clearly closer to the original text.[48] One quotation seems to come from the *Policraticus* rather than directly from Eutropius.[49] Frontinus' *Strategmata* appear thirteen times in the *Breviloquium* (under the name of Vegetius). Twelve of these exempla appear in the *Policraticus* as well, but in most cases John of Wales gives a better reading.[50] It is possible that John found his material in the *Policraticus* and went back to the original text, but the exclusive double use of the material might also just be a coincidence. All in all, John of Wales used at least 42 exempla from John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, and possibly more.

The next important source was the works of Seneca, which were rediscovered by Roger Bacon († 1292) shortly before the *Breviloquium* was written.[51] John of Wales used Seneca's treatises *De ira* (11 exempla), *De providentia* (5 exempla), *De beneficiis* (4 exempla), *De clementia* (4 exempla), *De constantia sapientis* (3 exempla), and his *Epistulae ad Lucilium* (7 exempla). Twenty quotations come from seven different works of Cicero, of which four are quoted more than once: *De officiis* (4 exempla), *De senectute* (3 exempla), *Tusculanae disputationes* (3 exempla) and *De inventione* (7 exempla).

More than 85 percent of all the exempla in the *Breviloquium* come from the above mentioned sources. We may therefore assume that John of Wales systematically browsed this rather limited repertoire of sources in order to find suitable material. For the texts that he used for the rest of his work, it is rather unlikely that John of Wales studied them in a similarly systematic way. None of them are quoted more than three times, most of them only once. In most cases, however, John of Wales gave a correct source reference, which indicates that he did not quote indirectly. I therefore assume that John had direct access

[47] Eutropius, *Breviarium ab urbe condita*, ed. Carolus Santini (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1979).

[48] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.5.3/4.4.2 and *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 5.7 quote independently Eutropius, *Breviarium* (as in n. 47), 2.14.1-3. *Breviloquium*, 1.6.17 and *Policraticus*, 5.8 quote independently Eutropius, *Breviarium*, 8.5.3.

[49] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 3.2.14.

[50] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.4.5 / Frontinus, *Strategmata*, 4.3.3 / *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 1.4.8 / *Strategmata*, 4.3.2 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 1.6.9 / *Strategmata*, 4.5.20 / *Policraticus*, 6.11. *Breviloquium*, 1.6.22 / *Strategmata*, 4.7.3 / *Policraticus*, 4.8. *Breviloquium*, 1.6.23 / *Strategmata*, 4.7.1 / not in *Policraticus* *Breviloquium*, 1.6.25 / *Strategmata*, 4.2.4 / *Policraticus*, 6.14. *Breviloquium*, 1.6.26 / *Strategmata*, 4.2.7 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 2.5.2 / *Strategmata*, 4.2.9 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 3.1.2 / *Strategmata*, 4.3.9 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 3.1.3 / *Strategmata*, 4.3.1 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 3.1.4 / *Strategmata*, 4.3.7 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 3.1.5 / *Strategmata*, 4.3.13 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 3.1.6 / *Strategmata*, 4.3.11 / *Policraticus*, 5.7. *Breviloquium*, 3.1.14 / *Strategmata*, 2.11.6 / *Policraticus*, 5.7.

[51] See Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 6-7.

to most of these works. This list contains the following classical or classicising texts:

Alexandreis? (*Breviloquium*, 1.5.4, no source ref.)
Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachia* (*Breviloquium*, 1; 1.6.11, correct source ref.)
Aristotle, *Tropica* (*Breviloquium*, 2.1.1, correct source ref.)
Ps. Aristotle, *Ep. ad Alexandrum* (*Breviloquium*, 3.1.9; 3.2.15, source ref.)
Cicero, *In Verrem orationes sex* (*Breviloquium*, 2.6.5, ref. to the author)
Cicero, *De amicitia* (*Breviloquium*, 1.6.11, correct source ref.)
Cicero, *Pro Q. Ligario oratio* (*Breviloquium*, 4.3.20, ref. to the author)
Commentator Ethicae (*Breviloquium*, 1; 2.2.6; 3.1.1, correct source ref.)
Justinus, *Epitoma Pomp. Trog.* (*Breviloquium*, 1.2; 2.3.6, correct source ref.)
Juvenal, *Satirae* (*Breviloquium*, 3.1.19, ref. to the author)
Plato, *Phaedrus* (*Breviloquium*, 2.5.4, correct source ref.)
Quintus Curtius, *Historia Alexandri Magni* (*Breviloquium*, 2.4.10, ref. to the author)
Solinus, *De mirabilibus mundi* (*Breviloquium*, 1.6.8, ref. to the author)

and the following patristic and theological works:

Ambrose, *De virginitate* (*Breviloquium*, 3.1.13, correct source ref.)
Augustine, *De beata vita* (*Breviloquium*, 3.3.1, correct source ref.)
Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* (*Breviloquium*, 5, correct source ref.)
Augustine, *De gratia novi testamenti liber, seu ep. 140* (*Breviloquium*, 1.6.13, quoted as *Ep.*, 34)
Augustine, *Ep.* 155 (*Breviloquium*, 5, quoted as *Ep.*, 34)
Ps. Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* (*Breviloquium*, 2.6.1, quoted as Augustine, *De spiritu*)
Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione* (*Breviloquium*, 2.1.7, quoted as *Liber ad Eugenium*)
Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermo de adventu domini* (*Breviloquium*, 1.6.18, correct source ref.)
Heliand, *De cognitione sui* (*Breviloquium*, 2.1.7, ref. to the author)
Historia Transmarina? (*Breviloquium*, 2.5.5, quoted as *Historia Transmarina*)
Hugh of St. Victor, *Magni glossarum libri glossae quibus Virgilii nomen praefixum est* (*Breviloquium*, 2.4.2, ref. to the author)
Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* (*Breviloquium*, 5, correct source ref.)
Leontius Neapolitanus, *Vita Johannis Eleemosynarii* (*Breviloquium*, 2.5.3, source ref.)
Moralium dogma philosophorum (*Breviloquium*, 2.5.1, correct source ref.)
Petrus Alphonsus, *Disciplina clericalis* (*Breviloquium*, 2.5.6, quoted as *De prudentia*)
Petrus Comestor, *Historia scholastica* (*Breviloquium*, 2.1.5, quoted without author)
Sozomenos, *Historia ecclesiastica* (*Breviloquium*, 2.1.6, quoted as *Historia tripartita*)

This overview of John of Wales' sources gives an impression different from that given by the list provided by Swanson and Little.[52] According to their list, one might assume that John's work was indeed based on a very large part of classical tradition. Though John indeed *knew* many of these classical texts, the number of texts he actually *worked* with is rather limited.

3. EDITING CLASSICAL MATERIAL FOR A CHRISTIAN TEXT: HOW DID JOHN OF WALES WORK?

After this reconstruction of John of Wales' "library", I shall discuss what John of Wales actually did with the texts he had at his disposal. The most remarkable feature of his work – and probably one of the reasons for its popularity – is the fact that he gave detailed source references, usually to the author and title of the work (as he knew it), often to the book and sometimes even to the chapter of the work which he quotes.[53] Other collections of exempla, such as John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, Gerald of Wales' *Liber de instructione principum* or Étienne de Borbone's *Tractatus* refer sometimes to authors and their references were certainly not meant to provide the reader with easy access to the original works. Based on John's quotation system, one could regard the *Breviloquium* as an anthology of classical literature rather than a collection of exempla for education and edification.

If we examine the exempla themselves, we can roughly discern two techniques of editing. For about half of his exempla John of Wales takes a fragment of his source text and quotes it almost literally, to give his reader basically the same information as given in the source text. Usually he adds an introductory sentence linking the exemplum to a specific virtue and giving a reference to author and work. Often he adds a concluding sentence emphasising the specific moral meaning of the exemplum. Sometimes (though only in the first half of the work) this conclusion is supported by a biblical quotation, mostly from one of the books of proverbs. One example:

Breviloquium, 2.2.1 (V, fol. 246rb; P, fol. 69rb; M, fol. 9v)	Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, 8.7.ext.5 (ed. Briscoe, p. 525)
De prudentia autem philosophorum et studio ad eam habendam supervacuum est scribere, cum eorum studia pateant per sapientie documenta. De quorundam autem studio narrat Valerius libro viiio ubi ait	

[52] Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 59-62 and A. G. Little, *Studies in English Franciscan History: Being the Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford in 1916* (Manchester, 1917), pp. 187-191. Both relied on the information John of Wales provided himself (which is sometimes incorrect) and did not distinguish between central and peripheral sources.

[53] See also Pantin, "John of Wales" (as in n. 1), p. 305.

quod *Carnaydes laboriosus et diuturnus* fuit *sapientie miles. Si quidem nonaginta expletis annis, ita se mirifice doctrine operibus addixerat, ut, cum cib*um *capiendi recubuisset, cogitationibus inherens manum ad mensam porrigere obliuisceretur, idem*que *illi vivendi* et *philosophandi finis fuit.*

Carneades, laboriosus et diuturnus sapientiae miles, si quidem nonaginta expletis annis idem illi vivendi ac *philosophandi finis fuit, ita se mirific*um *doctrinae operibus addixerat ut cum cib*i *capiendi* causa *recubuisset, cogitationibus inhaerens manum ad mensam porrigere oblivisceretur.*

In almost every literally quoted exemplum John of Wales applies minor changes. Very often he reverses the word order and the structure in order to make the text easier to understand for a medieval reader less acquainted with the succinct Latin style of Valerius Maximus.[54] One feature appearing regularly throughout the text is the moving of the main verb to a more primary position and a change to a simpler tense.[55] Moreover expressions that John of Wales probably regarded as unusual or difficult he often replaced by more usual ones.[56]

On several occasions John adds short explanations to the text, either explaining specific expressions or giving background information missing in the fragment he is quoting.[57] At some occasions, however, he omits information not related to the moral message of his exemplum.[58]

John of Wales quotes almost all exempla from the "peripheral" sources (that is: *not* Valerius Maximus, John of Salisbury, Eutropius, Seneca or Augustine)

[54] See also (Source →John of Wales): ex parva magnam → magnam ex parva (1.4.4); Magnum auri pondus cum Samnites [...] → Cum Samnites magnum pondus auri [...] (1.4.7); in asiam veni → veni in asiam (1.6.4) etc.

[55] See e.g. mutaturos → mutarent (1.2); comparabat → comparuit (1.3.3); fuisset → fuerat (1.4.6); accusabit → accuset (1.4.15); spectabit → spectat (1.4.15); rapiat → rapit (1.5.5); possit → potest (1.5.5); proderit → prodest (1.6.16); agetur → agitur (1.6.16) etc.

[56] See e.g.: praecipere → iubere (1.2); praepotens → potens (1.3.3); colere → excolere (1.4.6); esse abductum → eductus est (1.4.6); tradere → prodere (1.4.15); appellare → vocare (1.4.10); invitus → immeritus (1.4.19); liberos → filios (1.4.10); innumeri → imenses (1.6.24); fudere → subdere (1.6.24); instituere → instruere (1.6.28); considere → sedere (1.6.30); communiter → publice (2.1.6); ars → opus (2.1.6); numen → deus (2.2.4) etc.

[57] E.g. *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.1: "Si solus captus sit Alexander, latro erit, si ad nuntum Dionidis populi famulentur, erit Dionides Imperator. (Vocabatur enim Pirrata Dionides)". *Breviloquium*, 1.6.12: "Unde solebant antiqui simulacra gratiarum effigiari nuda (sive depingi facere imagines nude) [...]"; *Breviloquium*, 3.1.19: "Non me Punice (id est Aphricane), neque fratrem meum Asiane (id est de Asia) gaze auarum reddiderunt […]". *Breviloquium*, 3.1.20: "Hoc ait, quod invidia est respectu maiorum. Iob v: Paruulum occidit invidia. (Est ergo sensus: Locupletior invidia id est virtutibus, quibus inuidetur)". *Breviloquium*, 3.1.33: "Vellem de ceteris, ut a sole mihi non obstes, (id est: non stes inter me et solem)". *Breviloquium*, 4.3.24: "'Gaudes', ait rex 'quia aliquid boni spero, si in castris meis silentium habeo' (id est: 'si mei de mala non loquuntur'"). See also 2.2.5; 2.4.4; 2.5.5; 3.1.28; 3.1.40; 4.3.2.

[58] Some examples: *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.4.11 replaces Sulcipius Galba and Aurelius with "duo consules"; 1.6.28 simplifies the structure of Augustus' family.

in this rather literal manner, cautiously translating the original Latin into an idiom accessible to his public. He did so as well with about half of the material he found in his main sources.[59]

For the rest of the exempla, his interventions into the text went further than merely adapting language and expressions. Often he rephrases most of his story, using some expressions of the original text. Yet in almost every "reparsed" exemplum John leaves one or two key sentences almost unchanged, usually an aphorism or a catchy quotation with the central message. One example:[60]

Breviloquium, 3.1.11 (V, fol. 250ra; P, fol. 71va; M, fol. 14r)

Novit enim vir industrius, quod voluptas enervat et effeminat voluptuosos. Unde etiam ***in fabulis*** legitur, quod ***fons Salmacis ingredientes*** in eum ***enerva***bat et ***viris effeminatis sexum adim***ebat. Et hoc dictum fuit in figura voluptatis. Sic legitur in libro v^{o} de nugis philosophorum.

John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 5.10

Unde eleganter ***fons Salmacis***, infamia mollitiei insignis, eidem comparatur. Ut enim ***in fabulis*** est, unda illius aspectu decora est, gustu dulcis, suavis tactu, et omnium sensuum usu gratissima, sed tanta mollitie ***ingredientes enerva***t, ut ***viris effeminatis*** nobiliorem ***adim***at ***sexum***; nec ante quisquam egreditur, quam stupeat et doleat se mutatum esse in feminam.

Unlike John of Salisbury, who rephrased most of his classical material,[61] John of Wales gives the impression that allowing access to – mildly edited – classical Latin texts was certainly one of his intentions for collecting his exempla. Even his rephrased exempla usually provide some suitable background information to a small piece of original Latin literature. This rather respectful way of dealing with classical texts supports the impression that, despite the structure, genre and expressed intention, John simply wanted to instruct his audience about classical literature; this, indeed, may have been one reason for the success of the *Breviloquium*.

John of Wales, however, repeatedly inserts "reminders" into the text, which point out to the reader that his exempla refer to a non-Christian world and a remote past. In this way he implicitly forces his audience to "translate" the moral message of the given exempla into something applicable to their own Christian moral perception. In these reminders John of Wales consistently refuses to call the ***antiqui*** virtuous, though on numerous occasions he states that his exempla show how their acts excelled in the virtues which he discusses.[62] Usually he

[59] See appendix. Exempla that are edited by John of Wales are indicated with chapter numbers in *italics.*

[60] See also *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.2; 1.4.1; 1.4.2; 1.4.11; 1.4.12; 1.4.15; 1.5.2; 1.5.3; 1.6.14; 1.6.15; 1.6.17; 2.2.4; 2.4.6; 2.5.7; 3.1.10; 3.1.15; 3.1.18; 3.1.19; 3.1.20.

[61] Southern, "Medieval humanism" (as in n. 11), p. 30, speaks of John of Salisbury's "sovereign indifference to the source".

[62] E.g. *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.3.1: "In antiquis enim regibus fuit mira severitas iustitie pro legibus custodiendis"; 1.6.1: "Qualiter autem hec virtus (i.e. iustitia) viguit in

uses the expression *vigere* to show how strong and vigorous the *antiqui* were: the *antiqui* may have performed *opera virtutum* but there is no true virtue without Christian revelation. One of the few explicit statements relating non-Christian excellence and Christian virtue is found in the middle of book one on *iustitia*, and here the boundaries and the message to Christian readers are clearly formulated:[63]

> *Breviloquium*, 1.5.5: Si ergo ignari legis divine tales fuerunt in operibus iustitie amore patrie et cupiditate inanis glorie, quales debent esse illuminati fide, ordinati caritate, certi spe glorie pro re publica christiana in operibus divine iustitie?

John of Wales repeats this thought in the epilogue – and this is the only occasion where he uses the expression *virtuosus*:

> *Breviloquium*, 5: His breviter premissis de virtutibus premeditandum est, quod si illi antiqui non illuminati fide, non ordinati caritate, non solidati spe tam virtuosi fuerunt in operibus virtutum et tanta sustinuerunt, – et hoc vel pro cupiditate glorie vel pro temporali utilitate vel pro vite honestate –, quanta facere debent fideles qui sunt predictis virtutibus gratuitis, scilicet fide, spe et caritate prediti, et quanta debent contemnere pro eterna felicitate?

On one other occasion, John of Wales makes clear that non-Christian achievements are admirable and exemplary despite their errors. Here he discusses the *pietas* of the *antiqui* and gives Valerius Maximus himself the opportunity to explain what in Christian discourse would become the difference between "political" virtues and true Christian virtues:

> *Breviloquium*, 1.6.13: Et non solum hec in eis vigebant, sed pietas et religio secundum ritus eorum. Pietas enim cultus dei dicitur, ait Augustinus epistola xxxiiii. Et cum est cultus veri Dei est vera pietas. Cum autem falsorum deorum est falsa et pernitiosa pietas, pro quantum observanda erant diligentes et studiosi. Sicut dicit Valerius libro i^{o}, quod non dubitaverit imperia sacris servire et ita se humanarum rerum habere regimen estimantia, si divine potentie bene constanterque fuissent famulata.[64]

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magnatibus antiquis, eorum gesta testantur"; 2.3.1: "Viso qualiter prudentiam in communi viguit, in antiquis videndum est in eius partibus".

[63] Both fragments are edited in Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), p. 253.

[64] V (as in n. 1), fol. 244rb; P (as in n. 1), fol. 645b; Vat. (as in n. 1), fol. 27v. This passage, which goes further than any other in paying respect to non-Christian piety, is – perhaps deliberately – omitted in one branch of the manuscript tradition, represented by the manuscripts Milano, Ambros. A 23 Sup, 32 (s. XIII^{3}) and Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 111 (s. XIII/XIV). As I have pointed out elsewhere, the copyist producing the subarchetype for this branch of the tradition had a stricter position against acknowledging the value of non-Christian virtuous deeds than had John of Wales himself. He removed most of the statements explicitly acknowledging the achievements of the *antiqui*. See Diem, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), pp. 219-236.

The three quoted statements on the relationship between non-Christian virtuous deeds and a morality rooted in Christian revelation, but also the permanent emphasis on the distance between "them" (the *antiqui*) and "us" (the Christian readers) express the limits of identification with the non-Christian past. Throughout the text, however, John of Wales puts a much stronger emphasis on another aspect: despite this distance, the categories he handles are valid for Christians as well and the examples of virtuousness do indeed have an educating and moral value. Part of his strategy of "selling" his exempla, consists of using a Christian author as a source or giving both a non-Christian and a venerable patristic author as a source, showing that other Christian authors had used these exempla earlier.[65] Another part consists of showing that biblical quotations, especially quotations from the books of proverbs, comprise the same moral message as the respective classical exempla.[66] On several occasions, especially in introductions to specific virtues, John of Wales deliberately combines classical and biblical definitions of virtues, implying that there is indeed *one* morality.[67] Strikingly enough, John of Wales applies these techniques of bridging between non-Christian and Christian concepts of morality almost exclusively in the first half of this work. This gives the impression that in the course of composing the ***Breviloquium*** he may have lost interest in discussing their relationship.

4. THE RECEPTION OF JOHN OF WALES

Jenny Swanson extensively discusses whether the ***Breviloquium*** could be regarded as a "mirror of princes", despite the fact that its structure and content neither fulfil the promises made in the prologue nor resemble any other contemporary texts nowadays assigned to this genre. Her rather unsatisfactory conclusion is to deny the ***Breviloquium*** the title of a ***Fürstenspiegel*** while generally giving it the potential to be an instructive text for rulers.[68] Richard Newhauser's description of the ***Breviloquium*** is somewhat more elaborate but still not the final word. For him the text is one-third a treatise on the cardinal virtues, one-

[65] Double ascriptions can be found in ***Breviloquium*** (as in n. 1), 1.1; 1.4.1; 1.4.2; 1.4.4; 1.4.12; 2.1.1; 3.2.8; 4.3.6; 4.3.20.

[66] ***Breviloquium*** (as in n. 1), 1.4.10; 1.5.5; 1.6.11; 1.6.13; 1.6.18; 1.6.21;1.6.28; 1.6.29; 1.6.30; 2.1.2; 2.1.4; 2.16; 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 2.4.10; 2.5.3; 3.1.20.

[67] ***Breviloquium*** (as in n. 1), 2.2.6: "Carentem enim prudentia et virtutibus, scire uti rebus non estimauit. Prudentia enim per se est desiderabilis, et etiam propter quid, quod utilis ad multa, ait Commentator Ethicae i. Vere enim beatus vir, qui inuenit sapientiam et qui affluit prudentia, proverbia iii. Ideo studentes philosophie velut inutili rei detrahebant pecunie, et huius gratia eam abiciebant, ait Commentator, ubi scripsit. Ut enim dicitur proverbia xvii: Quid prodest stulto habere divitias, cum sapientiam emere non possit"? See also ***Breviloquium***, 2.5.4; 2.6.1.

[68] Swanson, ***John of Wales*** (as in n. 1), pp. 55-59.

third an exempla collection and one-third a *Fürstenspiegel*.[69] Bert Roest describes the text in very global terms as a preaching aid.[70]

On the basis of its title (or rather titles), its prologue, its structure and its actual content, the *Breviloquium* may indeed be assigned to not less than five different genres: a "mirror of princes" according to its prologue;[71] a treatise on the cardinal virtues;[72] a thematically organised *florilegium* of classical literature; a collection of *exempla* for pastoral use and moral education;[73] and, finally, a "proto-humanist" anthology of classical texts put together as a statement propagating the use and reception of classical literature.[74]

Instead of assigning this text to a particular genre, it seems more reasonable to ask how John and his readers used the text – a question that may also give a clue to its enormous success. John of Wales' own intentions can be approached by looking at his entire oeuvre, which indicates that the *Breviloquium* was essentially, just like all his other works, a pastoral text, inspired by the idea that good Christians can indeed learn and profit morally from the heritage of antiquity. He uses the same exclusively non-Christian material in his *Breviloquium* and time and again along with Christian exempla in his later pastoral works. The question whether John acted in this particular case rather as a "classicist" or as a pastor or both, remains open.

For the way that the text was used by others, the manuscript transmission may give an important clue. Within twenty years the work was copied all over Europe and it remained in widespread use for at least 250 years. The following observations depend on the necessarily incomplete information given in library catalogues and do not claim to give more than a first impression. They are based on a spot check of about sixty manuscripts with reasonably detailed descriptions in library catalogues.

The *Breviloquium* appears in the manuscripts with a wide variety of titles, though two clearly prevail: *Breviloquium de virtutibus cardinalibus* and

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[69] Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues* (as in n. 1), p. 131.

[70] Roest, *Franciscan Literature* (as in n. 3), p. 319; M. Menzel, *Predigt und Geschichte. Das historische Exempel in der geistlichen Rhetorik des Mittelalters* (Cologne, 1998), pp. 24-90.

[71] An overview of contemporary mirrors of princes is given in L. K. Born, "The perfect prince. A study in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century ideals", *Speculum* 3 (1928), pp. 470-504.

[72] An overview and an attempt to define a genre is given in Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues* (as in n. 1). The most complete list of texts is provided by Bloomfield, *Incipits* (as in n. 3). Richard Newhauser is currently preparing an update on Bloomfield's repertory. István Bejczy has published numerous studies on specific treatises on the cardinal virtues.

[73] On this genre, see *Exempel und Exempelsammlungen* (as in n. 6); J.-C. Schmitt, *L'Exemplum* (Turnhout, 1982); M. Schürer, *Das Exemplum oder die erzählte Institution. Studien zum Beispielgebrauch bei den Dominikanern und Franziskanern des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Münster, 2005).

[74] See Smalley, *English Friars* (as in n. 6), p. 52.

(slightly more often) *Breviloquium de virtutibus antiquorum principum et philosophorum* (with variations). Both titles are used in the oldest manuscripts and there is no clear indication as to which one goes back to the original text.[75]

About half the manuscripts preserve the text without giving the name of the author; the other half give Iohannes Guallensis (in many variants). The fact that numerous manuscripts transmitted the text anonymously may indicate that the medieval reader regarded this work rather as a florilegium than as the product of a specific author, though acknowledgement of John of Wales as the author of the *Breviloquium* never disappeared.

The most important indications of how the text was used, come from the texts which appear in the manuscripts together with the *Breviloquium*. The *Breviloquium* is hardly ever combined with other treatises on the cardinal virtues or on virtues and vices in general. Only three of the manuscripts investigated contain (among other texts) treatises on virtues.[76] All of them can be counted among the pastoral compendia. The only exception is Martin of Braga's († 579)/Ps.-Seneca's *Formula honestae vitae*.[77] Nine of the sixty manuscripts examined contain both texts. This combination, however, points to the use of the *Breviloquium* as a *florilegium* of classical literature, rather than as a treatise on the cardinal virtues.

Another text appearing regularly in combination with the *Breviloquium* is Walter Burleigh's († 1337) *De vita et moribus philosophorum*, a collection of 132 biographical sketches of ancient philosophers.[78] A third text that regularly accompanied the *Breviloquium* is Peter of Limoges' († 1306) *Tractatus moralis de oculo*, a collection of exempla written in the same period as the *Breviloquium*.

About ten percent of the manuscripts combine the text exclusively or almost exclusively with other texts on classical antiquity. We may assume that the compilers of these manuscripts regarded the *Breviloquium* first and foremost as an anthology of classical literature. More than fifty percent contain (often combined with patristic works and works of theology) pastoral texts (collections of sermons, exempla and moral treatises), and especially collections of other exempla. Less than five percent combine the *Breviloquium* with abstract theological texts or with political or historical works that might indicate its use as an instructive text for rulers.

This overview indicates that most copyists indeed regarded the *Breviloquium* as a text for pastoral use, though there is a persistent (and, regarding the dates of the manuscripts, increasing) use of the *Breviloquium* as an anthology

[75] See Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), pp. 247 and 251.

[76] The references to the respective manuscripts had to be removed due to shortage of space. The details may be obtained on contacting the present author.

[77] Martin of Braga, *Formula honestae vitae*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. C. W. Barlow (New Haven, 1950), pp. 236-250. See Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues* (as in n. 1), pp. 110-113.

[78] Walter Burleigh, *Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum*, ed. H. Knust (Tübingen, 1886).

of classical texts which were probably not read in a pastoral context. Since the *Breviloquium* is rarely combined with political and historical texts and never with John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* and only incidentally with other treatises on virtues, we may assume that it did not play a significant role as a text for the education of princes, or as a treatise on the cardinal virtues, though its combination with Martin of Braga's *Formula* might still serve as a counter argument.

Another important criterion for understanding the use of the *Breviloquium* is its reception in other texts. The *Breviloquium* has already been identified as a source for several later works. The diversity of the latter gives strong reason to assume that only the smallest part of such intertextual relations has yet been discovered. I provide a list of works that already have been identified, and then add two texts to this list, where the *Breviloquium* has not yet been identified as a source.

The reception in Spain and Catalonia, especially the use of the *Breviloquium* by Juan García de Castrojeriz († after 1350) and Francesco Eiximenis († c. 1409) is investigated by Conrado Guardiola.[79] In Italy the Augustine Hermit Michele da Massa († 1337)[80] produced a revised version of the *Breviloquium* under the title *Liber Communiloquiorum*.[81] Swanson mentions three collections that made use of the *Breviloquium*:[82] a Franciscan collection of exempla preserved in a Birmingham manuscript,[83] a collection of exempla by the Dominican Robert Holcot († 1349)[84] and Gower's († 1408) *Confessio amantis*.[85] Pamela Kalning is currently investigating the impact of the *Breviloquium* on the *Liber de ludo scaccorum* (1322).[86]

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[79] C. Guardiola, "La influencia de Juan de Gales en España", *Antonianum* 60 (1985), pp. 99-119; idem, "Juan de Gales Cataluna y Eiximenis", *Antonianum* 64 (1989), pp. 354-361. See also G. Olson, "Juan Garcia de Castrojeriz and John of Wales: A Note on Chaucer's Reading", *Speculum* 64 (1989), pp. 106-110.

[80] Bloomfield, *Incipits* (as in n. 3), nos. 5124, 664, 2698. See also Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), pp. 218-229 and 266-269 with an analysis and edition of the epilogue of the work; Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), p. 211; Tuve, "Notes" (as in n. 4), pp. 272-273; Smalley, *English Friars* (as in n. 6), pp. 265-273.

[81] On Michele's alterations, see Diem, "Virtus est via" (as in n. 1), pp. 219-236.

[82] See Swanson, *John of Wales* (as in n. 1), pp. 203-205.

[83] See also J. H. Swanson, "John of Wales and the Birmingham University Manuscript 6/III/19", *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 76 (1983), pp. 342-349; D. D'Avray, "Another Friar and Antiquity", in *Religion and Humanism*, ed. K. Robbins, Studies in Church History 17 (Oxford, 1981), pp. 49-58.

[84] On Holcot, see Smalley, *English Friars* (as in n. 6), pp. 133-202.

[85] *The Works of John Gower*, ed. G. C. Macaulay (Oxford, 1901), online available on http://omacl.org/Confess/.

[86] F. Vetter, ed., *Das Schachzabelbuch Kunrads von Ammenhausen nebst den Schachbüchern des Jakobs von Cessole und des Jacob Mennel* (Frauenfeld, 1892). See P. Kalning, "Iustitia vel fortitudo: Tugenden und Exempla bei Johannes Guallensis und Jacobus de Cesslois", forthcoming; eadem, "Virtues and Exempla in John Waleys and Jacobus de Cessolis", in *Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200-1500*, ed. I. P. Bejczy and C. J.

Another quite widespread work whose dependence on the *Breviloquium* has not yet been recognised, is the *Dialogus creaturarum moralizatus*,[87] a fourteenth-century collection of exempla structured like a medieval encyclopedia. The text consists of 122 chapters on the stars, gemstones, landscapes, plants and especially (87 chapters) on animals. The author assigns to each object or animal a series of exempla based on the allegorical meanings of the respective lemma. Almost all exempla related to antiquity are quoted (usually literally) from the *Breviloquium*, with complete source references. In most cases the quotations from the *Breviloquium* are placed at the end of each lemma. Sometimes the compiler followed the order provided by John of Wales, sometimes he rearranged his material. The *Dialogus* quotes at least 83 chapters of the *Breviloquium*, about a third of the text. It is clear that the author saw the *Breviloquium* indeed as a florilegium of classical material rather than as a treatise on the cardinal virtues.

A famous collection of classical exempla generally dated to the beginning of the fourteenth century, the *Gesta Romanorum*,[88] quotes at least three exempla from the *Breviloquium* almost literally. One of these stories, on Trajan rendering justice to a widow who lost her son before starting a new campaign, originally comes from John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*.[89] For the two other stories, on a slave who has to whisper warnings into Caesar's ears during his triumph, and on the Brahmins asking Alexander for immortality,[90] I have not been able to find out which was the source used by John of Wales. A thorough comparison of the two texts might provide important new insights into the date of the composition of the *Gesta Romanorum* and its original content, which are still a matter of debate.

This certainly incomplete list of texts using the *Breviloquium* nonetheless gives some indications of the way in which the *Breviloquium* was read. Most of the authors using the *Breviloquium* were either Franciscans or members of the other mendicant orders. Only for the *Gesta Romanorum* and the *Dialogus creaturarum moralizatus* is a mendicant authorship uncertain. As a collection of ex-

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Nederman (Turnhout, 2007), and G. Hedegård's forthcoming monograph *Video auctorem, vide fontem: Jacobus de Cessolis' sources in books II and III of De ludo scachorum.*

[87] *Dialogus creaturarum moralizatus*, ed. J. G. T. Grässe, *Die beiden ältesten lateinischen Fabelbücher des Mittelalters* (Tübingen, 1880), pp. 125-280, with an introduction on pp. 303-308. The text is online available on http://www.ub.rug.nl/-ozsmed/teksten/dialogus2.htm http.

[88] See U. Gerdes, "Gesta Romanorum", in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1981), cols. 25-34; N. F. Palmer, "Das 'Exempelwerk der englischen Bettelmönche': Ein Gegenstück zu den 'Gesta Romanorum'", in *Exempel und Exempelsammlungen* (as in n. 6), pp. 137-173. For the edition by W. Dick, *Die Gesta Romanorum nach der Innsbrucker Handschrift vom Jahre 1342* (Erlangen, 1890), see also www.slu.edu/colleges/AS/languages/classical/latin/tchmat/readers/gr/grl.html.

[89] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 1.6.16 from *Policraticus* (as in n. 36), 5.5, quoted in *Gesta Romanorum* 42.

[90] *Breviloquium* (as in n. 1), 2.3.2. and 2.5.5, also in *Gesta Romanorum*, 65-6.

empla, the *Breviloquium* was predominantly used as a source for other collections of exempla. In most cases these exempla were clearly compiled for pastoral and moralising use (with the possible exemption of the *Gesta Romanorum*). Yet with the exception of Michael of Massa, nobody seems to have been interested in John's original order of his material based on the cardinal virtues and its subdivisions.

CONCLUSION

The *Breviloquium* was an exceptionally successful work, perhaps for the very reason that John of Wales crossed numerous boundaries – of periods, genres and literary forms – and produced a text suitable for many different purposes. As a contribution on the cardinal virtues, his work was not as dramatically dull as most scholastic treatises on the topic. Instead of losing himself in philosophical speculations related neither to actual life nor to any useful moral concept, John of Wales used the cardinal virtues as a framework which might link classical texts with pastoral intent.

In this sense, John of Wales might be a "medieval" humanist according to both definitions that Richard Southern provided in his essay on "medieval humanism". He was interested in Latin language and literature ***and*** he wanted to make the moral teachings of antiquity accessible to his readers. Though some of the exempla in the *Breviloquium* express rather silly forms of heroism and moral rigour, many of them have a clearly "humanistic" message, calling upon human dignity, moderate rule, peace and self-restraint.[91] Calling him an "early humanist" in anticipation of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italian humanism, however, would certainly be misleading.

One question that remains to be discussed (though it is in a way reconciled by Southern's double definition of humanism) is whether the *Breviloquium* was actually meant to be a pastoral text or a florilegium of Latin literature. Were the classical texts the framework, the "wrapping", and the moral message the true content of the treatises, or was the form (pastoral exempla collection/instructive text for the powerful) a wrapping for its true content – that is, an enjoyable florilegium of classical Latin literature, presented in digestible bits? The reception and the manuscript transmission show us that the text has been used both ways.

John's references to the unbridgeable gap between classical proofs of excellence and true Christian morality are by no means prominent in the text and probably did not disturb any reader who wished merely to enjoy classical texts and stories. Nevertheless, I tend to believe that John of Wales understood his work as a contribution to what Leonard Boyle called the "pastoral revolution",

[91] The question of how far John of Wales' choice of exempla may have produced a text with a very specific moral or possibly even political standpoint has not been discussed in this article, though it may be a fruitful subject for a subsequent study.

a movement of Christian moral education and pastoral care mainly initiated by the Fourth Lateran Council.

NOTES TO THE APPENDIX

The following table gives an impression of what the work actually contained and how it was structured. It follows the chapter division provided in the Venice 1492-edition and gives each exemplum a number within the chapter (i.e. ***Breviloquium***, 3.3.2 is the second exemplum of book 3, chapter 3). A chapter number in ***italics*** indicates an exemplum that is rephrased or shortened by John of Wales. 28 exempla used in the ***Breviloquium*** are listed in Frederic Tubach's abundant ***Index Exemplorum***, a repertory of 5400 exempla collected from the most popular medieval exempla collections. Their reference number is added between brackets in the third column.[92] The third column provides the reference to the source text used by John of Wales, as far as it was identifiable. Where John of Wales mentions a source reference different from the identified one, this reference is added in parentheses.

CHAPT.	CONTENT	SOURCE (TUBACH)
Prol.	Prologue	Prv. 20.28
1	*Iustitia*	Arist. Eth. 5.1, Comm. Eth.
1.1	*iustitia in possidendo* Alexander and the pirates	Aug. De civ. 4.4, Pol. 3.14 (de nug.) (T113)
1.2	*iustitia in statuendo leges iustas* Lycurgus' unchangeable laws	Just. Epit. 3.3.10; 3.2.9ff. (Pompeius Trog) (T3101)
1.3.1	*de observatione legum* Zeleucus gives an eye for his son	Val. Max. 6.5.ext. 3 (T1944)
1.3.2	Karundo convicted by his own law	Val. Max. 6.5.ext. 4
1.3.3	Bad laws are like spiders' webs	Val. Max. 7.2.ext.14
1.3.4	Themistocles' bad advice	Val. Max. 6.5.ext. 2
1.4.1	*de providentia circa rem publicam*. Marcus Regulus returns into hostage	Cicero De officiis 1.39 Aug. De civ. 1.15
1.4.2	Codrus sacrifices himself for Athens	Aug. De civ. 18.19
1.4.3	Plato on the state	Cic. De officiis 1.85
1.4.4	Lucius Valerius, the poor consul	Aug. De civ. 5.12
1.4.4[a]	Poverty of Lucius Valerius	Aug. De civ. 5.18
1.4.5	Poverty of Attilus Regulus	Font. Str. 4.3.3, Pol. 4.7
1.4.6	Poor Quintus becomes dictator	Aug. De civ. 5.18.2
1.4.7	Quintus is incorruptible	Cicero De senectute 5.5
1.4.8	Fabricius is incorruptible	Front Str. 4.3.2, Pol. 4.7
1.4.9	Scipio foregoes going to Spain	Val. Max. 6.3.3
1.4.10	Helius refuses his children the title of *Augustus Caesar*.	Pol. 4.11, Sir. 7.6 (T421)

[92] F. C. Tubach, ***Index Exemplorum. A Handbook of Medieval Religious Tales*** (Helsinki, 1969).

1.4.11	Two consuls compete who goes to Spain	Val. Max. 6.4.2
1.4.12	Brutus kills his sons	Aug. De civ. 3.15, Val. Max. 5.6.1
1.4.13	Torquatus kills his son	Aug. De civ. 5.18
1.4.14	Torquatus convicts his son	Val. Max. 5.8.3
1.4.15	Cicero on sons and state	Cicero De officiis 3.90
1.4.15	Two wise people in distress at sea	Cicero De officiis 3.29
1.5.1	*de iustitia erga inimicos*, Justice of Camillus against teacher of the Falisci	Val. Max. 6.5.1
1.5.2	Timocrates refuses to poison Pyrrhus	Val. Max. 6.5.1
1.5.3	Fabricius saves his enemy from being poisoned	Eutrop. Brev. 2.14.1, Pol. 5.7 (Aemilius Florus) (T3761)
1.5.4	Alexander hangs the murderers of Darius	Not identified (T108)
1.5.5	Conclusion	Phil. 2.21, Cic. De offic. 3.22
1.6.1	Introduction	Moral. Dogm. 1.B.1
1.6.2	(*liberalitas*), Titus: a day without giving is a lost day	Pol. 3.14 after Suet. Tit. 8.1 (Gesta romanorum) (T1459)
1.6.3	Alexander gives city instead of denarius	Seneca De benef. 2.16 (T100)
1.6.4	Alexander conquers not for himself	Seneca Ep. 53.10
1.6.5	Antigonus gives neither talent nor denarius	Seneca De benef. 2.17
1.6.6	divisions of *iustitia* according to Macrobius	Macrobius Somn. 1.8.7
1.6.7	(*innocentia*) Innocence of Titus	Pol. 3.14 after Suet. Tit. 10.1 (Gesta antiquorum) (T4872)
1.6.8	Only an old, childless person can be elected king	Solinus De mirab. 54
1.6.9	(*amicita et concordia*), Faithfulness of the Casilini fighting Hannibal	Aug. Ep. 138.2.11, Front. Str. 4.5.20, Pol. 6.11
1.6.10	Faithfulness of Amon and Phyta	Val. Max. 4.7.ext.1
1.6.11	(*amicita*)	Arist. Eth. 7, Cic. De amic. 44 and 51, Sir. 6.14, Sir. 6.10
1.6.12	(*pietas*/*religio*), On the piety of the Graces	Pol. 3.7, Petron. Satyr. 76
1.6.13	On pagan piety: false but admirable	Aug. De gratia nov. test. 18.45, Val. Max. 1.1.9
1.6.14	On the piety of Roman women	Val. Max. 1.1.15
1.6.15	(*constantia*), Alexander's sacrifice	Val. Max. 3.3.ext.1
1.6.16	(*affectus/humilitas*), Trajan and the widow	Pol. 5.5 (Heliandus) (T4989)
1.6.17	No emperor is happier than Trajan	Eutr. Brev. 8.5.2, Pol. 5.5
1.6.7[a]	Trajan gives his son to a widow	Not identified (T5267)
1.6.18	Bernard on *iustitia* towards equals and superiors	Bern. Clar. Serm. de adv. 5 and others, Prv. 9.1
1.6.19	Ruler is an image of Divine majesty	Pol. 4.1
1.6.20	Caesar was denied triumph because it took him too long to defeat enemies	Not identified (Gesta Romanorum)
1.6.21	Senate refuses payment of legions	Val. Max. 2.7.15, Rom. 13.1
1.6.22	(*consilium*), L. Paulus advises emperor	Front. Str. 4.7.3, also Pol. 4.8
1.6.23	Caesar: hunger works better than sword.	Front. Str.4.1, not Pol.
1.6.24	(*disciplina/custodia*), Alexander and the Romans conquered the world	Pol. 4.14
1.6.25	40 soldiers make a victory	Front. Str. 4.2.4, also Pol. 6.14
1.6.26	Victory of Titus' small army	Front. Str. 4.2.7, Pol. 5.7

1.6.27	Aurelius punishes his son	Val. Max. 2.7.4
1.6.28	Octavian teaches his sons and daughters to become self-supporting	Pol. 6.4, Sir. 7.25-26
1.6.29	Jerome excludes three clerics from table	Pol. 8.12, Sir. 33.25
1.6.30	Cambyses skins a bad judge	Val. Max. 6.3.ext.3, Dt. 16.18 (T2859)
2.1.1	*prudentia in principibus* (introd.) Rulers need wisdom. Do not choose a young ruler. Praise of wise rulers	Pol. 4.2 after Veg Epit. 1.praef, Arist. Trop. 3.2, Pol. 6.2, Val. Max.7.2.ext.4, Sen. Ep. 90.5
2.1.2	Emperors were never illiterate	Pol. 4.6, Prv. 8.15
2.1.3	*Rex illiteratus est asinus coronatus*	Pol. 4.6
2.1.4	Philip appoints Aristotle as Alexander's teacher	Pol. 4.6, Sap. 6.16, 6.22, 6.23, Sir. 10.1, 10.3, 1 Rg. 3.9
2.1.5	Democritus' library/translation of the Septuagint	Petr. Comest. Hist. Schol. Hist. Lib. Esther 7
2.1.6	Theodosius studies at night	Sozom Hist. Eccl. 1.1, Dt 17.18f
2.1.7	On human law and divine law	Heliand De cog. 25/15, Bern. Clar. De cons. 2.7
2.2.1	*de prudentia philosophorum*, Carneades dies philosophising	Val. Max. 8.7.ext.5
2.2.2	Solon dies philosophising	Val. Max. 8.7.ext.14
2.2.3	Socrates' wisdom	Val. Max. 8.7.ext.8
2.2.4	Archimedes' disturbed circles	Val. Max. 8.7.7
2.2.5	Themistocles on wisdom, wealth	Val. Max. 7.2.ext.9
2.2.6	Wisdom is precious in itself and more worthy than wealth	Comm. Eth. 1, Prv. 3.13, Prv. 7.16
2.2.7	Socr: wisdom and wealth incompatible	Not identified
2.3.1	*de memoria* (introd.); Cicero's division of *prudentia*; importance of *memoria*	Cic. De inv. 2.53.160 Not identified (Hugo)
2.3.2	Reminders at the moment of triumph	Not identified, Ovid Ars amat. 214 (Hieronymus Ep.)
2.4.1	*De intelligentia*, The hesitant king	Val. Max. 7.2.5, Rm 12.8
2.4.2	The king's immunity to adulators	Hugo Gloss. Virg. 31, Is 13.23
2.4.3	Philosophers' immunity to adulators	Arist Eth. 1.7 ?
2.4.4	Philosopher warns king for adulators	Pol. 3.1.14 (Cec. Balb., De nug.)
2.4.5	Death of adulterer Timogoras	Val. Max. 6.3.ext.2
2.4.6	Wounded Alexander recognises his humanity	Sen. Ep. 59 (T149)
2.4.7	Alexander's memento mori	Alexandreis 332-378
2.4.8	Anacharus' praise and Alexander's *memento mori*	Val. Max. 8.14.ext.2
2.4.9	Warning against pride	Alexandreis ?
2.4.10	Another warning for Alexander	Quint. Curt. Hist. Alex. 7.8.14, Sir. 10.12, Sap. 5.8, Sap. 5.9
2.5.1	*de providential*, Xerxes warned of wrong strategy	Moral. Dogm. 1.A.1 (T5398)
2.5.2	Defeat of Xerxes	Front. Str.4.9 also Pol.5.7
2.5.3	Architects adulate the emperor	Leont. Neap. Vita Ioh. Eleemos 17, Sir 7.40
2.5.4	True philosophy is thinking of death	Plato Phaedr., Sir. 7.

2.5.5	Brahmins ask Alexander for immortality	Not identified (historia transmarina) (T750)
2.5.6	Philosophers comment on the death of Alexander	Petr. Alphonsus, Disc. clericalis, fab. 30, Hiob 20.7, Sir 7.3 (T121)
2.5.7	Sword of Damocles	Cic. Tusc. 5.C. 21.60 (T4994)
2.5.8	Memento mori	Not identified (Macrobius)
2.6.1	*de reliquis prudentie partibus* (intr.) Division of *prudentia* according to Macrobius' definitions, especially of *providentia*	Macrob. Somn. 1.8.7, Ps. Aug. De spir. et anima 11, Moral. Dogm. 1.A.3, Cic. De senec. 17 (Cic. De offic.), Prv 24.6
2.6.2	Alexander prefers older soldiers	Just. Epit. 11.6.4 (T95)
2.6.3	Definition of *doctilitas*	Moral. Dogm. 1.A.3
2.6.4	Definition of *cautio*	Moral. Dogm. I A 3 (Sen. Ep.), Decr. Grat. Dist. 61.6 (Greg. Moral.), Cic. In Verrem 1.39
2.6.5	Trojan Horse	Not identified (Cicero) (T2629)
3.0	*de temperantia* (intr.)	Prv. 3.14, Sir. 10.16, Macr. Somn. 1.8.7, Cic. De inv. 54.164 (Rhet.)
3.1.1	*de continentia*	Comm. Eth. 1
3.1.2	Alexander eats bread with his friends	Front. Str. 4.3.9, Pol. 5.7
3.1.3	Scipio/Cato drink wine with servants	Front. Str. 4.3.1, Pol. 5.7
3.1.4	Hannibal never rests	Front. Str. 4.3.7, Pol. 5.7
3.1.5	Army under Marcus Saurus leaves apple tree untouched	Front. Str. 4.3.13, Pol. 5.7
3.1.6	Massinissa, 90, never sits down to eat	Front. Str. 4.3.11, Pol. 5.7
3.1.7	Caesar eats little and simple food: bread, small fish, cheese and figs	Pol. 5.7 after Suet. De Vit. Caes. Div. Aug. 76.1
3.1.8	Roman women do not know wine	Val. Max. 2.1.5
3.1.9	Alexander voluntarily suffers from thirst for his soldiers	Ps. Arist. Ep. ad Alex.
3.1.10	Scipio bans everything from the camp that leads to buggery	Val. Max. 2.7.1
3.1.11	Fonts of Salmacis cause effeminacy	Pol. 5.10 (de nug.)
3.1.12	Spurinna destroys his beauty to avoid being an object of women's desire	Val. Max. 4.5.ext.1
3.1.13	Boy slits his face to flee female desire	Ambr. De virg. 12.83
3.1.14	Alexander does not touch a beautiful virgin who is engaged to a prince	Front. Str. 2.11.6, Pol. 5.7
3.1.15	Scipio returns a virgin to her fiancé	Val. Max. 4.3.1
3.1.16	Xenocrates is incorruptible	Val. Max. 4.3.ext.3
3.1.17	Pythagoras teaches continence	Pol. 7.4 (de nug.)
3.1.18	Duellius stinks everyone away	Pol. 3.13 (de nug.)
3.1.19	Scipio earns nothing on conquest of Africa	Val. Max. 3.7.1c
3.1.20	Samnites cannot bribe Curius	Hiob 5.2, Val. Max. 4.3.5
3.1.21	Pyrrhus does not touch the loot	Val. Max. 4.3.5
3.1.22	Fabricius returns gifts to the Samnites	Val. Max. 4.3.50
3.1.23	Quintus Tuber returns gifts	Val. Max. 4.3.7
3.1.24	Anathocles takes gold as clay	Polic. 5.17 (de nug.)
3.1.25	Anathocles eats from earthenware	Polic. 5.17 after Ausonius, Ep. 7

3.1.26	Not gaining wealth by power	Val. Max. 4.4.9
3.1.27	Powerful people who were too poor to give their daughters into marriage	Val. Max. 4.4.9
3.1.28	Poverty, not wealth has served Rome	Aug. Ep. 138.3.16
3.1.29	Desire has destroyed Roman poverty	Juv. Sat. 6.294-295
3.1.29	Caesar suffers with his soldiers	Pol. 4.3
3.1.30	Soldier asks Caesar to be advocate	Pol. 3.14.29 (de nug.)
3.1.31	Antigonus reacts to slander	Sen. De ira 3.23.3
3.1.32	Continence in Plato's academy	Cic. Tusc. 1.49.119; Cic. Tusc. 2.5.13; not identified (Papias)
3.1.33	Diogenes to Alexander: get out of my sun!	Val. Max. 4.3.ext.4 (T1673)
3.1.34	Diogenes is richer than Alexander	Sen. De benef. 5.6.1 (T1673)
3.1.35	Diogenes moves into the barrel	Pol. 5.17 (Hier. Contra Iov. 2.14)
3.1.36	Diogenes throws away his wooden chalice	Not identified (T1674)
3.1.37	Diogenes becomes ill on the way to the Olympic games	Not identified (T2021)
3.1.38	Socrates refuses money because one cannot be rich and wise	Not identified
3.1.39	Democritus does not have and does not lose anything	Sen. De const. sap. 5.6
3.1.40	Anaxagoras: The beauty of modesty	Val. Max. 7.2.ext.12
3.2.1	*De clementia* (intr.), definitions	Sen. De clem. 2.3.1/2.7.3
3.2.2	King of the bees has no sting	Sen. De clem. 1.19 (T 547)
3.2.3	Marcellus cries over Syracusans' fate	Val. Max. 5.1.4
3.2.4	Caesar laments the death of Pompey	Val. Max. 5.1.10 (T3837)
3.2.5	Compass. of Pompey for king of Armenia	Val. Max. 5.1.9
3.2.6	Compassion of consul Lucius Paullus	Val. Max. 5.1.8
3.2.7	Caesar leaves Cato's children unharmed	Val. Max. 5.1.10
3.2.8	A king's duties	Not identified
3.2.9	A king has to reward, not to punish	Pol. 6.8 after Ovid Ep. Pont. 1 carm. 2.21-22 (Ethnicus)
3.2.10	Humanity, compassion shape largesse	Val. Max. 5.1.1
3.2.11	Romans free hostages from Carthage	Val. Max. 5.1.1a
3.2.11[a]	Caesar's compassion	Pol. 6.15 after Solinus
3.2.12	Caesar: one has to be loved by his soldiers	Pol. 4.3
3.2.13	The ethics of a tyrant	Pol. 4.8 after Eutr. Brev. 8.5.1 (Gest. Rom.)
3.2.14	Alexander equally treated as his soldiers	Val. Max. 5.1.ext.1
3.2.15	Alexander restores Pyrrhus to his realm	Ps. Arist. Ep. ad Alex.
3.3.1	*De modestia* (intr.) Definitions of modesty	Cic. De off. 1.40.142 Aug. Beata vita 4.32
3.3.2	Titus has nothing to regret	Pol. 3.14 (T4872)
3.3.3	Divis. of *temperantia* according to Macrobius	Macrob. Somn. 1.8.7
4	*De fortitudine*, definitions and divisions of *fortitudo*	Macrob. Somn. 1.8.7 Cic. De inv. 2.54
4.1.1	*De magnificentia* (intr.)	Cic. De inv. 2.54, Sen. Ep. 104.23, Ep. 65.20
4.1.2	Privernum makes peace with Rome	Val. Max. 6.2.1
4.1.3	Belinus and Pompey	Val. Max. 6.2.8

4.1.4	Innocently convicted woman receives justice from Philip	Val. Max. 6.2.ext.1
4.1.5	Woman prays for tyrant Dionysius to avoid worse	Val. Max. 6.2.ext.2
4.1.6	Aristotle sends Callisthenes to criticise Alexander's Persian habits	Val. Max. 7.2.ext.11 (T143)
4.1.7	Diogenes refuses to adulate Dionysius and eats cabbage	Val. Max. 4.3.ext.4 (T822)
4.1.8	Alexander thinks bigger than Parmenius	Val. Max. 6.4.ext.3 (T90)
4.2.1	*De fidentia* (intr.)	Cic. De inv. 2.54
4.2.2	Alexander trusts Philip's medicine	Val. Max. 3.8.ext.6
4.2.3	Plato trusts Xenocrates	Val. Max. 4.1.ext.2 (T3820)
4.2.4	Fidelity of a Spartan soldier	Val. Max. 3.7.ext.8
4.2.5	Arrows provide only shadows to real heroes, but no fear	Val. Max. 3.7.ext.8
4.2.6	Wall is easier conquered than women	Val. Max. 3.7.ext.8
4.3.1	*De patientia* (intr.)	Cic. De inv. 2.54
4.3.2	Antigonus praises Alexander	Pol. 3.14.12 (de nug.)
4.3.3	Caesar's old age	Pol. 3.14 (de nug.)
4.3.4	Caesar is not a tyrant	Pol. 3.14 (de nug.)
4.3.5	Scipio is not a warrior but a leader	Pol. 3.14 (de nug.)
4.3.6	Theodosius is merciful to a slanderer	Pol. 3.14 (de nug.)
4.3.7	Vespasian reacts to slander	Pol. 3.14.38 (de nug.)
4.3.8	Antigonus ridicules slanderers	Sen. De Ira 3.22.2
4.3.9	Aristippus ignores slander on himself	Pol. 3.14.5 (de nug.)
4.3.10	Antisthenes ignores slander	Pol. 3.14.6 (de nug.)
4.3.11	Xenophon endures slander	Pol. 3.14 (de nug. phil. phil.)
4.3.12	Diogenes endures people's insults	Pol. 3.14 (de nug.)
4.3.13	Socrates' patience towards Xantippe	Pol. 5.10 (de nug.)
4.3.14	Theodore the Syrian resists a tyrant	Val. Max. 6.2.ext.3
4.3.15	Servant of Alexander burns his arm not to disturb a sacrifice	Val, Max. 3.3.ext.1
4.3.15	Pompey burns his finger	Val. Max. 3.3.2
4.3.16	Zeno resists the tyrant	Val. Max. 3.3.ext.2
4.3.17	Zeno bites the tyrant's ear off	Val. Max. 3.3.ext.3 (T1842)
4.3.18	Bravery of Anaxarchus	Val. Max. 3.3.ext.4
4.3.19	Leonidas fighting the Spartans	Val. Max. 3.2.ext.3
4.3.20	(*remissio iniuriae*) Evil must not be answered with evil	Cic. Pro Q. Ligar. orat. 35 Aug. Ep. 138.2.9
4.3.21	Wise man ignores injustice to him	Sen. De const. sap. 14.3
4.3.22	Philip does not punish barefaced diplomat	Sen. De ira 3.22.2-3
4.3.23	Alexander gives pardon to a soldier who wanted to kill him	Not identified (T114)
4.3.24	Antigonus on slander	Sen. De ira 3.22.4
4.3.25	Peisistratus on slander	Sen. De ira 2.11.4
4.3.26	Peisistratus endures being called cruel	Sen. De ira 2.11.1-2
4.3.27	Socrates is calm when he gets angry	Sen. De ira 3.13.3
4.3.28	Diogenes refuses to get angry	Sen. De ira 3.38.1-2
4.3.29	Pyrrhus on slander	Val. Max. 5.1.ext.3
4.3.30	Tiberius on slander	Pol. 3.14.24 (de nug.)

4.3.31	(*iniuriarum oblivisci*)	Sen. Ep. 94.28; De const. sap. 3.5
4.3.32	(*moderatio disciplinarium et correctionum*), Tarentius does not punish his negligent serfs	Val. Max. 4.1.ext.1
4.3.33	Plato tempers anger towards a servant	Val. Max. 4.1.ext.2
4.3.34	Plato punishes a servant	Sen. De ira 3.12.5/12.7/13.1
4.3.35	Plutarch punishes without anger	Pol. 4.8 (de nug.)
4.3.36	Too much discipline causes harm, not good	Pol. 4.8 (de nug.)
4.3.37	Discipline has to cure, not to repress	Pol. 1.5
4.4.1	*De perseverantia*, def., subdivisions	Cic. De inv. 2.54.163
4.4.2	It is easier to divert the sun from its course than Fabricius from honesty	Eutr. Brev. 2.14.2, also in Pol. 5.7 (T3761)
4.4.3	Socratates: wise man cannot be offended	Pol. 3.14.11 (de nug.)
4.4.4	Everybody grows from adversity	Not identified, Sen. Ep. 140
4.4.5	Stoics: passions are a sign of stupidity	Aug. De civ. 9.4
4.4.6	Fearless Stoic on tempestuous sea	Aug. De civ. 9.4
4.4.7	Unhappy man who never had setbacks	Sen. De prov. 2.2/33
4.4.8	Death of Socrates	Sen. De prov. 3.12
4.4.9	Death of Socrates	Val. Max. 7.2.ext.1
4.4.10	Only experience creates *fortitude*	Sen. De prov. 4.3/4.6
4.4.11	Women have *fortitudo* as well	Not identified
4.4.12	Lucretia sacrifices herself	Aug. De civ. 1.18-19
4.4.13	Anaxagoras does not grieve on death of son	Val. Max. 5.10.ext.3 (T 202)
4.4.14	Xenophon does not grieve on death of son	Val. Max. 5.10.ext.2 (T5397)
4.4.15	Bias' wealth is in his mind	Val. Max. 7.2.ext.3
4.4.16	Paulinus does not care about wealth	Aug. De civ. 1.10
4.4.17	Subdivisions according to Macrobius	Macrob. Somn. 1.8.7
5	*De ordinat. Virtutum* Discussing the value of pagan deeds of excellence committed without access to the Christian revelation, the nature of the cardinal virtues and the necessity of appropriate motivations for good deeds	Aug. De civ. 5.20, Sen. De benef. 4.1.2, Aug. De civ. 5.12/9.4/ 19.25, Aug. Ep. 155.4.13, Ps. 72.28, Aug. Ep. 5.3.12/5.16, Aug. De gen. 26.54, Ps. 41.2, Aug. De civ. 1.22.1, Prv. 11.23, Sap. 8.7, Io.14.6, Hugo De sacr. 8.10

HUMANISM AND STOICISM

VIRTUE AS AN END IN ITSELF: THE MEDIEVAL UNEASE WITH A STOIC IDEA

István P. Bejczy

The Stoic understanding of virtue in terms of individual perfection regardless of its social utility agrees quite well with the Christian premises of medieval moral thought. Even if Roman Stoic authors like Cicero and Seneca – infinitely better known in the Middle Ages than their Greek predecessors – frequently conceive of the virtues in a political setting, the ideal of the virtuous wise who lives in seclusion from the world shines through the work of those authors. In the tenth and last book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* even Aristotle embraces this ideal, thus actually taking distance from the moral philosophy developed in the nine preceding books, in which the virtues, as Thomas Aquinas observes, are discussed "in as much as they order us toward the civil life" (*secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem*).[1]

What medieval Christians found difficult to accept, however, is the Stoic notion that virtue is an end in itself and constitutes its own reward (*pretium virtus sibi ipsa*).[2] Several Latin fathers polemicised with Stoicism on this particular issue, as Marcia Colish has demonstrated.[3] In the conception of the fathers, virtue has God as its goal and the union with God in the afterlife as its reward. From the Early Middle Ages these views were commonplace: "the objective of the virtues is that we receive the eternal life and the glory of the celestial kingdom as rich bequests from a promised heritage", as the *Glossa ordinaria* on Prov. 22: 4 repeats after Bede.[4] Notably, Augustine rejects the Stoic

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.161.1 ad 5, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome, 1882-), vol. 10, p. 293.

[2] The phrase "pretium virtus sibi ipsa" occurs in Ovid, *Tristia* 5.14.31, ed. J. B. Hall (Stuttgart, 1995), p. 214; cf. Claudian, *Panegyricus dictus Mallio Theodoro consuli* (*Carmina maiora*) 17.1, in *Carmina*, ed. J. B. Hall (Leipzig, 1985), p. 129: "Virtus pretium sibi".

[3] See M. L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1985; repr. 1990), p. 33 (Minucius Felix), p. 45 (Lactantius), pp. 216-220 (Augustine).

[4] *Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria*, 4 vols. (Strasbourg, 1480/1481; repr. Turnhout, 1992), vol. 2, p. 680 = ed. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina [henceforth: PL], vols. 1-221 (Paris, 1844-1865), vol. 113, col. 1105B-C: "finis virtutum in futuro, ut divitias promissae haereditatis, regni coelestis gloriam, et vitam recipiamus aeternam"; cf. Bede, *In Proverbia Salomonis* 2 (22:4), ed. D. Hurst, in Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [henceforth: CCSL], vol. 1- (Turnhout, 1954-), vol. 119B, p. 112.

idea of human virtue as an end in itself. In his view, virtue is a gift of God which procures happiness in the afterlife. Only in the sense that the contemplation of God in heaven will be mediated through celestial virtue can virtue be said to constitute its own goal and reward.[5]

In this essay I intend to deal with two related topics: first, the ambiguous medieval attitude toward the Stoic idea of virtue as an end in itself; second, the medieval debate on the end and reward of naturally acquired virtues. I shall concentrate on philosophical, theological, and moral literature from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries.

At close inspection, the Stoic conception of virtue does not seem to have struck Augustine as patently unreasonable. Significantly, he does not so much criticise the Stoic notion of observing the virtues for their own sake as their alleged idea that virtue procures perfect happiness on earth. Also, he charges the Stoics with the view that fame, and not virtue itself, constitutes virtue's reward.[6] The idea that virtue is an end in itself was apparently not altogether easy for Augustine to dismiss.

The debate on virtue and reward, which came to a standstill after the patristic era, revived in the twelfth century when classical moral philosophy was studied with renewed intensity. Repudiations of the Stoic view recur from then on in moral literature.[7] Like Augustine, a number of twelfth-century authors

[5] T. H. Irwin, "Splendid Vices? Augustine For and Against Pagan Virtues", *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999), pp. 105-127, esp. 116-119, argues that Augustine approved of the pagan view that virtues were to be chosen for their own sake, so that pagans, in his view, possessed genuine virtues. It seems to me that Irwin (who does not enter into discussion with Colish or other recent commentators of Augustine's moral thought) makes light of Augustine's idea of charity as a prerequisite of genuine virtue. A more balanced assessment of Augustine's ideas on virtue can be found in M. Becker, "Augustinus über die Tugenden in Zeit und Ewigkeit", in *Alvarium: Festschrift für Christian Gnilka*, ed. W. Blümer, R. Henke, and M. Mülke (Münster, 2002), pp. 53-63.

[6] See *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118 *sermo* 12.2, ed. E. J. Dekkers, CCSL (as in n. 4), vol. 40, p. 1701; *De civitate Dei* 5.20, ed. A. Kalb and B. Dombart, CCSL (as in n. 4), vol. 47, pp. 156-157. For attacks on the Epicureans' view of fame as a motive of virtue, see *Contra Iulianum* 4.3.21, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 44, col. 749; *Sermo* 150.7, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 38, col. 812.

[7] See, e.g., Garnier of Langres, *Sermo* 34, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 205, col. 789C: "Sed in hoc decepti fuerunt philosophi, quod eorum alii voluptatem, alii virtutem, rerum finem esse dixerunt. Nec a veritate isti longe fuissent, si virtutem finem finalem dixissent. Nam finis finalis omnium virtutum Deus [...] Philosophi vero virtutem Deum esse, non donum Dei, credebant, et propter hoc evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis"; Peter Comestor, *Historia scholastica* Acta 87, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 198, col. 1702A (also attributed to Peter of Poitiers, see Ph. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers, Master in Theology and Chancellor of Paris (1193-1205)* [Washington, 1936], pp. 118-122): "Et disputabant cum Paulo Epicurei, qui ponebant felicitatem hominis in sola corporis voluptate, et Stoici, qui in sola animi virtute"; *Summa breves dies* (late twelfth century), Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Laud. misc. 80, fol. 165va: the end of virtue consists "in ipsam secundum paganos, uel in eius originem secundum catholicos".

(followed by Albert the Great one century later) attacked ancient, notably Stoic, philosophers for observing virtue either for the sake of glory and honour, or out of a senseless, self-imposed rigour.[8] Like Augustine, these authors thus saved themselves the more difficult task of refuting the notion that virtue is in itself something worth striving for. Moreover, their accusations contradict each other, for the self-imposed rigour ascribed to the Stoics implies insensitivity toward precisely such things as honour and glory. Alan of Lille, for instance, admitted that the fortitude of ancient philosophers such as Cato, Socrates, and Diogenes made them "disdain worldly fortune, scorn glory, contemn wealth, and depreciate the power of men". Were these philosophers truly virtuous, then? Seeking an easy way out, Alan remarks that their attitude "remained without the merit of virtue since it lacked the foundation of faith, the elevation of hope, and the perfection of charity".[9] Blaming the ancients for not recognising God as the goal of virtue was always possible; demonstrating the intrinsic inferiority of their actual virtues was a less obvious affair.

A direct confrontation of Christian and Stoic notions is staged in the *Collationes* of Peter Abelard, who rarely avoided debate**.** In the work, a Christian and a Philosopher face each other with their rival ethics. Both personae agree that what Christians call *divinitas* is called 'ethics' by the ancients: while the Christians have the destination in view (God), the pagans concentrate on the means to reach the destination (the virtues).[10] Abelard would have had some reason to make his Philosopher disagree with this statement, since for him the destination of virtue would rather be virtue itself. Indeed, the Christian claims later on that Christ's teaching is superior to ancient moral philosophy since it exhorts to the

[8] See *Ysagoge in theologiam*, ed. A. M. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d' Abélard: Textes inédits* (Louvain, 1934), pp. 61-285, p. 73 (quoted below, n. 15); Peter Comestor, *Sermo* 30, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 198, col. 1790A: "Summum enim bonum in vita dixit Epicurus voluptatem corporis, Stoicus contemptum mortis, Peripateticus virtutem mentis: quod secus est a veritate. Summum enim bonum in vita est gratia Dei per Jesum Christum"; Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 1.4 (23), ed. W. Kübel, in *Opera omnia* (Münster, 1951-), vol. 14, p. 21: "Stoici ponebant summum in honore et virtute"; id., *Ethica* 1.6.2, in *Opera omnia*, ed. S. C. A. Borgnet, 38 vols. (Paris, 1890-1899), vol. 7, p. 86: *honor* counts for the Stoics as *praemium virtutis* and *finis vitae civilis*.

[9] Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria* 24, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 210, col. 160A-C: "Secunda [sc. fortitudo] est, qua philosophi spernebant fortunam mundi, aspernabantur gloriam, respuebant divitias, abdicabant potestates humanas. Sed haec fortitudo insufficiens erat ad meritum, impotens ad vitae praemium; quia carebat forma, id est charitate quae est forma omnis affectionis bonae. Secundum hanc fortitudinem dicitur rigor fuisse in Catone, magnanimitas in Socrate, mundi contemptus in Diogene. Sed quia haec fidei fundamentum non habuit, eam spes non erexit, charitas non perfecit, virtutis meritum amisit". Cf. Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 21.8-11, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Medievalia [henceforth: CCCM], vol. 1- (Turnhout, 1971-), vol. 2A, pp. 166-167: *sapientes mundi* like Socrates and Diogenes bore hardship, but not for the proper end of fortitude, which does not reside in worldly honour and dignities but in God and celestial beatitude.

[10] Peter Abelard, *Collationes*, ed., transl. J. Marenbon and G. Orlandi (Oxford, 2001), pp. 82-84.

virtues with better reason and hope by pointing to the eternal life as the destination of virtue, whereas according to pagan ethics, virtue should be observed for its own sake, so that virtue is reduced to the honourable (*honestum*).[11] The Philosopher replies that the ancients merely detached virtue from earthly rewards but strived after immaterial happiness which is indeed granted in the future life. Moreover, he tries to reconcile Christian and ancient ethics by equating the Epicurean ideal of *voluptas* with both the *tranquillitas animi* sought by the Stoa and the celestial kingdom of the Christians – a device echoed three centuries later in Lorenzo Valla's *De voluptate* (1431).[12]

Although it is clear from these passages that Abelard clung to the notion of virtue being observed for God's sake and rewarded in the hereafter – he even makes his Philosopher agree with it – one of his modern commentators believes that Abelard regarded virtue as an end in itself.[13] Yet the *Collationes* agree on this point with Abelard's other writings. According to the *Theologia christiana*, even the pagans knew that humans possessed the virtues *secundum ipsum Deum ac propter ipsum*, so that observing the virtues "for virtue's sake" or "for God's sake" amounts to the same thing.[14] Moreover, when explaining his definition of virtue as *habitus animi optimus*, Abelard states in one work that *optimus* means *propter Deum*; in another work, he paraphrases *optimus* as *habens remunerationem*.[15] According to Abelard, hoping for a heavenly reward is not only permitted, but actually required, by true virtue, despite his distinction be-

[11] Abelard, *Collationes* (as in n. 10), p. 110.

[12] Abelard, *Collationes* (as in n. 10), pp. 100-102, 108-112 ("beatitudinem Epicurus uoluptatem, Christus uester regnum celorum nominat", 112); cf. Lorenzo Valla, *De voluptate – On Pleasure* 3.9.2-3.10, ed., transl. A. Kent Hieatt and M. Lorch (New York, 1977), pp. 266-268, for the association of beatitude with Epicurean pleasure.

[13] See D. E. Luscombe, "The School of Peter Abelard Revisited", *Vivarium* 30 (1992), pp. 127-138, p. 132: "But the Abelardian school distills out all notion of recompense and reward. Charity is the love of God for God's sake; it is therefore defined simply and strictly for what it is, not for what it entails".

[14] Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 2.28, ed. E. M. Buytaert, CCCM (as in n. 9), vol. 12, pp. 143-144: "Quod si id minus uidetur esse ad meritum saluationis quod dicitur 'amore uirtutis', et non potius 'amore Dei', ac si uirtutem uel aliquod bonum opus habere possimus quod non secundum ipsum Deum ac propter ipsum sit, – facile est et hoc apud philosophos reperiri, qui summum bonum, quod Deus est, omnium tam principium, id est originem et causam efficientem, quam finem, id est finalem causam constituunt, ut omnia scilicet bona amore ipsius fiant cuius ex dono proueniunt".

[15] See *Sententiae Abaelardi* 32, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 178, col. 1750A ("propter Deum"); *Sententie Parisienses*, ed. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques* (as in n. 8), p. 51 ("habens remunerationem"); see also *Collationes*, p. 130: "Optimus uero ille est animi habitus qui ad uere beatitutidinis meritum nos informat". Cf. *Ysagoge in theologiam* (as in n. 8), p. 73: "quidam etiam habitus boni sunt, non tamen virtutes, quia non est Deus in causa, immo rigor vel gloria, ut contemptus pecunie in philosophis et carnis continentia, additur optimus, id est, in quo consistit meritum, vel ad eternam vitam utilis"; likewise *The Commentary on Martianus Capella's De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris* 7, ed. H. J. Westra (Toronto, 1986), p. 166.

tween the virtuous love of God for his own sake and the love of the reward which God gives us (which is in fact God himself).[16]

Abelard's position may hurt modern notions of unselfish virtue as corroborated by Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative and preserved in popular sayings (*la virtù è premio a se stessa*, as the Italian proverb goes), but it was certainly not unique in the Middle Ages. Julian Pomerius, active around 500 AD, had already pointed out that the proper motive of virtue is the hope of a future reward.[17] Alan of Lille took an even more radical position. In his view, not only is trying to win the favour of human beings an improper motive for virtue, but so also is the disinterested love of God, as his account of Adam's innocence shows: although Adam "loved God more than himself and his neighbour like himself, his love was nevertheless no virtue, for he did not direct it to God in order to have him as his reward".[18] For Alan, only the self-interested love of God apparently results in virtue. In effect, twelfth-century authors sometimes insist on the virtuous character of acts which may strike us today as calculated behaviour. Alan's contemporary Stephen Langton, for instance, qualified giving to the poor without any sense of pity, just in order to avoid mortal sin, as an act of justice.[19]

Some twelfth-century writings, however, contain statements which seem to favour the idea of virtue as an end in itself. John of Salisbury circumscribes true love in his *Entheticus* as virtue which is content in itself and has itself as its reward,[20] while according to Clarembald of Arras († 1187) virtue is pleasant in itself, even without the hope for a reward[21] – a view which has a precedent in

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[16] See J. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 300-303. Abelard expands here on Augustine's distinction between the love of God for his own sake and the love of God's gifts; Augustine, however, was primarily thinking of earthly gifts. Statements similar to Abelard's can be found in contemporary writings of Walter of Mortagne (Abelard's major source of inspiration) and Hugh of Saint Victor; see I. van 't Spijker, "Hugh of Saint Victor's Virtue: Ambivalence and Gratuity", in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, ed. I. P. Bejczy and R. G. Newhauser (Leiden, 2005), pp. 75-94, esp. 87-88.

[17] See Julian Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3.24.2, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 59, col. 507B.

[18] Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus sancti* 1.5, ed. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 6 vols. (Louvain, 1942-1960), vol. 6, p. 65: "quamuis dilexerit Deum plus quam se et proximum tamquam se, tamen illa dilectio non erat uirtus, quia non dirigebat eam ad Deum ad hoc ut ipsum haberet in premium"; see also ibid., vol. 1.1, pp. 48-49.

[19] See Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB133a (*redactio brevior*), ed. I. P. Bejczy, "An Edition of Two Questions of Stephen Langton on the Cardinal Virtues", *Medioevo* 31 (2006), pp. 299-335, esp. p. 329: "Si autem do pauperi absque omni compassione, quia uideo me peccaturum mortaliter nisi dedero cum fame afflictus sit, motus ille est motus iustitie".

[20] John of Salisbury, *Entheticus maior* ll. 797-1800, in *Entheticus maior and minor*, ed. J. C. P. A. van Laarhoven, 3 vols. (Leiden, 1987), vol. 1.

[21] See Clarembald of Arras, *Epistola ad Dominam* 1 (= *Tractatulus super Genesim Praef.*), in *Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras: A Twelfth-Century Master of the*

Alcuin's *De rhetorica*.[22] Anselm of Canterbury's famous definition of justice as *rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata* even seems to exclude the idea of self-interest altogether (it is probably not without intent that Hugh Ripelin suppressed the clause *propter se servata* in his quotation of the definition).[23] The definition frequently recurs in Anselm's works[24] and remained influential in theology and pastoral literature until the fifteenth century.[25] Yet Anselm's only example of serving the good for improper reasons is almsgiving *propter vanam gloriam*;[26] he remains silent about striving for a heavenly reward. Still greater ambiguity can be found in Richard of Saint Victor, who strongly recommends disinterested virtue in one of his works, but in another work condemns the study of virtue without caring for its reward as a foolish enterprise.[27]

School of Chartres, ed. N. M. Häring (Toronto, 1965), p. 225: "Virtutes enim in eo rerum genere sunt ponendae quae per se placent tametsi nullius emolumenti spes reluceat".

[22] See Alcuin, *De rhetorica* 43, ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores latini minores* (Leipzig, 1863; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1964), p. 548: "quaedam res tam clarae et tam nobiles sunt, ut non propter aliud emolumentum expetendae sint, sed propter suam solummodo dignitatem amandae sunt et exsequendae [...]. Hae sunt virtus, scientia, veritas, amor bonus". However, Alcuin refers to the celestial reward of virtue elsewhere in the work (p. 549) as well as in *De vitiis et virtutibus* 35, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 101, col. 637B (virtue as "aeternae beatitudinis meritum").

[23] See Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium theologicae veritatis* 5.33, in Albert the Great, *Opera*, ed. Borgnet (as in n. 8), vol. 34, p. 179.

[24] See Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate* 12, in *Opera omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1938-1961; repr. Stuttgart, 1968), vol. 1, p. 194; *De libertate arbitrii* 3, *Opera*, vol. 1, p. 212; *De conceptu virginali* 3, 5 and 29, *Opera*, vol. 2, pp. 143 (twice), 147, 172; *De concordia praescientiae* 1.6, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.12, *Opera*, vol. 2, pp. 256, 265, 268, 284. For a recent analysis of Anselm's general idea of virtue, see A. Vanderjagt, "The Devil and Virtue: Anselm of Canterbury's Universal Order", in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Bejczy and Newhauser (as in n. 16), pp. 33-51.

[25] According to A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 4 vols. (Regensburg, 1952-1956), vol. 1.1, pp. 43-50, the definition remained influential until Philip the Chancellor rejected it. Actually the reverse is true: the influence of the definition was very limited in the twelfth century but substantial after Philip the Chancellor's time. It was quoted, e.g., by William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.5.1, in *Summa virtutum ac vitiorum*, vol. 1 (Lyon, 1554), pp. 437-438; John of Pouilly, *Quodlibet* 4.10, ed. T. Graf, *De subiecto psychico virtutum cardinalium secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1935), vol. 2, p. 102*; Dionysius the Carthusian, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* 2.33, *Opera omnia*, 44 vols. (Turnhout, 1896-1935), vol. 39, p. 214.

[26] Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate* 1.12, *Opera*, ed. Schmitt (as in n. 24), vol. 1, p. 193.

[27] See Richard of Saint Victor, *De differentia sacrificii Abrahae a sacrificio virginis*, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 196, col. 1057A: "Quando ergo sine respectu mercedis virtus propter virtutem ipsam diligitur, quando etiam sine retributionis intentione bonitas ipsa propter semetipsam amatur, vere et absque dubio amoris incendium in intimis succendi et ne ad exteriora erumpat in intimis coerceri videtur"; idem, *De eruditione hominis interioris* 3.11, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 196, col. 1359A-B: "Virtutis enim studia exercere, et virtutum merita, vel praemia non curare, nec quaerere, quid aliud est quam se per inane in alta suspendere"?

Taking these conflicting opinions into account, it is small wonder that Peter Lombard tried to settle the issue in his *Sententiae*. Augustine taught that virtues are not to be loved for their own sake, but only for the sake of beatitude, so the Lombard acknowledges; others, however, think that the virtues must be acquired and loved for their own sake. Compromising between both opinions, the Lombard declares that "the virtues must be acquired and loved for their own sake, and yet only for the sake of beatitude", that is: humans must refer their love of the virtues to God as the highest good and the final object of all joy.[28] In the twelfth century, the influence of the Lombard's solution is perceptible in a couple of Victorine tracts and the *Speculum universale* of Radulphus Ardens.[29] Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologians rarely discussed the Lombard's compromise, although Albert the Great, Hervaeus Natalis, and William of Ockham lent their support to it.[30] But the Lombard did not succeed in silencing opposition against the idea of virtue as an end in itself. Giles of Rome teaches in his commentary on the *Sententiae* that only God is to be loved for his own sake, not the virtues, except for charity which is itself the love of God.[31] Likewise, Ockham declares in his commentary as well as in another work that virtue can never be an end in itself, and that unbelievers who love virtue *non propter felicitatem* do not really aspire after the ultimate good.[32] Similar statements can be found throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Francis Petrarch, for instance, claims in several writings that the ancient philosophers were wrong to believe that our goal is virtue itself; the virtues rather constitute the

[28] Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* I.1.3.7-10, ed. I. C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata, 1971-1981[3]), vol. 1, pp. 59-61 (citation § 9, p. 60: "virtutes propter se petendae et amandae sunt, et tamen propter solam beatitudinem").

[29] See Pseudo-Hugh of Saint Victor, *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli (Gal.* 56), PL (as in n. 4), vol. 175, cols. 566D-567A; *Speculum de mysteriis ecclesiae* 9, PL (as in n. 4), vol. 177, col. 376C; J. Gründel, *Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens von den Verstandestugenden auf dem Hintergrund seiner Seelenlehre* (Munich, 1976), pp. 241, 251.

[30] See Albert the Great, *Commentarii in libros Sententiarum* I.1.21-22, *Opera*, ed. Borgnet (as in n. 8), vol. 25, pp. 48-50; cf. id., *Ethica* 1.6.2, pp. 86-87 (we choose virtue because of its intrinsic value as well as the happiness it confers); Hervaeus Natalis, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria* I.1 (Paris, 1647; repr. Farnborough, 1966), p. 23; William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum* 1.4 ad 3, ed. G. Gál and S. F. Brown, *Opera theologica* (Saint Bonaventure, NY, 1967-), vol. 1, p. 447. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.145.3, *Opera* (as in n. 1), vol. 10, p. 148: "Ipsa autem virtus, quae secundum se honestum est, refertur ad aliud sicut ad finem, scilicet ad felicitatem". The Lombard's solution is disregarded in the commentaries of, e.g., Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Mediavilla, Duns Scotus, and Francis of Meyronnes.

[31] Giles of Rome, *In primum librum Sententiarum* 1.1.2 (Venice, 1521; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 12ra-rb.

[32] See William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum* 1.1, p. 377; *Centiloquium* 94, in *Opera philosophica*, ed. P. Böhner and G. J. Etzkorn (Saint Bonaventure, NY, 1974-), vol. 7, p. 502.

road to our final destination and we must love them on behalf of God.[33] There is no disagreement on this point between Petrarch and the predominantly devotional moral literature of his day, in which the idea that virtue must be observed on behalf of its heavenly reward is taken for granted and used as an exhortation for moral living.[34]

Some late medieval authors worked out their own compromise between Augustine and the Stoics. In his *Summa aurea*, William of Auxerre endorses Augustine's alleged opinion that all ancient philosophers considered beatitude the end of the cardinal virtues.[35] Augustine actually said the reverse, but William's statement suggests (in line with Abelard's teachings which meanwhile had been forgotten) that the ancients agreed with the Christian idea of rewarding virtue with salvation. Something similar happens in the *Sophologium*, a huge moral encyclopaedia composed by the Augustinian hermit Jacques Legrand (Iacobus Magni, ca. 1360-1415). The chapter *Quomodo virtutes non querunt mercedem temporalem* opens with the following statement:

> Virtue would not bring about so much perfection if it made the human being servile or if it demanded a merely temporal reward. Virtues must therefore be loved for their own sake in such a sense as not to be striven after for the sake of anything created; instead, they should be referred to the uncreated good only.[36]

The remainder of the chapter chiefly consists of quotations of ancient authorities who reject temporal goods like money and honour as proper rewards of

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[33] Francis Petrarch, *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* 4, in *Invectives*, ed., transl. D. Marsh (Cambridge, MA, 2003), pp. 316-318; *De remediis utriusque fortunae*, 1.108, in *Petrarch's Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul: A Modern English Translation of De remediis utriusque fortune, with a Commentary*, transl. C. H. Rawski, 5 vols. (Bloomington, 1991), vol. 1, p. 293. But cf. *Senilia* 16.7, transl. A. S. Bernardo, S. Levin, and R. A. Bernardo, *Letters of Old Age: Rerum senilium libri I-XVIII*, 2 vols. (Baltimore, 1992), p. 629: "virtue itself is its own glory" (meaning, however, that its value is not dependent on human praise).

[34] See, e.g., *Paradisus animae sive libellus de virtutibus*, *Prologus*, in Albert the Great, *Opera*, ed. Borgnet (as in n. 8), vol. 37, pp. 447-448 and *passim*; Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Summa de gradibus virtutum*, *Prologus*, in Bonavanture, *Opera omnia iussu Bernardini a Portu Romatini edita*, 11 vols. (Quaracchi, 1881-1902), vol. 8, p. 646 and *passim*; John Bromyard, *Summa iuris moralis* (Cologne, c. 1473), lemma *Fortitudo*; Pierre Bersuire, *Dictionarium morale*, lemma *Virtus*, in *Opera omnia*, 3 in 2 vols. (Cologne, 1620), p. 1283b. See, however, a small treatise on the cardinal virtues preserved in Cambridge, St. John's College, MS E.17 (120), fol. 182vb (13th century): "Atque hec omnia propter se solum, ut nichil adiungatur emolumenti, petenda sunt". The treatise is catalogued in M. W. Bloomfield *et al.*, *Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices, 1100-1500 AD* (Cambridge, MA, 1979), no. 6480.

[35] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.20.3, ed. J. Ribailler, 5 vols. (Paris, 1980-1987), vol. 3, p. 395.

[36] Jacques Legrand, *Sophologium* 2.1.3 (Strasbourg, 1480): "Uirtus non ita perficeret si seruilem hominem redderet: aut si temporalis fructus mercedem dumtaxat conquestaret. Sunt igitur virtutes propter se diligende: sic tamen quod propter aliquid creatum non querantur: sed ad increatum bonum solum referantur".

virtue. The obvious suggestion is that the ancients rejected these rewards for the same reason as medieval Christians, because they believed that virtue should be loved for the sake of God and the prospect of salvation. However, Jacques adduces no classical or even Christian texts to support this idea.

In fifteenth-century Italian humanism, the Stoic view that happiness resides in virtue itself gave rise to interesting controversy. While Francisco Filelfo affirmed that a virtuous life in accordance with wisdom (which is "identical with reason") is perfectly blessed, happy, and pleasurable,[37] others repeated that virtue is but a means toward the end of celestial beatitude.[38] Lorenzo Valla used the latter argument for a vehement attack on Stoicism in his *De voluptate* or *De vero bono*, claiming that virtues are no ends in themselves but means to happiness conferred by God in the hereafter. Valla even insisted that whatever is done without the hope of a future reward is actually sinful.[39] Even if one of the interlocutors of Valla's dialogue speaks in the name of Epicureanism, the charges brought against Stoicism bear a notable resemblance to what one finds in Augustine: pursuing virtue for its own sake is a vain and meaningless enterprise which conceals the real motivations of the ancients praised for their virtue, namely, self-interest and a desire for fame. Moreover, the Stoic spokesman of *De voluptate* concedes that virtue does not actually bring happiness, since it often goes together with misery – an argument which was used a few years before Valla by Cosma Raimondi († 1436), likewise in the context of identifying Epicurean pleasure with the supreme good.[40] Yet despite the novel Epicu-

[37] Francesco Filelfo, "A Letter to Bartolomeo Fracanzano" (1428), transl. L. Deitz, in *Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts*, I: *Moral Philosophy*, ed. J. Kraye (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 234-237. See also Filelfo's *De morali disciplina libri quinque* [...] (Venice, 1552), which considers virtue, in accordance with Aristotle, as a human product conferring individual goodness and *civilis felicitas*.

[38] For examples, see C. E. Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1970), vol. 1, p. 205 (Bartolomeo Facio), p. 294 (Bartolomeo Platina), pp. 317-320 (Aurelio Brandolini); for Platina, see now his *De falso et vero bono*, ed. M. G. Blasio (Rome, 1999), esp. pp. 89-91.

[39] See Lorenzo Valla, *De voluptate* 3.8.1, ed. Hieatt and Lorch (as in n. 12), p. 262: "Ne Deo quidem sine spe remunerationis servire fas est"; 3.10.1, p. 266: "Quicquid citra spem illius posterioris [sc. voluptatis] fit propter spem huius presentis peccatum est".

[40] Strikingly, both Lorenzo Valla, *De voluptate* 2.1.2 and 2.7, ed. Hieatt and Lorch (as in n. 12), pp. 136, 148-150, and Cosma Raimondi, *Defensio Epicuri* (c. 1429), ed. M. C. Davies, "Cosma Raimondi's Defence of Epicurus", *Rinascimento* n.s. 27 (1987), pp. 123-139, esp. p. 133 mention Regulus as an example, the Roman general who during the First Punic War was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians and sent to Rome under parole to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; having advised against such an exchange, he returned to Carthage and was put to death, "preferring his execution to betraying the promise given to the enemy" (Cicero, *De officiis*, 1.13.39). The example of Regulus was well known in the Middle Ages, not only directly from Cicero, but also from the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus, who upholds Regulus as a model of *magnificentia* at the very end of the chapters on fortitude, under reference to Cicero. The *Summa* survives in over 400 manuscripts; see M. Verweij, "The Manuscript Transmission of the *Summa*

rean context, the argument has a precedent in scholastic Aristotelianism. In the first book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, which by 1250 had come to dominate intellectual debate about the virtues, Aristotle suggests that virtue brings happiness, but admits in passing that happiness does not coincide with virtue itself, since virtue is compatible with sufferings and misfortune.[41] Eagerly siding with Aristotle against the Stoics, scholastic philosophers and theologians frequently quoted this remark in order to refute the notion that virtue constitutes its own reward[42] – a device followed in Quattrocento humanism by Marsilio Ficino and Niccolò Tignosi.[43]

Not only the Epicureanism but also the Platonism in vogue among Italian humanists contributed to discrediting the Stoic view. Marsilio Ficino, to mention the most famous example, claimed in this *Theologia platonica* that the moral virtues aim at purging the mind from the body and thus to enable the contemplation of eternal truth;[44] the human virtues, implanted by God, prepare us for attaining the exemplary virtues present in God's being.[45] The Neoplatonic idea that the (cardinal) virtues, far from being ends in themselves, serve as

de virtutibus by Guillielmus Peraldus: A Preliminary Survey of the Manuscripts", *Medioevo* 31 (2006), pp. 103-297.

[41] Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* 1.3, transl. Robert Grosseteste, ed. R.-A. Gauthier, *Aristoteles latinus* XXVI.1-3 (Leiden, 1972-1974), p. 379 (recensio recognita): "Videtur enim contingere [...] habentem virtutem [...] mala pati, et infortunatum esse plurimum".

[42] See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* III.34-35, *Opera* (as in n. 1), vol. 14, pp. 89-91; Pseudo-James of Douai, *Questiones in Ethicam*, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 14698, fol. 137ra-rb; James of Pistoia, *Quaestio de felicitate*, ed. I. Zavattero, "La *Quaestio de felicitate* di Giacomo da Pistoia: Un tentativo di interpretazione alla luce di una nuova lettura critica del testo", in *Le felicità nel Medioevo*, ed. M. Bettetini and F. D. Paparella (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2005), pp. 355-409, at p. 398; Guido Terreni, *Quaestiones in libros Ethicorum* 1 q. 12, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 3228, fol. 7vb.

[43] Marsilio Ficino, letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, in *Opera omnia*, 2 vols. (Basel, 1576; repr. Turin, 1959), vol. 1, p. 662: "Nunquid in moribus est felicitas? quod Stoici et Cynici arbitrantur? Nequaquam, operationes enim moralium uirtutum, ceu temperantiae, fortitudinisque negotiosae atque laboriose sunt"; Niccolò Tignosi, *Commenta in Ethicorum libros*, Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, MS Plut. LXXVI.49 (dedication copy to Piero de' Medici), fol. 9vb (book 1, ad *Atque eam*): "Stoici posuerunt uirtutem, id est uirtutis habitum, esse summum bonum. Peripathetici dixerunt illud esse secundum uirtutem operari. Cum uelit stoicos improbare, primo pretermittens illorum opinionem dixit *Atque eam fortasse quispiam magis putabit esse finem ciuilis uite* quam honorem [...]."

[44] Marsilio Ficino, *Theologica platonica* 8.3, ed. R. Marcel, 3 vols. (Paris, 1964-1970), vol. 1, p. 298; see also P. O. Kristeller, *Die Philosophie des Marsilius Ficino* (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 272-273. Cf. also Ficino's letter to Lorenzo de' Medici quoted in the previous note.

[45] Ficino, *Theologia platonica* 14.6 (as in n. 44), vol. 3, p. 268; see also Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness* (as in n. 38), vol. 2, p. 492.

instruments of man's ascension to God was known throughout the Middle Ages from Macrobius's *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*.[46]

A special case is Coluccio Salutati. In a letter written in 1401, Salutati not only points out that Stoic virtue offers no protection against suffering, but also sets forth a view on the religious end of moral action which varies from scholastic as well as humanist traditions:

> We should not live or work in order to attain fame, perhaps not even to gain eternal life; our actions should instead be directed towards God, who is the end of all things. Anyone who proposes another end for himself, even beatitude, will never act properly, whatever he does.[47]

Salutati introduces a radical distinction between acting on God's behalf and acting on behalf of a heavenly reward, aspects which in the medieval view usually went together; in Valla's *De voluptate*, loving God for his own sake is even explicitly rejected as virtue's proper aim.[48] Salutati is thus one of the very few authors of his age to have believed that true virtue resides in the disinterested love of God.

As long as virtue was religiously conceived – either as a gift of God, as Peter Lombard taught it was, or as a human quality informed by charity and grace – the idea that it was rewarded with the eternal life was, theologically speaking, a matter of course. Acting virtuously under the guidance of divine grace was an obvious way for medieval Christians to earn merit. In the second half of the twelfth century, however, naturally acquired virtues entered the stage of Western moral thought: human beings were henceforth assumed capable of develop-

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[46] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 1.8.5-11, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1970[2]), pp. 37-39; see also P. Henry, *Plotin et l'occident: Firmicius Maternus, Marius Victorinus, Augustin et Macrobe* (Louvain, 1934). For the medieval reception of Macrobius, see H. van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne de la vertu: Essai sur la genèse d'un article de la Somme théologique de Saint Thomas* (Fribourg, 1926).

[47] Salutati, *Epistola* 12.4, in *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, ed. Fr. Novati, 4 vols. (Rome, 1891-1911), vol. 3, p. 471: "Non est vivendum nec laborandum nobis ad famam, forte non etiam ad vitam eternam, sed solum actus nostri in Deum, qui finis est omnium, irigendi. Qui finem alium sibi proponit, etiam si beatitudo sit, recte, quicquid faciat, nunquam agit"; the translation follows "A Letter to Francesco Zabarella: Selections", transl. R. G. Witt, in *Cambridge Translations* (as in n. 37), pp. 179-191, esp. p. 185. See, however, ibid., p. 464: "beatitudo [...] finis est virtutis". See also *Epistola* 14.22 in *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, vol. 4, p. 164: "Qui virtutis enim actum in aliud quam in finem verum et ultimum dirigit, certum est actum non efficere virtuosum, licet cunctis sit aliis respectibus commendandus [...] verus enim finis est ipse Deus, qui obiectum beatificum est"; and *De laboribus Herculis*, ed. B. L. Ullman (Zürich, 1951), pp. 134-135, discussed and translated in Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness* (as in n. 38), vol. 2, pp. 669-670.

[48] See Lorenzo Valla, *De voluptate* 3.13.3, ed. Hieatt and Lorch (as in n. 12), p. 274: "Quare non placet mihi ut dicatur Deum propter se esse amandum, quasi amor ipse et delectatio propter finem sit et non ipsa potius finis. Melius diceretur Deum amari non tamquam causam finalem sed efficientem". These words are pronounced by the interlocutor who speaks in the name of Christian orthodoxy.

ing virtuous attitudes of their own, without divine assistance.[49] What about the final end of these virtues? Were they rewarded according to medieval thinkers, and if so, how – with a natural or a supernatural good?

The Parisian theologians of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries to whom the Middle Ages owe the recognition of natural virtues gave a clear answer. While the "Catholic" virtues (i.e., the virtues infused or elevated by grace) have God as their end, the "political" (i.e., naturally acquired) virtues have a *finis* of their own: the *utilitas* of either the community or the human individual. This *utilitas* consists of practical benefits and honour,[50] or, as Simon of Tournai further specifies, of the temporal goals of glory, dignity, power or majesty, and friendship.[51] The fact that naturally acquired virtues lead to natural rewards is acknowledged in these statements. Something similar happens in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, where (natural) happiness appears as the reward of what seems to be non-religious virtue. Discussing the Stoic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean views of reaching virtue and happiness, John observes: "virtue is the merit of happiness, happiness the reward of virtue [...] For man is not happy in order to act well, but acts well in order to live happily".[52]

In thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholasticism, the idea that the acquired virtues aim at the happiness of the moral agent is commonplace. Commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and other masters using this work approved of Aristotle's idea that happiness resides in acting in accordance with virtue. Strikingly, many of them associated this happiness with the contemplation of God, as recent scholarship has amply demonstrated – an interpretation which originated in the first commentaries on Aristotle's work, written in the

[49] See I. P. Bejczy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue", in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Bejczy and Newhauser (as in n. 16), pp. 133-154.

[50] See R. Heinzmann, *Die Summe "Colligite Fragmenta" des Magister Hubertus (Clm 28 799): Ein Beitrag zur theologischen Systembildung in der Scholastik* (Munich, 1974), p. 202 n. 123: "Officium virtutis civilis est congruus [actus] personae secundum mores et instituta gentis. Finis eius est utilitas rei publicae vel sua quae duplex est, scilicet utilitas et honor"; likewise Praepositinus of Cremona, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* (as in n. 18), vol. 3, p. 114. Alan of Lille does not specify the end of political virtues, but mentions as an example: "iste est castus, non propter Deum, sed propter humanum fauorem" (*De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1, p. 48). Alan is clearly thinking of individual reward in terms of glory, in accordance with the current idea that the Stoics observed virtue for the sake of fame.

[51] Simon of Tournai is cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* (as in n. 18), vol. 3, p. 118 n. 1: "Sunt autem fines quatuor: gloria, dignitas, amplitudo, amicitia". The citation is continued in I. P. Bejczy, "The Concept of Political Virtue in the Thirteenth Century", in *Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200-1500*, ed. I. P. Bejczy and C. J. Nederman (Turnhout, 2007), n. 23.

[52] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum*, 7.8, ed. C. C. J. Webb, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1909), vol. 2, p. 118: "Virtus ergo felicitatis meritum est, felicitas uirtutis praemium [...] Non enim felix est quis ut recte agat, sed recte agit ut feliciter uiuat".

first half of the thirteenth century by Parisian masters of arts.[53] The idea of a supernatural aim in relation to naturally acquired virtues was thus surprisingly introduced by non-theologians in their debate over an ancient work of secular ethics. Modern commentators often assume that the arts masters made their theologising statements out of deference to their colleagues at the theological faculty. We have seen, however, that it is precisely the theologians who by 1200 assigned natural ends to the naturally acquired virtues. The arts master who commented on Aristotle's *Ethics* thus apparently possessed a more religious outlook than the moral theologians who made the acceptance of naturally acquired virtues possible. It is even conceivable that the teachings of the arts masters are the ultimate source of one of the articles condemned by the Parisian bishop Etienne Tempier in 1277: "That a man whose intellect and affect are adequately ordered as a result of the intellectual and moral virtues discussed by the Philosopher in his *Ethics* is sufficiently disposed toward eternal felicity".[54]

All in all, the Stoic idea of virtue as an end in itself produced much unease among medieval and early Renaissance thinkers and tempted many of them to introduce doubtful arguments. Starting with Augustine, they sometimes suggested that the Stoics did not really observe the virtues for their own sake (something which might have made a favourable impression) but for improper advantages such as fame and honour, or out of a pointless desire for rigour and discipline. Others attenuated the difference between observing virtue for virtue's sake and for God's sake, or claimed that even the ancients recognised God, or the beatific life, as the proper goal of virtue. Still others presented the contemplation of God as the ultimate end even of the acquired virtues, although from a theological viewpoint acquired virtues only admit of natural ends.

The reason for the blurred character of the medieval debate might be that the idea of virtue as an end in itself did not ***really*** displease medieval thinkers. Statements in favour of it regularly emerge in medieval moral literature, while

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[53] See G. Wieland, *Ethica - scientia practica: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 1981), pp. 143-197; A. J. Celano, "The Understanding of the Concept of *felicitas* in the pre-1250 Commentaries on the *Ethica nicomachea*", *Medioevo* 12 (1986), pp. 29-53; idem, "The 'finis hominis' in the Thirteenth Century Commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 58 (1986), pp. 23-31; V. Buffon, "Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness: An Analysis of Early Latin Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*", *Laval théologique et philosophique* 60 (2004), pp. 449-476; I. Zavattero, "Felicità e Principio Primo: Teologia e filosofia nei primi commenti latini all'*Ethica nicomachea*", *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 61 (2006), pp. 109-136.

[54] See *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, ed. D. Piché (Paris, 1999), p. 126: "Quod homo ordinatus quantum ad intellectum et affectum, sicut potest sufficienter esse per uirtutes intellectuales et alias morales de quibus loquitur philosophus in ethicis, est sufficienter dispositus ad felicitatem eternam". I owe the suggestion to Valeria Buffon, "The Structure of the Soul, Intellectual Virtues, and the Ethical Ideal of Masters of Arts in Early Commentaries on the *Nichomachean Ethics*", in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500*, ed. I. P. Bejczy and B. Kent (Leiden, 2008).

the idea was not even formally rejected at a doctrinal level, at least in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*. In a way, virtue *was* its own end and reward in the medieval view: the loving adherence to God in the afterlife counted as the perfection of the prime Christian virtue of charity. This religious idea not only underlies much of the medieval attitude to the Stoic conception of virtue, but even made commentators of Aristotle's *Ethics* present the contemplation of God as virtue's ultimate end.

FLORENTIUS VOLUSENUS AND TRANQUILLITY OF MIND: SOME APPLICATIONS OF AN ANCIENT IDEAL

Alasdair A. MacDonald

Tranquillity of mind has doubtless always made a strong appeal to the imagination, and as an ideal it may seem as unassailable as motherhood and apple pie. However, the concept is somewhat protean, lending itself to different interpretations – individualistic, generalistic, humanistic, philosophical or religious. Not surprisingly, tranquillity of mind tends to be especially desiderated during times of moral, intellectual and spiritual uncertainty. The century of the Reformation is widely considered to have been one such period, and the present essay discusses some of the ways in which the originally Ancient ideal of tranquillity of mind was thematised and instrumentalised by humanists and poets of the time. In the following paragraphs, various treatments of this theme are examined, both for their own intrinsic merits, and also in the light of one particularly interesting case which provides an overall focus to the discussion: the *De animi tranquillitate* of the Scottish humanist Florentius Volusenus [Florens/ Florence Wilson].

Tranquillity of mind is generally, if not exclusively, associated with Stoic philosophy. Within this tradition, the figure with by far the greatest relevance to the present purpose is Seneca, especially in respect of his moral dialogue *De tranquillitate animi* (written c. 53 CE). With almost equal importance for the Renaissance is Plutarch, among whose *Moralia* is a treatise on the same topic, *Peri euthymias* (written c. 100 CE) – a title which is traditionally latinised as *De tranquillitate animi*, after the one of Seneca.[1] In its assimilation of Stoic philosophy the Renaissance was also indebted to such figures as Cicero, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, whose works function as regular points of reference for writers engaging with the theme of tranquillity of mind.[2] One sees this, for example, in such a work as Petrarch's *De otio religioso* (1347).[3] One may also detect influence from Stoicism in works where the topic of mental tranquillity involved the impugnation of the role played by Fortune in human affairs. This

[1] On these two texts see H. D. Betz, "De Tranquillitate Animi (Moralia 464E-477F)", in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, ed. H. D. Betz (Leiden, 1978), pp. 198-230.

[2] A treatise on this subject by Hipparchus the Pythagorean, together with another by Epictetus, was printed at London in 1654, 1657; with English translation 1699.

[3] *Il "De otio religioso" di Francesco Petrarca*, ed. G. Rotondi (Città del Vaticano, 1958).

is the central message of Petrarch's *De remediis utriusque fortunae* (1354-1366), a work which the author declares to have been inspired by another treatise by Seneca: *De remediis fortuitorum*, and which enjoyed a very wide European dissemination, both in its original language and in vernacular translation.[4] It was, for example, the first piece of prose by Petrarch to be adapted and translated into English (early fifteenth century), and some hundred years later queen Katherine of Aragon asked Sir Thomas Wyatt to make an English translation of the work (never, in fact, carried out).[5] While Petrarch's book counts as an early representative of the upcoming humanism, it remains compatible with the venerable medieval and Christian tradition of works directed against the essentially non-Christian forces of fate and fortune. Indeed, it is precisely the symbiosis and equipoise of elements Classical and late-medieval, pagan and Christian, that is characteristic of many of the Renaissance treatments of the theme of tranquillity of mind, as of much else.

From the late fifteenth century onwards, the cultural impact of works of Ancient literature came to be greatly increased, as a result of the easy availability of a plethora of new translations and the increased circulation of original texts and vernacular renderings via the medium of print. It was not long before several editions of the works of Seneca appeared: Naples, 1475; Treviso, 1478; Venice, 1490, 1492, ?1495, 1503; Basel, 1515, 1529, the latter two being edited by none other than Erasmus. In addition, there was at least one printing of Seneca's *De tranquillitate animi* as a separate work (Leipzig, 1499). A Greek-language edition of Plutarch's *Moralia* appeared at Venice in 1509, and a Latin version, containing the translation, *De tranquillitate et securitate animi*, by Budæus [Guillaume Budé], together with translations of other texts of Plutarch by Pirckheimer, Politianus, Erasmus, Melanchthon and others, was printed at Basel in 1530; this was followed by another, edited by Hieronymus Gemusæus (Basel, 1541), and by the widely received translation by Xylander [Wilhelm Holtzmann] (Basel, 1560-1570). Among the most important vernacular translations of Plutarch are the French version of the *Moralia* by Budæus (Paris, 1505, 1530), and by Iehan Collin: *Le liure de Plutarque de la tranquillité & repos de l'esprit* (Paris, 1538). It was on the basis of Budæus's French version that Sir Thomas Wyatt produced his English translation, *Of Quyet of Mind* (London, 1528).[6] This little survey suffices to suggest the extent to which the way was quickly prepared for our theme to establish itself among the larger cultural concerns of the age.

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[4] On this, see M. Lemmer, "Nachwort", in Franciscus Petrarca, *Von der Artzney der Glück, des Guten und Widerwertigen*, facsimile of Augsburg, 1532 (Leipzig and Hamburg, 1984), pp. 194-204.

[5] For the early English text, see: *A Dialogue between Reason and Adversity*, ed. F. N. M. Diekstra (Assen, 1968).

[6] Wyatt's translation has been reproduced in facsimile: *Plutarch's Quyete of Mynde*, ed. C. R. Baskervill (Cambridge, MA, 1931. The *Quyete of Mynde* is included in *Collected poems of Sir Thomas Wyatt*, ed. K. Muir and P. Thomson (Liverpool, 1969), pp. 440-463. In his opening sentences Wyatt mentions Queen Katherine's request that he should translate Petrarch's *De remediis*.

The treatise of Seneca, and also, if to a lesser extent, that of Plutarch, had not been forgotten during the Middle Ages. Their shared title is encountered as a fixed phrase in the works of some thirty writers: among the latter, Ambrose, Origen, Augustine, Cassiodorus, Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas all employ it more than once.[7] Furthermore, one is struck by the fact that the words *tranquillitas* and *animi*/*animae* regularly appear in proximate, if not precise, collocation in a host of medieval writings. In Latin literature, the seminal influence of the ideal goes back before Seneca to Cicero: over six appearances of this exact phrase are listed in the latter's works, all of them in texts well known to medieval readers (e.g. *De officiis*). As is only to be expected, a large number of the medieval examples of the phrase *tranquillitas animi* occur when writers are explicitly citing Seneca. In the medieval way, however, many, and perhaps the majority, of such quotations may come, derivatively, from the works of other medieval writers rather than from personal acquaintance with the original works in question. It is evident, however, that the idea of tranquillity of mind, despite its origins in pagan philosophy, was able to pass with ease into the Christian discourse of patristic and medieval theologians. At the hands of such writers it was available to be transmitted in contexts quite unrelated to those envisaged by Seneca or Plutarch – the monastic life-style, after all, being highly propitious to the cultivation of mental tranquillity.

By way of illustration, one may consider the French Cistercian Arnulphus de Boeriis (Arnaud de Bohéries), author of the *Speculum monachorum* and the *Octo puncta perfectionis assequendae* (c. 1200). The latter work offers much good advice to monks, arranged under eight headings, under the sixth whereof one reads:

> Omnia namque quamvis utilia, quamvis necessaria videantur, spernenda tamen sunt, ut perturbatio devitetur; et omnia quae adversa sunt vel putantur, sustinenda sunt, ut pacis dilectionisque tranquillitas servetur: quia nihil perniciosius ira, nec charitate quidquam utilius est credendum; nec tranquillitate animi pretiosius, propter quae non solum commoda carnalium et transitoriorum, sed et spiritualium spernenda videntur, si alias acquiri vel perfici non possint.[8]
>
> [For all things, however useful or necessary they appear, are nevertheless to be despised, that disquiet may be avoided, and all things which are, or may be perceived to be, adverse are to be preserved, that tranquillity of peace and love may be served: for one must believe that nothing is more harmful than wrath, nothing more beneficial than charity; neither is anything more precious than tranquillity of mind, on account of which things the pleasures not only of carnal and transitory affairs, but also of those of the spirit, are seen to deserve spurning, if they cannot in any other way be acquired or performed.[9]]

[7] The results reported here derive from a search of large electronic databases, such as that of the *Patrologia Latina*, and the Brepolis *Library of Latin Texts Online*.

[8] *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, ed. J. P. Migne, Vol. 184 (Paris, 1854), cols. 1184-1185.

[9] The translations given in this chapter are by the present writer.

From this and other passages one sees how *tranquillitas animi* – or *tranquillitas mentis*: for Arnulphus the terms are synonymous – is regarded as a high virtue, and an important goal on the way to spiritual perfection. A later work redolent of the same attitude is the *De animi tranquillitate libri duo* (Paris, 1512), written by the strict Benedictine, Carolus Fernandus [Charles Fernand].[10] However, such a religious, and essentially pre-humanist understanding of tranquillity of mind may well, by the sixteenth century, have seemed of reduced relevance for the wider readership of lay readers, concerned less with the *via perfectionis* than with the perils of the here and now.

It is this very tension that makes the *De animi tranquillitate* of Florentius Volusenus such a fascinating document. The author, who deserves to be much better known, resembles Erasmus to an extent, and like him was an internationally-mobile scholar.[11] Born (c. 1504) in or near the town of Elgin in northern Scotland, Volusenus received an excellent training in Classical languages at King's College, Aberdeen. This institution was founded in 1495, under the learned bishop William Elphinstone, who in 1509 was probably the person who recommended Erasmus as tutor to the juvenile Alexander Stewart, archbishop of St. Andrews and son of king James IV. The first principal at Aberdeen was the humanist and historian Hector Boece [Boethius].[12] From Scotland Volusenus proceeded to London, where he associated with such men as Thomas Cromwell, Thomas Starkey, Sir Francis Bryan, Guillaume du Bellay, and bishop John Fisher of Rochester (mentioned in *De animi tranquillitate*), in whose diocese Volusenus seems to have been granted a benefice.[13] Through

[10] Fernand, born at Bruges, became librarian at the abbey of St. Vincent, Le Mans, where he died in 1517. He was a correspondent of Budæus and Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, among others: *Biographie Nationale de Belgique*.

[11] For the biography of Volusenus, see the following studies by D. Baker-Smith, to whom I am very greatly indebted: *The Writings of Florens Wilson in Relation to Evangelical Humanism*, Diss., University of Cambridge, 1969; idem, "Florens Wilson and his circle: émigrés in Lyons, 1539-1543", in *Neo-Latin and the Vernacular in Renaissance France*, ed. G. Castor and T. Cave (Oxford, 1984), pp. 83-97; idem, "Florens Wilson and the Politics of Irenicism", in *Acta conventus neo-Latini Torontonensis*, ed. A. Dalzell, C. Fantazzi and R. J. Schoeck (Toronto, 1991), pp. 189-198; idem, "Florens Wilson: A Distant Prospect", in *Stewart Style 1513-1542: Essays on the Court of James V*, ed. J. Hadley Williams (East Linton, 1996), pp. 1-14. Also J. Durkan, "Wilson [Volusene], Florence", in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [henceforth *ODNB*]. Prof. Dana F. Sutton has published (29 May, 2008) a hypertext critical edition and translation of Volusenus' dialogue, accessible through the website of "The Philological Museum".

[12] J. Durkan, "The beginnings of Humanism in Scotland", *Innes Review* 4 (1953), pp. 5-24; idem, "The Cultural Background in Sixteenth-Century Scotland", in *Essays on the Scottish Reformation 1513-1625*, ed. D. McRoberts (Glasgow, 1962), pp. 274-331; *Humanism in Scotland*, ed. J. MacQueen (Edinburgh, 1990).

[13] On Volusenus and the English court see, in addition to the articles by Baker-Smith listed above (footnote 11): D. Starkey, "The Court: Castiglione's Ideal and Tudor Reality; Being a Discussion of Sir Thomas Wyatt's Satire Addressed to Sir Francis Bryan", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 45 (1982), pp. 232-239 (esp. 236).

familiarity with Sir Thomas More's friend, the Italian humanist Antonio Bonvisi, Volusenus would have become aware of humanism in Lucca.[14] From the early 1530s Volusenus was in Paris, where he was the tutor of the son of cardinal Wolsey, and maintained his many contacts with the evangelical party in religion. He also gained the respect of cardinal Jean du Bellay, the ambassador of Francis I to England in connection with the marriage difficulties of Henry VIII. In 1535, while *en route* to Italy in the company of the cardinal, Volusenus was detained by illness in the papal enclave of Avignon, where the eminently eirenic and humanistically minded cardinal Jacopo Sadoleto, to whom Volusenus had been directed by Thomas Starkey, was pleased to appoint him master of the grammar school at Carpentras.[15] In the 1540s Volusenus was one of a group of humanists in Lyon, and it was there, in 1543, that his *De animi tranquillitate* saw the light of day. The book appeared from the press of Sebastian Gryphius, a man responsible for publishing so many works by humanists; Volusenus seems indeed to have acted as corrector for Gryphius. From his base in the Rhône valley Volusenus was well placed to remain abreast of the contemporary political and religious situation in Europe, and he was in touch with scholars in Italy, France, England and Scotland. It was there that he met Conrad Gesner, in 1540, and at Lyon one of the Scotsman's pupils at the Collège de la Trinité was Sebastian Castellio, the Bible translator, educationist and noted advocate of religious tolerance.[16] The last certain record of Volusenus is as public orator in Lyon for the feast of St. Thomas, in 1551.[17] As a writer of stylish humanist prose (and of Latin verse), Volusenus was fittingly commemorated in an epigram by his compatriot George Buchanan, to whom, it may *en passant* be noted, he presented his copy of the *Dictionarium Hebraicum* (Basel, 1523) of Sebastian Munster.[18]

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[14] D. Baker-Smith, "Antonio Buonvisi and Florens Wilson: A European friendship", *Moreana* 43, 165 (2006), pp. 88-108; with corrigenda *Moreana* 43, 166-167 (2006), pp. 253-254.

[15] R. M. Douglas, *Jacopo Sadoleto 1477-1547: Humanist and Reformer* (Cambridge, MA, 1959).

[16] M. Hillar, "Sebastian Castellio and the Struggle for Freedom of Conscience", in *Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism*, vol. 10, ed. D. R. Finch and M. Hillar (Washington, 2002), pp. 31-56; Sébastien Castellion, *Dialogues Sacrés/Dialogi Sacri (Premier livre)*, ed. D. Amherdt and Y. Giraud (Geneva, 2004). Typically, in his final work (1563), on the interpretation of Scripture, Castellio was concerned "in rebus ad conscientiarum tranquillitatem" [in matters pertaining to tranquillity of consciences]: *De arte dubitandi et confitendi ignorandi et sciendi*, ed. E. F. Hirsch (Leiden, 1981), p. 39.

[17] Durkan, however, suggests that Volusenus may have survived till at least 1553, since a Scot at Lyon in that year denounced the killing of Servetus, and there is no apparent alternative for the identity of this person: *ODNB* (as in n. 11), "Wilson [Volusene], Florence".

[18] This volume is now in Edinburgh University Library: De.1/1.73. It testifies to the interest of Volusenus in all three *linguae sacrae*. On Buchanan's relations with Volusenus see: I. D. McFarlane, *Buchanan* (London, 1981), p. 36 *et passim*. Buchanan's epigram has often been printed, e.g. in D. Irving, *Lives of Scotish Writers* (Ed-

The writings of Volusenus are those of a convinced humanist, operating at the interface between religion and philology. His first two books provide explanation and commentary on Holy Writ: *Psalmi quintidecimi enarratio* (Paris, 1531)[19] and *In psalmum nobis 50, Hebraeis vero 51* […] *enarratio* (Paris, 1532). The former of these books was dedicated to Jean de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine; in the dedication of the latter (to bishop Stephen Gardiner) Volusenus pays warm tribute to Sir Thomas More. His *Scholia seu commentariorum epitome in Scipionis Somnium* (London, c. 1534) – dedicated to Gregory, son of Thomas Cromwell – and his *Latine Grammatices Epitome* (Lyon, 1544) show a comparable concern with the explication of familiar texts, and with providing young scholars with the linguistic apparatus necessary to the understanding thereof. For its part, the *Commentatio quaedam Theologica quae est in aphorismos dissecta* (Lyon, 1539) was dedicated to Francesco Turretini of Lucca, and is a specimen of *theologica rhetorica*, being a response to Holy Scripture couched in short, lyrical paragraphs containing phrases drawn from the Bible, the liturgy, and the Ancient classics, and all imaginatively recombined in a way designed to appeal to the common ground between both Catholics and Protestants.[20] All these works, albeit in different ways, can be seen to be relevant to the author's *magnum opus*, the *De animi tranquillitate* of 1543.[21] That the

inburgh, 1850), vol. 1, p. 33 – and most recently by Baker-Smith in his *Moreana* article (see note 14, above).

[19] This work has recently been made available electronically via the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: http://mdz10.bib-bvb.de/~db/0002/bsb00025744/images/

[20] Baker-Smith, "Florens Wilson and his circle" (as in n. 11), pp. 91-93; the opening page of the *Commentatio* is reproduced in the catalogue, *The Eye of the Mind: The Scot and His Books* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 28. While Baker-Smith compares the spirit of the work to the *Modus orandi Deum* of Erasmus, its style has also been compared to that of the Bible translation of Castellio: Durkan, *ODNB* (as in n. 11), "Wilson [Volusene], Florence".

[21] An edition of *De animi tranquillitate* has been reported as having been published at Edinburgh in 1571: *Typographical Antiquities* [etc.], ed. J. Ames, augmented by W. Herbert, 3 vols. (London, 1785-90), vol. 3, 1493; repeated in R. Chambers, *A Biographical Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen*, ed. T. Thomson, 3 vols. (London, 1870; reprint Hildesheim and New York, 1971), III, 537. This date may be a mistake; in any event, no copy is known. On the other hand, the testament of the Edinburgh printer, publisher and bookseller Thomas Bassandyne records that at the time of his death (1579) he had no fewer than three copies of "Tranquillitie of the mynd" in stock: R. Dickson and J. P. Edmond, *Annals of Scottish Printing* (Cambridge, 1890), p. 298. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know whether this phrase refers to the work of Volusenus or to that of Seneca, Plutarch or some other author; neither is the use of the vernacular in this record necessarily an indicator of translation. All that can safely be said is that this title is corroborating evidence of the contemporary interest in the general topic. It is notable that a sentence referring to tranquillity of mind appears in the middle of the titlepage of the 1570 edition of the *Morall Fabillis of Esope the Phrygian* by Robert Henryson: "Vt Naufragij leuamen est Portus, Ita Tranquillitas animi, seu Iucunditas, est quasi Vitae Portus" [Just as the harbour is the consolation of the shipwreck, so tranquillity of mind, or happiness, is as it were the harbour of life]. Like Henryson's editor, I have not been able to trace a source for this sentence: *The Poems of Robert Henryson*, ed. D. Fox (Ox-

works of Volusenus made more than a local and momentary impact may be deduced from the reprinting of the *Commentatio* (Basel, 1544), from the appearance of a vernacular *metafrase* of the *De animi tranquillitate* by the humanist, academician and educationist Orazio Lombardelli: *Della Tranquillità dell'animo* (Siena, 1574), and from the various reprints of the *De animi tranquillitate* produced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[22]

The *De animi tranquillitate* evinces the profoundest concern with – and for – religion in the real world. It is not concerned with the monastic way of life, of which the characteristic element is retreat; rather, Volusenus focuses on the dilemma of the sincere and questing Christian soul, caught between competing religious doctrines and conflicting political allegiances. His most urgent starting point is the news of the English invasion of Scotland, a campaign that culminated in their victory at the battle of Solway Moss (24 November, 1542). Moreover, for many people at this time, getting one's personal religious (and therefore political) balance right could be a matter of life and death, or at the least of personal exile.[23] As a result of all these factors, the moment was ripe for the Stoic ideal promoted by Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch to be incorporated within the *Weltanschauung* of the Christian humanist. The religious element in Volusenus's book is what most obviously distinguishes it from its Classical progenitors: the latter, for all their discussion of the anxieties of the individual mind in its relation to the larger social environment, make no attempt to treat strictly metaphysical concerns. Volusenus responds imaginatively to his Stoic models, imitating and updating them at will, and using them in the creation of a new and highly individual visionary masterpiece. If his approach has been labelled "eclectic", this should in no way be understood as derogatory.[24] In one respect, Volusenus is almost more classical than either Seneca or Plutarch, since his work is a genuine specimen of philosophical dialogue. In this, he follows the Ciceronian (ultimately Platonic) example, with the result that his approach to tranquillity of mind differs markedly from those of Seneca and Plu-

ford, 1981), p. liii. This 1570 book was printed by the Edinburgh printer Robert Lekpreuik, at the expense of Henrie Charteris; the latter often provided his publications with humanistic texts.

[22] On these, see below. On Lombardelli (1545-1608): *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*.

[23] Among notable refugees from Italy in the early 1540s are: Peter Martyr Vermigli, Bernardino Ochino, Paolo Lacizi, Pier Paolo Vergerio and Celio Curione. For his part, the Frenchman Sebastian Castellio relinquished Geneva for Basel after incurring the animosity of Calvin, and it was from there that he would protest vigorously against the burning of Michael Servetus, in 1553.

[24] Baker-Smith notes "highly eclectic religious language" in the work: "Florens Wilson: A Distant Prospect" (as in n. 11), p. 8; Durkan, however, applies the word to the book as a whole: "an eclectic and attractively written work": *ODNB* (as in n. 11), "Wilson [Volusene], Florence".

tarch, whose treatises on this theme display no dynamic interaction of opinions and are little more than disquisitions cast in the form of letters.[25]

Volusenus also differs from Seneca and Plutarch in that for him moral philosophy is a stage in a journey towards deeper understanding. To this end, in the main part of his book he largely forsakes the discursive, for a somewhat more didactic, mode. This is communicated via the presentation of an allegorical dream-vision of a temple, over which the philosopher Democritus presides; it is likely that the latter owes his appearance here to the considerable influence which he exerted on the Stoics. The roof of this temple is supported by eight columns, on each of which there appears one of a series of moral precepts. Yet such maxims are shown to have their limitations, and the dreamer soon has a vision of a second temple, situated on a hill, and presided over by St. Paul.[26] On passing through the porch, Volusenus is vouchsafed a vision of the Crucified Christ: *Statim mihi agnitus est dulcis ille nostri generis Servator, Jesus*. [I at once recognised that this was Jesus, the sweet saviour of our human kind.][27] Thus, at this climactic moment in the book, Volusenus indicates an essentially fideistic dimension to the problem of tranquillity of mind. As was the case in the *Divina Commedia* of Dante, pagan wisdom – here represented by Democritus – can take one up to a certain point, but only faith allows the perception of the greatest truths. In a later passage Volusenus, his dream over, reasons with his two interlocutors, Francesco Michele and Demetrio Caravalla, and recommends the double paths of prayer and study, saying of the latter:

> Altera est sacrarum literarum lectio assidua. Simplex est orationis facies; sed incredibilem tum fructum, tum delicias claudit. Nemo enim unquam (dicere ausim) fuit, qui animo perficiendi seipsum eis studiis dediderit, qui non vel ex malo bonus, vel ex bono melior sit effectus. Et sane in hac rerum nocte, si libros illos excipias, nihil prorsus est in divinis rebus lucis: quapropter par est omnino eos libros omni studio atque observantia, perinde ac thesaurum aliquem incomparabilem, et conservare, et venerari. Habent (mihi crede) nescio quid arcanae et velut magicae cujusdam (si tamen ita loqui fas est) virtutis, in rapiendis in coelum, et Deum versus, animis. Et sane mihi animus est, in iisdem tabernaculum vitae collocare.[28]
>
> [The second of these consists of the assiduous reading of sacred literature. Holy Writ has a simple outward appearance; but it encloses within it incredible fruit as well as

[25] One should not overlook possible dialogue-models from the Renaissance itself, such as those involving Ficino, Landino and Machiavelli: cf. D. Allan, *Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland: Neo-Stoicism, Culture and ideology in an Age of Crisis, 1540-1690* (East Linton, 2000), p. 31.

[26] In a forthcoming article, Baker-Smith notes that Erasmus, in his *De sarcienda ecclesiae concordia* (Basel, 1533), animadverts specifically to the topic of tranquillity of mind, and contrasts the writings of Ancient philosophers with the greater wisdom of St. Paul: "*Tranquillitas animi*: Erasmus and the Quest for Spiritual Reassurance, 1533-1543".

[27] *De animi tranquillitate* (1543), p. 369; *idem* (1751), p. 268. Where double page-numbers are given for the reader's convenience, the second relates to the edition printed at Edinburgh in 1751 (on which see below).

[28] *De animi tranquillitate* (1543), p. 390; (1751), p. 284.

> sweetnesses. There has never been anybody, I may dare to say, who, with the intention of perfecting himself, has given himself over to those studies, who has not been changed either from evil to good, or from good to better. And indeed, in this dark night of human affairs, if you should take away those books, there is absolutely no illumination in matters of religion: wherefore it is absolutely proper to preserve and venerate those books through every kind of study and diligence, as some treasure beyond compare. They contain, believe me, I know not what secret, and almost magical, power (if it is permitted so to speak) to transport minds to the heavens and towards God. And indeed, I am minded to locate in them the tabernacle of life.]

The outlook of Volusenus here and in other places is manifestly indebted to Budæus, especially to the latter's final work, *De transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum* (Paris, 1535). This book, dedicated to Francis I, had a great influence on evangelical and reformist readers, including Melanchthon and Calvin.

> Proinde (ut finem dicendi faciant ea de re, quae nec dicendo, nec scribendo, nec commentando finem ullum invenit) literaram bonarum (ut vocamus) doctrinam, philosophiamque antiquam et externam, sic cedere sapientiae oraculi et consecratae oportet, ut sensum rationi.[29]
>
> [Therefore, in order that they should put an end to speaking about that matter which discussions, writings and commentaries never yet exhausted, it is necessary to subordinate the teaching of good letters (as we call it) together with ancient and external philosophy, to wisdom that is both divinely inspired and consecrated, just as the senses bow to reason.]

Such passages from Budæus and Volusenus reflect Christian humanism at its best – viewing philology as the handmaid of religion, and remaining loyal to the authority of the Church, even while conceding and criticising the imperfections of that institution.

It is interesting to consider briefly whether also any vernacular work might have influenced Volusenus in the structuring of his treatment of tranquillity of mind. The narrative motif of a temple which is allegorically significant is a veritable *cliché* in medieval literature, and Volusenus could hardly have escaped familiarity therewith, since the motif figures prominently in English literary works (e.g. by Chaucer and Lydgate) known to have been influential in Scotland, especially among the so-called "Scottish Chaucerians".[30] One of the latter, bishop Gavin Douglas, composed an elaborate allegorical poem containing two juxtaposed and contrasted buildings: *The Palice of Honour*.[31] The latter poem, written c. 1501 for king James IV, leads up to a sight of the god of chi-

[29] Guillaume Budé, *Le passage de l'hellénisme au christianisme*, ed. M.-M. de la Garanderie and D. F. Penham (Paris, 1993), p. 271.

[30] On this term (which is today rather out of fashion), see: *I Chauceriani Scozzesi*, ed. M. Rossi (Naples, 1964); D. Fox, "The Scottish Chaucerians", in *Chaucer and Chaucerians*, ed. D. S. Brewer (London, 1966), pp. 164-200.

[31] *The Shorter Poems of Gavin Douglas*, ed. P. Bawcutt (Edinburgh, 2003[2]); P. Bawcutt, *Gavin Douglas* (Edinburgh, 1976). The possibility of a debt to Douglas was pointed out long ago: D. Irving, *The History of Scotish Poetry* (Edinburgh, 1861). pp. 276-277.

valric honour, only for this apparent climax to be trumped by a superexcellent vision of the God of a better (because divine) Honour. The parallel with the *De animi tranquillitate* is suggestive, if no more. There may have been several reasons for Volusenus to recur to Douglas: these would indubitably have included patriotism and religion, but it must not be forgotten that Douglas was one of the earliest and best representatives of northern humanism in Scotland, being the translator of the integral text of Virgil's *Æneid* (1513).[32]

The *De animi tranquillitate* partakes somewhat of a *cri de cœur*, articulating the author's apprehension of the threats to Christian tranquillity emanating from *inter alia* controversies in church doctrine. Although in his book Volusenus deplores schism as such, he concedes that there is a certain merit in the attitudes of the Lutherans, and he even mentions by name several friends who were already infected with Protestant ideas and who would shortly make a formal break with Rome.[33] Significantly, the book is dedicated to Francesco Michele, who had recently arrived in Lyon from a Lucca thrown into consternation by the defection to Protestantism on the part of several very prominent churchmen.[34] The overall eirenicism shown by Volusenus is typical of that of such reform-minded ecclesiastics as cardinal Gasparo Contarini (1483-1542), as also of Sadoleto, the Scotsman's patron and mentor.[35] However, in an age of rapid and radical change a few years can make a big difference, and it is possible that at some point within this period Sadoleto may have deemed it prudent to adjust his view of his *protégé*. This may be inferred from the existence of a volume in which the *De animi tranquillitate* is bound together with the *De auctoritate ecclesiæ* of Antonius Florebellus [Antonio Fiordibelli], itself likewise a production of the press of Gryphius (Lyon, 1546).[36] Florebellus and Volusenus would certainly have known each other, since the former had been a member of Sadoleto's household at Carpentras from 1533, and he would eventually edit the cardinal's correspondence (Rome, Cologne, 1545; Lyon, 1554; Louvain, 1555).[37] In his book, Florebellus addresses Sadoleto directly. Like the Scotsman, Florebellus is moved by an acute awareness of the wars and other dangers of the moment, and he is also deeply concerned with the ideal of tranquillity of mind. Despite this, the Italian's message is scarcely compatible with that of Volusenus. So far from exhibiting a tolerance of certain of the less-

[32] Douglas's translation of the *Æneid* was only the second ever into a European vernacular, after that of Octavian de Saint Gelais (1500). Douglas equips each book of the poem with his own original prologues, and he also translates the thirteenth, concluding book, by Maphæus Vegius (d. 1458).

[33] Baker-Smith, "Florens Wilson and his circle" (as in n. 11), p. 93.

[34] See footnote 22, above.

[35] On the party associated with Contarini, Sadoleto and others, see: P. McNair, *Peter Martyr in Italy* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 1-50; Douglas, *Jacopo Sadoleto* (as in n. 15), pp. 163-179.

[36] This volume is in a private collection. The binding is typical of the mid sixteenth century. Florebellus's book was reprinted at Louvain, in 1555.

[37] Douglas, *Jacopo Sadoleto* (as in n. 15), p. 244.

controversial viewpoints of the Protestants and their sympathisers, Florebellus conducts a rhetoric-fuelled polemic with those whom he denounces as heretics:

> An non nostris quoque temporibus animaduertere licet huius generis hominum spiritus atque insolentiam? Quid enim Luterani? Quid eorum aduersarii Œcolampadiani? Nonne certos se esse Christi internuntios, ueros euangeliorum interpretes gloriantur?[38]
>
> [Is it not permitted, in our times also, to animadvert to the mindsets and insolence of this kind of men? What of the Lutherans? What of the Œcolampadians, their adversaries? Do they not boast that they are the mediators of Christ, and the true interpreters of the Gospels?]

He thinks back to the days after the Council of Constance, when, the heresies of John Wiclif, John Hus and Jerome of Prague having been dealt with (Florebellus is silent on the means used to achieve this result), there was doctrinal harmony throughout Europe. Unfortunately, along came Luther to spoil everything:

> Hic Ecclesiae erat status: hæc tranquillitas: hæc quies: cum exortus est Luterus, qui tantam christiani nominis pacem turbaret, confessionemque dirimeret: qui elatus superbia (quæ omnis mater impietatis est) et impulsus odio: quod iam diu in Pontifices Romanos conceptum continebat, repentè suæ uenenum impietatis euomit. Eius turbulentam impiamque disciplinam cum uitæ licentia, quam suis sectatoribus largitur: tum uerò ordinis sacerdotum grauis et inueterata inuidia studiosis rerum nouarum hominibus commendauit.[39]
>
> [This was the condition of the Church, this its tranquillity, this its harmony: when Luther arose, who would disturb the great peace of the name of christian, and would shatter the confession: who, borne up by pride (which is the mother of all impiety) and driven by hate, suddenly spewed out the poison of his impiety, which, conceived long before against the Roman pontiffs, he had been holding in: his turbulent and impious teaching together with his licentious mode of life, which is now extended to his sectaries, even indeed of the solemn order of the priesthood, he with inveterate malice entrusted to men studious after revolutionary change.]

It is clear that for Florebellus tranquillity of mind is a matter of the institution rather than of the individual, and that it is predicated on the catholicity of the church directed from Rome. His book is an energetic reassertion of the sole and unchallengeable authority of the mother church, and as such reveals a response to the disputes in religion that differs fundamentally from the outlook of Volusenus. However, it is remarkable that it was evidently important for at least one contemporary reader to arrange for the Scotsman's work to be qualified through being made to share covers with the work of the Italian.[40] This convolute, therefore, which is likely to be bibliographically unique, provides

[38] Florebellus, *De auctoritate ecclesiæ* (Lyon, 1546), p. 45.
[39] Florebellus, *De auctoritate ecclesiæ* (Lyon, 1546), p. 55.
[40] Since the book exhibits no marks of ownership, it seems unlikely that the identity of the person who ordered this combined volume can be discovered.

physical evidence of how the eirenical, inclusive, humanist position in religion was, consequent upon such defining events as the Diet of Regensburg (1541), undermined by the hostile exclusivity of narrowly-drawn dogma.

Autres temps, autres mœurs: the theme of tranquillity of mind came more and more to be invoked in writings which make the general ideal conditional upon specific doctrinal affiliation. This is already implicit in the book by Florebellus, and the same attitude informs a work by Gulielmus Lindanus [Willem van der Lindt]: *Ruewardus, sive de Animi Tranquillitate, illorum in primis, qui ab Ecclesia Christi Iesu discessere* [… of those, especially, who have departed from Christ's church] (Cologne, 1567). Lindanus, a Louvain-trained theologian, became professor at Dillingen and later bishop of Roermond.[41] In the Protestant northern parts of the Netherlands he is remembered (mostly negatively) for his role as Inquisitor in the province of Friesland, where he displayed outstanding zeal in the cause of the counter-Reformation. The title of *Ruewardus* derives from the name of Lindanus's mentor at Louvain, Ruard Tapper, and the work urges that the only way back to tranquillity of mind is through a reversal of the processes whereby believers have allowed themselves to be seduced away from the Catholic faith and Roman allegiance.[42] Such a work testifies to very real and acute problems of conscience and faith. Perhaps the most sensational of the many contemporary cases of changing opinions was that of Francesco Spiera. This lawyer from Citadella, having enjoyed a Catholic youth, developed closet sympathies with several key opinions associated with Protestants; however, when his defection came to the attention of the authorities, he, fearing for the safety of himself and his family, was forced into a second apostasy. Such tergiversation took a terrible psychological toll, and the Italian died (1548) in a state of the profoundest religious despair. The case of Spiera was a *cause célèbre* with Europe-wide resonance, and it was soon invoked as a monitory *exemplum* by opposing parties in the religious controversies.[43] In reply to the Protestant account of Vergerio *cum suis*, one of the first Catholic allusions to the fate of Spiera was that by the Scottish theologian and humanist Patrick Cockburn, in his *De vulgari sacrae scripturae phrasi, libri duo* (Paris, 1552; 1558).[44] Such shocking illustration of the deleterious effects of the absence of tranquillity of mind would have been utterly abhorrent to Volusenus.

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[41] P. Th. van Beuningen, *Wilhelmus Lindanus als inquisiteur en bisschop* (Assen, 1966), pp. 29-31. A German translation quickly followed: *Ruewardus, das ist: von wahrer Ruhe der Seelen* (Dillingen, 1569).

[42] On Tapper and Lindanus see: P. Polman, *L'Élément Historique dans la Controverse religieuse du XVIe Siècle* (Gembloux, 1932), *passim*.

[43] The notoriety of the Spiera case was such that it was still being invoked in fundamentalist circles even in the nineteenth century: *A Relation of the Fearful Estate of Francis Spira* [etc.] (Leeds, 1811) is a cheaply produced collection of legends of egregious apostates, presented with a stridently Protestant bias; for its part, Carl Ludwig Roth, *Francesco Spiera's Lebensende* (Nürnberg, 1829) was intended for an educational institute for poor and abandoned boys ["für arme und verwahrloste Knaben"].

[44] See page Ciij. Cockburn's book was reissued, with new Indices, an Appendix, and several extra chapters (Paris, 1558). Both editions are dedicated to James Stewart, son of

The eventual cooling of the most intense fires of the Reformation cannot be said to have led to a diminution of interest in the overall theme of tranquillity of mind; rather, it paved the way for new applications in the spheres of religion, philosophy and *belles lettres*. From sixteenth-century Protestant circles one notes: John Bernard, *Oratio pia, religiosa, et solatii plena de vera animi tranquillitate* (London, 1568); Johannes Spinæus [Jean de L'Espine], *Excellens discours de J. de L'Espine touchant le repos et contentement* [etc.] (La Rochelle, 1588; 1594), later published as *De tranquillitate animi libri VII* (Geneva, 1591); and Jeremias Bastingius, *Oratio scholastica de vera animi tranquillitate* (Rotterdam, 1686).[45] On the Catholic side, an interesting case is that of Orazio Lombardelli's reworking of Volusenus, mentioned earlier. Whereas this latter book has been declared to be a translation into Italian,[46] it is both less and more than normally would be implied by that term. Lombardelli abandons the dialogue form of the original; on top of that, he criticises Volusenus for the many digressions contained in the *De animi tranquillitate*, and he allows but few references to the Scottish author to remain. The original discussion is reworked and expanded to give a sizeable moral treatise, divided into four books, each comprised of many chapters. As the second part of the title accurately indicates ([…] *sopr'il dialogo di Florenzio Voluseno*), the new book is *on the subject of* the earlier one. As a result, the Italian is free to develop the theme according to his own lights; for this reason his work is a notable document in the reception-history of Volusenus.

Later printings of the *De animi tranquillitate*, in themselves indications of the esteem in which Volusenus continued to be held, suggest that they are likely to have been tailored to the moral and spiritual needs of the times at which they appeared. In the seventeenth century, the background of the Thirty Years War in Germany and the Civil Wars in the British Isles may have prompted the reprint at Leiden (1637), reissued, with a new title-page, at The Hague (1642), both containing a preface by David Echlin.[47] The edition by the

James V and commendator of St. Andrews, who in 1552 granted Cockburn a pension of £50 from the rents of the kirk of Leuchars: *Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae*, ed. Hew Scott (Edinburgh, 1915), vol. 1, p. 368. On Spiera see: A. J. Schutte, *Pier Paolo Vergerio: The Making of an Italian Reformer* (Geneva, 1977), pp. 239-244. On Cockburn see: M. P. McDiarmid, "*The Complaynt of Scotlande*: Patrick Cockburn, Antonio Guevara, Antonio de Fregoso" *Notes and Queries* (July-August, 1959), pp. 245-248; A. Esposito, *ODNB* (as in n. 11), "Patrick Cockburn".

[45] Jean de L'Espine, or Spina (c. 1506-1597), was first a monk, before becoming pastor at Saumur: *La France Protestante*; Bastingius (1551-1595) was preacher in Antwerp and later in Dordrecht: *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden*.

[46] Durkan, in *ODNB* (as in n. 11), "Wilson [Volusene], Florence".

[47] Echlin was physician to the queens Anne of Denmark and Henrietta Maria, and was a poet in both French and Latin: T. A. Birrell, "Some rare Scottish books in the Old royal Library", in *The Renaissance in Scotland*, ed. A. A. MacDonald, M. Lynch and I. B. Cowan (Leiden, 1994), p. 410. Echlin's edition was dedicated to Sir Robert Ker, 1st earl of Ancram. Ancram was a courteour under James I and Charles I, to whom he remained loyal during the Civil War, dying in exile in the Netherlands in 1654. He was himself a poet imbued with neo-Stoicism, as is reflected in his sonnet "In Praise of a

humanist scholar Thomas Ruddiman, for the press of the Scottish patriot and Jacobite sympathiser Robert Freebairn (Edinburgh, 1707), appeared at a time of no small anxiety about the loss of the independent identity of Scotland through the Union of Parliaments.[48] The final British printing (Edinburgh, 1751) was designed especially for high-school students, and was issued by the press of Hamilton and Balfour, a firm renowned *inter alia* for their elegant editions of the Ancient classics.[49] The editor of this volume was William Wishart, a noted Presbyterian moderate, professor of Divinity and principal of Edinburgh University.[50] In a prefatory letter, John Ward (of Gresham College, London) praises the book for providing not only a commendable specimen of Scottish Latin prose, but also a protection against the various contemporary currents of thought typical of the Enlightenment. These would have included agnosticism, scepticism, rationalism, deism, atheism and denominational factionalism: *in tot tantisque molestiis et perturbationibus* [in so many and so great vexations and perturbations]. For its part, the last printed edition of *De animi tranquillitate* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1760) appeared midway through the Seven Years War. From the evidence of publication-history one can see that, when circumstances conspired to imperil the preservation of tranquillity of mind, the wise counsels of Volusenus were appreciated anew. It is perhaps in this light that one should note a passage on philosophical tranquillity in David Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (London, 1751):

> Of the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed philosophical TRANQUILLITY, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and each assault of adverse fortune. Conscious of his own virtue, say the philosophers, the sage elevates himself above every accident of life; and securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on inferior mortals, engaged in pursuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every frivolous enjoyment.

While the modern editor records Hume's debt here to both Stoics and Epicureans, he is silent on any possible influence from Volusenus – yet such is by no means impossible, since the philosopher may be presumed to have known the

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Solitary Life": D. Allan, *Philosophy and Politics* (as in n. 25), pp. 110-113. J. Lettice in his biographical account mentions a Leiden edition of 1537, but this is manifestly a mistake for 1637: *The European Magazine*, February (1795), p. 92. The date of 1648 attached to an edition of Volusenus in the catalogue of the books of Sir Robert Gordon of Gordonstoun would seem to be a mistake for 1642: cf. Allan, *Philosophy and Politics* (as in n. 25), pp. 30-31, 220. The alleged, but unattested, Edinburgh edition of 1571 has been noted, above, footnote 20.

[48] D. Duncan, *Thomas Ruddiman: A Study in Scottish Scholarship of the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh and London, 1965), pp. 45-47.

[49] W. McDougall, *Gavin Hamilton, John Balfour and Patrick Neill: A Study of publishing in Edinburgh in the Eighteenth Century*, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1975.

[50] Perhaps through confusion with the famous Scottish Protestant martyr (d. 1546) of the same name, the eighteenth-century Wishart's Christian name has mistakenly been given as "George": Irving, *Lives of Scotish Writers*, vol. 1, p. 30.

dialogue, of which Wishart's edition was published in Edinburgh in the very year of the first version of the *Enquiry*.[51]

From the sixteenth century onwards, tranquillity of mind was to become a distinct and not unimportant theme in imaginative literature, especially in poetry. The Roman satirists had made much of the opposition between urban vice and rural virtue: *Beatus ille qui procul negotiis* […] [Happy the man, who far from the cares of business …].[52] This Horatian trope was resumed during the Renaissance and cultivated with enthusiasm. Volusenus's contemporary Sir Thomas Wyatt, for example, uses it in reacting to the dangers of court life under Henry VIII, when, in a *faux-naïf* way, he poses as a man living the simple life "in Kent and Christendome".[53] Another figure who, like Wyatt, combined skill in poetry with a marked interest in Stoic philosophy, was Thomas Naogeorgus [Kirchmeyer], ex-Dominican, Protestant theologian, and author of anti-Catholic dramas. Indeed, in one of his publications he includes a Latin translation of Plutarch's *De tranquillitate animi* together with Seneca's treatise, both preceded by his own satires in five books (Basel, 1555). An explicit link with Horace is witnessed in the *prælectiones* on the sixteenth ode of the Roman poet's second book, published by the professor of Latin, and late convert from Lutheranism to Calvinism, Nathan Chytræus [Kochhaf], in his *De philosophica animi tranquillitate* [etc.] (Rostock, 1592).[54] Still other applications of Horatian satire were possible. One is the English lyric (attributed to Sir Edward Dyer) "In praise of a contented mind" (1588).[55] The opening line of this poem – "My mind to me a kingdom is" – finds an echo in the *Arx Virtutis, sive de vera animi tranquillitate satyrae tres* (Ghent, 1621), by the Catholic Joannes [Jan] van Havre, a supporter of Philip II and long-serving Ghent city magistrate charged with settling civil disputes ["schepen van gedeele"], who offers a survey of human society in which each member is shown to suffer from envy at, and jeal-

[51] David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals: A Critical Edition*, ed. T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford, 1998), p. 63. The capitalisation is Hume's. William Wishart and Hume certainly knew each other. Wishart was suspicious of Hume's religious views, and in 1744 he was one of the party which successfully opposed Hume's appointment to the chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University: E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume* (Oxford, 1980[2]), pp. 153-157. In the passage quoted, Hume's allusion to the temple may be intended to recall Lucretius: *De rerum natura*, 2.7-13. Hume writes in similar vein about the temple of wisdom in his essay "The Stoic": *Selected Essays*, ed. S. Copley and A. Edgar (Oxford, 1993), pp. 87-88. Additional evidence of the impact of the 1751 edition may be gleaned from a patriotic allusion to Seneca and Volusenus in Tobias Smollett's comedy, *The Reprisal: or, The Tars of Old England* (Dublin, 1757), p. 11.

[52] Horace, *Epodi*, 2.1.

[53] *Collected poems of Sir Thomas Wyatt* (as in n. 6), p. 91; this is from the satire beginning "Myne owne John Poyntz".

[54] See the respective articles on "Naogeorgus, Thomas" and "Chytræus, Nathan" in the *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, giving further references.

[55] *The New Oxford Book of Sixteenth Century Verse*, ed. E. Jones (Oxford, 1991), pp. 322-323.

ousy of, his neighbour. As with much medieval "estates satire", this betrays an outlook that is essentially conservative:

> Ipse egomet mihi sum Regnum. Procul ite profanae
> Spesque Metusque, Amor, atque Odium; fallacibus hamis
> Irretite alios; non vos, non Extera posco.[56]
>
> [I myself am a kingdom to myself. Away, profane Hopes and Fears, Love and Hate; ensnare others with your treacherous hooks; I long neither for you, nor for any outward things.]

In van Havre and other writers on the theme one observes the tendency to associate tranquillity of mind with the shunning of worldly allurements; by an irony, therefore, his position becomes somewhat comparable with that of any person (e.g. Arnulphus de Boeriis) writing from the monastic perspective – albeit that, in a later and secular age, in which a man could claim to be his own kingdom, the life of virtue would be more easily located in the virtual monastery of the mind: the example of Michel de Montaigne, living the life of a solitary intellectual in his tower, immediately proposes itself.

A significant turn in the thematisation of tranquillity of mind brings one to the pastoral. For Renaissance writers focused on the Bible, this trend may have been stimulated by a revalorisation of the Edenic ideal; yet others may have been indebted rather to Greek and Roman writings in the genre.[57] Portrayals of idealised landscapes had, of course, been standard stock-in-trade throughout the Middle Ages, but now the allegorical abstractions tended to make way for Scriptural imagery and/or the conventions of Classical mythology.[58] An instance of the new trend is such a poem as Alexander Hume's *Of the Day Estivall* (Edinburgh, 1599), with its remarkable description of a perfect summer day. This poem has been said to betray influence from the Psalms; one might also observe that it self-evidently proceeds from a mind that has attained to a profound and devout tranquillity.[59] Although the landscape described by Hume is a purely generic one, other poets of the period connect the ideal of tranquillity with the contemplation or recollection of specific localities. This is responsible for the particular *Georgic*-like charm of the poem *Zlatna, oder von ruhe des gemüttes* (Liegnitz, 1623) by Martin Opitz von Boberfeld, in which the virtues of this richly-endowed area of Transylvania [Siebenbürgen] are lovingly described.

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[56] See the article on Jan van Havre in the *Vaderlandsch museum voor Nederduitse letterkunde*, in which the lines quoted here appear.

[57] J. Bennett and S. Mandelbrote, *The Garden, the Ark, the Tower, the Temple* (London, 1998).

[58] Vernacular alternatives to the hosts of Strephons, Damons, Chlorises, etc. were also on offer: for English examples see those in *The Shepheardes Calender* (1579): Edmund Spenser, *Shorter Poems*, ed. W. A. Oram *et al.* (New Haven and London, 1989), pp. 1-213; H. Cooper, *Pastoral: Medieval into Renaissance* (Ipswich, 1977).

[59] For a convenient text: *Longer Scottish Poems: Volume One 1375-1650*, ed. P. Bawcutt and F. Riddy (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 291-302.

> Wo wil Ich aber hin? Ich sol von Zlatna schreiben /
> Das den verdruß der zeit mir kan so wol vertreiben
> Mit seiner grossen lust. Ich suche was Ich wil /
> So find' ich da genug / vnd mehr noch als zuviel. (117-120)
>
> [Where else should I go? I am bound to write about Zlatna, which with its great delight is able to drive the vexation of the time away from me. I seek what I want, and so doing find plenty, and even more than too much.]

Opitz, writing during the Thirty Years War, was acutely aware of the tension between the poet and his troubled times, and it is highly appropriate that this celebrated poem was introduced by a commendatory work in Latin by his friend Bernhard Nüssler, entitled (how could it be otherwise?) *De tranquillitate animi*.[60]

One may recall that there are two notable passages in which Volusenus himself evokes a sense of place. The first of these affords a glimpse of the juvenile scholar on the banks of the river Lossie, near his own home town of Elgin, happily engaged in peripatetic discussion with his schoolfellow, future canon of Aberdeen and rector of Cruden, John Ogilvie, to whom Volusenus would later present a copy of the *Apophthegmata* (Paris, 1533) of Erasmus.[61] The placing of this vignette within the *De animi tranquillitate* is crucial, coming just before the author embarks on the lengthy account of his dream. That an act of personal memory should trigger oneiric revelation may be taken as evidence of the importance of the Scottish landscape within the author's mind. The other passage occurs at the very beginning of the dialogue, when the three friends betake themselves to the sylvan heights of Fourvières, there to look down in tranquillity over the bustling city of Lyon and indulge in lofty debate. It would seem that Volusenus's characteristic instinct is to give tranquillity of mind a local habitation and a name.[62]

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[60] Martin Opitz, *Gesammelte Werke: Kritische Ausgabe*, ed. G. Schulz-Behrend, vol. 2, part I (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 75; G. Schulz-Behrend, "Opitz" *Zlatna*", *Modern Language Notes* 77 (1962), pp. 398-410. In a liminary letter to Nüssler, Gregorius Richterus, rector of Görlitz, links Opitz and Spinæus (on whom see above): Opitz, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2, part 1, p. 70. Opitz's poem has certain affinities with Ben Jonson's *To Penshurst* and other works in the country-house tradition, on which see: A. Fowler, *The Country House Poem: A Cabinet of Seventeenth-Century Estate Poems and Related Items* (Edinburgh, 1994). A suggestive parallel has been drawn between Scotland and the Silesian Baroque: Allan, *Philosophy and Politics* (as in n. 25), p. 85. Opitz was the translator into German of John Barclay's hugely successful neo-Latin romance, *Argenis*.

[61] *Early Scottish Libraries*, ed. J. Durkan and A. Ross (Glasgow, 1961), p. 160. Elgin was an early centre of humanism. Giovanni Ferreri [Johannes Ferrerius] taught at the nearby Cistercian abbey school at Kinloss: Durkan, *ODNB* (as in n. 11), "Wilson [Volusene], Florence"; idem, "Education: The Laying of Fresh Foundations", in *Humanism in Scotland* (as in n. 12), pp. 125, 134.

[62] An equivalent trend has been detected in poetry: A. A. MacDonald, "The Sense of Place in early Scottish Verse", *English Studies* 72 (1991), pp. 12-27.

The book of Volusenus, as has been mentioned, retained the power to attract readers through more than two centuries. It is also likely that the Scotsman's by no means inconsiderable talents in neo-Latin verse also contributed to the preservation of his reputation. In 1619 one Thomas Volusenus (no known relation) collected the poems of his namesake, and published them at the end of a volume containing the verses of the Scottish bishop Patrick Adamson (d. 1591).[63] Within the text of the *De animi tranquillitate* itself many poems are included, and the work is brought to its conclusion with the author reciting a Horatian ode of his own composition, about which he feels a fitting combination of modesty and pride:

> Composui, sed parum feliciter: quod præcipue illis videbitur, qui profanarum rerum admiratione capti, nullum carmen aptum existimant, si desint Thespiades, Joves, Veneres, Ledae, et fabulosa id genus Græcorum commenta. Sed ne Jupiter quidem ipse (ut in proverbio est) omnibus placet. Ergo, ut mihi tandem per vos abire liceat, afferam carmen ipsum, etsi non doctum aut cultum, certe tamen, quod multo potius est, pium.[64]
>
> [I have written something, but with little success: as it will seem chiefly to those who, captivated by admiration of prophane things, think no poem suitable, if Muses, Joves, Venuses, Ledas, and all that sort of Greekish fabulations are absent. But indeed, not even Jupiter himself (as the proverb has it) can please everyone. Therefore, in order that you may allow me to depart, I propose to adduce that same poem, which, if it be neither learned nor stylish, is nonetheless something better by far: religious.]

The poem in question, *Quid vos, ô superi boni*, consists of stanzas each containing two couplets, in imitation of Horace's ode *Sic te diva potens Cypri*.[65] The theme of Volusenus's poem is declared to be *Nihil esse in hac vita requietis, præter id, quod a sapientia, et pietate proficiscitur* [In this life there is no tranquillity beyond that which proceeds from wisdom and religion], which in effect epitomises the argument of the book as a whole. Through the inclusion of this work in the *Delitiae Poetarum Scotorum* (Amsterdam, 1637), the poetical talents of Volusenus were held up to the attention of a Europe-wide readership of *literati*. In eighteenth-century Britain, awareness of this poem was further increased via the much anthologised English version by Robert Blair:

> Why do I, O most gracious God!
> So heavily complain?

[63] *Reverendissimi in Christo patris, Patricii Adamsoni, Sancti-Andreæ in Scotia Archiepiscopi dignissimi ac doctissimi, Poëmata Sacra* [etc.] (London, 1619), fols. 74-79.

[64] *De animi tranquillitate* (1543), p. 392; (1751), p. 286;. This poem is given pride of place in Thomas Volusenus's collection, where it is introduced as being "viri, sua ætate literatissimi, ac verè pii" [of a man in his own age most learned and truly religious].

[65] Horace, *Carmina*, 1.3.

And at thy providence most just,
Why do I thus repine? (1-4)[66]

As it happens, the simple metre adopted by Blair is identical with that of Alexander Hume's *Day Estivall*, and it is likely that both clergyman-poets may have wished to exploit the resonances of the common metre of the Scottish Psalter. Religion and Stoical philosophy conjoined to determine the mindset of both men, even though Blair's best-known work, *The Grave* (Edinburgh, 1743), displays an un-Volusenan and pre-Gothic *frisson* at the contemplation of human mortality.

It will be sufficiently evident that it is here impossible to explore comprehensively every Renaissance treatment of tranquillity of mind; neither is it possible to pursue every hint of potential influence from Volusenus. Such was the currency of the theme during the Renaissance and the Baroque that it was deemed suitable exercise-material for public examinations in neo-Latin rhetoric; this was the case with Adriaan Pauw, in his *De animi tranquillitate, carmen ascepliadeum* (Amsterdam, 1675).[67] The Civil Wars in England provided a comparable background for another poet who was temperamentally attracted to the theme of tranquillity of mind. This was none other than Andrew Marvell, assistant to the still greater poet, John Milton.

Fair quiet, have I found thee here,
And Innocence, thy sister dear?
Mistaken long, I sought you then
In busy companies of men.
Your sacred plants, if here below,
Only among the plants will grow,
Society is all but rude,
To this delicious solitude. ("The Garden", 9-16)[68]

Such lines constitute perhaps the *locus classicus* of seventeenth-century neo-Stoic poetry on tranquillity of mind, a theme which runs like a red thread though the literature of the European Renaissance, both in neo-Latin and in the vernaculars. As Sir Thomas Browne memorably enjoined: "Live happy in the

[66] "An Ode, Translated from the Latin of Florentius Volusenus Scotus" [etc.], in *The Poetical Works of Robert Blair* [etc.] (London, 1802), pp. 69-87.

[67] This Adriaan Pauw is not to be confused with his great namesake (1585-1653), who represented the Netherlandish Estates at the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia.

[68] *The Poems of Andrew Marvell*, ed. N. Smith (London, 2003), pp. 155-156. The theme of country quiet and contentment was widely popular in the Renaissance and the Baroque: M.-S. Røstvig, *The Happy Man: Studies in the Metamorphoses of a Classical Ideal*, 2 vols. (Oslo, 1962). Although there is an undeniable affinity between happiness and tranquillity, the two ideals deserve to be distinguished. As the passage quoted from David Hume shows, tranquillity of mind transcends happiness, and indeed may even be said to imply the repudiation of many kinds of happiness.

Elizium of a virtuously composed mind".[69] *Mutatis mutandis*, the Ancient ideal of tranquillity comes to enter the intellectual space formerly occupied by the older ideal of monasticism; it is a concept that lends itself to various applications in connection with the religious, moral and political conflicts of the Reformation; it approaches, but does not coincide with, the literary terrain of the pastoral; it harvests and harmonises the insights gained from both Biblical and Classical scholarship; it is responsible for informing a corpus of fascinating poetic texts, in which the ideal inherited from Stoic philosophy is shown to countervail the disillusionments born of warfare and dispute. In all this literary activity, the *De animi tranquillitate* of Volusenus stands out like a shining beacon, since, in a creative and very satisfying way, the work encapsulates and illustrates every aspect of the larger theme. With his supple mastery of the language of learning, and through his eirenic attitude to many of the most urgent preoccupations of his age, the Christian humanist Volusenus remained, through more than two centuries, a man for all seasons.[70]

[69] *Christian Morals*, 3.23, in: Sir Thomas Browne, *The Major Works*, ed. C.A. Patrides (Harmondsworth, 1977), p. 466.

[70] In the preparation of this article I have benefited from the expertise of the following scholars: Prof. dr. D. Baker-Smith; Mr I. C. Cunningham; Mr T. van Heijnsbergen; Prof. dr F. L. van Holthoon; Ms G. C. Huisman; Dr F. L. Roig Lanzillotta. Any errors are my own responsibility.

THE FIRST CHRISTIAN DEFENDER OF STOIC VIRTUE? JUSTUS LIPSIUS AND CICERO'S *PARADOXA STOICORUM*

Jan Papy*

Know then this truth (enough for Man to know)
"Virtue alone is happiness below".
Alexander Pope, *Essay on Man*, 4.309-310.

CICERO'S *PARADOXA STOICORUM*: A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE

If Sabbadini was right to label Erasmus's *Ciceronianus*, published in 1528, "a decisive work with respect to the long controversy over the imitation of Cicero as a writer and stylist", Erasmus's famous dialogue was, so it appeared, as decisive for a new sort of criticism addressed to the "philosopher Cicero".[1] For whereas Celio Calcagnini (Ferrara, 1479 - Ferrara, 1541), then professor at the University of Ferrara, called into question 25 places of Cicero's *De officiis* in his *Disquisitiones aliquot in libros officiorum Ciceronis* of 1538,[2] Marcantonius Majoragius (Ferrara, 1514 - Ferrara, 1555) published an open attack against Cicero as philosopher eight years later. His lively Christian Platonist dialogue, which purports to have been held in the suburbs of Milan in the garden of the Fannianus family – thus subtly echoing the setting of Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* – was entitled *Antiparadoxon* because of the fact that Majoragius had attacked Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* as invalid on two counts: they were not Socratic (in the way the Florentine Platonists Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Agostino Steuco understood "Socratic"), and they were not true since Cicero's method of argument and argumentation was false, ignorant and unskilful.[3] Once again Majoragius, stating that a rhetorician is not

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[1] R. Sabbadini, Storia del Ciceronianismo e di altre questioni letterari nell' età della Rinascenza (Torino, 1885), p. 60.

[2] J. Papy, "Calcagnini, Celio (1479-1541)", in Centuriae Latinae II. Cent une figures humanistes de la Renaissance aux Lumières. A la mémoire de Marie-Madeleine de la Garanderie, ed. C. Nativel (Genève, 2006), pp. 161-166.

[3] See Q. Breen, "The *Antiparadoxon* of Marcantonius Majoragius or, A Humanist Becomes a Critic of Cicero as a Philosopher", *Studies in the Renaissance* 5 (1958), pp. 37-48.

likely to be a good philosopher, agreed with Pico's celebrated letter to Ermolao Barbaro[4]: "You may have a great store of words, you may excel in the free flow of words, you may discharge whole wagonloads of trifles, but you should understand that by so many tricks you conclude nothing".[5] Worse, according to Majoragius, however, was Cicero's hostility towards the Platonists together with his attempts to insult the majesty of Plato and to pervert the truth: that is the reason why Majoragius's *Antiparadoxon* was embellished with numerous Christian Platonist views on the divine mind as Christ, the body as prison of the soul, the freedom of man, and true riches. Moreover, those who deny a future life or say man can be happy only in this life, are condemned by Majoragius to be burned alive and in full consciousness (*vivus videnque*).[6]

TOWARDS A "CHRISTIAN" READING OF THE *PARADOXA STOICORUM*: THE COMMENTARY TRADITION

However much Sabbadini and Breen were right to see Erasmus's *Ciceronianus* as a catalyst in this philosophical debate, it has to be emphasised that important traces of this discussion can equally be discerned in sixteenth-century editions and commentaries of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*.

Whereas the *editio princeps* (Mainz, 1465) and the various subsequent fifteenth-century editions had only offered Cicero's Latin text and, in some cases, the explanatory notes by Petrus Marsus (Pietro Marso; Cesa 1442 - Rome 1512)[7] – yet all these without any precise reference to ancient Greek sources – it was Franciscus Maturantius (1443-1518) who was the first to offer a true scholarly commentary. Moreover, in his commentary, which was first published in 1506, Maturantius explained the Stoic backgrounds to the text in greater detail. Indeed, he even quoted important elucidating passages from Cicero himself, Diogenes Laertius, Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Isocrates, Juvenal, Seneca, and Epicurus in the Latin or Greek original.[8]

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[4] See Q. Breen, "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1952), pp. 385-426.

[5] Antonius Majoragius, *Antiparadoxon, sive suburbanarum quaestionum libri sex, in quibus M. Tullii Ciceronis omnia paradoxa refelluntur* (Lyon: S. Gryphius, 1546), pp. 158-159. Translation taken from Breen, "The *Antiparadoxon* of Marcantonius Majoragius" (as in n. 3), p. 47.

[6] Majoragius, *Antiparadoxon* (as in n. 5), pp. 67-79; 187-199; 227-231. The passage on burning at the stake can be read at p. 76.

[7] These were published in Cologne (1467), Rome (1469), Venice (1470, 1472, 1474, 1477, 1480, 1482, 1484, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1491, 1492, 1494, 1496, and 1498-1499), Milan (1474, 1476, 1478, 1480, and c. 1490) and Louvain (1483). See the survey offered by M. V. Ronnick, *Cicero's «Paradoxa Stoicorum»: A Commentary, an Interpretation and a Study of Its Influence* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp. 170-199.

[8] We have not been able to consult the first edition published in 1506 in Venice by J. de Tridino. For this reason we have used the following later edition: *Ciceronis De Officiis libri III, Cato maior vel De senectute, Laelius vel De amicitia, Paradoxa Stoicorum*

Equally important is the Badius edition published in Paris in 1532. This edition was embellished with a detailed commentary by Franciscus Sylvius Ambianus (François Dubois; c. 1483-1536), professor of rhetoric and principal of the Collège de Tournai at Paris.[9] Whereas Maturantius had focused on a philosophical reading of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, Sylvius engaged rather with the philological and historical details. However, contrary to important previous editions containing the notes of Marsus, Badius, Maturantius or Erasmus, Sylvius deliberately tackled the problem of the "Socratic" origin of the *Paradoxa*. His view seems to have been of particular interest to the later debate sparked off by Majoragius:

> "Maxime videntur esse Socratica": according to Cicero in his fourth book of *Academics* most Stoic "startling truths" which are called "paradoxes" are Socratic. The same Cicero argues that not all of them however are Socratic. For Socrates would never say that only wise men are kings, wealthy or beautiful etc. Moreover, Socrates never wrote anything, but Plato committed his thoughts to paper, as is stated by Cicero in the third book *On the orator*. Zeno who was the inventor of the Stoics lived after Socrates. One should not believe that these Socratic paradoxes originated after Zeno.[10]

More precisely, Sylvius, who did not omit to refer to Quintilian's translation of *paradoxa* by "inopinata" (cf. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 9.2.13) and to Cicero's rendering by "admirabilia" (cf. *De finibus*, 4.27.74), saw their actual origin with Zeno of Citium, founder of the Stoic school.[11] In addition to the

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sex. Cum Petri Marsi, Francisci Maturantii, Omniboni, Martini Philetici et Ascensii in haec omnia praestantissimis commentariis. Marii Nizolii Brixellensis defensiones locorum aliquot Ciceronis contra disquisitiones Calcagnini. Cum duplici indice, tam omnium capitum quam rerum adnotatione dignarum (Venetiis, Apud Ioan. Gryphium, 1572). Copy in London, British Library, shelfmark 722.m.14.1-2.

[9] On François Dubois, see the article by A. Labarre in *Dictionaire de biographie française*, vol. 11 (Paris, 1967), p. 931. I was able to use the later reprint: *Paradoxa M. T. Ciceronis ad M. Brutum, Cum F. Sylvii Ambiani Commentariis* (Vaeneunt Iodoco Bad. Ascen. Cum privilegio [1532]). Copy in London, British Library, shelfmark 834.f.2/10.

[10] *Paradoxa M. T. Ciceronis ad M. Brutum, Cum F. Sylvii Ambiani Commentariis* (Paris, [1532]), p. IIIv: "MAXIME VIDENTUR ESSE SOCRATICA: Authore Cicerone lib. Academicarum 4. sunt Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum quae Paradoxa nominantur. Idem contendit omnia non esse Socratica. Numquam enim diceret Socrates sapientes solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos etc. Socrates autem nihil umquam scripsit, sed eius sententiam Plato scriptis mandavit, ut est apud Ciceronem lib. de Oratore 3. Zeno qui fuit Stoicorum author fuit post Socratem. Ne credas paradoxa haec Socratica post Zenonem nata esse".

[11] In his *Introduction to the reading of Seneca*, first published in 1586, Henri Estienne equally emphasised that not all paradoxes are proper to the Stoic school. See *Henri Estienne, Introduction à la lecture de Sénèque (1586)*, ed. and transl. D. Carabin, (Paris, 2007), I.5 (p. 92): "non omnia paradoxa propria Stoicis fuisse existimandum est". Estienne would also tangle the issue of the exact Latin translation of the Greek *παράδοξα*; see *ibid*., I.5 (pp. 92-94): "Mirum est porro Senecam *παράδοξα* interpretari

paradoxes Cicero had dealt with in his short treatise *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, Sylvius also informed his readers on the other *loci classici* on Stoic paradoxes in Cicero's writings, viz. his famous humorous passus in the *Oratio pro Murena* (chapters 60-66) and the partial discussions in *De oratore* (3.65-66), *De finibus* (4.74-78) and *Tusculanae disputationes* (3.10; 3.21; 4.72; 5.4-5). Finally, Sylvius also exerted himself to include all information possible on the precise origin of these and other (Stoic) paradoxes, information which was mainly scattered in book VII of Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of eminent philosophers*.[12]

An important step towards a "Christian" reading of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, however, was the extensive commentary by Xystus Betul(e)ius (Memmingen, 1500 - Augsburg, 1554). Betul(e)ius, who taught philosophy and literature at Basle and Augsburg, was not only the author of *Dramata sacra* (Basle, 1547); he also devoted his scholarly life to writing numerous commentaries on Cicero's *De officiis*, *De amicitia* and *De senectute*, as well as on Lactantius. The preface to his commentary on Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* demonstrates that he was well acquainted with both Majoragius's *Antiparadoxa* and the *Antiparadoxa* which Vitus Amerbach (Wemding, 1503 – Ingolstadt, 1557), professor of philosophy at Ingolstadt, had published earlier.[13] It was especially Amerbach's frequent references to Christian dogma in his *Antiparadoxa* (Strasbourg, 1541) that seem to have inspired Betul(e)ius. In commenting upon Cicero's second paradox (*In quo virtus sit ei nihil deesse ad beate vivendum* / "That he who has virtue in him lacks nothing for living a happy life") he referred to Plato, Diogenes Laertius (7.126-128), and Cicero's fifth book of the *Tusculanae disputationes*, yet he also inserted full quotations from Saint Paul's *Epistles to Corinthians*, *Timothy* and *Philippians*. Moreover, Cicero's view on Marcus Regulus's Stoic attitude towards his captivity by the Carthaginians during the First Punic War, and especially the statement that "his very soul, under the protection of such a huge guard and so great a throng of virtues, could not really be captured, although his body was" (Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, 16) was, so Betul(e)ius argued, a view which was in perfect concordance with Christian doctrine and with the attitude of Saint Paul when he was captured in Rome.[14] Yet, according to Betul(e)ius, who followed St. Augustine (*De civitate dei*, 4.3) here, it was Cicero's fifth paradox (*Omnes sapientes liberos esse et*

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inopinata, quum Latini *inopinatum* vocent potius quod Graeci *ἀπροσδόκητον* [...] quum tamen nonnulli haec *παράδοξα* non aliter interpretati sint quam *mirabilia*. Sed minime sequendi sunt".

[12] See Diogenes Laertius, 7.24, 101, 120, 122, and 126-128.

[13] Xysti Betuleii Augustani in M. T. Ciceronis libros III de natura deorum, et Paradoxa, commentarii multa ac varia eruditione referti, nuncque primum in lucem editi. Accessit locuples rerum et verborum in iis memorabilium Index (Basle: Ioannes Oporinus, [1550]), fol. A3r-A3v. I used the copy preserved in London, British Library, shelfmark 525.c.27. Remarkably, Betul(e)ius's commentary is not mentioned in Ronnick's survey of editions and commentaries (see our note 7).

[14] *Xysti Betuleii Augustani in M. T. Ciceronis libros III De natura deorum, et Paradoxa, commentarii* (Basle, [1550]), p. 30: "Quod congruit cum doctrina Christiana, quae ut corporis servitutem non aufert, ita Paulus etiam in ipsis vinculis liber fuit".

stultos omnes servos / "Only the wise man is free and every fool is a slave") which was the most "Christian".[15]

Though this aperçu may appear striking, more distinguished sixteenth-century scholars commenting on Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* – such as Erasmus, Melanchthon, Paulus Manutius, Denis Lambin and Carolus Langius – all seem to have focused on philological and historical issues. Manutius's sole occupation, for instance, was to elucidate in short marginal notes that Phidias's statue of Athena (mentioned by Cicero in *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, prooemium, 5) was made out of ebony,[16] whereas Lambin's major four-volume *Opera omnia* edition of 1565-1566 offered merely a few *Adnotatiunculae in paradoxa Stoicorum*, these commenting on variant manuscript readings only.[17] The notes in Langius's editions of 1563 and 1568, finally, were labelled by his printer Guilielmus Silvius (c. 1520-1580) himself as short but learned, and as being especially helpful to those scholars interested in history and antiquarian matters.[18] The reader of Langius who is interested in Phidias's statue of Athena and in comparing Langius's and Manutius's work, is referred to the second book of Thucydides's history and Plutarch's *Life of Pericles*.[19] A philosophical analysis of whatsoever kind is as absent in Langius's commentaries as it was in those of Manutius and Lambin.

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[15] *Xysti Betuleii Augustani in Ciceronis De natura deorum* (as in n. 14), pp. 39-40): "Hoc Paradoxon propius ad Christianam professionem accedit quam superiora. Sic enim scribit Augustinus de Civit. Dei, lib. 4 cap. 3. Proinde bonus etiamsi serviat, liber est; malus autem etiam si regnet, servus est. Nec unius hominis, sed quod est gravius, tot dominorum quot vitiorum".

[16] Not being able to use the first Aldine edition of 1541, we used the Aldine 1559 edition, preserved in London, British Library, shelfmark 1385.b23: *Ciceronis De officiis libri II, Cato maior vel de senectute, Laelius vel de amicitia, Paradoxa Stoicorum sex, Somnium Scipionis, ex libro sexto de republica*. Cum annotationibus Pauli Manutii, in margine adscriptis. Index rerum et verborum (Venetiis, 1559). On fol. 123v the passus "quasi illa Minerva Phidiae" (Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, prooemium, 5) is explained as "ex ebore. Pli. lib. 34 c.8", thus referring to Pliny the Elder's account in the *Naturales Historiae*, 34.8.

[17] We used the Paris edition of 1565-1566 issued with B. Turrisanus (copy in London, British Library, shelfmark 656.g.3); this edition is not mentioned in Ronnick's survey of editions and commentaries (see our note 7). The "Adnotatiunculae in Paradoxa Stoicorum" are on pp. 503-504.

[18] M. Tullii Ciceronis De officiis lib. III, Cato Maior vel de senect. ad T. Pomp. Attic., Laelius vel de amicitia, ad eundem Atticum, Paradoxa Stoicorum sex ad M. Brutum, Somnium Scipionis ex libro VI. de Repub. opera Caroli Langii ita ad optima et vetustissima exemplaria recogniti ut nunc demum editi videri queant. Eiusdem in hosce Ciceronis libros annotationes. Cum annotationibus Pauli Manutii in margine adscriptis (Antverpiae: Ex officina Guilielmi Silvii, 1568). We used the copy preserved in London, British Library, shelfmark 673.a.11. We refer to Silvius's letter of dedication to Joachim Hopperus, dated at Antwerp on 2 January 1568, where on fol. A2v it is stated: "Annotationes eiusdem licet breves, doctae tamen, plurimum lucis allaturae sunt historiae et antiquitatum studiosis".

[19] Viz. on page 230, note 1: "De Minerva eborea Phidiae Thucyd. lib. II & Plutarch. in pericle".

LIPSIUS AND THE *PARADOXA STOICORUM*: A NEW READING?

Contrary to what Langius's commentary might tend us to believe, his thorough knowledge of Cicero's philosophical works had a great and surprisingly direct impact. For, after his return from Leiden in 1591 and while staying at Spa and Liège, the humanist Justus Lipsius (Overijse, 1547 - Louvain, 1606) was a regular guest of Langius (Berquin, 1521 - Liège, 1573)[20], then Canon at Liège Cathedral.[21] Their daily conversations resulted in the fact that Lipsius made the Liège humanist and philologist Langius his interlocutor in his influential "Senecan" dialogue *De constantia* (1583/4). Lipsius also continued to broaden his own philosophical approach of Roman Stoicism. The result is known: a new philosophical interpretation and reading of Seneca, together with a political philosophy based on Tacitus, led to Lipsius being hailed as founding father of Neostoicism.[22]

Here, however, we wish to turn to Lipsius's *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam*, a guide to the history and doctrines of the philosophising sect, which Lipsius published in 1604 as a sort of introduction to his major 1605 edition of Seneca. Together with his *Physiologia Stoicorum*, a comprehensive account of Stoic natural philosophy, likewise published in Antwerp, in 1604, in the *Officina Plantiniana*, and with his edition of Seneca, this *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* formed the fitting culmination of Lipsius's lifelong "promotion" of a new secular ethics – an ethics, so it has been argued, which could be regarded as a true complement to Christian, biblical morality.[23] Or, as Lipsius himself had stated in the *Praescriptio* to his *De constantia* of 1584: *Philosophum ego agam, sed Christianum*.[24]

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[20] S. Gysens, "Langius (Delanghe of Langhe, de), Carolus", in *Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek*, vol. 18 (Brussel, 2007), pp. 567-579; J. Roulez, "Delanghe (Charles)", in *Biographie nationale de Belgique*, vol. 5 (Bruxelles, 1876), cols. 310-315.

[21] Lipsius first arrived in Spa in May 1591 (cf. ILE (= *Iusti Lipsi epistolae*, vol. 1- (Brussels, 1978-)), letter 91 05 16 H). At the end of June he went to Liège (cf. ILE 91 06 30 G). On 26 May 1592 he returned to Spa to take a short cure (cf. ILE 91 05 27 DE). In June 1592, he was back in Liège (cf. ILE V, 92 06 14 S). On 9 August 1592, he finally returned to Louvain where he had been appointed professor in history and Latin (cf. ILE V, 92 08 13 G).

[22] See, for instance, J. Kraye, "Moral philosophy", in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C. B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye (Cambridge, 1988), p. 370; M. Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics. Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius* (Princeton, 1991), pp. 64-66; J. Lagrée, *Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoïcisme. Étude et traduction des traités stoïciens De la Constance, Manuel de philosophie stoïcienne, Physique des stoïciens (extraits)* (Paris, 1994).

[23] J. Kraye, "Moral philosophy" (as in n. 22), pp. 370-371; Lagrée, *Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoïcisme* (as in n. 22), pp. 119-121.

[24] Justus Lipsius, *De constantia libri duo, qui alloquium praecipue continent in Publicis malis*. Ultima editio (Antwerp: Apud Viduam et Filios Io. Moreti, 1615), Ad Lectorem pro Constantia mea praescriptio (fol. *2v). Also quoted in A. Steuer, *Die Philosophie des Justus Lipsius. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde* (Münster, 1901), p. 6.

Remarkably, in his *Guide to Stoic Philosophy* the herald Lipsius saw the true fortress of Stoicism in the Stoic paradoxes.[25] In fact, Lipsius was the first, since Antiquity, to discern and acknowledge their philosophical "system" and to compare it to a tree of which the root and the trunk (*radix* and *truncus*) are strongly connected to the branches and twigs (*rami* and *ramuli*). Moreover, and this is proof again of his scholarly genius, Lipsius discerned a remarkable and unique order in Stoic philosophy. It was, so Lipsius emphasised, the Stoic school's proper virtue to have organised all elements of its system in such a way that not only is order ingeniously respected and preserved, but also the connection and coherence itself.[26] As they had once been for Marcus Porcius Cato – the "perfect Stoic" to Cicero (*Brutus*, 31.120, and *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, 2) – the Stoic concise and pointed syllogisms (*consectaria brevia et acuta*) were to Lipsius solid proof of the school's truthfulness.[27] Moreover, although Cicero at first labelled these Stoic, apparently contradictory, doctrines as "startling truths" (*mirabilia*),[28] he later criticised them as being like wine, which is better to taste than to drink,[29] it was part of Lipsius's new philosophical endeavour to take up a serious defence of all Stoic paradoxes in his *Guide to Stoic Philosophy*. In his view Cicero – Lipsius's manuscript copy of Cicero is still preserved at Leiden University Library today[30] – only commented upon six of all the extant paradoxes; moreover, even then the rhetorician Cicero did not analyse them in a proper philosophical way. Just as Plutarch later, Cicero was an Academic and therefore attacked Stoic positions *ex professo* and without admitting their deeper meaning: to taste this wine is but one thing; what is

[25] Iusti Lipsi Manuductionis ad Stoicam philosophiam Libri Tres, L. Annaeo Senecae aliisque scriptoribus illustrandis (Antwerp: J. Moretus, 1604), III.2: "Arx enim, ut sic dicam, Stoicorum est in istis".

[26] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.1: "Faciamus et ad decreta nostra redeamus, quorum radicem heri vidimus et truncum. Iam ex isto ecce rami et ramuli adsurgunt, mira serie nexi. Proprium hoc Stoicorum: vincire omnia et quasi anulos nectere in catena, ut non ordo solum, sed sequela et cohaesio sit rerum".

[27] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.1: "*Consectaria me*, inquit (sc. Cato), *Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant*, quia nempe mutuo sese consequuntur et devincta haerent; ipsum illud grande argumentum veritatis". Lipsius refers to Cicero, *De finibus*, 3.7.26.

[28] See Cicero, *De finibus*, 4.27.74: "Haec παράδοξα illi, nos admirabilia dicamus".

[29] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.2: "Atqui Cicero iam ea exsecutus est, et ne sic quidem approbavit. Quid approbaret? Fatetur ipse ut *levia vina esse quae magis gustata, quam potata delectent*". Lipsius refers to Cicero, *Tusculanae*, 5.5.13.

[30] Leiden, University Library, Ms. Lips 46. This in-quarto manuscript, partly in parchment, partly in paper consists of 111 folia; next to Seneca Rhetor's *Controversiae* it contains Cicero's *De amicitia*, *De senectute*, and *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, the latter on fols. 56r-60v ("Ciceronis Paradoxa ad Brutum contra Marcum Antoninum"); the latter ends abruptly at *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, 31 ("[...] tua vero sicha aprehensa est qui"). In addition Lipsius's manuscript also includes Albertus Magnus's *De proprietatibus Herbarum, Lapidum et Animalium quorundam excerpta* and *Excerpta ex eiusdem libro De Mirabilibus Mundi*, and *Regimen Sanitatis per curriculum anni*.

obligatory, so Lipsius stated, is to drink it.[31] Finally, it was Cicero himself who, when not speaking as an Academic but in an open hearted mood in the preface to his *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, admitted that these paradoxes seemed to be the "utmost Socratic" and "by far the truest".[32] Is Lipsius here continuing the debate Majoragius had begun almost sixty years earlier, or is his reading of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* a totally new one?

Commentators before Lipsius, for obvious reasons, only took into consideration the six paradoxes which Cicero had included in his short treatise *Paradoxa Stoicorum*. One can therefore easily discern how the philologist and historian Lipsius aimed at going further. His goal, however, was not only completeness and accuracy. To be sure, just as Francesco Patrizi (Cherso, 1529 - Rome, 1597), the first professor of Platonic philosophy at Ferrara, had discussed Aristotle and his Peripatetic school while quoting Greek sources such as Ammonius, Athenaeus, Plutarch, Suida, Diogenes Laertius, Homer, Aelian, Theophrastus and Simplicius abundantly and while translating them all into Latin,[33] so too did Lipsius collect and comment upon all material which he could find and detect – both the known and the new, both Latin and Greek. Nonetheless, Lipsius also ordered his material in such a way as to demonstrate, at least according to Jason Lewis Saunders, "that these Paradoxes were nothing more than the typical Stoic attempt to illustrate the absolute distinction between good and evil".[34]

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[31] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.2: "Nam gustare parum est; potare et demittere, inquam, opus, si vim et vigorem sensurus es talium decretorum".

[32] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.2: "Unum Ciceronis testimonium, ubi ex animi sententia: *Mihi,* inquit, *ista Paradoxa quae appellantur, maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima*". Reference is to Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, prooemium 4.

[33] Francesco Patrizi, Discussionum Peripateticarum Tomi IV. Quibus Aristotelicae Philosophiae universa Historia atque Dogmata cum Veterum Placitis collata, eleganter et erudite declarantur (Basle, 1581): Tomus I. De Aristotelis vita, moribus, libris, auditoribus, sectatoribus, expositoribus, interpretibus, sectis, philosophandi ratione libris tredecim disserit; Tomus II. Aristotelis cum Platone aliisque veteribus Philosophis, a multis promissam, a nemine editam, in omni philosophiae genere concordiam libris octo continet; Tomus III. Aristotelis cum Platone aliisque veteribus, a nemine promissam vel editam discordiam libris septem persequitur; Tomus IV. Aristotelis Dogmatum Censuram philosophicam libris decem instituit. On Patrizi and his new history of the Peripatetic school, see M. J. Wilmott, Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Humanist Critique of Aristotle (PhD diss. University of London, 1984); idem, "'Aristoteles exotericus, acroamaticus, mysticus': two interpretations of the typological classification of the corpus Aristotelicum by Francesco Patrizi da Cherso", Nouvelles de la République des Lettres (1985), pp. 67-95; M. Muccillo, "La storia della filosofia presocratica nelle Discussiones peripateticae di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso", La cultura 13 (1975), pp. 48-105; idem, "La vita e le opere di Aristotele nelle Discussiones peripateticae di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso", Rinascimento, ser. II, 21 (1981), pp. 53-119.

[34] J. L. Saunders, Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism (New York, 1955), p. 111.

Despite the value of Saunders's general conclusion, his analysis of Lipsius's treatment of Stoic paradoxes remains limited to half a page,[35] whereas Lipsius's thorough study of eleven Stoic paradoxes (viz. in *Dissertations* 3-13 of book III) – eked out by Lipsius with numerous other paradoxes or, as he called them, "paralogisms" (*paraloga*) in *Dissertations* 14-22 – fill no less than nineteen elaborate *Dissertationes*. Should one then perhaps better turn to Jacqueline Lagrée's more recent interpretation, who sees in Lipsius's elaboration on the *Paradoxa* nothing else than the logical result of Lipsius's assimilation – fully in line with currents in Hellenistic philosophy and Patristics – of Logos and God, of the Stoic *sapiens* and the true, ideal Christian?[36] For the latter does not need to exist; this Stoic *sapiens* simply serves as an ideal model, as Lipsius had already explained in *Dissertatio* VIII in the second book of the *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam*.

When considered in this way, Lipsius's long chapters on Stoic paradoxes in the third book of the *Manuductio* are more than a simple showing off of his newly acquainted knowledge gathered by means of his exceptional philological skills. They are clearly intended to make all the Stoic paradoxes both intelligible and acceptable. Not unsurprisingly, however, Lipsius distanced himself from one Stoic paradox, viz. the one claiming that it is the wise man's freedom c.q. duty to take his own life.[37]

If this view should be thought appealing, it still needs to be questioned what was the order that Lipsius imposed on his detailed survey of *Paradoxa* (certainly if one includes the five additional "paralogisms"), and why so? Cicero himself had only offered a choice of six such paradoxes, in the shortest of his (extant) philosophical works, the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, written in 46 B.C.[38]

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[35] In fact, Saunders's analysis focuses exclusively on Lipsius's views on suicide as elaborated in *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* (as in n. 25), III.22-23. See Saunders, *Justus Lipsius* (as in n. 34), pp. 111-116. For a full and more detailed account of Lipsius's views on death and suicide, see now J. Papy, "Lipsius's Neostoic Reflections on the Pale Face of Death: From Constancy to Rubens's *Dying Seneca*", in *Les Fastes de la mort dans les anciens Pays-Bays (XVIe-XVIIe siècle – Celebrating Death in the Low Countries, Sixteenth-Seventeenth Cent., Actes du Colloque international / Proceedings of the International Conference Bruxelles-Anderlecht, 16, 17 et 18 mai 2002*, ed. A. Dierkens (Bruxelles, 2008) [forthcoming].

[36] Lagrée, Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoïcisme (as in n. 22), p. 33.

[37] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.22 *in fine*: "Haec pro Stoicorum sensu dicta sunto, plene et libere, sed pro illorum", and III.23: "Auditor: "Heus tu, an non aliquid inclinas?" – Lipsius: "Absit, respuo. Quod accuratius dixerim, candide et magno a me animo factum. Caussae praevaricari numquid debui? Et pleraque omnia igitur attuli, nec dicta iis subduxi, quia vincere constitui, non circumscribere. Ecce enim omnes istos aliosque colores una veritatis spongia iam ibo detersum". See also Papy, "Lipsius's Neostoic Reflections on the Pale Face of Death" (as in n. 35).

[38] On Cicero's analysis and presentation, see A. Michel, "Cicéron et les paradoxes stoïciens", *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 16 (1968), pp. 223-232; the introduction in *Cicéron: Les Paradoxes des Stoïciens*, ed. and transl. J. Molager (Paris, 1971); P. S. Bowman, *The Treatment of the Stoic Paradoxes by Cicero, Horace and Persius* (PhD thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972); B. Wis-

Cicero, who had been interested in the Stoic paradoxes throughout his life,[39] seems to have been attracted mostly by the "highly Socratic" and – thence, "by far the truest"[40] – ones:

1. That only the honourable is good.
2. That he who has virtue in him lacks nothing for living a happy life.
3. That all sins and virtues are alike.
4. That every fool is insane.
5. That only the wise man is free and every fool is a slave.
6. That only the wise man is rich.

In this respect, it also needs to be emphasised that Cicero only criticised the third paradox in a serious philosophical way (the one stating that all sins are equal). His known quarrels with the Stoics appear rather to have taken aim at their clumsy terminology and the concealed contradictions inherent in certain of their doctrines. A famous example is his fierce attack – in fact, designed "to play to the gallery" as he would admit later[41] – in his speech in defence of Lucius Licinius Murena, an attack in which Cicero actually only referred to two of the Stoic Paradoxa, viz. *Paradoxa* 3 and 4.

Now, Lipsius's interest was obviously different as was his elaborate study and presentation of the subject. His intention was to show his readers the essence of Stoic moral doctrine. In order to offer a full and balanced account of all Stoic paradoxes, their origin and the context in which they should be understood, Lipsius put great effort into quoting and analysing all relevant passages. Apart from Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and *Pro Murena oratio*, Lipsius built his account on the equally obvious key information stored in *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, *Academica posteriora*, *Tusculanae disputationes*, and *De natura deorum*. When dealing with the famous Stoic statement that true friendship is only possible among wise men, Lipsius included obvious passages from Cicero's *Laelius de amicitia*, *Cato de senectute*, and *Epistulae ad familiares*.[42] Still, however much Cicero was present in Lipsius's account, it was Seneca who once again played a prominent role in Lipsius's study of Stoic para-

niewski, "Les *Paradoxa Stoicorum* de Cicéron et la Sophistique", *Les Études Classiques* 49 (1981), pp. 292-303; and B. P. Wallach, "Rhetoric and Paradox: Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum IV*", *Hermes: Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* 118 (1990), pp. 171-183.

[39] M. Valente, *L'Éthique stoïcienne chez Cicéron* (Paris, 1956); A. Michel, "Cicéron et les grands courants de la philosophie antique: problèmes généraux (1960-1970)", *Lustrum* 16 (1971-1972), p. 81.

[40] Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, prooemium 4: "eoque hos locos scripsi libentius, quod mihi ista παράδοξα quae appellant maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima".

[41] Cicero, *De finibus*, 4.27.74: "Apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt; aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius".

[42] Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.16, entitled: "XIII. Parad[oxum]: Sapientes soli inter se amici, soli amare gnari".

doxes.[43] This of course is no surprise if one remembers that Lipsius's *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* was meant to be a proper introduction to a Neostoic reading of Seneca.[44] Moreover, Lipsius's first biographer, Aubertus Miraeus (Brussels 1573 – Antwerp 1640), devoted a special paragraph to Lipsius's philosophical sources and emphasised that Lipsius's ethical views were indeed derived from Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, yet were certainly also drawn from other authors such as Epictetus,[45] Plutarch and Musonius Rufus as well:

> He took his ethical insights [*in marg.: Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam*] from Epictetus and his interpreters, Arrian and Simplicius, from Plutarch's *Against Colotes*, from Musonius as reported in Stobaeus, from Cicero's *Paradoxes*. He derived his physical theories [*in marg.: Physiologia*] from Cleomedes's *De motu circulari corporum caelestium*, Stobaeus's *Eclogae* and Cicero's *Academica*. Both things he took from Seneca, Diogenes Laertius's *Zeno* and others.[46]

Still, a closer look at Lipsius's chapters on the Stoic paradoxes also reveals the presence of authors such as Nemesius, Gregory of Nyssa, St. Ambrose, Lactan-

[43] Lipsius made extensive use of Seneca's *Epistles to Lucilius* (viz. nos. 1, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 51, 54, 57, 59, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 95, 98, 116, 119, 120, and 145). In addition he quoted from Seneca's *De vita beata*, *Consolatio ad Helviam matrem*, *De beneficiis*, *De ira*, *De providentia*, *De constantia sapientis*, *De tranquillitate animi*, and *De clementia*.

[44] See J. Papy, "O *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* (1604) de Lipsius e a Recepção do Estoicismo e da Tradição Estóica no Início da Europa Moderna", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 58 (2002), pp. 859-872; idem, "Erasmus's and Lipsius's Editions of Seneca: A 'Complementary' Project?", *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 22 (2002), pp. 10-36; idem, "Neostoizismus und Humanismus: Lipsius' neue Lektüre von Seneca in der *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* (1604)", in *Der Einfluss des Hellenismus auf die Philosophie der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. G. Boros (Wiesbaden, 2005), pp. 53-80.

[45] If Seneca and Epictetus were clearly present, it remains remarkable that Marcus Aurelius's *Meditations*, known only lately in early modern Europe via the Latin translation by Xylander in 1559, had no important impact on Lipsius's discussion of Stoic philosophy. See J. Kraye, "'Ethnicorum omnium sanctissimus'. Marcus Aurelius and his Meditations from Xylander to Diderot", in *Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. J. Kraye and M. W. F. Stone (London, 2000), pp. 107-134 (esp. pp. 108-109), reprinted in: J. Kraye, *Classical Traditions in Renaissance Philosophy* (Aldershot, 2002).

[46] A. Miraeus, *Vita Iusti Lipsi* [1st ed. 1609], quoted here from *Iusti Lipsi Sapientiae et Litterarum Antistitis Fama Postuma*. Editio tertia (Antwerp: B. Moretus, 1629), pp. 128-129: "Ethica quidem [in marg.: Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam] ex Epicteto, eiusque interpretibus Arriano ac Simplicio, Plutarcho item adversus Coloten, Musonio apud Stobaeum, M. Tullii Paradoxis; Physica vero [in marg.: Physiologia] ex Cleomedis Meteorologicis, Stobaei Eclogis, et M. Tullii Academicis; utraque autem ex Seneca, Diogenis Laertii Zenone, aliisque revocavit".

tius, St. Jerome, Gregory the Great, Clement of Alexandria,[47] Alexander of Aphrodisias, Sextus Empiricus, Philo, and St. Augustine. So, whereas Denis Lambin in his first edition of Cicero (1566) still tried to present a stoicism which was cleared of its *Paradoxes*,[48] Lipsius both called for a broader and more detailed reading of these paradoxes. Not only did he invoke testimonies from the pagan and Christian authors mentioned, he also imposed a new order on his survey of Stoic paradoxes:

1. That all wise men are equal.
2. That virtues are alike and at the same time individual.
3. That the wise man is always equal to himself and is always joyful.
4. That even in torments the wise man is happy.
5. That the wise man is free from passions and cannot be perturbed.
6. That the wise man is not opining and likewise is ignorant of nothing, that he neither deceive nor lie.
7. That nothing happens to the wise man which is not just an opinion.
8. That the wise man is self-sufficient and is content with himself.
9. That the wise man has everything and that he alone is to be regarded as rich.
10. That only the wise man is free, and that all others are to be considered slaves.
11. That only the wise man is a king.
12. That the wise man is equal to God.
13. That the wise man does everything rightly, even in stretching out his finger. That he is without sins.
14. Only wise men are mutual friends, only they know to love.

- Extra. A few more paradoxes at the same time: that only the wise man is beautiful, noble, a citizen, a magistrate, a prophet, a rhetorician and further.
- Other paradoxes, which are also mixed: that the wise man is not affected by injury, insanity or drunkenness.
- Two other paradoxes and "paralogisms" to us: that the wise does not forgive and does not feel pity.
- One remarkable paradox: that all fools are insane and that all sins are in all.
- Another remarkable paradox: that sins are equal.
- From a Stoic decree: that the wise man sometimes can, is allowed, and is obliged to take his life.
- This decree [is] rejected, and [it is] demonstrated with a mixture of reasons and testimonies that it is neither allowed nor obligatory.[49]

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[47] It is interesting to animadvert to the 1590 Paris edition by S. Nivellius with a Latin translation and the commentary by Gentianus Hervetus Aurelianus (we used the copy preserved in London, British Library, shelfmark b79.g.2). Hervetus, like Betuleius much earlier already in his commentary on Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, explained the Stoic paradox "sapiens solus est dives" mentioned by Clement of Alexandria by invoking Plato's *Phaedrus* and the fifth book of Plato's *Laws*, yet equally by referring to the New Testament, viz. Matthew 14 and Mark 19.

[48] Lagrée, Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoïcisme (as in n. 22), p. 105.

[49] See Lipsius, *Manuductio* (as in n. 25), III.3-23:

"1. Sapientes omnes pares esse.
2. Virtutes pares itemque individuas esse.
3. Sapientem sibi parem et in gaudio semper esse.
4. Sapientem vel in tormentis beatum esse.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA OR THE NEW WAY TO WISDOM: LIPSIUS AND SCHOPPE

Something else that is new is Lipsius's "eclectical" attitude in interpreting and explaining these paradoxes. As Clement of Alexandria was wont to do in his ***Stromateis***, Lipsius invokes all ancient philosophers, yet also ancient poets and biblical texts, in order to "confirm" Stoic doctrine by similar maxims from Socrates, Epicurus, Peripatetic and Christian authors. Lipsius's predilection for the Greek theologian Clement of Alexandria († c. 215), who himself had converted to Christianity, who was one of the first to attempt a synthesis of Platonic and Christian thought, and who, more importantly, in his ***Stromateis*** ("Patchwork") had himself transformed Stoic ethical theories,[50] is not without reason. If we examine Clement's methodology, it becomes apparent how this Lipsian "eclectical" interpretation and explanation corroborates Stoic dogma.[51]

Still, Lipsius's approach also reveals an interesting evolution in the interpretation of Stoic paradoxes ***vis-à-vis*** Christian dogma. In 1604 Matthieu de Chalvet, councillor of the French king at the Parlement of Toulouse, in his widely read translation of Seneca's philosophical works, still emphasised the striking difference between thoughts normally accepted and Stoic principles as understood in their ***Paradoxa***. To him these "Stoic paradoxes" were nothing else but ideas and thoughts "contrary to the pure and Saint Philosophy [i.e. "Christian philosophy"]".[52] In that same year 1604, Lipsius's "eclectic" ap-

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5. Sapientem apathem et imperturbabilem esse.
6. Sapientem non opinari itemque non ignorare; non fallere, non mentiri.
7. Sapienti nihil praeter opinionem evenire.
8. Sapientem sibi sufficere sive se solo contentum esse.
9. Omnia sapientis et solum divitem censendum.
10. Solum sapientem liberum, ceteros omnes servos censeri.
11. Solum sapientem regem esse.
12. Sapientem Deo parem.
13. Sapientem omnia recte facere, etiam digitum exserendo. Sine peccatis esse.
14. Sapientes soli inter se amici, soli amare gnari.

- Extra: Pluscula simul paradoxa: solum pulchrum, nobilem, civem, magistratum, vatem, rhetorem et plura esse.
- Paradoxa item mixta: non iniuria affici, non insania, non ebrietate.
- Duo alia paradoxa atque etiam paraloga nobis: non ignoscere, non misereri.
- Paradoxum singulare: omnes stultos insanire, et, omnia vitia in omnibus.
- Item singulare paradoxum: peccata aequalia esse.
- Sapientem sumere aliquando mortem posse, decere, debere, ex Stoico quidem decreto.
- Decretum hoc reiectum et ostensum non licere, non debere mixtis rationibus testibusque".

[50] S. R. C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971), pp. 2-3.

[51] D. Carabin, Les idées stoïciennes dans la littérature morale des XVIe et XVIIe siècles (1575-1642) (Paris, 2004), pp. 696-697.

[52] Œuvres de Lucius A. Seneca mises en françois par Matthieu de Chalvet (Paris: A. Langelier, 1604), p. 134.

proach, as adopted in the *Guide to Stoic Philosophy* and clearly following the lead of Clement of Alexandria,[53] paved the way to a new and confident reading of Stoic paradoxes. A telling example is the reading proposed by Kaspar Schoppe (Caspar Scioppius; Neumarkt, 1576 – Padova, 1649) in his *Elementa philosophiae Stoicae moralis*, published two years later and dedicated to Cardinal Cinzio Aldobrandini. Like Lipsius, Schoppe invokes Clement time and again to "Christianise" his reading and interpretation of Stoic paradoxes claiming that virtue is enough in itself,[54] that virtue by itself is sufficient for happiness, that the wise man is free from passions and cannot be perturbed, that the wise man is free and is a true citizen (of the heavenly Jerusalem!), that the wise man is beautiful (because of his soul, as Plato and Clement saw it), that the wise man is rich, and that he is a priest and a king (here not only invoking Plato and Clement, but also St. John's Apocalypse).[55] Yet, there is more to it than that. Just as Lipsius had endeavoured to propagate Stoic philosophy as a philosophical doctrine which ought to be taught at universities – just as the Aristotelian one which dominated all the curricula – Schoppe[56] too saw the Stoic doc-

[53] See J. Papy, "Sanctifying Stoic Virtues? Justus Lipsius's Use of Clement of Alexandria in the *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* (1604)", in *Virtutis Imago: The Conceptualization and Transformation of an Ancient Ideal*, ed. G. Partoens, G. Roskam and T. Van Houdt (Leuven, 2004), pp. 507-527; Idem, "Clément d'Alexandrie dans la philosophie néostoïcienne de Juste Lipse", in *Stoïcisme et christianisme à la Renaissance* (Paris, 2006), pp. 163-181.

[54] Casp. Scioppii Elementa Philosophiae Stoicae Moralis. Quae in Senecam, Ciceronem, Plutarchum aliosque scriptores commentarii loco esse possint (Moguntiae: Ex Calcographeo Ioannis Albini, 1606), cap. 135 (fols. 95v-96r): "Cum igitur Virtutem sive cognitionem aut dilectionem Dei (neque enim quomodo appelles refert) summum bonum vel vitam nostram esse dixerimus, verissimum sit oportet ut Virtus propter se sit expetenda. Hoc Decretum Paradoxon et admirabile multis accidet cum tot sint sacrarum literarum loca quibus mercedis et praemii consequendi caussa iubemur mandatis Dei parere. Non dubitat tamen Clemens Alexandrinus, praestantissimus utique inter Christianos Philosophus firmiter et quasi mordicus sententiam hanc tenere, velut ex iis, quum subiiciam videre licet. In sexto Stromatum: Perfectissimum, inquit, bonum est cognitio Dei, quae per se expetenda; per consequentiam autem bona quoque quae per eam consequuntur. Suscipiamus ergo cognitionem: non ea, quae inde eveniunt, cupientes, sed propter hoc ipsum solum, nempe ut cognoscamus, eam amplectentes".

[55] *Casp. Scioppii Elementa Philosophiae* (as in n. 54), cap. 139 (fol. 105r): "In Apocalypsi S[ancti] Ioannes legimus: 'Princeps regum terrae, qui dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo, et fecit nos Regnum et sacerdotes Deo et patri suo'. Et rursum: 'Fecisti nos Deo nostro Regnum et sacerdotes, et regnabimus super terram'. Clemens noster Platonem quoque in Politia hoc Decretum habere affirmat, idque in sapientem Christianum sic accomodat: 'Iam qui in Christum crediderunt, Christi, id est, uncti et sunt et dicuntur, sicut ii, qui sunt revera Regales, Regi curae sunt, sicut enim sapientes sunt sapientia sapientes, et qui sunt iusti iustitia sunt iusti, ita etiam sunt a Christo rege Reges, et qui a Christo, sunt Christiani'".

[56] *Casp. Scioppii Elementa Philosophiae* (as in n. 54), cap. 140 (fol. 105r-105v): "Sic igitur planum me fecisse arbitror Dogmaticam Stoicae Philosophiae partem multipropius quam vel Epicuri vel Peripateticorum rationem ad integritatem et veritatem

trines, and especially the Stoic paradoxes, as being eminently compatible with the truths of Christian faith and as particularly suitable to be taught at schools and universities.

If Lipsius could be called the first "Christian defender" of Stoic virtue – at least he was the first to take Stoic virtue and the equality of all virtues for granted and serious in his *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* – his new, practical reflection on the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* gave impetus to a new Christianised reading and rehabilitation of Stoicism. Like Gassendi's Epicurean project in the 1640s, Lipsius's systematisation, ordening and synthesising of Stoic doctrine, c.q. their paradoxical thinking, was far more than a philological and historical re-evaluation of a philosophical school. It was a successful, yet erudite and elite quest for wisdom. The paradoxical way was, as it appears from the testimony of François de la Mothe Le Vayer a few decades later, is an appealing and direct one:

> Mais s'il n'y a point d'arts ny de professions qui n'ayent leurs paradoxes, comme quand la médecine ordonne de percer l'œil pour lui restituer la veuë, ou de rompre la jambe pour la faire cheminer droit, pourqouy nous emerveillerons-nous que la philosophie, souveraine médecine de nos ames, ait aussi les siens? Et qu'importe qu'elle nous donne des paradoxes, pourveu que, comme disoit Cleanthes, ils ne soient point paralogues, ou absurdes et desraisonables?[57]

Christianae fidei accedere, ut ita scholarum nostrarum praeceptores de tradenda illa et publice docenda minime dubitare debeant".

[57] François de la Mothe Le Vayer, *Cinq Dialogues faicts à l'imitation des anciens par Oratius Tubero* (Mons, P. de La Flèche, 1671), p. 111 ("De la vie privée").

COORNHERT ON VIRTUE AND NOBILITY

Hans and Simone Mooij-Valk

One of the foremost Dutch humanists of the sixteenth century was Dirck Volkertszoon Coornhert. He was active in many fields: as an etcher and printer, as a poet and translator, and as a prolific writer of tracts, dialogues and several longer books on theology and ethics. He had many friends in the spheres of culture and government, such as the poet Hendrik Laurensz. Spiegel and Jan van Hout, the secretary of the city of Leiden; and he was on friendly terms with the Prince of Orange, William the Silent. His writings, all of them in Dutch, were instrumental in creating a refined version of the Dutch language, suited to intellectual purposes.[1]

Coornhert was born in Amsterdam in 1522. His mother, Truy Clements, came from a well-to-do family, and his father Volkert Jansz. Coornhert owned a drapery business. As a merchant's son, the young Dirck was not educated to become a scholar, but from an early age he manifested a lively interest in intellectual and religious questions.

> Ick was noch beneden myne sesthien jaeren als ick door Godts ghenade yverich began te speuren nae mynder zielen saligheydt: myne Ouders waren Roomsch Catholijcken die my naerstelijck inder Catholijcken [leer] deden op-voeden: maer want sy eenen Bybel hadden binnen heuren huyse, las ick dagelijcks daer inne, also begon ick vroegh eenighe misbruycken ende dolingen te mercken inde leere van de Roomsche Catholijcken, dit so langher so meerder, tot dat my (ontrent twee-en-twintigh Iaren oudt wesende) ter handen quamen eenighe boecken, van Luther, van Menno, ende oock van Calvino, daer merckte ick datter waren vier gemeynten uytterlijcke oeffeningen van Gods-dienste ghebruyckende.
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> [I was not yet sixteen when, by God's grace, I began assiduously to search for the salvation of my soul. My parents were Roman Catholics and raised me conscientiously in the Catholic faith, but because we had a Bible at home which I read daily, I began to notice early on certain abuses and errors in the teachings of the Roman Catholics. My doubts increased until, when I was about twenty-two years old, I laid

[1] The following survey of Coornhert's life is based on the excellent biography by H. Bonger, *Leven en Werk van D. V. Coornhert* (Amsterdam, 1978); English version: H. Bonger, *The Life and Work of Dirck Volkertszoon Coornhert*, translated, edited and annotated by G. Voogt (Amsterdam, 2004). For the relationship between Coornhert and Calvinism, see also the critical review article by W. Nijenhuis, "Een monoloog van Dirk Volckertsz. Coornhert", *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, n.s. 60 (1980), esp. pp. 97-101.

> hands on some books by Luther, Menno, and Calvin, thus discovering that there were four different external forms in which religion was being practised.][2]

This is an important passage, and not only because it shows a critical and independent spirit. If this retrospective view is correct, it shows that already at an early stage Coornhert made a distinction between the external practice of religion and its inner experience. All his life he held that the Bible alone does not err. His later criticisms of Calvin and Luther were likewise based on biblical authority.

In 1539, at the age of seventeen, he married Cornelia Symons. His widowed mother, who was bitterly opposed to the marriage because the bride was poor and his senior by twelve years, disinherited him, whence Coornhert's adage: *Verkiesen doet verliesen* [To choose means to lose]. With Neeltje, as she was called, he settled in Haarlem, where he made a living by etching and engraving. He read widely and soon began to write poems and plays. When he was already past thirty he learned Latin in order to be able to read the Fathers of the Church and the ancient philosophers in the original. In 1560, Coornhert started a printing-press together with Jan van Zuren, under whose name it operated, and two others. Its first publication was his translation of Cicero's *De Officiis.*[3]

In his early forties he became a notary in Haarlem and a civil servant, secretary to the municipal government, and it was in that capacity that he first met the Prince of Orange. In the years 1565 and 1566, the Prince repeatedly made use of Coornhert's services as an intermediary and counsellor. He trusted Coornhert, who was in complete agreement with him on the issue of religious freedom for both Catholics and Reformed. By that time Orange was already considering taking up arms to oppose the persecution and execution of heretics by the Inquisition.

These contacts with the Prince and his circle made Coornhert highly suspect in the eyes of the authorities. In September 1567, he was arrested at the command of the Spanish stadtholder Bossu and repeatedly interrogated. After some months in jail in The Hague, he was put on parole and given permission to move around in town during the day. However, having received information that this permission would soon be cancelled and that his case might end badly, he fled and went into exile. In September 1568, he was officially banished by Alva. His possessions were confiscated.

During this first period of exile, which lasted until 1572, Coornhert lived in Cologne and Xanten, and was active in raising funds to support the Revolt. After his return in 1572, he became Secretary of the Free States of Holland. Almost immediately he was charged with the task of investigating the behaviour of the Gueux [Beggars] in Kennemerland. After coming up with an incrimina-

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[2] Coornhert wrote this in the preface of his treatise *Van de Erfsonde* [On Original Sin], (1580) in *Coornherts wercken, waer van eenige noyt voor desen gedruct zyn*, ed. Cornelis Boomgaert, 3 vols. (Amsterdam, 1630), vol. 2, fol. 551v. Translation from Bonger, *The Life and Work of Coornhert* (as in n. 1), p. 20.

[3] *Officia Ciceronis, leerende wat yeghelijck in allen staten behoort te doen* (Haarlem, 1561). There were several reprints: Leiden, 1589; Delft, 1604; Delft, 1614.

tory report about the lootings and atrocities committed by Lumey's troops, he heard of death threats by Lumey and fled again to Xanten, where he stayed until 1576. During this period he returned to etching and engraving. One of his pupils at the time was Hendrick Goltzius. In the summer of 1576, he sent a petition to King Philip II asking for permission to repatriate, but probably received no answer.

Shortly afterwards, owing to the Pacification of Ghent (November 1576), Coornhert returned nonetheless. This second return to Haarlem was the beginning of his most fruitful period of intellectual production. He wrote several allegorical comedies and published widely on theological and ethical issues such as the Fall, the perfectibility of man, predestination and tolerance, but also on the penitentiary system and the treatment of idlers and criminals: he famously argued that they should be put to work, instead of being corporally punished or maimed or simply put behind bars. Moreover, he was active in debates with Calvinist ministers in several cities. Coornhert liked polemics and was a skilled debater. The peak of his career in this field was the public disputation in The Hague on the Heidelberg Catechism with the Calvinist minister Adriaen Saravia, later professor of theology at the University of Leiden.[4] It took up almost ten days during the period from October to December 1583, with an interruption because of the serious illness of Coornhert's wife. The outcome was inconclusive and the debate was broken off prematurely. In the following year, Neeltje Symons died after a long illness.

Some Calvinist ministers considered Coornhert's opinions on original sin and predestination so pernicious that they wanted to have him arrested, but he was supported by the Prince. Shortly after Orange was murdered (in the summer of 1584) Coornhert went back into exile, this time to Emden. There, he wrote or completed his best-known work, *Zedekunst, dat is Wellevenskunste* [Ethics or the Art of Living Well], the first Ethics in any European vernacular, published anonymously in 1586. He returned to Haarlem the same year. He remained very active, publishing, among other things, a book *On Predestination* and having a fierce polemic with Justus Lipsius on tolerance and the treatment of heretics. This also resulted in a book, *Proces van 't Ketterdoden ende dwang der conscientien* [Trial of the Killing of Heretics and the Constraint of Conscience].

The last year of his life Coornhert spent in Gouda. He died on 29 October 1590 (New Style) and was buried in St. John's Church, where his tombstone with the epitaph by his friend Spiegel is still to be seen. He did not live to complete his most ambitious work, a biblical Concordance. Shortly after his death some of his ideas about the treatment of criminals and beggars were put into

[4] For a survey of the disputation with Saravia, see W. Nijenhuis, *Adrianus Saravia (c. 1532-1613). Dutch Calvinist, first Reformed Defender of the English Episcopal Church Order on the basis of the ius divinum* (Leiden, 1980), pp. 85-91 and 180-182.

practice in Amsterdam and Leiden through the creation of houses of correction.[5] His collected works were published around 1630 in three folio volumes.

VIRTUE AND PERFECTIBILITY

The centre of Coornhert's world-view is his conception of the perfectibility of man.[6] He rejected the doctrine of original sin, that is to say, he did not believe that the sin of Adam and Eve had irrevocably tainted all their descendants. On the contrary, he believed that every man, helped by God's grace, had the possibility to follow His commands and so to become perfect and godlike. He based this belief on a close reading of the relevant biblical texts, particularly Matth. 5:48: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect". He considered the Golden Rule or Law of Nature as the essence of God's commands: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them" (Matth. 7:12 and Luke 6:31). At the same time, this law of nature follows from reason. Since reason is common to all men, pagans and unbelievers can also discover and follow God's commands and be saved.[7]

All this is not to say that it is an easy thing to save one's soul. Though the soul is not radically corrupted as a result of the Fall, the inveterate habit of sinning is a real danger and makes it extremely difficult to free oneself from sin. In the *Ladder Jacobs of trappe der deughden* [Jacob's Ladder or Stairway of Virtues], Coornhert defined the stages by which man can reach perfection. Halfway up these steps the person, if he sincerely wants to love God, will be able to shed his old self and become truly reborn as a child of God. But this conversion is not a sudden enlightenment or a mystical experience achieved by mortification of the flesh, but a gradual process. Throughout, the emphasis is on self-knowledge and practical virtue. Coornhert was no ascetic, not even a puritan. He considered the body as something intermediate between good and evil, he was not opposed to any of the corporal pleasures (unless abused) and he positively appreciated merry entertainment, not to speak of his commendation of doing well and being cheerful (*Zedekunst* 1.13.10; this goes back to Ecclesiastes 3:12). For Coornhert the soul too belongs to the intermediate things and

[5] As a tribute to Coornhert's practical and, for his time, progressive views on the treatment of criminals, a Dutch association for the reform of criminal law that critically follows developments and pinpoints abuses in the fields of jurisdiction and prison management has taken the name "Coornhert League".

[6] The first to stress Coornhert's perfectism or perfectibilism was Bruno Becker, in "Coornhert, de 16e eeuwse apostel der volmaakbaarheid", *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, n.s. 19 (1926), pp. 59-84.

[7] In Coornhert's time, the idea of perfectibility already had a very long history, from ancient philosophy and early Christianity on, with important modifications in mysticism, asceticism and monasticism. Because of the fierce opposition by Luther and Calvin, it took on a new topicality in the sixteenth century. For many details of this history, see the illuminating study by J. Passmore, *The Perfectibility of Man* (London, 1970), esp. chapters 3-7.

whether she will be used for better or worse depends on the will, the Queen of the soul, as he calls her. He sees sinning as a deliberate turning away from God.

Not surprisingly, Coornert was seen by many as a follower of Pelagius, an allegation against which he defended himself with the argument that he followed only the Bible. Since he maintained that there is no biblical support for predestination either, it is understandable that he was highly suspect in the eyes of the Calvinists. Indeed, he never formally left the Catholic Church and even argued that, despite all the abuses to which this Church was prey, it was still the only institutional Christian Church; but in the latter part of his life he was no longer a practising Catholic.

Many of Coornhert's ideas are close to the tradition of spiritualism and sometimes even mysticism, in so far as for him the true religion was not to be found in the outward manifestations of sacraments, ceremonies and irreproachable behaviour, but in the inner life of true belief and in the worship, love and imitation of God. For him the true church is the invisible community of the reborn who love God and their neighbours. This belief is at the base of his plea for religious tolerance and his passionate condemnation of the persecution and killing of heretics. As we cannot really know the hearts and minds of others, it is not for us to judge and to punish. That should be left to God at the Final Judgement, as the Bible teaches us in the parable of the wheat and the tares in Matth. 13:24-30.

In general, his maxim in the second part of his life was "Weet of rust" [Know or rest]. By this he meant that theological hairsplitting such as about the three Persons of the Trinity or the two natures of Christ is useless and even harmful. These questions are by their very nature unfathomable mysteries and best left alone; our knowledge should be only of ourselves and of good and evil.

It is clear that Coornhert was a deeply religious Christian, albeit unorthodox from a Roman Catholic as well as a Protestant point of view. He firmly believed that God wants all men to be saved and that salvation is possible by the coadjuvation of God and man. He clearly states this conviction in the *Zedekunst*:

> Tot Gode, die vande wegh het eynde is, komtmen alleenlyck doort hantteren van de deughde, die d'eenighe wegh tot Gode waart (3.1.5).
>
> [To God, who is the end of the road, one comes only by practising virtue, which is the sole way to God.]

> Maar de moghelyckheyd om dueghdlyck te worden is allen redelycken menschen angheboren (3.1.7).
>
> [But the possibility of becoming virtuous is innate in all men endowed with reason.]

> Maar d'oorzaken daar uyt de dueghde werdt gheboren inden mensche, zyn God ende de mensche te zamen. God als een mild ghever, de mensche als een begheerlyck ontfanger (3.1.22).
>
> [But the causes from which virtue is born in man are God and man together. God as a generous giver, man as an eager receiver.]

> De mensche is dan een medewercker met Gode vande dueghde in hem, maar hy is de werckman alleen van zyn zonde (3.1.55).
>
> [Man then brings forth his virtue together with God, but his sin he brings forth alone.]

> Tot verkryghinghe van deze dueghde voorderen [...] ghoede opvoeding [...] ende byzonder een vlytighe navolghing vande wet der naturen int doen van een ander alsmen ghaarne ghedaan zoude zyn (3.1.41).
>
> [To acquire this virtue are helpful [...] good education [...] and in particular an assiduous imitation of the law of nature in treating others as you would like to be treated yourself.]

Reason then, in particular by following the Law of Nature, gives man the possibility to become virtuous. This view is close to the ideas found in several of the ancient philosophers with whom Coornhert was conversant. Through his translations of Cicero's *De officiis* and Seneca's *De beneficiis*, he was well acquainted with Roman Stoicism. Besides, he knew and admired Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius* and Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae*, the latter of which he also translated. Coornhert knew no Greek, but through Marsilio Ficino's Latin translation he knew the work of Plato, whose *First Alcibiades* he adapted in a Dutch version.[8] References to these and other works from Antiquity are to be found in many of Coornhert's books, especially in the *Zedekunst.* This work, one of his last (1586) and a summing up of his ethical thinking, is a systematic treatise in six books on the art of living well, that is, living virtuously.

In Book 1, Coornhert deals with the passions in some detail. With regard to the general problem, whether they are innate or a product of choice, he concludes that the possibility of passions, both good and bad, is innate in man, but not the passions themselves. Book 2 treats the means by which virtue and sin can be recognised, viz. will, reason, deliberation, judgement, knowledge and conscience. Books 3-6 have as their subject the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance. Each virtue is treated with its offshoots and their opposites.

As Suffridus van der Meer has shown in his doctoral dissertation, the composition of books 3-6 closely follows the first Book of Cicero's *De officiis*, which has the Stoic Panaetius as its main source.[9] In general, one can say that the importance that Coornhert attached to the following of Reason and the Law of Nature as the road to salvation made him receptive to Stoic thought. Nor is this surprising, since Coornhert did not exclude pagans and unbelievers from the possibility of becoming perfect. Ideas such as virtue being based on knowledge and practice, the concept of things intermediate, the importance of distinguishing between what is within our control and what is not, were easily ab-

[8] For an analysis of this adaptation, see M. F. Fresco, "Coornhert en zijn transformatie van een platonische dialoog", in *Naar hoger honing?*, ed. M. F. Fresco and R. van der Paardt (Groningen, 1998), pp. 52-71, esp. pp. 59-71.

[9] S. van der Meer, *Bijdrage tot het onderzoek naar klassieke elementen in Coornhert's "Wellevenskunste"* (Amsterdam, 1934).

sorbed in his own world-view (see for instance *Zedekunst* 5.5.3 and 29). Moreover, he shared the Stoic admiration for Socrates. Accordingly, he insisted on the primary role of self-knowledge; he believed that wrongdoing results from ignorance, and he applied the Socratic method in some of his dialogues. Like the Stoics, he considered it a duty to be active in public life and, as we have shown, he was himself active in many fields. On the other hand, he differed from Stoicism in fundamental respects. In particular, the Stoic concept of fate as inescapable necessity was unacceptable to him, even repugnant. He disparagingly called the Calvinists "nieuwe Stoycienen" [Neostoics], because of their doctrine of predestination.[10]

It would be wrong therefore to call Coornhert a Stoic. He cast his net much wider. Many passages in the *Zedekunst* show his acquaintance with and assimilation of other ancient philosophers and their writings, among which Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea*, the works of St. Augustine and Boethius' *Consolatio* hold pride of place.[11]

Moreover, Coornhert held the Bible to be an infallible, though not the only source of knowledge on how to live well, and his work contains countless references to the Bible. For reasons that are not quite clear, the *Zedekunst* does not refer to any specific biblical text. Even so, the book radiates an unmistakably Christian ethos. And it does mention, though only once, the possibility of knowledge without proof, on the authority of what Christ, Moses, Isaiah, Matthew or Paul have said (2.5.7). *Dit heetmen ghelooven* [This is called believing]. In view of this intertwining of biblical and rational, philosophical strands, Coornhert is best characterised as a biblical humanist. We therefore cannot subscribe to Van der Meer's dictum: "[...] that we can hardly bring ourselves to call his Ethics a Christian work".[12]

The term "biblical humanism" was introduced by Johannes Lindeboom in his pioneering study of 1913.[13] He coined it to refer to a group of scholars from the middle of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, who applied

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[10] Coornhert, *Zedekunst dat is wellevenskunste*, ed. B. Becker (Leiden, 1942), 2.3.27.

[11] M. F. Fresco makes the point that even a striking similarity between some remark by Coornhert and a classical author does not prove that Coornhert took that remark directly from its source. M. F. Fresco, "Coornhert en de Oudheid. Een verkenning", in *Dirck Volckertszoon Coornhert. Dwars maar recht*, ed. H. Bonger *et al.* (Zutphen, 1989), pp. 60-79.

[12] S. van der Meer, *Bijdrage* (as in n. 9), p. 165: "[...] dat het ons moeilijk over de lippen wil zijn ethiek nog een christelijk werk te noemen".

[13] J. Lindeboom, *Het Bijbelsch Humanisme in Nederland* (Leiden, 1913); reprint with the new subtitle *Erasmus en de vroege Reformatie* and an introduction by C. Augustijn (Leeuwarden, 1982). For a general description of the movement, see the introductory chapter, esp. pp. 15-20. Cf. also A. J. Vanderjagt, "Wessel Gansfort (1419-1489) and Rudolph Agricola (1443?-1485): Piety and Hebrew", in *Frömmigkeit - Theologie - Frömmigkeitstheologie. Contributions to European Church History. Festschrift für Berndt Hamm zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. G. Litz, H. Munzert and R. Liebenberg (Leiden, 2005), pp. 159-172, esp. 159-161.

philological and rhetorical methods to the study of the Bible, primarily in order to instil piety.

In a strict sense, Coornhert does not belong to this movement. He lived after its decline, he was not a biblical scholar in the above sense, nor was he much interested in eloquence or liable to "latinomania", which was, according to Lindeboom, perhaps the main weakness of the members of this group. He did share, however, another weakness: lack of interest in, or even distrust of, knowledge of the natural world.

In a broader sense, the term is certainly applicable. Coornhert used his knowledge of classical philosophy for a better understanding of what it means to live a Christian life according to the teachings of the Bible. Furthermore, he shared the movement's latitudinarian position with respect to Christian dogma and its somewhat ambiguous position between Roman Catholicism and Reformation. Therefore, the term rightly suggests that Coornhert's views were in many respects close to those of Wessel Gansfort, Erasmus or Regnerus Praedinius.[14]

LINGUISTIC PRINCIPLES

Having learnt Latin only in his thirties, Coornhert was, in a sense, an outsider in the learned world of his time. Yet, in spite of this lack of early humanistic training, he turned himself into a good latinist and a competent translator; moreover, he was a pioneer in this field, and the first to translate important works of ancient philosophy into Dutch. His tracts, books, letters and poems he wrote in Dutch. Perhaps he made a virtue of necessity, but he was also well aware that by writing in the vernacular he could reach a much wider public. In the preface to the *Zedekunst*, he writes:

> [...] alst my wel scheen an te locken overmids den groten nut die ick zagh voor velen daar inne te zyn gheleghen, te meer overmids ick wiste dat zulx noch noyt in ghemene talen en was ghedaan
>
> [… though it seemed very attractive to me, because of the benefit for many I saw therein, the more so because I knew that never before had anything like that been done in the vernacular.]

At the same time, he could in this manner contribute to the movement of language reform which aimed at freeing Dutch from a surplus of words derived

[14] The affinity between Erasmus and Coornhert has been stressed (perhaps somewhat overstressed) by Wilhelm Dilthey in his study "Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 17. Jahrhundert". See his *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1969[8]), pp. 95-100. It will be clear that Coornhert is beyond the scope of Lindeboom's book on biblical humanism, but he is seriously and sympathetically discussed in Lindeboom's book on the history of heresies, *Stiefkinderen van het Christendom* (The Hague, 1929; repr. Arnhem, 1973). See the chapter "The Heretics of Humanism and Rationality. Castellio, Coornhert and Grotius".

from French or Latin. In the preface to *Twe-spraack van de Nederduitsche letterkunst* [Dialogue about writing in Dutch], one of the first Dutch grammars, probably written by his friend Spiegel and published in 1584, Coornhert gives vent to his displeasure at the frequent and unnecessary borrowing of words from foreign languages and declares that he had resolved

> […] myn moeders taal weder in haar oude ere te brenghen ende haar kleed, dat van zelfs ryckelyck was ende cierlyk, vande onnutte lappen ende vuyle brodderyen te zuyveren.
>
> [to restore my native tongue to its old honour and to purify her garment, rich and elegant in itself, of useless and ugly patches.]

His translations were, among other things, a means to demonstrate the richness and versatility of the Dutch language.

Twenty years earlier, in his preface to the *Officia Ciceronis*, "De vertaelder totten Leser" [the translator to the reader] Coornhert had already given an outline of his ideas on translating and the choosing of suitable words. The Dutch language, he writes, is sometimes more like Latin or French than like the German from which it is derived. As a result, simple people are often unable to understand official proclamations or the verdict of a judge in their own case. Some words of foreign origin, however, are so ingrained that it is next to impossible to translate them, for example: *nature, glorie, conscientie* [nature, glory, conscience]. But that is no reason not to use, where possible, perfectly good words like *vergelijckinge* [comparison] instead of *comparatie* or *algemeen* [general] for *generael*. Admittedly, there are some old Dutch words that are too harsh on the ear, for instance, *sege* for *victorie*, *grootachtbaerheyt* for *authoriteyt* or *byspel* for *exempel.* For the moment, it is better to avoid them, though he still thinks of using them in the course of time [*hoe wel ick die noch metter tyt al dencke te gebruycken*].

These reservations are all about vocabulary. In other respects, as has been convincingly shown by G. S. Overdiep and Arie-Jan Gelderblom,[15] Coornhert's writing gained much from his knowledge of Latin and from his translating. In his later work and in his letters, the influence of Cicero and Seneca is evident in his period-building, his construction of paragraphs, and his use of antithesis, anaphora, tricolon and other figures of speech.

But Coornhert's translations served yet another, moral purpose. Having absorbed the lessons of Cicero, Seneca and Boethius, he felt the need to make that wisdom accessible to a wider, and non-elitist audience. He wanted to teach and edify his readers. This is clear from the prefaces to his translations and the titles he gives them. To the title of *De beneficiis* he adds the words:

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[15] G. S. Overdiep *et al.*, *De letterkunde van de Renaissance tot Roemer Visscher en zijn dochters* in *Geschiedenis van de letterkunde der Nederlanden*, ed. F. Baur, vol. 3 (Antwerpen, 1944), pp. 351-387, esp. 353-364. A.-J. Gelderblom, "'Nieuwe stof in Neerlandsch'. Een karakteristiek van Coornherts proza", in *Dwars maar recht* (as in n. 11), pp. 98-114.

> Leerende den rechten aert van broederlijcke liefde, getrouwe vrientschap en beleeftheyt. Voor allen staten seer nut om te lesen.
>
> [Teaching the real nature of brotherly love, faithful friendship and courtesy. For people in all stations most useful to read.]

And on the title page of *Officia Ciceronis*: *"Leerende wat yegelijck in allen staten behoort te doen"* [Teaching what everybody in all stations should do].

NOBILITY

The place of his translations in Coornhert's œuvre has been well studied. Not much has been said, however, about his translation of a Latin version of a short treatise by Philo Judaeus (c. 20 B.C.-50 A.D.), *Peri Eugeneias* or *De nobilitate*. This was published in 1583 under the title *Van edelheydt. Een edel boecxken* [On Nobility. A Noble Booklet].[16] It seems worthwhile to devote some attention to this booklet, the more so because it might be of special interest to the recipient of this collection of essays.

Peri Eugeneias is usually taken to be the last of four tracts with the common title *On the Virtues*, the other three dealing with Fortitude, Humanity and Repentance. In the introductory part Philo argues that true nobility is conferred only by virtue. Nobility is the characteristic feature of a pure mind and does not automatically follow from high birth. Just as the blind are not helped by the sharp-sightedness of their ancestors, or the mute by their eloquence, so unjust or intemperate children are not made noble by the virtue of their parents. Yet descent is not irrelevant: *noblesse oblige*. For the wicked not only fail to be noble, "they (also) destroy ancestral prestige and dim and quench all the glory which illumines the family".[17] For that reason, even affectionate fathers disinherit their depraved sons and shut them out from their home and kin. And when Philo lets Nobility speak in person (195-197), she castigates in particular the wicked sons of great houses who, having good models at hand, never cared to reproduce their excellence.

In the main body of the text, Philo gives examples, all taken from the book of Genesis, of people of excellent lineage going to the bad, and of others, of humble birth, becoming noble by their virtuous life. In the first category are Cain, Adam, Ham and Esau. The most important instance of the opposite kind is Abraham, a man of obscure, even highly suspect origin, but "the first person spoken of as believing in God" (Genesis 15:6). Further examples are Tamar and the concubines of Jacob. This range of examples gives us a broad and pano-

[16] *Van edelheydt. Een edel boecxken* (Haarlem, 1583). M. F. Fresco made some comments on this translation; see again his "Coornhert en de oudheid. Een verkenning", in *Dwars maar recht* (as in n. 11), pp. 68-70. See als Bonger, *The Life and Work of Coornhert* (as in n. 1), p. 286.

[17] Philo, *Peri Eugeneias* 191, transl. F. H. Colson, 10 vols. (London, 1940), vol. 8, p. 281.

ramic view of the early history of mankind in general and the Jewish people in particular, from Adam to the sons of Jacob. It cannot be denied, however, that for the sake of his argument, Philo shows a marked tendency to smooth over the less than idyllic episodes in the life of the patriarchal family.

The tract closes with the conclusion:

> I doubt indeed if any more mischievous doctrine could be propounded than this, that avenging justice will not follow the children of good parents if they turn to wickedness, and that honour will not be the reward of the good children of the wicked, thus contradicting the law, which assesses each person on his own merits and does not take into account the virtues and vices of his kinsmen in awarding praise or punishment.[18]

In matters of practical morality, Philo found much that was congenial to him in the ethics of the Stoa. To him, as to the Stoics, the proposition of nobility being based on virtue alone was self-evident. Many passages of *Peri Eugeneias* show his incorporation of Stoic thought and terminology. A case in point is the wording of the tenet that the true good resides exclusively in the leading part of the soul [*hegemonikon*], that is the reasoning faculty [*hegemon nous* or *logismos*], where God has implanted it, thus giving man the possibility to become virtuous. Yet, unlike the Stoics, Philo does not think that man can acquire virtue through his own resources alone, without God's help, nor does he consider being virtuous as a goal in itself. For him virtue is a means to the ultimate end of obeying and imitating God. Religion and morality are intimately connected. Of Abraham he says that his search for God led him to the notion of His existence and providence, and that, having gained that insight, "the most sure and certain of the virtues, he gained with it all the other virtues [...]".[19]

In the preface to his translation of *De nobilitate* Coornhert writes:

> Onlancx comende te lesen in Philonis Iudaei scrifte, vruntlike Borre, quam my voor zijn Boecxken vande Edelheydt. Dat behaechde my, en vertaeldet om door den druc allen Nederlanders gemeen te maken.
>
> [Recently reading in the writings of Philo Iudaeus, my friend Bor, I chanced upon his booklet about nobility. It pleased me, and I translated it in order to make it by printing known to all Dutch.]

Indeed, the importance that Philo attached to the classical virtues fits in very well with Coornhert's own ideas. Moreover, several places in his own work show views on nobility similar to those of Philo. The subject was, of course, familiar to him through his translations and reading of Cicero, Seneca and Boethius. In the *Zedekunst* [6.9.13-14] he writes:

> Wat gheboren Edelman doet wat tot zyn Edeldom? [...] Is hy niet edeler ende lofwaardigher die door 'thanteren van dueghden edel wordt?

[18] Philo, *Peri Eugeneias*, 227 (as in n. 17), vol. 8, p. 304.
[19] Philo, *Peri Eugeneias*, 216 (as in n. 17), vol. 8, p. 295.

> [What born nobleman does something for his nobility? [...] Is not more noble and praiseworthy the man who becomes noble by practising virtues?]

One of the pieces in the collection *Verscheyden t'samenspraken* [Various Dialogues] treats the subject in a more playful manner.[20] On board a market-boat between The Hague and Haarlem, a nobleman, a Lutheran and a Franciscan friar pass the time by engaging in conversation. In the discussion, the nobleman accuses the friar of laziness, hypocrisy and fraud, but is soon reduced to silence by the Franciscan, who in turn reproaches him with taking pride in his inherited rank and doing nothing useful himself to prove his nobility. Real nobility depends, according to the friar, exclusively on one's own virtue and has nothing to do with the merits of one's ancestors. However, the skirmish between the nobleman and his fellow-passenger is subsidiary to the main argument of the piece: an attack by the friar, whom we may see as Coornhert's spokesman, on the doctrines of original sin and *iustitia imputativa*. The Lutheran, of course, is not convinced. But the Franciscan wins a compliment from the nobleman, who admits that his talk was not what he had expected from one wearing his habit. He even expresses the wish that there were many more religious like him, thus implicitly retracting his accusation of laziness, hypocrisy and fraud.

Most importantly, Coornhert concurred in Philo's religious justification of ethics. Both insist on the intermediary function of the virtues to the higher end of leading man to God. Philo taught that God plants and builds the virtues in the soul, but he added that it is nonetheless man's own responsibility to strive to make himself perfect. Correspondingly, Coornhert believed that without the help and grace of God man cannot become perfect and he also insisted that man's willing cooperation was essential. Indeed, this perfectism, as elaborated in *Jacob's Ladder* and *Zedekunst*, may be considered without exaggeration the very core of Coornhert's thinking. The latter's "pleasure" in reading the "booklet" and his decision to translate it are therefore not at all surprising. He may have felt in Philo a kindred spirit.

Philo's works were printed for the first time by Adrien Turnèbe in 1552.[21] The *editio princeps* was soon followed by several Latin translations. In Coornhert's time, at least three Latin versions of *De nobilitate* were available.[22] We may be fairly certain that, as Bonger assumes, Coornhert worked from Gelenius' translation. A close comparison of the three relevant texts, Philo's Greek, Ge-

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[20] *Coornherts Wercken* (as in n. 2), vol. 1, fol. 439A-461B.

[21] *Philonis Iudaei in libros Mosis, de mundi opificio, historicos, de legibus. Eiusdem libri singulares* (Parisiis ex officina Adriani Turnebi, 1552).

[22] (1) *Philonis Iudaei lucubrationes omnes quotquot haberi potuerunt. Nunc primum Latinae ex Graecis factae per Sigismundum Gelenium* (Basel, 1554). (2) *Optimates sive De Nobilitate, eiusque antiqua origine, natura, disciplina & recta ac Christiana institutione Libri tres. Laurentio Humfredo autore. Adiunctus est propter utilitatem & affinitatem argumenti Philonis Iudaei De Nobilitate, Graece et Latine: Eodem interprete* (Basel, 1560). (3) *Philonis Iudaei, et Graecorum philosophiae studiosissimi & oratoris eloquentissimi, liber de nobilitate: ex Graeco in Latinum conversus ab Hermanno Nehemio Tremoniano* (Basel, 1581).

lenius' Latin and Coornhert's *Van Edelheydt*, shows that the Dutch translation faithfully follows Gelenius' additions and omissions, and sometimes questionable interpretations. Moreover, of the three translations only Gelenius' volume has all of Philo's work, at least *lucubrationes quotquot haberi potuerunt.* And Coornhert himself tells us that he came upon *De nobilitate* while "reading in Philo's writings". This excludes Humfredus' book, which is a treatise on the nature and different aspects of nobility, to which Philo's tract is added only as an illustration because of its affinity with the argument. Besides, Coornhert's translation diverges repeatedly from Humfredus' Latin text. As regards Nehemius, he translated only *De nobilitate*, which excludes him for the same reason as Humfredus.

When Coornhert published *Van Edelheydt* in 1583 he was an experienced translator. A comparison of his articulated presentation with Gelenius' Latin text, printed, so to speak, in one piece without any division, shows a confident handling of the material. There is a clear division in short paragraphs and every person referred to is indicated in the margin by his or her name. This makes for much easier reading and understanding of the text, presumably exactly what Coornhert intended. In this connection, it is interesting to reconsider the ideas about vocabulary that he formulated in 1561 in his preface to the *Officia Ciceronis* and later again in *Twe-spraak*, in order to see whether, and if so how, they were applied in *Van Edelheydt*. It becomes clear then that he remained true to his principles and has even gone a step further. The number of words of Latin or French origin is very small indeed. In thirty pages of text, we have found only about eleven foreign words that Coornhert apparently considered untranslatable. Some of those, like *coronel* [colonel] or *capiteyn* [captain], were already in common use and no longer perceived as foreign. For others such as *glorie*, formerly thought indispensable, a Dutch substitute has been found, *roem*. In the category that in 1561 was still judged too harsh and reserved for future use is *grootachtbaerheyt* [authority], now softened by time and found acceptable. Another from the same group is *exempel*. The Dutch translation *byspel* (cf. German *Beispiel*), earlier proposed by Coornhert, has not been adopted. For Latin *exemplum* or *exemplar*, he now uses alternately *voorbeeldt*, *voorbeeldinge* and *exempel*. Some variety was probably welcome for those frequently used words. Moreover, Coornhert did not shrink from using uncommon words to avoid borrowings from Latin or French. *Onontschuldelyck* [inexcusable] and *beheerschapt* [ruled], for instance, may not be neologisms, but in the *Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal* they are attested only in the work of Coornhert.

But Coornhert did more than translate a Latin version. Firstly, he chose a motto from the first book of Samuel. The relevant verse is part of the passage in which God withdraws the priestly prerogatives from the lineage of the prophet Eli, because of the sins of the latter's sons, "but now the Lord saith, Be it far from me; for them who honour me I will honour, and they who despise me shall be lightly esteemed" (Sam. I,2:30). The motto is well chosen. It illustrates, negatively, that birth from a noble parent in itself counts for nothing; and posi-

tively, that nobility depends on virtuous behaviour and the grace of God. It fits in very well with Philo's tract.

Secondly, on the title page, Coornhert presents a short poem composed by himself. It is a condensed expression of his perfectism and extols the close connection between being virtuous and becoming godlike. The virtuous man is praised as being noble and becoming an image of God by acquiring heavenly virtue; he wrongs nobody and his wise counsel is a help to everybody and therefore he is "een recht edelman en uit Godt self geboren" [a real nobleman born from God himself].

Thirdly, and most importantly, in the preface directed to his younger friend and fellow-notary Pieter Bor, he discusses certain social and political aspects of nobility which were not treated by Philo at all. It is his aim, he declares, by making Philo's tract accessible to all Dutch, to correct the despisers of true and the praisers of false nobility, and to exhort good people to obtain true nobility. Nobody will deny that every virtuous person is noble before God and men. But Coornhert also thinks that the children of virtuous parents, if only they are not dishonourable themselves, are justly honoured as noble persons.

This is the starting point for a specific political proposal. Coornhert takes it as a matter of fact that most people become virtuous only because they are sensitive to the honour connected with it; they do not really know the intrinsic value of virtue. Moreover, because of the great love between parents and children, parents like to leave behind an honourable position for their offspring, and children like to follow in the footsteps of their noble ancestors. Therefore, it is desirable to reward meritorious men, in peace-time as well as during a war, with important offices. At the same time, this policy would be an exhortation to others to behave in an exemplary way. Indeed, it was practised already by the Romans, who as a result became a world-power, and by the Greeks. Coornhert then tells a story about Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. Once on a hot day, Pyrrhus saw two horsemen fully harnessed, engaged in a ball-game. When he asked why they played in their heavy armour and in the sun instead of in the shade of a nearby wood, they answered that they did so in order to train themselves for the real fighting. Pyrrhus praised them and promoted them captains. Their captains, who all this while were relaxing, sitting in the shade and drinking wine, were reduced to the ranks. All the army understood the lesson and behaved accordingly.

Thus, by its recommendation to award high public office to those who have deserved it by their virtuous behaviour rather than to those of noble birth, the preface acquires a political dimension and can be read as a plea for a meritocratic policy. The preface is followed and supported by two quotations from Boethius in Coornhert's own translation.[23] In the first, Boethius argues that the

[23] Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae*, 3. pr.6. 22-30 and 3. c.6. 7-9. Boethius was one of Coornhert's favourite authors. He used to reread the *Consolatio* once or twice every year. He published two translations. The first, in 1557, from a Flemish version by Arend de Keysere, the second from the Latin: *Van de vertroosting der wysheyd; uyt 't Latijn op nieus vertaalt* (Leiden, 1585).

only use of hereditary nobility is the incitement not to deviate from the virtues of one's ancestors; in the second, he declares that for God all men are equally noble and that only through their own sins can men forfeit their divine origin.

Finally, at the end of the book, Coornhert adds no less than eleven quotations and sayings from Euripides, Diogenes, Lycurgus, Antisthenes, Petrarch, Cicero, Seneca, Jerome and Chrysostom.[24] By these additions as well as by his preface, Coornhert places Philo's treatise in a broader context. Philo, in the general drift of his argument and his examples, emphasises piety and sacred history as against sinning and apostasy, and his references to the social dimensions of the classical virtues fade into the background; Coornhert for his part stresses the importance of social virtue and exemplary behaviour over against egoism and indifference.

To be sure, the motto from the book of Samuel is wholly in line with Philo's thought. On the other hand, the poem, which is a restatement of Coornhert's perfectism, describes nobility in terms of social virtue and human relationships. And the general idea of the preface and quotations from ancient authorities is that nobility can be gained only through an exemplary role in society.

By so locating his text within this framework, Coornhert has effected a subtle but, we think, unmistakable change and given *Van Edelheydt* a somewhat different character from Philo's original. In a sense, he has made a place for it within his own work.[25]

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[24] As M. F. Fresco has pointed out (see note 11) it is, in general, difficult to trace the source of remarks by Coornhert. Likewise, it is far from clear whence he took the quotations he added to his text of *Van Edelheydt*. For instance, as Coornhert did not read Greek, those from Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius may have come from Latin translations (Stobaeus, by Varinus Camers, Rome, 1517; Diogenes, by Ambrosius Traversarius, Rome, 1431, reprinted many times), but just as well from one of the many collections of memorable deeds and sayings of famous men. The following synopsis shows where our search for possible sources of the said quotations has been successful, and where not.

Euripides: from two of his lost plays, *Diktys* and *Melanippe*, Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, 4.29.1 and 11, ed. Otto Hense (Berlin, 1909), pp. 702 and 705.

Diogenes: Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, 4.29.19, Hense p. 708.

Lycurgus: Erasmus, *Opera Omnia* 4, *Apophthegmata*, 1.3.58, ed. Johannes Clericus, reprinted (Hildesheim 1962), p. 123; Plutarch, *Moralia*, 225F.

Antisthenes: Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum*, 6.10.

Petrarch: not found.

Cicero: not found.

Seneca: not found.

Jerome: *Epistulae*,148. 21. 1, ed. Isidorus Hilberg (Vienna, 1996), p. 347.

Chrysostom: two quotations, not found.

We have not been able to trace the story of King Pyrrhus and the two soldiers that Coornhert tells in the preface. It may be a "Wanderanekdote" ascribed to different commanders. Plutarch (*Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, 182) tells it of Antigonus Monophthalmus.

[25] We thank Dr N. F. Streekstra (University of Groningen) for kindly helping us to understand some finesses of Coornhert's sixteenth-century Dutch.

HUMANISM AND PHILOSOPHY

THE *DE VERITATE FIDEI CHRISTIANAE* OF JUAN LUIS VIVES

Marcia L. Colish

Published posthumously in 1543, *De veritate fidei christianae* (*DVFC*), the last and longest of the works of Juan Luis Vives (1492/3-1540), has attracted scant scholarly interest. What notice it has received neglects its intended audience. Most Vives scholars have simply ignored this text.[1] Treatments of Vives' theology give priority to his early devotional works.[2] There is one minor excursus here, no longer on the radar screen, the issue of whether Vives' attack on Aristotelian syllogistic made him a sceptic with regard to religious knowledge.[3]

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[1] The best overviews are by E. González González, "La lectura de Vives, del siglo XIX a nuestros días", in Ioannes Ludovicus Vives, *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Mestre (Valencia, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 1-76; idem, "Vives: Un humanista judeoconverso en el exilio de Flandres", in *The Expulsion of the Jews and Their Emigration to the Southern Low Countries (15th-16th c.)*, ed. L. Dequeker and W. Verbeke (Leuven, 1998), pp. 35-39; less useful is C. G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (The Hague, 1970), pp. 5-13, 291. Note: the editor of the *Opera omnia* cited above also styles himself as Antonio Mestre Sanchis and Antonio Mestre Sanchís in other works; we will follow his chosen practice in referring to his publications below.

[2] The most recent surveys are J. M. Belarte Forment, "Aproximación al estudio de la teología humanística de Juan Luis Vives", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 317-318; A. Mestre Sanchis, "Teología y espiritualidad cristocéntricas en Vives", in *Un valenciano universal: Joan Lluis Vives*, ed. A. Mestre Sanchis and P. Pérez García (Valencia, 1993), pp. 234-236.

[3] On Vives' critique of Aristotelian, and late scholastic, logic, see G. A. Kater, *Johann Ludwig Vives und seine Stellung zu Aristoteles* (Erlangen, 1908), pp. 27-30, 73-80, more recently amplified by the recognition that Vives sought to redefine logic rhetorically along the lines proposed by Lorenzo Valla and Rudolf Agricola, as in C. Vasoli, "Juan Luis Vives e un programma umanistica di riforma della logica", *Atti e memorie dell'Accademia toscana di scienze e lettere La Colombaria* 25, n.s. 11 (1960-1961), pp. 217-263; idem, "La concezione filosofica in Vives", in *Luis Vives y el humanismo europeano*, ed. F. J. Fernández Nieto, A. Melero Bellido, and A. Mestre Sanchís (Valencia, 1998), pp. 117-129. On the anti-Aristotelian Vives as sceptic, see J. A. Fernández Santamaría, *Juan Luis Vives: Escepticismo y prudencia en el renacimiento* (Salamanca, 1990); idem, *The Theater of Man: J. L. Vives on Society* (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 11-37, 43-56, 119-124. For critiques of that position, see R. D. Clements, "A Sixteenth-Century Psychologist on the Immortality of the Soul: Juan Luis Vives", *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance* 28 (1966), p. 82; Á. Gómez-Hortiguëla, "Juan Luis Vives, filósofo", in *Un valenciano universal* (as in n. 2), pp. 218-228. The supersession of this debate can be seen in L. Casini, "Aristotelianism and Anti-Stoicism in Juan Luis Vives",

More prominent among treatments of *DVFC* is the view that Vives heralds a rationalistic neo-Thomist apologetics[4] or, alternatively, an "intrinsic" apologetics based on revelation.[5] Abandoning such anachronisms, others regard the *DVFC* as the mere recycling of medieval anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim polemics, Thomistic or not.[6] Still others place him in the *devotio moderna* tradition, as available in his native Valencia.[7]

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in *Moral Philosophy and the Threshold of Modernity*, ed. J. Kraye and R. Saarinen (Dordrecht, 2005), pp. 283-305.

[4] P. Graf, *Luis Vives como apologeta: Contribución a la historia de la apologética*, transl. J. M. Millás Vallicrosa (Madrid, 1943), followed by Millás Vallicrosa, "La apologética de Luis Vives y el Judaísmo", *Sefarad* 2 (1942), pp. 293-294; V. Moreno Gallego, "Sobre humanismo y fe en el siglo XVI: *De veritate fidei christianae* de Luis Vives, y sus impresiones", in *Humanismo y Císter*, ed. F. R. de Pascual *et al.* (León, 1996), pp. 336-338.

[5] G. Heinz, "Zwischen Intrinsezimus und Extrinsezimus: *De veritate fidei christianae* von Juan Luis Vives als Dokument eines apologetischen Systemwechsels", in *Fides quaerens intellectum: Beiträge zur Fundamentaltheologie*, ed. M. Kessler, W. Pannenberg, and H. J. Pottmeyer (Tübingen, 1992), pp. 611-617. Other anachronisms affecting readings of the *DVFC* include Vives as the father of modern psychology, on which, in addition to references cited in M. L. Colish, "The Mime of God: Vives on the Nature of Man", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962), p. 3 n. 1; repr. in *Race, Gender, and Rank: Early Modern Ideas of Humanity*, ed. M. C. Horowitz (Rochester, N.Y., 1992), p. 321 n. 1, see M. Sancipriano, *Il pensiero psicologica e morale di G. L. Vives* (Florence, 1958); and as a forerunner of Enlightenment secularism, on which see K. Reinhardt, "Vives' Auseinandersetzung mit der jüdischen Auslegung des Alten Testaments", in *Juan Luis Vives und seine Bedeutung für Spanien und Deutschland*, ed. C. Skosetski (Frankfurt, 1995), pp. 20-21; K. Kohut, "Anmerkungen zu 'De veritate fidei christianae'", in ibid., p. 131.

[6] J. Gómez, "El diálogo *Contra iudaeos* de Vives y su tradición medieval", *Criticón* 41 (1988), pp. 70-85; Reinhardt, "Vives' Auseinandersetzung" (as in n. 5), pp. 10, 15-16, 20; Millás Vallicrosa, "La apologética" (as in n. 4), pp. 293-294. E. V. George, "Rules of Engagement: The Humanist Apologetics of Vives' *De veritate fidei Christianae*", *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 27 (2007), pp. 1-36 approaches the text as well from a literary and stylistic standpoint. My thanks to Jane E. Phillips for this reference.

[7] Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (as in n. 1), pp. 235-237 and Gómez-Hortiguëla, "Juan Luis Vives" (as in n. 3), p. 214, both emphasise that Vives shows no awareness of the Thomist revival whether in the person of Cajetan in Italy or of Peter Crockaert in Paris and his Spanish disciples, soon to found the Salamanca school of neo-Thomism. For more on Cajetan and Crockaert, see C. Giacon, *La seconda scolastica: I grandi commentatori di San Tommaso* (Milan, 1944), vol. 1, pp. 29-30, 40-80. The major contemporary apology informed by Thomism was that of Savonarola, which Giacon sees as a summary of the *Summa contra gentiles*, ibid., vol. 1, pp. 28-29. But more is at issue in that work. Written immediately following Savonarola's official silencing and excommunication (May 1497), his apology aims less at converting philosophers, astrologers, idolaters, heretics, Jews, and Muslims, his ostensible targets, than of asserting, against detractors, his own orthodoxy. See Girolamo Savonarola, *Triumphus Crucis: Testo latino e volgare*, ed. M. Ferrara, Edizione nazionale delle opere di Girolamo Savonarola (Rome, 1961). There is no indication that Vives knew this work. On the influence of the

This lack of consensus aside, earlier scholars have not explained why Vives aimed his apology ostensibly at Jews and Muslims. When he wrote, most authors defending Christianity did so to attack other Christians, or to argue for or against forced evangelisation in the Indies. To be sure, Vives' Spanish predecessors did address the Jewish and Muslim communities living in their midst. But between 1492 and the 1520s, these communities, compelled to accept baptism or expulsion, officially ceased to exist. Some *conversos* and Moriscos truly embraced Christianity. Others, however, remained Christian in name only. The argument of this paper is that these imperfectly Christianised *conversos* and Moriscos constitute Vives' prime audience. His hope is to move them from nominal to full Christian commitment. In estimating what this text owes to Renaissance humanism and to previous apologists, Spanish and otherwise, and in clarifying Vives' own argument, we need to understand both *converso* and Morisco religious culture and the historical realities that conditioned it.

Until recently, historians informed by essentialism have over-simplified these realities. Medieval Christians, they tell us, viewed each of these groups as a notional "Other", whether alone or as a fungible element in a more composite "Other".[8] While occasionally adding new data, correct or incorrect, spokespersons for the majority culture repeated the same stereotypes. The Hispanists' particular version of essentialism accents two points. First, a golden age of *convivencia* gave way in the late Middle Ages to increasing hostility toward Jews and Muslims. Then ensued the still more lachrymose chronicle of expulsion or forced conversion and Inquisitorial persecution. But, second, the embattled survivors held their own. Apostasy was unthinkable for them. If they could not relocate, they preserved their traditions while conforming externally to Christianity, the Moriscos applying the principle of *taqiyya* which their jurists conceded. *Conversos* and Moriscos were essentially crypto-Jews and crypto-Muslims. This interpretation makes use of *aljamiado* literature, Muslim texts composed in Iberian vernaculars, for the Moriscos. But for both groups the primary source

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devotio moderna in Valencia, see M. Andres Martín, *Historia de la teología en España (1470-1570)* (Rome, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 104-105, 110-112, 259-260; A. Mestre, "La espiritualidad de Juan Luis Vives", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 410-459; idem, "Teología y espiritualidad" (as in n. 2), pp. 236-237, 248-257; Belarte Forment, "Aproximación" (as in n. 2), vol. 1, pp. 319-320, 387-393; and, most recently, C. Fantazzi, "Vives' Parisian Writings", in *Humanism and Creativity in the Renaissance: Essays in Honor of Ronald G. Witt*, ed. C. S. Celenza and K. Gouwens (Leiden, 2006), pp. 245-246, 260. With respect to Vives as a humanist theologian, a decided joker in the deck is B. Gómez Montsegú, "Erasmo y Vives y la 'philosophia Christi' como humanismo cristiano", in *Erasmo en la España*, ed. M. Revuelta Sañudo and C. Morón Arroyo (Santander, 1986), pp. 357-374, who sees him as a critic of Erasmus and as a precursor of the "integral humanism" of Jacques Maritain.

[8] The scholarly prototypes here are E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1995[2]) and R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250* (Oxford, 1987). A late-blooming defender of Moore is D. Iogna-Prat, *Order and Exclusion: Cluny and Christendom Face Heresy, Judaism, and Islam (1000-1150)*, transl. G. R. Edwards (Ithaca, N.Y., 2002).

exploited is Inquisition records. Despite the fact that Inquisitors were interested only in discovering and punishing deviants, this one-sided evidence takes pride of place even for historians aware that it does not tell the whole story. But what it tells is the story that essentialising historians want to tell: how these believers kept the faith under duress, and, most recently, how *converso* and Morisco women exercised agency therein.[9]

[9] The literature on this subject, and also that referred to in notes 10-11 below, is vast; citations here will be exemplary, not exhaustive. General studies of medieval Christian attitudes toward Jews as varied in time, place, and circumstance, which also provide overviews of earlier essentialist interpretations and correct them, include B. Blumenkranz, *Les auteurs chrétiens latins du moyen âge sur les juifs et le judaïsme* (Paris, 1963); G. Dahan, "L'usage de la *ratio* dans le polémique contre les juifs, XIIe-XIVe siècles", in *Diálogo filosófico-religioso entre cristianismo, judaísmo, y islamismo durante la edad media en la península ibérica*, ed. H. Santiago-Otero (Turnhout, 1994), pp. 289-308; idem, *The Christian Polemic against the Jews in the Middle Ages*, transl. J. Gladding (Notre Dame, Ind., 1998); R. E. Lerner, *The Feast of St. Abraham: Medieval Millenarians and the Jews* (Philadelphia, 2001). Among recent studies clarifying the attitudinal differences toward Jews in Spain and in trans-Pyrenean Europe, see G. I. Langmuir, "L'absence d'accusation de meurtre rituel à l'ouest du Rhône", in *Juifs et judaïsme de Languedoc, XIIIe-début XIVe siècle*, ed. M.-H. Vicaire and B. Blumenkranz (Toulouse, 1977), pp. 235-249; D. Romano, "Penseurs chrétiens catalans vis-à-vis des Juifs", in *From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought*, ed. J. Cohen (Wiesbaden, 1996), pp. 294-336; R. Po-chia Hsia, "Witchcraft, Magic, and the Jews in Late Medieval and Early Modern Germany", in ibid., pp. 419-433; for more on the early modern period, see H. A. Oberman, *The Role of Anti-Semitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation*, transl. J. I. Porter (Philadelphia, 1984). For overviews of the historiography on attitudes toward *conversos*, see S. Freund and T. F. Ruiz, "Jews, *Conversos*, and the Inquisition in Spain, 1391-1492", in *Jewish-Christian Encounters over the Centuries: Symbiosis, Prejudice, Holocaust, Dialogue*, ed. M. Perry and F. M. Schweitzer (New York, 1994), pp. 169-195; N. Roth, *Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain* (Madison, Wis., 1995), pp. 319-327; G. Starr-LeBeau, *In the Shadow of the Virgin: Inquisitors, Friars, and Conversos in Guadalupe, Spain* (Princeton, N.J., 2003), pp. 3-5.

For treatments of medieval Christian attitudes toward Muslims or "Saracens" more loosely showing their diversities, with Spanish writers not unanimous but in the vanguard as more knowledgeable than other Europeans, see B. Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches toward the Muslims* (Princeton, N.J., 1984); the essays by J. V. Tolan, J. C. Lamoreaux, K. B. Wolf, T. E. Burman, P. Krey, and J. S. Geary in *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam: A Book of Essays*, ed. J. V. Tolan (New York, 1996), pp. xv-xx, 3-31, 85-108, 109-128, 153-174, 291-311; A. Echeverria, *The Fortress of Faith: Attitudes toward Muslims in Fifteenth-Century Spain* (Leiden, 1999); J. V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York, 2002); K. S. Beckett, *Anglo-Saxon Perceptions of the Islamic World* (Cambridge, 2003).

For overviews of the historiography on attitudes toward Moriscos, see M. Á. de Bunes Ibarra, *Los moriscos en el pensamiento histórico: Historiografía de un grupo marginalizado* (Madrid, 1983), updated by M. L. Candau Chacón, *Los moriscos en el espejo del tiempo: Problemas históricos y historiográficos*, (Huelva, 1997), pp. 15-108, with extensive bibliography, pp. 219-250. The shift to a sympathetic treatment of the Moriscos that marks much recent scholarship is accompanied by the lachrymose chroni-

Revisionists have added to Inquisition records and contemporary literature by or against these communities a much wider range of sources, yielding different conclusions on the experience of *conversos* and Moriscos, and before them, medieval Spanish Jews and Muslims. Their circumstances were far from uniform. Some received protection as non-Christians and acceptance as New Christians. The attitudes of their Christian rulers, overlords, business associates, pastors, and neighbours were diverse, and highly situational. Studies of the Crown of Aragon, and especially Valencia, the major frontier in the late medieval Reconquest, the area with the highest population density of Muslim and then Morisco subjects, have been particularly helpful in reconfiguring the essentialist picture. Here, policy toward religious minorities was more tolerant than elsewhere in Iberia, slower to adopt or to enforce discriminatory or repressive laws, and more hostile to the goals and the jurisdictional encroachments of

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cle approach and the view that all or most Moriscos were crypto-Muslims, visible in the essays by M. de Elpaza, L. Sabbagh, A. Redondo, and R. Benítez Sánchez-Blanco in *Les morisques et leur temps*, ed. L. Cardaillac (Paris, 1983), pp. 29-41, 43-56, 111-123, 125-157, and by L. Cardaillac, *Morisques et chrétiens: Un affrontement polémique (1492-1640)* (Zaghoun, Tunisia, 1995[2]), pp. 12-13, 37-41, 46, 77-80, 88-89; C. López-Morillas, "The Moriscos and Christian Doctrine", in *Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain: Interaction and Cultural Change*, ed. M. D. Meyerson and E. D. English (Notre Dame, Ind., 2000), pp. 290-305; L. P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain, 1500-1614* (Chicago, 2005), pp. 59-75, 108-109, 115-117, 143-161; B. Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos: Juan de Ribera and Religious Reform in Valencia, 1568-1614* (Baltimore, 2006).

A recent historiographical trend which critiques both *convivencia* and essentialism and which studies Christian attitudes toward Spanish Jews and Muslims, *conversos* and Moriscos, and their varying situations in Spain comparatively, is found in R. Barkai, "Les cultures ibériques entre dialogue et polémique", in *Chrétiens, musulmans, et juifs dans l'Espagne médiévale: De la convergence à l'expulsion*, transl. M. Bennaroch (Paris, 1994), pp. 227-251; idem, "Il diálogo filosófico-religioso en el seno de las tres culturas", in *Diálogo filosófico-religioso*, ed. Santiago-Otero, pp. 3-27; essays by M. D. Meyerson, R. I. Burns, L. Martz, M. E. Perry, and D. Nirenberg in *Christians, Muslims, and Jews*, ed. Meyerson and English, pp. xi-xvii, 91-124, 141-160, 220-240, 274-289. Bunes Ibarra, *Los moriscos*, p. 103, has astutely noted that the historiographical revolution occasioned by the discovery that many prominent early modern Spanish writers had *converso* backgrounds has not led to a parallel quest for the Morisco origins of anyone deemed to have made an important contribution to Spanish thought or letters.

On women as transmitters of crypto-Judaism and crypto-Islam in early modern Spain, see, respectively, R. L. Melammed, *Heretics or Daughters of Israel?: The Crypto-Jewish Women of Castile* (New York, 1999); eadem, "Crypto-Jewish Women Facing the Inquisition: Transmitting Religious Practices, Beliefs, and Attitudes", in *Christians, Muslims, and Jews*, ed. Meyerson and English, pp. 197-219; M. E. Perry, "Moriscas and the Limits of Assimilation", in ibid., pp. 274-289; eadem, "Moriscas and the Politics of Resistance", in *Spanish Women in the Golden Age: Images and Realities*, ed. M. S. Sánchez and A. Saint-Saëns (Westport, Conn., 1996), pp. 37-53; eadem, *The Handless Maiden: Moriscos and the Politics of Religion in Early Modern Spain* (Princeton, N.J., 2005).

the Inquisition.[10] Important in its own right and as a corrective to earlier historiography, these findings also shed light on the Valencia in which Vives was raised and on how it conditions his self-imposed assignment in *DVFC*. His approach to his audience was not based merely on earlier literary images of the fictive Jew and Muslim. For he had the opportunity to learn by observation about these groups and the mentalities which, as New Christians, they brought with them into the church.

Even more striking than his encouragement of *converso* assimilation is Vives' concern with Morisco conversion, which is rather at odds with sixteenth-century Spanish attitudes. Despite other disagreements, Hispanists acknowledge that official initiatives in catechising and ministering to Moriscos came too little, too late, in the face of conflicting interests later complicated by resistance to post-Tridentine reform.[11] Nor was Vives preoccupied with the idea that disaffected Moriscos formed an Ottoman fifth column within Spain. Vives

[10] For recent scholarship, particularly works focusing on the Crown of Aragon and providing more nuanced views on the circumstances of Spanish Jews and *conversos*, see Roth, *Conversos* (as in n. 9); Starr-LeBeau, *In the Shadow of the Virgin* (as in n. 9); M. D. Meyerson, *A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain* (Princeton, N.J., 2004); idem, *Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom: Society, Economy, and Politics in Morvedre, 1248-1391* (Leiden, 2004); D. Nirenberg, "Figures of Thought and Flesh: 'Jews' and 'Judaism' in Late-Medieval Spanish Poetry and Politics", *Speculum* 81 (2006), pp. 398-426; for the circumstances of Muslims and Moriscos, see R. I. Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia* (Princeton, N.J., 1973); idem, "Christian-Muslim Confrontation: The Thirteenth-Century Dream of Conversion", in his *Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 80-118; idem, "Muslims in the Thirteenth-Century Realms of Aragon: Interaction and Reaction", in *Muslims under Latin Rule, 1100-1300*, ed. J. M. Powell (Princeton, N.J., 1990), pp. 57-102; M. D. Meyerson, "The Survival of a Muslim Minority in the Christian Kingdom of Valencia, Fifteenth-Sixteenth Centuries", in *Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Eighth to Eighteenth Century*, ed. M. Gervers and R. J. Bikhazi (Toronto, 1990), pp. 365-380; idem, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991); J. B. Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians: Moriscos and Catholicism in Early Modern Spain* (New Orleans, 2002), although his focus is on Castile, where the Morisco population was much smaller; M. Halavais, *Like Wheat to the Miller: Community, Convivencia, and the Construction of Morisco Identity in Sixteenth-Century Aragon* (New York, 2005). Scholars comparing the two communities in Aragon and other parts of Spain include S. Haliczer, *Inquisition and Society in the Kingdom of Valencia, 1478-1834* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), pp. 5, 13-18, 29, 35-37, 121-123, 209-272; D. Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J., 1991); T. Ruiz, *Spanish Society, 1400-1600* (Harlow, Essex, 2001), pp. 6, 95-107, 178-182.

[11] See, for example, A. G. Chejne, *Islam and the West: The Moriscos, a Cultural and Social History* (Albany, N.Y., 1983), p. 16; Haliczer, *Inquisition and Society* (as in n. 10), pp. 245-248; Meyerson, "Muslims in Valencia" (as in n. 10), p. 230; Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians* (as in n. 10), pp. 2, 22, 24-28, 36-43, who adds the Catholic Reformation dimension to his analysis, as does Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos* (as in n. 9), pp. 14-17, 106-125, 127, 130.

wrote both a treatise and a dialogue against the Turks, triggered by their stunning victory at Mohács (1526), which show that he is not fully on the contemporary wavelength.[12] To the extent that they mention the Turks' religion, current writers rehash medieval libels on Muhammad's moral character and revive Crusade rhetoric. Those with personal experience of the Turks could praise their military discipline and austere morality. But a wider tendency, especially among humanists, was to classicise them negatively as barbarian, or, alternatively, as "Asian" and hyper-civilised. Such views were deemed compatible with vilifications of the Turks as the devil's spawn or the advance troops of Antichrist. Both Catholic and Protestant controversialists yoked this apocalyptic understanding to their confessional causes, even as politicians, who had en-

[12] Good surveys are found in R. Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517)* (New York, 1967), although conditioned by a conception of East-West standoff inspired by the Cold War, and M. Soykut, *Image of the "Turk" in Italy: A History of the "Other" in Early Modern Europe* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 5-11, 15-22, 24-28, 39-62. N. Bisaha, "'New Barbarian' or 'Worthy Adversary'?: Humanist Constructs of the Ottoman Turks", in *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of the Other*, ed. D. R. Blanks and M. Frassetto (New York, 1999), pp. 185-206 and eadem, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia, 2004), overrates the secularism of humanist attitudes. In recounting the reaction to the Turkish seizure of Negroponte in 1470, M. Meserve, "The News from Negroponte: Politics, Popular Opinion, and Information Exchange in the First Decade of the Italian Press", *Renaissance Quarterly* 59 (2006), pp. 440-480, and eadem, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008) shows that humanist and other responses ranged from the diplomatic to the apocalyptic and from self-flagellation to finger-pointing. Among Christian writers reacting specifically to Mohács, Luther, who initially advised Europeans to accept Turkish victory as punishment for their sins, later (1529) urged German princes to unite under the banner of a reformed emperor – not the pope – against the Turks, whose theology he condemns. See Martin Luther, "On War against the Turks", transl. C. M. Jacobs, in *Luther's Works*, ed. R. C. Shultz (Philadelphia, 1967), vol. 46, pp. 161-205; on Luther, see also D. Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 109-111. Although sharing Vives' pacifism, More and Erasmus criticised Luther, Erasmus for his initial recommendation of passive resistance and More, also, for dividing the Christendom that should unite against the Turks. See R. P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valor: More, Erasmus, and Vives on Humanism, War, and Peace* (Seattle, Wash., 1962), pp. 274-276; Soykut, *Image of the "Turk"*, pp. 39-41. A good index of the pragmatic political view of the Turks is Machiavelli, for whom they exemplify prudence and good fortune in their institutions and policies, as in *Discorsi* 1.1.7, 1.19.7-8, 2 preface 14-16 (where he endows them with *virtù*), 2.17.43; *Il principe* 4, 19; and *Istorie fiorentine* 6.32, 6.33, 7.4, 7.6, 7.22, 8.14, 8.20, 8.21, 8.22, 8.33, where he considers their depredations on the Italian mainland in the light of their effects on inter-Italian relations. Thus, he holds, their attack on Otranto in 1480 had a fine outcome ("cagione di molto bello") since it enabled Lorenzo de' Medici to make a separate peace with Naples that same year. See Niccolò Machiavelli, *Tutte le opere*, ed. M. Martelli (Florence, 1971), pp. 78, 104, 145, 171, 262, 288, 787, 789, 795, 796-797, 807, 827, 831-832, 833, 841. The quotation is at *Istorie fiorentine* 8.22, p. 833.

gaged in diplomacy with the Turks for some time, weighed alliances with them pragmatically.

Among Turkish policies facilitating such alliances was their toleration of "Peoples of the Book", a phenomenon far less likely to elicit comment than their levy of Christian youths.[13] Vives agrees in part. He cites Christian disunity as the cause of the catastrophe at Mohács but ignores eschatology and tactfully refrains from naming the sultan's French and German allies. Christian disunity cannot be attributed to a single cause. Kingdom battles against kingdom; cities and even neighbourhoods contend with one another. Hostilities divide noble factions, nobles and the lower classes, rulers and the ruled. Laymen are pitted against clerics. In the schools, Hellenists contend with Latinists, dialecticians with moral philosophers; Thomists, Scotists, and Ockhamists are at each other's throats. Lutherans, divided among themselves, vie with anti-Lutherans, while Catholic religious orders attack each other as do the observants and non-observants within individual orders. While Christian disunity is thus lamentably widespread, the chief reason for the Turkish victory and remedy for it lie with the Christian princes.[14]

That said, Vives goes on to contradict himself on Turkish religious policy and mores. On the one hand, he charges, the Turks are enemies of the faith, ty-

[13] This policy has been flagged by A. Fattal, *Le statut légal des non-Muslims en pays d'Islam* (Beirut, 1958), pp. 366-30; P. F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (Seattle, Wash., 1977), pp. 4-7, 13, 16-19, 21, 31, 33, 39-40, 45-49; N. Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago, 1980), pp. 34, 49-54, 59-61; and Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire* (as in n. 12), pp. 11, 16-18, 46-49, 51, 67-68, 83-91, 101-105, 111-112, 169-183, 187-188, 231, the best general treatment of the gap between European perceptions and Ottoman reality. Both Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire*, p. 50 and Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire* (as in n. 12), pp. 67-68, note that the levy of Christian youths decried by European polemicists was not seen as oppressive by the Ottomans' Christian subjects but as an advantageous career opportunity. On Turkish hospitality and benefits granted to Jews, see J. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), pp. 3, 193-194, 203 nn. 1, 12; H. İnalcık, "Foundations of Ottoman-Jewish Cooperation", in *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth through Twentieth Century*, ed. A. Levy (Syracuse, N.Y., 2002), pp. 5-14; D. Goffman, "Jews in Early Modern Ottoman Commerce", in ibid., pp. 15-32.

[14] Juan Luis Vives, *De conditione vitae christianorum sub turca*; *De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. G. Mayens y Síscar, 8 vols. (Valencia, 1782-1790; repr. London, 1964), vol. 5, p. 456; vol. 6, pp. 455-458, 462 and 480-481. This edition will be used for all Vives citations. Excellent analysis is provided by J.-C. Margolin, "Conscience européenne et réaction à la menace turque d'après le 'De Dissidiis Europae et bello turcico' de Vives (1526)", in *Juan Luis Vives*, ed. A. Buck (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 107-141. Less useful are Adams, *Better Part of Valor* (as in n. 12), pp. 262-264; Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (as in n. 1), pp. 225-257. M. Zappala, "Vives' *De Europae Dissidiis et Bello Turcico*, the Quattrocento Dialogue, and 'Open' Discourse", in *Acta conventus neo-latini torontoniensis*, ed. A. Dalzell, C. Fantazzi, and R. J. Schoeck (Binghamton, N.Y., 1991), pp. 823-830 provides a literary analysis only. The argument of A. Fontán, *Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540): Humanista, filósofo, político* (Valencia, 1992), pp. 66, 105-108, 110-111, 118-120, 124-125, 128, 134, 137-144, that Vives merely recycles medieval commonplaces is belied by the evidence that he himself cites.

rants who enslave their Christian subjects, treating them no better than animals. They impose the hated levy of Christian youths and force Christians to choose conversion to Islam or death.[15] On the other hand, the Turks are kinder and more permissive toward Christians than are their own co-religionists, which explains why some prefer Turkish rule to that of European princes.[16] Vives says little about Islam as the Turks' religion. He focuses on their ethos and customs. Ignoring predecessors who ascribe any virtues to them, he recapitulates the classicising notion that the Turks are both effete and over-refined[17] and barbarian in their brutality, superstition, and contempt for laws, rights, and treaties, a treachery which their faith allows, and in their lack of scientific and literary culture.[18] At the same time, Vives notes that the Turks have no monopoly on barbarism, given the inhumanity and bad faith with which Europeans treat their Christian enemies.[19]

As a collective European problem, Vives concludes, Ottoman victories have resulted not only in territorial losses; they have also slowed the expansion of Europe's imperial sway, from East to West and from sea to sea. If these victories continue, he warns, Europeans may have to flee in great ships to the Indies to escape Turkish dominion.[20] This imperial outlook notwithstanding, Vives is guarded on whether Europeans, should they defeat the Turks, ought to evangelise them. In the person of the interlocutor Tiresias, he professes ignorance as to whether Christ would approve of that goal. For it would be an evil, he says, although one more tolerable than the insanity of intra-European dissension.[21] Vives thus sees no apostolic option and no possibility of inter-religious dialogue with the Turks, in contrast with the Moriscos in his own homeland.

That he regards the Moriscos as amenable to full Christianisation reflects Vives' understanding of their current cultural situation. Hispanists agree that, while the scientific, philosophical, and theological culture of Muslim Spain reached its apogee under the caliphate of Córdoba, the patronage of speculative thought then waned, starting in the late eleventh century with the conquests of the puritanical and rigidly orthodox Almoravids and Almohads and continuing with the Reconquest of the Christian kings. Fundamentalism and intolerance

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[15] Vives, *De conditione*; *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 447, 455-457; vol. 6, pp. 474-475, 479.

[16] Vives, *De conditione*; *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 449, 451: Turkish rule as "quasi is benignior sit in largienda libertate hac, quàm christianus"; vol. 6, p. 468.

[17] Vives, *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 6, pp. 477-478.

[18] Vives, *De conditione*; *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 451, 455-456, 458; vol. 6, pp. 470, 474-475.

[19] Vives, *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 6, pp. 463-465.

[20] Vives, *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 6, pp. 463-465, 481.

[21] Vives, *De Europae dissidiis* (as in n. 14), vol. 6, p. 479: "nescio an idem Christo videatur, sed certe hoc tolerabilius malum, quàm furor ille civilis dissidii". Cf. On this point, see C. G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives on the Emotions* (Carbondale, Ill., 1989), pp. 63, 89, 191-196, 231-232, for a different assessment of Vives on the Turks and their relation to the Moriscos.

led learned elites to move to North Africa and the Near East, leaving Spanish Muslims deprived of intellectual leadership. Their religious illiteracy increased and their understanding of their tradition shrank to a doctrinal minimum and the rote practice of religious duties. The rapid abandonment of thirteenth-century efforts of Dominicans and others to persuade Spanish Muslims philosophically testifies to the lack of speculative thinkers on the Muslim side of the divide with whom to debate.[22] Matters deteriorated further after mosques and schools were closed and Arabic texts were banned in the 1520s. The very *aljamiado* literature through which crypto-Muslims maintained their heritage is remarkably unprepossessing in character. It freely mixes basics of belief and practice with folk traditions, the Koran with legends, juristic rulings and anti-Christian polemic with sorcery, prognostication, testimonies of and advice to the persecuted, and cookbooks. Its content has been described as "generally pedestrian" and as "so pathetic as to be risible".[23] And its authors constituted the best educated among the Morisco population.

Converso culture reflects some parallels with that of the Moriscos, but also specific differences.[24] The Jews had always been a minority in Spain and had never been a possessor power. In medieval Iberia they often gained importance as political and intellectual intermediaries between Muslims and Christians. Their status and influence won them both political protection and jealousy. They became targets of both evangelisation and persecution well before Spanish Christians turned this kind of attention to Muslims. From the twelfth century onward, the conversion of a number of learned rabbis acquainted Christian apologists with the Talmud and more recent rabbinical literature and armed them to wield this information against the Jews along with traditional, and polemical, exegeses of the Old Testament. While the blood libel, Host desecration, and well-poisoning accusations found in anti-Jewish texts and behaviours elsewhere in Europe were either non-existent or of very late medieval arrival in Spain, that period witnessed preaching campaigns against Jews, their forced at-

[22] From a long list of historians illustrating this consensus, the following are recommended: W. M. Watt, *A History of Islamic Spain* (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 95-96, 98-99, 101, 108-109, 134, 137, 140, 142-144; the publications of Burns cited above in notes 9 and 10; G. Jackson, *The Making of Medieval Spain* (New York, 1972), pp. 25-27, 43-45, 58, 62-63, 66, 67, 69-70, 100; A. G. Chejne, *Muslim Spain: Its History and Culture* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1974), pp. 81-82, 88, 91, 317-320, 332, 339; B. F. Reilly, *The Medieval Spains* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 102-103, 121-130; M. Á. de Bunes Ibarra, "La evolución de la polémica anti-islámica en los teólogos españoles del primer renacimiento", in *Diálogo filosófico-religioso* (as in n. 9), pp. 399-405; E. Colomer, "La controversia islamo-judeo-cristiana en la obra apologética de Ramon Martí", in ibid., pp. 243-248; Dahan, "L'usage de la *ratio*", in ibid., pp. 291-307; H. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of Al-Andalus* (New York, 1996), p. 272.

[23] Thus L. López-Baralt, *Islam in Spanish Literature from the Middle Ages to the Present*, transl. A. Hurley (Leiden, 1992), pp. 174-191; the quotations are at pp. 174 and 188 respectively.

[24] For the outlines of this history and regional differences, see the literature cited in notes 9 and 10 above.

tendance at sermons, the staging of inter-religious "debates" whose outcomes were foregone conclusions, and sporadic anti-Jewish violence. Although not imposed uniformly in all the Spanish kingdoms, forced conversions began in 1391. Significant numbers of former Jews entered the church in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, often remaining in touch with brethren who continued to practice Judaism under the rulers' protection. The very success of *conversos* in gaining positions in ecclesiastical and royal bureaucracies transferred to them the resentment previously directed toward Jews and inspired suspicion among some Old Christians regarding the sincerity of their commitment. By the late fifteenth century, such fears led to the substitution of "purity of blood" for orthodox faith and practice as the definition of a Spanish Catholic.

Those who remained Jews between 1391 and 1492 faced, as did Muslims, the attrition of their philosophers and speculative theologians. In addition, they experienced a uniquely Jewish form of demoralisation. Not only did prominent rabbis convert; a series of pseudo-prophets and false Messiahs arrived on the scene, spreading disillusionment when they proved to be frauds. Some rabbis, setting the date for the end of the diaspora, brought their congregants up short when it failed to materialise. Other rabbis responded by muting theological reflection altogether, urging fideism, or, alternatively, the notion that punctilious observance of the ritual law, not belief, defined Judaism. Anti-intellectual attitudes of these kinds were found among those who remained practising Jews before 1492 and among *conversos* who were crypto-Jews, who could rely on the former for the texts, personnel, and agencies needed for worship, instruction, and ritual observance.[25] After 1492 such was no longer the case.

While *conversos*, except for those who entered the Christian clergy and religious orders and received a scholastic education, inherited the turn away from speculative thought, their religious attitudes were far from monolithic. Some were hyper-observant crypto-Jews. Some were fervent Catholics. Some had an eclectic or hit-or-miss approach to religion. Allegiances could and did vary within the same family.[26] No one knew this better than Vives. The Inquisition opened proceedings against his own *converso* family in the 1520s.[27] All four of his late grandparents were censured for judaising. A paternal uncle and aunt

[25] These issues have been flagged well by Millás Vallicrosa, "La apologética" (as in n. 4), pp. 295-296; Haliczer, *Inquisition and Society* (as in n. 10), p. 214; Roth, *Conversos* (as in n. 9), pp. xiv-xv, 11-12, 35-47, 78-79; Melammed, *Heretics or Daughters of Israel?* (as in n. 9), pp. 45-72, 169-170, and p. 218 note 2 for further literature on false Messiahs.

[26] Haliczer, *Inquisition and Society* (as in n. 10), pp. 211-212, 220-221; Roth, *Conversos* (as in n. 9), pp. 78-79.

[27] The text of the Inquisition trials and a summary of the facts are printed by M. de la Pinta Llorente and J. M. de Palacio y de Palacio, *Procesos inquisitoriales contra la familia judía de Juan Luis Vives*, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, B-8 (Madrid, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 39-87, 98-107. See also R. García Cárel, "La familia de Luis Vives y la inquisitión", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 489-519; Á. Gómez-Hortiguëla, *El pensamiento filosófico de Juan Luis Vives: Contexto sociocultural, génesis y desarollo* (Valencia, 1998), chapter 1.

were prosecuted for maintaining a *sub rosa* synagogue in their house. In 1524, his father was convicted and executed and his property confiscated, and his mother's remains were exhumed and desecrated in 1529. The story differs in Vives' own generation. His brother died young, before his views became clear. One married sister and her husband were questioned by the Inquisition and released; his other married sister and her husband were not cited. Vives' youngest sister became a *beata*. While nothing specific is known about his own early religious education, his works early and late indicate that he himself was a committed Christian,[28] and one in a position to be notably well informed about *conversos* no less than Moriscos.

In *DVFC* this knowledge joins with the psychology and ethics which Vives develops fully in earlier works. While Vives the psychologist claims to derive his conclusions from observation, his ideas in this area all derive from classical sources, notably Aristotle and Galen.[29] He combines Aristotle's faculty psychology with Galen's theory of the four humours to propound a doctrine of personality types, used as a template for detecting the emotions to which particular types are prone and prescribing apposite remedies. That ethics so informed should be a respecter of persons coincides with his rhetorician's awareness of the need to temper discourse to the ethos of the audience. Although scholars concur on the substance of Vives' psychology, they either see no connection between it and his apology[30] or argue for an inverse relationship between them.[31] Yet, his anthropology bears directly on his argument in *DVFC*, along with a selective use of previous polemical literature.

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[28] Mestre, "La espiritualidad de Juan Luis Vives", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, p. 413. Largely on the basis of an argument from silence, González González, "Vives: Un humanista judeoconverso" (as in n. 1), pp. 64-68, 71-78, 81, urges that Vives was a crypto-Jew. Aside from ignoring his devotional and theological writings, this position fails to explain why he was invited to return to Spain to succeed Antonio Nebrija at the University of Alcalá in 1522, an offer he declined in order to cultivate greener pastures in England. Accepting Vives' *converso* background has been difficult for scholars in some quarters. In the uncorrected introduction to the 1992 reprint of his translation of Vives, Lorenzo Riber opines that this is a mere theory, "que nos merece una repulsa instintiva"; see Juan Luis Vives, *Obras completas*, 2 vols., transl. L. Riber (Madrid, 1947-1948; repr. 1992), vol. 1, p. 15.

[29] For earlier literature, see Kater, *Johann Ludwig Vives* (as in n. 3), pp. 23-26; Colish, "The Mime of God" (as in n. 5), pp. 3-20; repr., pp. 321-338. More recently, see Sancipriano, *Il pensiero psicologico*, although with the limits noted in n. 5 above; Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives on the Emotions* (as in n. 21), pp. 71-112, 119-123, 132-137, 141, 158, 166-167, 172-218; idem, introduction to his transl. of Juan Luis Vives, *The Passions of the Soul* (Lewiston, N.Y., 1990), p. 2; Casini, "Aristotelianism and Anti-Stoicism" (as in n. 3), pp. 283-305 with excellent bibliography in his notes.

[30] Sancipriano, *Il pensiero psicologico* (as in n. 5), pp. 69-80; Belarte Forment, "Aproximación", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, p. 320: Vives' *De anima et vita* "no aporta ningún elemento nuevo de interés para la aproximación al estudio de la teología humanistica de Vives".

[31] Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions* (as in n. 21), pp. 67-68, reads Vives' theology as informing his psychology, not vice versa.

Formally, there are two noteworthy features of *DVFC*. First, it is of mixed genre. Its first and second books state his views on God, human nature, and Christ, while the third and fourth books are dialogues between a Christian and his Jewish and Muslim interlocutors; the fifth book concludes with a summary and exhortation. Second, unlike earlier apologists who lead off with the Trinity and the divinity of Christ, the two major doctrines dividing Christianity from Judaism and Islam, sometimes including philosophical proofs of God's existence, Vives, after outlining his goals and methods, begins Book 1 with human nature. He then moves on to God. The deity he proposes, whose existence he sees no need to prove to fellow monotheists, is one envisioned as congruent with human nature and needs. The deity's attributes are described, not demonstrated.[32] Vives asserts here as elsewhere that we can discover human nature and ends by observation. And, given that God does nothing in vain, He provides us with what we need to lead meaningful lives and to achieve those ends. Religion is a natural phenomenon; the one to follow is the one that best accommodates these facts and needs. Since Jews and Muslims also hold that God reveals His law, Vives proceeds directly in Book 2 to argue for the superior utility of God's ministry to our nature and needs through His revelation in Christ. Vives acknowledges that his audience does not need Christ in order to get to God. Rather, Christ is to be preferred because He surpasses Moses and Muhammad in bringing God to us; He offers the divine guidance most apposite to the human condition. And He can do so better than anyone else because He is divine, as well as human. Having established these principles and conclusions as rationally acceptable to any ***homme moyen intellectuel***, Vives then refers back to them in the actual debates with the Jew and Muslim which follow.

But before he does, Vives defends and characterises his intended use of reason in *DVFC*. He recognises the existence of suprarational truths and direct testimonies of the Holy Spirit. But, we are granted only a glimmer of the former and the gifts of the latter are distributed unequally. Neither gives us sufficient data on how to live in this life.[33] Also inadequate is information based on the evidence of the senses. For the senses can be deceptive; the devil may appeal to them; and reliance on their testimony undercuts the merit of faith.[34] We should likewise dismiss arguments from miracles. For they too appeal to the senses, and are valued only by those who already believe, ***ex post facto***; nor do they tell

[32] The best treatment of this strategy is in Mestre Sanchis, "Teología y espiritualidad" (as in n. 1), pp. 248-251; idem, "La espiritualidad de Juan Luis Vives", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 417-458. See also Clements, "A Sixteenth-Century Psychologist" (as in n. 3), pp. 80-81; R. Marín Ibáñez, "El tema de dios in el pensamiento de Luis Vives", *Revista de filosofía* 25 (1966), pp. 469-473.

[33] Juan Luis Vives, *De veritate fidei christianae* [= *DVFC*], praef., 1.3, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mayans y Síscar (as in n. 14), vol. 8, pp. 3, 11. Note: the numbering of chapters in this edition of the work sometimes skips chapter numbers or assigns the same number to successive chapters. To facilitate reference, we will follow the editor's numbering system in citing this work.

[34] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef.; vol. 8, p. 3.

us what we need to know in order to be saved.[35] Nor should we defend religious truth purely on the basis of biblical exegesis. For some people regard the Bible, or certain versions of the text, as human inventions. Further, much confusion and irrelevancy has been based on over-subtle exegesis, of which Christians are also guilty.[36] How fully Vives follows his own guidelines on miracles and biblical exegesis the sequel will show. On the one hand, he asserts that reason is not the norm of faith; nor does it establish faith. But it corroborates faith and was so used by Christ Himself, by St. Paul in his mission to the Jews and Gentiles, and by later apologists and church fathers in defending the faith against heresy, without undermining its authority.[37] On the other hand, Vives forcibly rejects scholastic speculations and technicalities. He will limit himself, he says, to practical ethics and to arguments anyone can understand.[38] As to how we acquire reason, there is no consensus. Reason may be an inspiration, a seed, a light, a faculty of the human mind, a natural inclination, the immediate cognising of self-evident principles, or the ability to derive theological truths from the examination of created nature. Vives airs this controversy only to dismiss it, and because, whatever the merits of these alternatives, the endowment of human reason, despite our defects, enables us all to know our nature and ends. No one is exempted from applying this knowledge.[39]

Vives seeks to extend reason's aid to Old as well as New Christians. As he observes, some in the church are careless, lazy, and forgetful. Some are doubtful, confused, and fainthearted. Some are misled by evil customs learned from parents, teachers, public institutions, or vulgar opinion. Some profess the Christian faith but live in a manner inconsistent with it. Vives compares these weak brethren to a painting which, faded by time and mottled by superstition, unedifying debate, and scandalous clerical behaviour, has lost its clarity of outline and the freshness of its original colours. While it does not require complete repainting, it needs cleaning and restoration, retouched by the brush of a firmer persuasion.[40] Then, there are those who dissimulate their faith, who remain outsiders within the fold: "The Jew and the Saracen cling tooth and nail to their own sects […] just because they received them from their parents". They remain under a cloud; "the Jew is weighed down by it in discussing his law with the Christian, while the Muslim is forbidden to debate his religion in any way".[41] Both groups, he charges, treat their faith as if it were made of the thinnest of glass: touch it at all, and it shatters.[42] And, regrettably, "nowadays, we

[35] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.3; vol. 8, p. 20.
[36] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef., 1.3; vol. 8, pp. 1-2, 12, 17.
[37] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef., 1.3; vol. 8, pp. 2, 3, 18-19.
[38] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef., 1.2, 1.3; vol. 8, pp. 4, 11, 16, 18.
[39] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.1; vol. 8, pp. 8-9.
[40] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef., 1.3; vol. 8, pp. 2, 21.
[41] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef.; vol. 8, p. 4: "Sic Judaeus adhaeret mordicus suae sectae, sic Saracenus, […] quoniam eas a parentibus acceperunt"; 1.3; vol. 8, p. 16: "Judaeus gravatur cum Christiano de lege sua conferre; Mahometus de secta sua disputari omnino vetuit".
[42] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.3; vol. 8, p. 16.

see this issue dealt with more by passions, as with civic factions and cabals, than by reason and judgment".[43] Public policy, no less than the desired repristination of the church and its fuller integration of New Christians, requires the corrective of reason.

Vives then warms to the task of describing human nature with the observation that, just as all things have ends, and, once we know what they are, we can ascertain whether a given course of action fulfills them, so reasonable people will agree that we too have ends and the God-given natural capacity to discover and attain them.[44] He reprises the hylomorphic anthropology which he develops elsewhere, with its vegetative, animate, and rational faculties, the internal mental faculties with which we make the correct or incorrect judgments that lead to virtues or vicious passions, and the external faculties or physical senses. All aspects of human nature can be used well or badly. The exercise of both of these options explains our natural need for human society at various levels. But all things, even when good, are not finally good, since they are attached to transitory aspects of the human constitution and can be lost. Our true good and end is a spiritual one, eternal felicity, which cannot be lost. Virtues in themselves are not ends but means to that end.[45] And, given that our end is an eternal one and that our Creator has endowed us with the capacities needed to attain it, our souls must be immortal.[46] The chief point that Vives wants to make about God, aside from His possession of a pure spiritual nature, unity, aseity, immutability, omnipotence, and a unique creative role, attributes inferred from the premise that He must be the supreme instantiation of every conceivable excellence, is that He is supremely benevolent. Thus, although He acts freely, He also acts in accordance with His nature in granting us what is congruent with our own nature and in enabling us to discover what we need to do to gain the eternal blessings He prepares for us.[47]

These benefits apply to us both as created and as recreated. Given God's benevolence, it is no surprise that He should wish to rehabilitate us after Adam's fall. Nor it is surprising that He should retain in fallen humanity the rational capacity and free will needed to respond to Him.[48] Vives finds it pointless to hypotheticise on the ways in which the omnipotent God might have come to our rescue. What we do know is that He sent Christ, the best possible

[43] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), praef.; vol. 8, p. 4: "Quamquam videamus hodie rem potius affectibus geri, sicut in partibus, et factionibus civitatem, quàm ratione, ac judicio".

[44] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.1; vol. 8, pp. 5-9.

[45] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.5-6; vol. 8, pp. 30-44.

[46] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.7-8; 1.12-13, 1.17, vol. 8, pp. 51-58, 93-111, 132. For this argument on immortality see also Clements, "A Sixteenth-Century Psychologist" (as in n. 3), pp. 80-81.

[47] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.9-13; vol. 8, pp. 54-111.

[48] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 1.16-17; vol. 8, pp. 118-133. For Vives on the capacities of human reason after the Fall, see Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (as in n. 1), p. 229; Mestre, "La espiritualidad", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 422-425.

messenger, to show the way.[49] Nor has Vives any interest in theories concerning the hypostatic union or Christ's human psychology. And, it is merely in passing, in the context of Christology, that he brings up the doctrine of the Trinity. His only concern with it is to establish that Christ was fully divine both before and after the Incarnation, and that it was the second person of the Trinity who was incarnated because He was already a Son.[50] What really counts is that no mere human leader attached to a single people can do the job; it can be done only by a divine person who operates both efficaciously and universally.[51] Here, as in Book 3, Vives shelves his stated ban on exegetical argumentation. The Hebrew of the Old Testament text is obscure in language, grammar, and style, he charges. Even so, that text is frank in reporting the limitations of its worthies. Also, its law, given through Moses, was measured to a people as yet puerile. Time marches on, and a fuller revelation was given by Christ at a more mature stage of human development.[52] As for the Old Testament prophets, Vives gives them a pointedly topical profile by alleging that they sometimes "equated themselves with the Messiah".[53]

In fulfilling the law and the prophets, Christ as Vives presents Him taught by word and example, inscribing His message on human hearts. He left no writings Himself. This point leads to another exegetical engagement in support of the credibility and superiority of the New Testament to the Hebrew Bible, the Koran, and pagan texts alike.[54] The New Testament writers, Vives claims, were all contemporary witnesses to Christ. Their accounts, corroborated even by hostile pagan witnesses, narrate a straightforward story with no digressions or irrelevant speculations. The discrepancies among their texts are a plus factor: the authors did not convene ahead of time to manufacture the same tale verbatim; each responded to divine inspiration in his own way. They do not differ on essentials.[55] And the most essential of Christ's lessons which they convey is that God excludes no one from His blessings. To attain them, all must abandon worldly pleasures and join in the love of God and neighbour. The most difficult form of love enjoined by Christ is love of one's enemies, although nothing is more meritorious. For Vives, that Christ conveys this message with divine power is also attested by His miracles – another departure from his stated terms of argument – while the human Christ, by the force of His example, shows us how to internalise and express His virtues, especially His endurance of all the trials of the human condition, with a Stoicising equanimity and forbearance. Among events in Christ's life, Vives emphasises His Crucifixion as a model for

[49] For a fine discussion of Vives' Christology in this work, see B. Gómez Monsegú, "La doctrina cristológica de Luis Vives", *Estudios franciscanos* 55 (1954), pp. 429-458; 56 (1955), pp. 43-52.

[50] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.3, 2.6; vol. 8, pp. 147-152, 157-159.

[51] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.2, 2.4-5; vol. 8, pp. 141-147, 153-157.

[52] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.1, 2.3, 2.7, 2.9; vol. 8, pp. 136-141, 147-156, 159-167, 182-184.

[53] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.7; vol. 8, p. 167: "ipsos pro Messia substituant".

[54] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.8-9; vol. 8, pp. 167-178.

[55] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.8; vol. 8, pp. 173-174.

how to bear suffering and injustice and His Resurrection as the promise of our own, fully consistent with the immortality of the soul and the dignity of a body capable of freedom from earthly constraints that are basic human endowments.[56] This is a soteriology remote from any notion of ransom, advocacy, imputation, liberation from the devil's sway, liberation of a fallen will constrained to sin, or the satisfaction of divine justice.

Before leaving Book 2, Vives adds two other points illustrative of his theology. The one and only Christian ritual he cites with approval and the one and only sacrament whose function he discusses are the Mass and the Eucharist. He makes a single point here: the celebration of the Eucharist helps us call to mind Christ's moral example and promises. Vives seconds the real presence doctrine but with no interest in the debates on what the consecration formula means semantically or metaphysically. He does not discuss this sacrament – or any other – as a means of grace to recipients.[57] Nor is he interested in a topic found in many previous writers, the parallels or lack of them between Old Testament rites and Christian sacraments. Equally striking is his discussion of predestination at the end of Book 2. Its location there may seem odd until one registers his understanding of this doctrine. He aligns himself with the earliest position taken by Augustine when he held, briefly, that God predestines the elect in the light of their *praevisa merita*.[58] For Vives, this is indeed why God chose Jacob and not Esau. He goes on to explain that God calls everyone, offering His goodness to all. Whether we accept that call or not is up to us, and we can make the choice freely. Election means making use of God's call once we accept it. Predestination means perseverance in so doing. Reprobation means rejecting the call. Activating and using God's call involves grace, Vives continues. And God, cognisant that different individuals have different natural gifts and limits, gives to each of us the grace we need and can use. Vives has no interest in the priority or posteriority of grace and human effort, nor does he see their relationship as a zero-sum game. As he moves to the dialogic portions of *DVFC*, he clearly wants to stress both our own options as free moral agents and the commensurability of God's benevolence with human nature and needs.

It has to be said that, in turning to his inter-religious dialogues, Vives sees more points of continuity between Judaism and Christianity than he does in the

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[56] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.9-15, 2.17-18, 2.20-22; vol. 8, pp. 175, 184-187, 192-214, 217-222, 232-244.

[57] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.16; vol. 8, pp. 214-217; see also ibid. 3.7; vol. 8, p. 287. Vives mentions baptism in passing, at ibid. 3 praef.; vol. 8, p. 252, but merely as a membership card in the church, without interest in its objective or subjective effects on the recipient. Mestre, "La espiritualidad", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 449-452, overinterprets Vives on the Eucharist.

[58] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 2.24; vol. 8, pp. 244-246. Cf. E. TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (New York, 1970), pp. 176-181, for the loci in Augustine's works in the 390s. For Vives on grace and human effort, see Mestre, "La espiritualidad", in *Opera omnia*, ed. Mestre (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 417-419; Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives* (as in n. 1), p. 229, which corrects idem, *Juan Luis Vives on the Emotions* (as in n. 21), p. 67, where the author states that Vives omits the topic of grace altogether.

case of Islam. Basic to this view, of course, is that the Old Testament, interpreted correctly, remains a Christian text, whose moral truths are preserved in the New Testament. Much as the practice contravenes his methodological desiderata, he can scarcely avoid exegesis in Book 3. While Vives disclaims the utility of philological hair-splitting in interpreting texts on which much ink had been spilled, such as the word denoting "virgin" or "young woman" in Isaiah,[59] he concurs with tradition in holding that the Old Testament prophets foretold the coming of Christ and that He rules a spiritual kingdom, as opposed to the earthly kingdom of the hoped-for Jewish Messiah. He agrees that Christianity preserves the best part of the Jewish legacy. Vives also shows his Spanish colours in his familiarity with the Talmud and more recent Jewish commentary and praxis. But his aim is to go beyond the standard attack on Judaism as literal-minded and legalistic, or the critique of particular Jewish rites, by the counter-citation of biblical authority. Rather, he recasts what he portrays as unenlightened or erroneous in Judaism as a result of the misunderstanding of biblical history or as unworthy of God and of human nature. In addition to charging the Jews with uncritical fideism and inconsistency in these respects,[60] he wants to accent so far as possible the positive aspects of Judaism, arguing that, far from abandoning their heritage and betraying God in accepting Christianity, Jews will retain their true heritage and receive, from a loving God, a redemption from the sins that have repeatedly led to their exile, and one which Judaism cannot supply. And, just as the Jews will find in the church the New Israel, so also true Christians and truly spiritual Jews will form a single people.[61]

The opening sally of Christianus, the persona through whom Vives speaks in Book 3, is that he will speak with Judaeus, his *converso* opposite number, as one who "argues man to man, using human reason and judgment".[62] He swiftly wins Judaeus' assent to the conception of human and divine natures established in Book 1 of *DVFC*.[63] Such being agreed, Christianus points out, the Jews err by viewing God in the Old Testament and the Talmud anthropomorphically and as capricious and vengeful. The rabbis come in for his particular criticism, as adding fables to the biblical tradition, spinning arbitrary theoretical constructs, spreading confusion by their mutual disagreements, and arrogating authority to themselves. It is incongruous for God to limit His interest to a single people and beneath His dignity to concern Himself, and us, with trivia such as the abstention from certain foods or the wearing of clothes made of mixed fibres; God is not a dietitian or a draper. And, the rabbis have heaped new rituals upon old. Just as such practices are irrelevant to our well-being in this life, so also the

[59] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.11; vol. 8, p. 325.

[60] On Jewish fideism in Vives, see Millás Vallicrosa, "La apologética" (as in n. 4), p. 296; Gómez, "El díalogo *contra iudaeos*" (as in n. 6), pp. 77-79; Reinhardt, "Vives' Auseinandersetzung" (as in n. 5), p. 16.

[61] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.7; vol. 8, p. 290: "et veri Christiani sunt Judaei spiritales, et filii Israelis, et semen Abrahae".

[62] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.1, 3.2; vol. 8, pp. 247-252; the quotation is at 3.1; vol. 8, p. 248: "et homo cum homine humana ratione, ac judicio disceptante contendat".

[63] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.1, 3.2; vol. 8, pp. 248-252, 363-366.

substitution of a political return to Palestine for spiritual happiness in the next life, freed from the body's natural needs, shows that Jewish eschatology misconstrues human nature.[64] When Judaeus challenges Christianus by observing that Christianity has likewise added many post-biblical rituals to its praxis, Christianus responds that they stem from human legislation and will and are mere disciplinary rules which, by the same token, can be dispensed from, suspended, annulled – or ignored.[65]

Christianus then shifts to a historical attack on the continuing applicability of Jewish law and, again, the Jewish idea of the Messiah. Here, Vives harks back to the theory of progressive revelation and the "infancy of the race" argument aired briefly in Book 1. The obscurities of the Old Testament text and the elaborate addenda of the rabbis notwithstanding, the text makes it clear that, while God is immutable, He adapts to their capacities what He requires of His people over time. Animal sacrifice was once the rule and became obsolete. The covenant with Israel existed before the Ten Commandments, and before the host of new rules imposed on the Israelites in the desert after the golden calf episode. Temple worship was enjoined after the Temple was built. But when the Israelites were conquered and exiled and the Temple was destroyed, other modes of honouring God became acceptable. All this shows that, up to the present, Jewish praxis has not been static. So, it should continue to develop by abrogating what is pointless and spiritually immature in its tradition while retaining the spiritual worship of God taught by the prophets and psalmists, which has been preserved and universalised by Christianity.[66] As for the Messiah, history tells us that, from the days of Josephus to the present, the rabbis have promoted a series of false Messiahs, implicating Israel in their own follies, to its ridicule and ruin. "Only three years hence in Italy", Christianus remarks, "the Emperor Charles put to death one such Jew who claimed to be your Messiah, and daily we hear of a new Messiah born to you".[67] For how many more thousands of years should the Jews put up with this kind of compromised leadership and false hope?

After this unmistakable reference to current events, Vives winds down his Jewish-Christian dialogue with an effort to reinforce the positive. In place of the grandstanding, over-subtle, and fraudulent rabbis, the Jews should follow a true leader drawn from their own ranks: Philo.[68] It is no accident that Vives presents a model who, historically, enjoyed more authority among Christians

[64] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.1, 3.4-7, 3.9-11; vol. 8, pp. 252-263, 273-292, 305-357; see also 1.7; vol. 8, p. 131 and Millás Vallicrosa, "La apologética" (as in n. 4), pp. 296-299, 301-307, 312-314.

[65] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.2, 3.7; vol. 8, pp. 267-269, 285.

[66] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.2, 3.3-8; vol. 8, pp. 263-266, 271-304; see also 2.11; vol. 8, p. 194 and Millás Vallicrosa, "La apologética" (as in n. 4), pp. 308-310.

[67] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.2, 3.11, 3.12; vol. 8, pp. 270-271, 324-330, 361; the quotation is at 3.11; vol. 8, p. 330: "Tertio abhinc anno Carolus Caesar Judaeum quendam in Italiam excussit, qui se constanter Messiam esse vestrum affirmaret; et inter vos quotidie est audire, natum esse Messiam".

[68] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.2; vol. 8, p. 271.

than Jews. This counter-example suggests that, in critiquing the post-biblical Jewish tradition, Vives does not propose *scriptura sola* Judaism but a spiritualised approach to the Old Testament and to ethics alike. When such a path is followed, he concludes, it will lead Jews naturally into the church – and *conversos* into their full inheritance. Perfected in Christianity, they will continue to bring forth good things from their own treasury. Their true Messiah will be Christ. Their true promised land will be heaven. The true Temple will be a pure and holy soul. The true Mosaic covenant will be the law of nature inscribed on the human heart. The true unclean foods will be the impurities of the flesh. The true sacrifices will be the offering of spiritual worship and the renunciation of our animal passions. The true motivation for religion will be not fear of punishment but the love of God and neighbour.[69] This is the prospect and the hope, presented as consistent with reason, history, and divine and human nature, which Vives holds out to the *conversos*.

As Christianus turns from his Jewish to his Muslim interlocutor, three features of the dialogue in Book 4 prompt initial notice. First, the name Vives gives to the Muslim is Alfaquinus, one immediately recognisable to sixteenth-century Spaniards as the Latin form of *alfaquí*, the title of an earlier Muslim functionary and now of an undercover Morisco agent who, in place of the *imam* but without his educational credentials, gave judicial opinions and instruction and led worship services for crypto-Muslims.[70] Unlike Judaeus, portrayed as a rank and file member of his religious community, Alfaquinus represents what currently passes for the Morisco learned elite. Second, Christianus' account of Islam, unlike that of Judaism, does not distinguish between the Koran, the authoritative Hadiths, later interpretation and practice, and folk traditions; nor does Alfaquinus challenge him on that subject, suggesting that he himself has no clear understanding of his heritage. Third, while, for obvious reasons, Vives cannot invoke the progressive revelation theory against Islam in the way he applies it to Judaism, he does draw on historical arguments when he can, as well as rational ones, in targeting what he attacks in Islam. And, while he finds much to reject, he finds little to accept, concluding that the religion of Islam is not only unreasonable but also that it is fundamentally unnecessary.

The curtain-raiser in Book 4 presents the interlocutors meeting in a *locus amoenus*, leading to Alfaquinus' initial agreement that an all-wise and benevolent God possessing the standard attributes is the first cause of all things, not just the beauties of nature but also human beings created for their own well-being in this world and the next.[71] But at once the conversation hits a snag, designed to illustrate two points which Vives makes repeatedly: Islam is riddled with self-contradictions; and Muslims accept them out of a mindless reverence for authority. Questioned further about his views on human nature, Alfaquinus replies that the body is either the instrument of the soul or its dwelling or its prison; the passions are either perturbations of the soul or infrarational motiva-

[69] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 3.7, 3.12; vol. 8, pp. 287, 289-290, 358-364.
[70] Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos* (as in n. 9), pp. 30-34, 134-135.
[71] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.1; vol. 8, pp. 364-366.

tions that we share with animals. His source for these incompatible theories, he states, is his own learned master, a man also conversant with Judaism and Christianity, whose teachings he has followed since childhood, both on human nature and on Muslim law. He tries to forestall debate by asserting that he is not allowed to challenge this law: "He [my teacher] has indeed proved that it [the correct path] is the Muslim law, and that, on the orders of Muhammad himself, we are forbidden to question or dispute the traditions of our fathers in any way, but enjoined to hold them fast and not to depart from them by a hair. My father was a Muslim; hence I follow him".[72]

Observing ironically that Alfaquinus' master must have been a learned man indeed, Christianus asks why the founder of his religion imposed this ban, "since it is incredible that he would have done so for no reason".[73] Alfaquinus responds that Muhammad's aim was to spare weak and ignorant believers from doubt, and turns the question around by asking whether Christians, too, are not prohibited from debating their faith in public. Christianus establishes a major point in his answer. Yes, he says, this ban does apply to debates before the uneducated. But the educated are permitted, nay required, to seek *intellectus fidei*. For, just as it is fitting to apply human intelligence, the intelligence with which, Alfaquinus has just agreed, God has endowed us, to the arts and sciences, so it is fitting to apply it to religion, to support and clarify faith. If Muslim leaders, following Muhammad, regard their faith as irreconcilable with reason, he adds, then they perpetuate a fraudulent religion whose founder was a charlatan, not a true prophet of God.[74]

This allegation leads to an *ad hominem* critique of the ethics of Islam by way of an attack on Muhammad's personal morality, intentions, and research skills, one which rehearses some of the commonplaces of the polemical tradition. Vives concurs that Muhammad was greedy, lustful, and adulterous, a power-hungry murderer who spread his teachings by force and fear. Notably, Alfaquinus does not rejoin that Christians have also spread their faith by the sword, and that they are presently doing so in the New World, just as Christians at home have forced baptism on Spanish Muslims and Jews. The absence of this objection, and of any response to it by Christianus, highlights the fact that Vives intends to omit almost as much as he includes in this dialogue. For someone raised in an environment that included practising Muslims, the most surprising of Vives' canards is that Muhammad was an idolater, an accusation which Alfaquinus does not protest or correct.[75] Nor does he countercharge that

[72] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4 praef., 4.1-2; vol. 8, pp. 364-367. The quotation is at 4.1; vol. 8, p. 366: "Ille verò Mahumeticam probabat, et vetebat nos ex jussis Mahumetis ipsius quicquam de illa disputare, aut inquirere, sed tenere firmiter traditiones patrum, nec ab illis vel latum unguem esse deflectendum; Pater meus fuit Mahumeticus, ego illum sequar".

[73] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.2; vol. 8, p. 367: "nam non est credibile sine causa eum id fecisse". See also ibid. 4.6; vol. 8, p. 382.

[74] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.1, 4.2-4; vol. 8, pp. 367-379; see also 3.12; vol. 8, p. 361.

[75] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.3-5, 4.12; vol. 8, pp. 371-380, 401.

the Christians' use of religious art shows them to be the idolaters.

Christianus adds that Muhammad derived his erroneous ethics from flawed or inadequate sources. Rather than eliminating corruptions that had crept into the Old and New Testaments, he was misinformed by Talmudists and heretical Christians. Neither he nor his followers had the sufficient critical spirit to make an independent comparison with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures.[76] Further, Muhammad incorporated fantastic legends into the Koran, reported as God's truth. The most egregious example Christianus gives, and one, again, that provokes no demur from Alfaquinus, is Muhammad's purported reason for banning pork as an unclean food: the pig was not part of God's original creation. It was generated out of the excrement of the elephant in Noah's Ark.[77]

Aside from displaying an ignorance of natural science, Christianus continues, Muhammad's ethics reflects another defective source, equally unworthy of God and incompatible with human nature, the customs of a single, limited people, the pre-Islamic Arabs, which he merely codified. Consistent with an erroneous view of God as arbitrary, harsh and vindictive, Muhammad thus approved of vengeance, pillage, polygamy and divorce – at least by husbands – for frivolous reasons. On Muslim marital ethics Vives has much to say, observing that it is selfish and unfair to women, not to mention the children of divorce, and that it makes a mockery of marriage as a school for virtue.[78] This line of argument is a debater's point, given Vives' untroubled acceptance of patriarchy elsewhere in his *oeuvre*. Just as the domestic discord provoked by polygamy is bad for our moral health, so Muhammad's misappropriation of the principle of fasting detracts from the merit which this practice might otherwise have, and is bad for our physical health. For, after abstaining from food during the daytime in Ramadan, Muslims gorge themselves as soon as night falls.[79]

Just as Muhammad's moral law is unworthy of God and useless or harmful to us, so Christianus rejects Muslim eschatology for the same reasons. There existed a long tradition of Christian criticism of the Muslim belief that the resurrected body is like the body in this life and that heaven grants the saints physical pleasures. Vives draws on this tradition and recasts it as a ***reductio ad absurdum***. His strategy is to argue that, aside from reclothing us with a natural body that, as such, is necessarily subject to pain no less than pleasure, the Muslims' posthumous scenario is ridiculous. If there is feasting in heaven, will there be a sewage system to dispose of the waste products of the body? Will the female saints enjoy sexual pleasures comparable to those of male saints? Will there be weavers and tailors to make the saints' fine clothes? Will there be ball games, dice, music, and baths in heaven? If not why not? His goal is to show

[76] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.4, 4.6-8, 4.10, 4.13, 4.17; vol. 8, pp. 379, 380-387, 389-395, 401-403, 423-424.

[77] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.11; vol. pp. 395-399. For the Koran's actual teaching on the eating of animal flesh, see Sura 2, 5, 6, 16. For more on Muslim foodways as beneath the notice of a God who is not a dietitian, a point repeated from Vives' critique of Judaism, see *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.14; vol. 8, pp. 410-411.

[78] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.6, 4.9-10, 4.14; vol. 8, pp. 381, 387-395, 402-413.

[79] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.14; vol. 8, pp. 410-411.

that the Muslims' physical beatitude lacks both dignity, practicality and common sense.[80] Moreover, given that we have immortal souls as well as bodies, where are the spiritual joys of the Muslim heaven? Here, Christianus takes a tack comparable only in part to his recommendation of Philo to Jews in Book 3. He observes that learned authorities within Islam itself reject the standard Muslim eschatology in favour of an afterlife of pure intellectual bliss. His models are Avicenna and Averroes: "A better and truer blessedness is confessed by your sages, Averroes and Avicenna, handed down from the pagan Aristotle, than by your lawgiver".[81] Leaving aside the disingenuous claim that Aristotle believed in an afterlife, Vives' citation of these two eminent thinkers is not one he offers as a global remedy for Muslim credulity. For he is aware that they undergird major scholastic disputes from which he dissociates himself. Avicenna and Averroes are to be followed on the afterlife, and on the afterlife alone.

While these figures suggest that the history of Islam has had a few bright spots, and while he concedes that Muhammad at least converted pagan polytheists to monotheism,[82] Vives' general technique in Book 4 is to dismiss Islam's positive teachings by the tactic of strategic omission. Nowhere in the discourse of either Christianus or Alfaquinus do we hear of the Muslim God as compassionate and merciful; nowhere does either interlocutor mention the Muslim duties of forbearance, piety, and charity. Vives even manages to put a negative spin on a doctrine he elsewhere treats as a positive teaching of Islam, religious toleration. Christianus seizes on this principle and turns it on its head. It is true, he notes, that Muslims condemn apostates from their own faith. Yet, they tolerate Jews and Christians, holding that, so long as they live an upright life, each following his own law, they are assured of God's love. But if this teaching is correct, he argues, it contradicts the doctrine that the Koran is God's normative revelation, to which everyone should convert. And if that first claim is not cancelled by the second, then Islam, simply, is unnecessary, at least for believers in the other Abrahamic faiths.[83] A final index of Muslim irrationality to which Vives points brings his argument home to his native Spain. The Muslims who were defeated by the Christian kings lost because they were a culturally backward people, blindly obedient to a childlike faith, "in whom the light of all learning was extinguished […] unable to defend themselves either with arms or brains".[84] Yet, they continue to resist an advanced culture and a Christian message which Muhammad in no sense improved on, even to the point of fruit-

[80] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.15-16; vol. 8, pp. 413-423.

[81] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.16; vol. 8, p. 421: "et vestri sapientes Averrois, atque Avicenna confessi sunt meliorem, ac veriorem beatitudinem tradi ab Aristotele gentili, quàm a vestro legumlatore".

[82] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.12; vol. 8, p. 401.

[83] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.4, 4.18-19; vol. 8, pp. 379, 425-427; see 4.18; vol. 8, p. 425: "unumquemque in lege sua servari […] quòd in universum recte vivens, sive Judaeus, sive Christianus […] indubie divinam caritatem assequitur". This point is grounded in Koran, Sura 3, 5, 16.

[84] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.12; vol. 8, p. 402: "extincta luce omni litterarum […] invaluit ille sine repugnantia ingeniorum et lacertorum".

lessly taking up arms again: "In our own day we see in Spain leaders of sedition, boldly regarding themselves as authorised to do so by divine right".[85] This behaviour Christianus presents as just as fatuous and self-defeating for the Moriscos as is the belief in false Messiahs for the *conversos*. But, unlike his treatment of the *conversos*, whose Jewish law he can relativise as good for its time and as now perfected in its essentials by the church, he offers precious little in his debate with Alfaquinus that would encourage or facilitate an organic transition from Islam to Christianity.

This finding, as with much of the substance of Books 3 and 4, exposes the inconsistency of Vives' own argument with his conclusion in Book 5 that all religions, even false ones, imitate the truth of the Christian faith. His presentation of Judaism and especially of Islam is frequently biased and monocular, for all the information at his disposal and for all his claims to be reasonable and fair-minded. His picture of Christianity is also selective, sidelining as irrelevant whatever, as a Christian humanist, he dislikes. Most stunning and tendentious is his claim that the text of the New Testament is perfectly transparent and that all Christians agree on its message. While Vives is sometimes portrayed as completely disinterested in the Reformation debates and in Christian doctrine as such,[86] in *DVFC* he takes a stand, both by word and by deliberate omission, on such topics as the Trinity, Christology, sacraments, ritual, post-biblical miracles, predestination and its pendants grace and free will, and on the proper role of reason – and the kind of common-sense arguments he advocates – in a theology which, even more than that of some contemporary Christian humanists, puts ethics front and centre and ignores much else. His emphasis bespeaks more than the exigencies of apologetic rhetoric. Some members of his own church would have deemed many of his positions, at best, as jejune or at worst, as perilously close to the outer edge of the pre-Tridentine orthodox consensus. Yet and still, far from his homeland, Vives dedicates his swan-song to *conversos* and Moriscos, in the hope that they will become fully Christianised, and also to Old Christians, whose church needs reform and whose public policy ought to welcome those entering its ranks with more intelligence and humanity. These complementary objectives are pressing for Vives and go beyond his personal ethics and theology. They are also civic responsibilities. Christians, he agrees, should be citizens of the world. But they should also be good citizens of their own native lands. His final peroration in *DVFC* lays this imperative before his contemporaries and above all his fellow Spaniards. In Christ there is no Greek or barbarian, Jew or Gentile, Asia or Europe: "For in His law Christ conjoins and bonds men together, however different, in good will, teaching them to be

[85] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 4.3; vol. 8, p. 372: "Aetate nostra vidimus in Hispania duces seditionum, qui se divinitus ad id missos confirmarent".

[86] This is the view of Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives on the Emotions* (as in n. 21), pp. 146, 201, 299, although he contradicts himself, noting, pp. 119-120, that Vives wrote a polemical work against the Münster Anabaptists in 1535, as is also flagged by Sancipriano, *Il pensiero psicologico* (as in n. 5), p. 57.

brothers among themselves, for they are children of the self-same God".[87] With respect to the Old Christians and New Christians of Vives' Spain, this ideal, and this vision, were not to be realised.

[87] Vives, *DVFC* (as in n. 33), 5.9; vol. 8, p. 454: "Christus lege sua […] hominem quemcunque cuicunque alteri conjunxit, et conglutinavit bona voluntate, docens fratres illos esse homines inter se, qui Filii essent ejusdem Patris Dei".

MONTAIGNE AND CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

Peter Mack

Montaigne was both a practising Roman Catholic and a lifelong reader of Latin poetry and ancient history. Both his Christianity and his reading in classical philosophy contributed to his *Essais* but in them he made many arguments against major preoccupations of renaissance humanism and the different attempts to reconcile humanism and Christianity.[1] A comparison between his attitude to his classical reading and his not especially humanist version of Christianity may offer an approach to understanding the kind of writer and philosopher Montaigne was.

Christian humanists are often defined by their wish to reach the bedrock of Christian belief without some of the accretions of subsequent tradition. They apply humanist philological techniques to the scriptures, seeking to achieve a more reliable text and to make from it a more accurate Latin translation than that provided in the Vulgate. Typically they wish to base their religion as far as possible on the gospels and to investigate the practices of the primitive church where this can be deduced from the Acts of the Apostles and the writings of the early church fathers. Montaigne's *Essais*, by contrast, refer to Jesus relatively infrequently (perhaps ten times in the whole work) and take relatively few quotations from the Bible (perhaps forty-five quotations in all, compared to several hundred each from Plutarch, Seneca and Lucretius). Among the Bible

[1] The scholarly literature on both Montaigne's religion and his reading in classical literature is immense. Starting points would be P. Villey, *Les sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1933[2]); M. Dréano, *La pensée religieuse de Montaigne* (Paris, 1936); D. Frame, *Montaigne's Discovery of Man* (New York, 1955); G. M. Logan, "The Relation of Montaigne to Renaissance Humanism", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975), pp. 613-632; M. S. Meijer, "Montaigne et la Bible", *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne* 20 (1976), pp. 23-57; M. McKinley, *Words in a Corner: Studies in Montaigne's Latin Quotations* (Lexington, 1981); M. Smith, *Montaigne and the Roman Censors* (Geneva, 1981); M. Screech, *Montaigne and Melancholy* (London, 1983); H. Friedrich, *Montaigne*, transl. D. Eng (Berkeley, 1991); F. Gray, *Montaigne bilingue: le latin des Essais* (Paris, 1991); M. Metschies, *La citation et l'art de citer dans les* Essais *de Montaigne*, transl. J. Brody (Paris, 1997); M. Screech, *Montaigne's Annotated Copy of Lucretius* (Geneva, 1998); and the entries on Catholicisme, Chrétien, Horace, Humanisme, Livres, Plutarque, Protestantisme, Religion and Virgile in *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne*, ed. P. Desan (Paris, 2004). I am grateful to the British Academy for their support of my research on Montaigne and Shakespeare, of which this short essay is a by-product.

quotations, most are taken from Old Testament and apocryphal moral teaching (such as Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus and the Book of Wisdom), from the Psalms and from St. Paul's Epistles.[2] In contrast to the evangelical preoccupation of Christian humanism Montaigne cites the gospels only six times and even then sometimes for commonplaces ("Glory be to God"; "No man is a prophet in his own house") and on one occasion for a phrase from the Lord's prayer.[3] The Bible quotations almost all appear for the first time in either the 1580 or the 1595 (Bordeaux Copy) editions of the text.[4] There are only four quotations from the Bible in book three.[5]

One group of Montaigne's Bible quotations links him directly with the Christian humanists. In the *Apology for Raymond Sebond* he several times quotes passages from St. Paul's letters decrying wisdom and exalting folly.

> I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the prudence of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. (1 Corinthians 1:19-21)[6]
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> 'Eye cannot see', says St. Paul, 'nor can there rise up in the heart of man, what God has prepared for his own.' (1 Corinthians 2:9)[7]
>
> The weakness of God is stronger than men, and the foolishness of God is wiser than men. (1 Corinthians 1:25)[8]
>
> 'Men', says St. Paul, 'have become fools, professing to be wise, and have changed

[2] See Meijer, "Montaigne et la Bible" (as in n. 1).

[3] "Gloria in excelsis Deo et in terra pax hominibus" (Luke 2: 14), Montaigne, *Essais*, ed. P. Villey and V. Saulnier (Paris, 1978[3]), p. 618; "Nul a esté prophete non seulement en sa maison (Luke 4: 24), mais en son païs, dict l'experience des histories", *Essais*, p. 808; "Ne nos inducas in tentationem" (Matthew 6: 13), *Essais*, p. 1016. English translations in the text of this essay are taken from *The Essays of Michel de Montaigne*, transl. M. L. Screech (Harmondsworth, 1991); they follow Montaigne's versions of the Bible passages.

[4] Two substantially different editions of the *Essais* were published in Montaigne's lifetime (1580 and 1588). At the time of his death (1592) he was working on a third edition, represented by the manuscript additions in the Bordeaux copy and by the 1595 edition seen through the press by Marie de Gournay. For the current state of play on these editorial issues see *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne* (as in n. 1).

[5] Meijer, "Montaigne et la Bible" (as in n. 1), pp. 39-41.

[6] "Car, comme il est escrit: Je destruiray la sapience des sages, et abbatray la prudence des prudens. Où est le sage? où est l'ecrivain? où est le disputateur de ce siecle? Dieu n'a-il pas abesty la sapience de ce monde? Car, puis que le monde n'a point cogneu Dieu par sapience, il luy a pleu, par la vanité de la predication, sauver les croyans". Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 500, transl. Screech, p. 557. Part of this passage is quoted again (this time in Latin) at *Essais*, p. 553.

[7] "Œuil ne sçauroit voir, dict Saint Paul, et ne peut monter en cœur d'homme l'heur que Dieu a preparé aux siens". Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 518, transl. Screech, p. 579.

[8] "Infirmum dei fortius est hominibus, et stultum dei sapientius est homiibus". Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 523.

> the glory of the incorruptible God into the image of corruptible man.' (Romans 1:22-23)[9]

These passages on Christian folly were particularly dear to Erasmus and Thomas More. Montaigne uses them within the context of this chapter, and alongside quotations from classical philosophers, to diminish human claims to knowledge through reason and to exalt the role of God in teaching truth.

The chief exhibit in debates about Montaigne's Christianity is usually *Des prières* (I.56), in proportion to its length Montaigne's most heavily revised chapter, and now the subject of an excellent edition by Alain Legros.[10] On one side this chapter is marked by its deep submission to the Roman Catholic church, in which Montaigne lives and dies, and whose precepts he would be most unwilling to offend even unintentionally.[11] He attacks the reformers' trade-mark singing of the psalms in French and offends Erasmians by rejecting the promulgation and widespread discussion of the scriptures.

> It is not without good reason, it seems to me, that the Church has forbidden the indiscriminate, thoughtless and indiscreet use of those venerable sacred songs which the Holy Ghost dictated through David. We must only bring God into our activities with reverence and attentiveness full of honour and respect. That Word is too holy to serve merely to exercise our lungs and to please our ears […] Nor, certainly is it right to see the Sacred Book of the holy mysteries of our faith dragged through hall or kitchen.[12]

Montaigne asserts that theology and study of the Bible should be a specialised science permitted only to those who are dedicated to it and whom God calls.

> It is not a study for just anybody: it is a study for those who are dedicated to it, for people whom God calls to it.[13]

He considers that the people who have translated the Bible into the vernacular

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[9] "Les hommes, dict sainct Paul, sont devenus fols, cuidans estre sages; et ont mué la gloire de Dieu incorruptible en l'image de l'homme corruptible". Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 529, transl. Screech, p. 593.

[10] Montaigne, *Essais, I, 56: "Des prières" / Montaigne; edition annotée des sept premiers états du texte avec étude de genèse et commentaire*, ed. A. Legros (Geneva, 2003).

[11] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 317-318, 323.

[12] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 320-321: "Ce n'est pas sans grande raison, ce me semble, que l'Eglise defend l'usage promiscue, temeraire et indiscret des sainctes et divines chansons que le Sainct Esprit a dicté en David. Il ne faut mesler Dieu en nos actions qu'avecque reverence et attention pleine d'honneur et de respect. Cette voix est trop divine pour n'avoir autre usage que d'exercer les poulmons et plaire à nos oreilles […]. Ny n'est certes raison de voir tracasser par une sale et par une cuysine le Sainct livre des sacrez mysteres de nostre creance"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), pp. 358-359.

[13] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 321: "Ce n'est pas l'estude de tout le monde, c'est l'estude des personnes qui y sont vouées, que Dieu y appelle"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), p. 359.

in order that everyone could understand it were joking (*plaisantes gens*).

> People are joking if they think they have made it accessible to the vulgar simply by translating it into the vernaculars. When people fail to understand everything they read is it only the fault of the words? I would go further. By bringing Scripture that little bit nearer they actually push it further away. Pure ignorance, leaving men totally dependent on others, was much more salutary and more learned than such vain verbal knowledge, that nursery of rashness and presumption. I also believe that the liberty everyone takes of broadcasting so religious and so vital a text into all sorts of languages is less useful than dangerous.[14]

Montaigne is bitingly dismissive of the promulgation of the scriptures. In this field, for ordinary people, he believes that ignorance is wiser and healthier than knowledge. Furthermore he commends the people at the other end of the world who worship crosses, understand nothing of their religion and live a moral life.[15] Elsewhere he writes of the importance of ceremony and incense in giving the faithful a proper religious atmosphere and some sort of equivalent in physical sensations appropriate to the awesome mysteries of the Eucharist.[16] Far from endorsing the Christian humanists who have used literary skills to improve the text and understanding of the Bible he argues that study of the Bible (in the Latin of the Vulgate) should be separated from all other human learning.

> I have seen in my time criticisms laid against some books for dealing exclusively with the humanities or philosophy without any admixture of theology. The opposite case could be maintained not without some reason: that Christian Doctrine holds her rank better when set apart, as Queen and Governor; that she should be first throughout, never ancillary nor subsidiary; that Grammar, Rhetoric and Logic should perhaps choose their examples from elsewhere, not from such sacred materials, as also should the subjects of theatres, plays and public spectacles; that theology is regarded with more veneration and reverence when expounded in its own style rather than in one related to profane sciences.[17]

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[14] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 321: "Plaisantes gens, qui pensent l'avoir rendue maniable au peuple, pour l'avoir mise en langage populaire! Ne tient-il qu'aux mots qu'ils n'entendent tout ce qu'ils trouvent par escrit? Diray-je plus? Pour l'en approcher de ce peu, ils l'en reculent. L'ignorance pure et remise toute en autruy estoit bien plus salutaire et plus sçavante que n'est cette science verbale et vaine, nourrice de presomption et de temerité. Je croi aussi que la liberté à chacun de dissiper une parole si religieuse et importante à tant de sortes d'idiomes, a beaucoup plus de danger que d'utilité"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), p. 359 (adapted).

[15] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 322.

[16] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 315, 514.

[17] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 322-323: "J'ay veu aussi, de mon temps, faire plainte d'aucuns escris, de ce qu'ils sont purement humains et philosophiques, sans meslange de Theologie. Qui diroit au contraire, ce ne seroit pourtant sans quelque raison: que la doctrine divine tient mieux son rang à part, comme Royne et dominatrice; qu'elle doibt estre principale par tout, poinct suffragante et subsidaire; et qu'à l'aventure se tireroient les exemples à la grammaire, Rhetorique, Logique, plus sortablement

On the other hand Montaigne suggests that the Lord's Prayer should be even more widely used than it is on the evangelical grounds that it is the only prayer to have been taught directly by Jesus.[18] And in spite of his deep submission to the church in the hypothetical case of error, he actually maintains the one position in the chapter which the Roman censor of the *Essais* had criticised, that "Our soul must be pure, at least for that instant when we make our prayer, free from the weight of vicious passions".[19] He goes on to criticise those who pray too often or who pray without performing actions which indicate contrition and amendment.[20] His dislike of an outward show of religion combined with a sinful life and his criticism of the hypocrisy of some people's repentance[21] even suggest that on ethical issues he sometimes came closer to the reformers than to his own church. His harsh criticism of people who assume that professors of the Catholic faith were only pretending to do so[22] should not distract us from noticing that some of his own reasons for preferring Catholicism seem to be rooted in questions of identity or politics rather than in differences of religious belief. In *Des prières* he fears that all vulgarisation of the faith and all disputations about it will fuel dissensions and heresies, as though the resulting disorder is more to be feared than any possible intellectual improvement or resolution is to be hoped for. He urges people to avoid disorder (and he may well have the wars of religion in mind) by returning to the simple formulas of faith established by tradition.

> He also said that, where Theology is concerned the factions of princes are armed with anger not with zeal; that zeal itself does partake of the divine Reason and Justice when it behaves ordinately and moderately but that it changes into hatred and envy whenever it serves human passions, producing then not wheat and the fruit of the vine but tares and nettles. And there was another man who rightly advised the Emperor Theodosius that debates never settled schisms in the Church but rather awakened heresies and put life into them; therefore he should flee all contentiousness and all dialectical disputations, committing himself to the bare prescriptions and formulas of the faith established of old.[23]

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d'ailleurs que d'une si sainte matiere, comme aussi les arguments des Theatres, jeuz et spectacles publiques; que les raisons divines se considerent plus venerables et reverамment seules et en leur stile, qu'appariées aux discours humains"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), p. 361 (adapted).

[18] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 318.

[19] "Il faut avoir l'ame nette, au moins en ce moment auquel nous le prions, et deschargée de passions vitieuses", *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 319; transl. Screech, p. 356.

[20] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 319-320.

[21] Cf. Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), III.2, pp. 811-812.

[22] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 320.

[23] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 321-322: "Dict aussi que les factions des Princes sur le subject de la Theologie sont armées, non de zele, mais de cholere; que la zele tient de la divine raison et justice, se conduisant ordonnément et moderément; mais qu'il se change en haine et envie, et produit, au lieu du froment et du raisin, de l'yvraye et des orties, quand il est conduit d'une passion humaine. Et justement aussi cet autre, conseillant l'Empereur Theodose, disoit les disputes n'endormir pas tant les schismes de

In the *Apologie* he declares that he is a Christian by the same heritage that makes him a Perigordian.[24]

After criticising the false repentance of many in his time, in *Du repentir* (III.2), he explains that for him to repent truly would require the direct intervention of God.[25] One might feel that this too is closer to Lutheranism than Montaigne sometimes wishes to be. The *Apologie*[26] describes the strength of belief that would arise from true God-given faith ("If a ray of God's light touched us even slightly, it would be everywhere apparent: not only our words but our deeds would bear its lustre and its brightness"),[27] while implying that neither he nor anyone he knows actually possesses such a strong faith. Montaigne religiously insists on God's power to intervene and change human life for the better but at the same time he implies that this has not actually happened to him. When he writes about the importance of a fear of death and the ways of overcoming it[28] or about the behaviour of the Spaniards in the New World,[29] one feels that there would be room for a more strictly Christian position to be stated, if only as part of the range of alternatives to consider, and one notices that Montaigne does not do so. Christian readers have suggested that this is a consequence of the separation he makes between theological matters and appropriate subjects for the *Essais*, but one could also connect it with the doubt that Montaigne feels about witchcraft trials. When in his protest against witchcraft trials he observes that one would need to be very certain of something before one should burn people alive,[30] he at least implicitly undermines the church's view that saving many people from damnation (partly through the deterrent effect) is more important than leaving room for theological doubts.

One might compare and contrast Montaigne's attitude to Catholic tradition and belief with his attitude to humanism. Montaigne read and spoke Latin as his first language.[31] He was a lifelong reader of Latin poetry and his comments show a sure response to the sounds and implications of Latin words.[32] He

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l'Eglise, que les esveiller et animer les Heresies; que pourtant in faloit fuir toutes contentions et argumentations dialectiques, et se rapporter nuement aux prescriptions et formules de la foy establies par les anciens"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), p. 360. Villey (as in n. 3), p. 1263 points out that this whole passage is translated from Nicetas, quoted from Justus Lipsius' *Adversus dialogistam* III.

[24] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 445.

[25] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 813, 816.

[26] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 441-442.

[27] "Si ce rayon de la divinité nous touchoit aucunement, il y paroistroit par tout: non seulement nos paroles, mais encore nos operations en porteroient la lueur et le lustre". *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 442; transl. Screech, p. 493.

[28] In numerous chapters, especially, I.14, 19, 20; II.3, 6, 12, 13; III.12, 13.

[29] Especially in I.31 and III.8; the Spaniards argued that they colonised the New World partly to spread Christianity and thereby to save souls.

[30] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), III.11, p. 1032.

[31] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 173.

[32] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 872-873.

admired classical literature as a source of ideas and of exemplary behaviour. But he had no time for rhetoric, for Aristotelian method or for Ciceronian style.[33] He did not care for reading programmes which emphasised knowledge about authors or about curious details of antiquity. He wanted schoolboys to judge for themselves and to express their own opinions rather than parrot the views of their authors.[34] While he despised the pedantry of schoolmasters he respected the deep learning of a Turnèbe or a Lipsius.[35] He wanted readers to test what they read and to make it their own where it seemed right. He admired Plutarch for being able to read more into Livy than had been put there[36] and for his judgement of ideas and of men.[37]

Montaigne has no time for many of the by-products of humanist education. He hates any display of learning but he loves reading and the thoughts which reading can inspire. And classical literature and history are his favourite reading matter, providing an endless range of opinions to test and examples to judge and learn from. Looked at in one way Montaigne is an example of the best one could hope for from an immersion in classical literature (even if he prefers to read Greek texts in Latin or French) but he becomes that best by his continual sifting and questioning of what he has been offered. By contrast, while he always thought about the implications of being a Christian, he clearly set limits on what he would question or discuss. He would argue about the contributions which faith and reason might make to his understanding but he would not permit himself to uphold his own view against the tradition, which was of course the very thing that he most did in his reading of classical literature. He was perfectly well aware of this difference, explaining that religion and sacred texts deserved to be treated in a completely different way from other kinds of learning.

Another comparison is offered by Montaigne's use of ancient scepticism. In the *Apologie* he gives a thorough and knowledgeable account of what scepticism was, but he marks a slight distance from it, treating it as one philosophical system among others, though one whose rigour he particularly respects.[38] While Montaigne always questions received opinions, teasing out the implications of a particular position and comparing it with divergent views, he only rarely argues that no knowledge at all is possible and when he does so it is usually for a definite purpose. Towards the end of the *Apologie* he warns his patroness that he is now about to make the most dangerous arguments of all, disarming himself in order finally to defeat the arguments of his adversaries.[39] Where before he has attacked human pretensions about reason partly by showing that it is no better than what the animals achieve, partly by showing

[33] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 163, 311-313.
[34] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 150-151, 156.
[35] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 139, 578.
[36] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 156.
[37] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 413, 416, 875.
[38] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 502-505.
[39] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 557-558.

that it does no good and partly by illustrating the contradictory opinions espoused, now he argues, much more fundamentally, that human reason is always changing and that because the senses (the only conduit through which knowledge can reach the reason) are unreliable, there is no possibility that reason can attain true knowledge. He allows himself this degree of doubt on this particular occasion strictly for the purpose of annihilating his opponents' claims that better reasons for supporting Christianity could have been found than Sebond's. In other chapters, and indeed elsewhere in this chapter, he does not doubt the evidence of reason and the senses to this degree, though he always believes in the folly of human arrogance and the limitations of human reason. Rather than being a sceptic, Montaigne uses scepticism to support a particular argument, which is consonant, though not identical, with some of his deeply held beliefs.[40]

Dethroning human reason is absolutely compatible with Christian thinking, though not with the part of Christian thinking which seeks to erect a philosophical edifice to explain Christian beliefs and reconcile them with ancient philosophy. But Montaigne in more positive mood also wants to use human reason either as a preliminary step or as something which can later come into its own. One of his favourite quotations from St. Paul, while emphasising the nothingness of life compared with the hereafter, nevertheless envisages the human being desiring death in order to attain a more blessed state. He even associates the first use of the quotation with his discussion of ancient (and especially Stoic) suicides.

> I desire, says St. Paul to be dissolved, to be with Jesus.[41]
>
> I would be dissolved, we would say, and be with Jesus Christ.[42]

Here human reason shows him the corruption of the earth and enables him to make the comparison with the joy of the afterlife, which joy is revealed by faith and not by reason. Human reason is shown to collaborate with divine revelation in a different way at the end of the *Apologie*. Montaigne borrows (without acknowledgement until the end) several pages from Plutarch's essay "On the E at Delphi," in which he argues that human changeability is incommensurate with divine constancy and that the eternal is what really and fully exists.[43]

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[40] William Hamlin writes of Montaigne using Sextus Empiricus to support positions he had already reached rather than learning scepticism from him, "The Shakespeare-Montaigne-Sextus Nexus: A Case Study in Early Modern reading", *The Shakespearian International Yearbook* 6 (2006), pp. 21-36. I have not yet seen Frédéric Brahami, *Le scepticisme de Montaigne* (Paris, 1997).

[41] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 360: "Je desire, dict sainct Paul, estre dissoult pour estre avec Jesus-Christ". Philippians 1:23.

[42] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 445: "Je veuil estre dissout, dirions nous, et estre aveques Jesus-Christ".

[43] In the traditional ordering of Plutarch's *Moralia*, this essay is no. 24, at 384D-394C. Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 601-603.

Montaigne caps this "very religious conclusion of a pagan"[44] with the observation that only divine grace can raise a man above the human, which will require the abandonment of man's own means.

> "Oh what a vile and abject thing is man", he said "if he does not rise above humanity". A pithy saying; a most useful aspiration, but absurd withal. For to make a fistful bigger than the fist, an armful larger than the arm, or to try and make your stride wider than your legs can stretch, are things monstruous and impossible. Nor may a man mount above himself or above humanity: for he can see only with his own eyes, grip only with his own grasp. He will rise if God proffers him, extraordinarily His hand; he will rise by abandoning and disavowing his own means, letting himself be raised and pulled up by purely heavenly ones. It is for our Christian faith, not that Stoic virtue of his, to aspire to that holy and miraculous metamorphosis.[45]

So in religious terms, human reason is a step on the right path, which must nevertheless be abandoned before God takes over. This is a very telling instance of Montaigne combining his religious belief with his reading in classical literature. Earlier he had been a little kinder, arguing that human reason had some role to play once it was animated and put into form by grace.

> Nevertheless, this is my verdict: in a matter so holy, so sublime, so far surpassing Man's intellect as is that truth by which it has pleased God in his goodness to enlighten us, we can only grasp that truth and lodge it within us if God favours us with the privilege of further help, beyond the natural order. I do not believe, then, that purely human means have the capacity to do this; if they had, many choice and excellent souls in ancient times, souls abundantly furnished with natural faculties, would not have failed to reach such knowledge by discursive reasoning. Only faith can embrace, with a lively certainty, the high mysteries of our religion. But that is not to imply that it is other than a most fair and praiseworthy undertaking to devote to the service of our faith those natural, human tools which God has granted us.[46]

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[44] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 603: "À cette conclusion si religieuse, d'un homme payen".

[45] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 604: "O la vile chose, dit-il, et abjecte que l'homme, s'il ne s'esleve au dessus de l'humanité! Voilà un bon mot, et un utile desir: mais pareillement absurde. Car de faire la poignée plus grande que le poing, la brassée plus grande que le bras, et d'esperer enjamber plus que de l'estension de noz jambes, cela est impossible et monstrueux: ny que l'homme se monte au dessus de soy et de l'humanité: car il ne peut voir que de ses yeux, ny saisir que de ses prises. Il s'eslevera si Dieu luy preste extraordinairement la moyens, et se laissant hausser et souslever par les moyens purement celestes. C'est à nostre foy Chrestienne, non à sa vertu Stoique de pretendre à cette divine et miraculeuse metamorphose"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), p. 683.

[46] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), pp. 440-441: "Toutefois je juge ainsi, qu'à une chose si divine et si hautaine, et surpassant de si loing l'humaine intelligence, comme est cette verité de laquelle il a pleu à la bonté de Dieu nous esclairer, il est bien besoin qu'il nous preste encore son secours, d'une faveur extraordinaire et privilegée, pour la pouvoir concevoir et loger en nous; et ne croy pas que les moyens purement humains en soyent aucunement capables; et s'ils l'estoient, tant d'ames rares et excellentes, et si

While insisting strongly on the inadequacy of human reason to grasp God's truth, and on the need for God's help in order to do so, nevertheless Montaigne finds that once the soul has been informed by God's revelation it is fitting that reason should be employed in the service of divine truth. More radically, and in a different context, he once tells us that while the stories and axioms from other people may have to be taken on trust, he has complete confidence in the arguments he weaves around them.

> For the *exempla* which I borrow, I commit them to the consciences of those I take them from. The reasonings are my own and depend on rational proof and not on experience.[47]

At different times he seems to want to hold both these two opposing views, though he never puts them side-by-side like this: that human reason is inevitably and drastically flawed and that his own reason is the only thing he can rely on. If we must resolve this contradiction, it would be possible to argue that in the *Apologie* he attacks human reason tactically for the sake of a larger argument he needs to make there, disarming himself in order to defeat his opponent, as he says.[48] His reliance on reasoning in order to drive his writings forward would seem to be a more consistent and more central feature of the whole work.

There may be an analogy between Montaigne's view of reason and his use of his reading of classical sources. He generally uses his reading either to state a point of view which he then subjects to criticism (often on the basis of other opinions or of examples collected from his reading) or as a counter-example, to raise doubts about an earlier conclusion, or to decorate, support or generalise a conclusion he has reached (which may in turn provoke criticism of that conclusion). Reason is at the service of different points of view and it is itself subject to change. Montaigne's *Essais* aim to portray reason in action, that is to say, in movement, in change. He insists that we understand the limitations of being human and of human reason. He hopes that God might intervene to change him or to make him better. But in the here and now, in the process of writing the *Essais* he has to rely on human ethical arguments. He wants to work with what he has, to present an ethical way of living within the limits of the

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abondamment garnies de forces naturelles és siecles anciens, n'eussent pas failly par leur discours d'arriver à cette connaissance. C'est la foy seule qui embrasse vivement et certainement les hauts mysteres de nostre Religion. Mais ce n'est pas à dire que ce ne soit une tresbelle et tresloüable entreprinse d'accommoder encore au service de nostre foy les utils naturels et humains que Dieu nous a donnez"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), pp. 491-492.

[47] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 105: "Car les Histoires que j'emprunte, je les renvoye sur la conscience de ceux de qui je les prens. Les discours sont à moy, et se tienent par la preuve de la raison, non de l'expérience"; transl. Screech (as in n. 3), p. 119 (altered).

[48] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), p. 558.

human and without excessive regret for what he is incapable of.[49] The *Essais* insist that we face up to the limitations of human existence and that we do our best to live ordinately within those limits.[50] They leave a space open, and indeed long, for divine intervention though they insist that theology and scripture be assigned a different place, to be argued over only by those called and dedicated to its high study.

Montaigne believes that religion belongs to all, especially to the simple and trusting, while theology, arguing about scripture and religion, belongs only to the tonsured few. But in his reading of classical history, philosophy and literature he aims rather at selective doubt, at positive questioning. When he is faced with a moral axiom or a proposed conclusion he asks himself: is it really like this? how can we put it better? what in my reading or my experience can support or illuminate this conclusion? what can helpfully modify it? Montaigne trusts his reading enough to want to build on it. He subjects it to a rational criticism which will itself be subjected to questioning based on reading, experience and argument. For the most part his approach is not fully Pyhrronian but he privileges the acts of asking questions, of posing objections and of collecting counter-examples. These leading motives of his secular reading are precisely what he will not permit himself in his approach to theology, mainly for secular reasons. He is religious enough to hope for divine intervention but such a divine intervention could easily have given him certainties which would have altered the approaches to many questions debated in his *Essais*.

Montaigne rejects important aspects of Christian humanism. He thinks it inappropriate to apply grammatical knowledge and editorial techniques to improve the text and translations of the Bible. He does not want to put the scriptures, or paraphrases of them, in the hands of ordinary people. He defers to authority and tradition in religious matters. He values ceremony, incense and music. He disapproves of attempts to explicate Christianity in the language of Greek philosophy or to assimilate Christianity to classical ethics. Aspects of Christian humanism may be unpalatable to him because of their connections with protestantism. At the same time Montaigne manages to be a Christian humanist in the sense that he describes a world strongly influenced by classical literature which yet allows room for a Christian revelation. His classical understanding of the world rests on the materiality of Lucretius and the understanding of human limitations of Horace rather than on the Stoic ethical self-discipline which Lipsius and his Neo-Stoic (and humanist) colleagues tried to incorporate within Christianity.

[49] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), III.2, pp. 806, 808, 813.
[50] Montaigne, *Essais* (as in n. 3), III.13, pp. 1106-1110.

HUMANISM AND RELIGION IN THE WORKS OF SPINOZA

Fokke Akkerman*

In the abundant literature on Spinoza his relation to contemporaries and the influence of his texts on later philosophers have always received more attention than traces of earlier authors and texts in his own work. In the series *Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis*, for example, which contains most of the lectures delivered at the annual meetings of the Dutch Spinoza Society since 1934, sixteen of the ninety contributions have as their subject contemporaries of Spinoza, thirty-two deal with his influence on later philosophers, and only seven are devoted to predecessors; a further thirty-two discuss aspects of his philosophical system, and three have other themes. Spinoza, however, was as much a late representative of humanist culture as one of the founders of "modernity", to use a trendy word. Of the seven contributions on predecessors, the one by J. Coert, no. 3 (1936), deals with Spinoza and Grotius; in no. 5 (1939) Dr K. H. E. de Jong writes on Spinoza and the Stoa; while Coornhert, a sixteenth-century humanist (1520-1590) writing in Dutch, is discussed by Prof. J. J. von Schmidt and Dr H. Bonger, in nos. 14 (1956) and 57 (1989) respectively. No. 49 (1986), by A. J. Klijnsmit, is entitled "Spinoza and Grammatical Tradition", and no. 51 (1987), by Dr Clasina Manusov, is on Jacob Boehme (1575-1624). In my own contribution, no. 36 (1977), "Spinoza's tekort aan woorden. Humanistische aspecten van zijn schrijverschap" [Spinoza's lack of vocabulary: humanistic aspects of his writing], I discussed some aspects of his humanist Latin,[1] among them a number of borrowings from classical authors whom he had read in school or *privatim*. Of the school authors, Terence's comedies played an important role in language acquisition. They supplied Spinoza with a fair number of idiomatic phrases, in which quite often something of classical Hellenistic worldly wisdom sounds through. I even revealed the information that Spinoza played a part in public performances of two comedies in the years 1657 and 1658. Since then, my list of recognised borrowings from Terence in Spinoza's works has increased to about 150 places. In addition, I discussed borrowings from Tacitus and Seneca and Descartes as well as from Sallust, Livy

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[1] This article (translated by A. van de Lindt and J. Lagrée) reappeared as "La pénurie de mots de Spinza: aspects humanistes de son métier d' écrivain", in *Lire et traduire Spinoza*, in *Groupe de recherches spinozistes. Travaux et documents*, no. 1 (Paris, 1989), pp. 9-37.

and Curtius Rufus. Spinoza was also familiar with the works of Horace and Virgil. Earlier, J. H. Leopold had already pointed to these borrowings, and Proietti would propose many more.[2]

After these first attempts in 1977, I went on to analyse the rhetorical strategies in Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* which refer directly or indirectly to classical or humanist textbooks, especially Aristotle's *Rhetorica*. This regards not only the rhetorical construction of the *praefatio* of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* – divided into *exordium*, *propositio*, *narratio*, *divisio*, *peroratio* – but also the form of the arguments and the tone. Together such features lead to a clear, precise manner of writing in a modern Neolatin style, but they display a vocabulary and a tone that are much more classic than that of many of his contemporaries. As we shall see, the phrases in *Ethica* III, *praefatio* with which Spinoza expresses his gratitude to the "very distinguished men" from the past apply not only to his philosophical system but also to his Latin writing style and to the position he took on religion and politics.

In this rhetorical analysis of Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* published in 1985,[3] I made a first and tentative proposal to perceive a reminiscence to Lucretius in his work. It concerns the following sentence in the *praefatio* of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*:

> Tantum timor homines insanire facit
> [To such madness are men driven by their fears] [4]

which I consider an echo of Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 1.101:

> Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum
> [Such evil deeds could religion prompt] [5]

Some years later, in 1997, I examined the technical terms used by Spinoza in what may be considered a continuation of classical discussions.[6] The reminis-

[2] J. H. Leopold, *Ad Spinozae opera posthuma* (The Hague, 1902); O. Proietti, "Adulescens luxu perditus. Classici Latini nell'opera di Spinoza", *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 77 (1985), pp. 210-257; idem, "Lettres à Lucilius, une source du 'De intellectus emendatione' de Spinoza", in *Lire et traduire Spinoza* (as in n. 1), pp. 39-60; idem, "Il 'Satyricon' di Petronio e la datazione della 'Grammatica ebraica' Spinoziana", *Studia Spinozana* 5 (1989), pp. 253-272; see also his Spinoza, *Oeuvres, Tractatus politicus / Traité politique* (Paris, 2005), which contains many classical quotations in the notes.

[3] "Le caractère rhétorique du Traité théologico-politique", in *Spinoza entre Lumière et Romantisme*, Les cahiers de Fontenay 36-38 (1985), pp. 381-390.

[4] I quote here the Latin text from my own edition in *Spinoza Oeuvres. III: Tractatus théologico-politicus* (Paris, 1999), Praefatio, par. 3, and the translation from Baruch Spinoza, *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. S. Shirley (Leiden, 1989), p. 50.

[5] Titus Lucretius Carus, *De rerum natura libri sex*, ed., transl. C. Bailey, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1947, reprint 1950), vol. 1.

cences of Lucretius that I spotted this time provide even more compelling evidence that Spinoza had indeed read Lucretius fairly thoroughly.[7] One of these concerns a text in the *scholium* to thesis 57 of *Ethica* III where it is said that both the horse and the man are driven by a lust to procreate, but that their lusts must vary, just as Lucretius asserts of men and horses (Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 5.897-898):

> nec simili Venere ardescunt nec moribus unis
> conveniunt
>
> [nor are they fired with a like love,
> nor do they agree in a single character]

It seems that, apart from Spinoza, Lucretius is the only other philosopher to advance this insight. A longer passage can be found in *Tractatus theologico-politicus* chapter 17, par. 4, which has a great ethical likeness to Lucretius's *De rerum natura* 3.59-73 and 83-84. Accordingly, it may be said that Spinoza's physics as well as his ethics have a lot in common with those of Lucretius (and Epicurus), a conclusion which has recently been confirmed by Moreau.[8] Spinoza's high praise of the threesome Epicurus, Democritus and Lucretius in *Epistula* 56 is not surprising, therefore, though there are some differences too. Spinoza not only rejects their theory of empty space and atoms, he also avoids using the term *religio* in a negative sense. In the *exordium* of the *praefatio* to the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* he makes a clear distinction between *superstitio* and (*vera*) *religio*, thus following the terminology of Cicero and Seneca,[9] who also attach a positive value to *religio* and a negative one to *superstitio*. Not so Lucretius: he only uses the term *religio* and always values it negatively. Apart from the famous quotation in *De rerum natura* 1.101, he never expresses this more clearly than in the *laudatio* to Epicurus (*De rerum natura* 1.62-79):

> Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret
> in terris oppressa gravi sub religione
> quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat
> horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,

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[6] "Mots techniques – mots classiques dans le Tractatus theologico-politicus de Spinoza" in *Spinoziana, Ricerche di terminologia filosofica e critica testuale. Seminario internazionale, Roma, 29-30 settembre 1995*, ed. P. Totaro (Florence, 1977), pp. 1-22.

[7] The Latin text of Lucretius was well known in the seventeenth century. In the Low Countries alone it was printed ten times in four separate editions between 1542 and 1631. The first complete translation into any language was the one in French by Michel de Marolles which appeared in 1650 in Paris; it was reedited in 1659; this time the life of Epicurus and his three preserved letters, taken from the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius were included. See C. A. Gordon, *A Bibliography of Lucretius* (London, 1962).

[8] P. F. Moreau, *Problèmes du Spinozisme* (Paris, 2006), pp. 15-26.

[9] Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.71: "Non enim philosophi solum verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt"; Seneca, *De clementia* 2.5.1: "[…] religio deos colit, superstitio violat […]".

> primum Graius homo mortali tollere contra
> est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra.
>
> [When the life of man lay foul to see and grovelling upon the earth, crushed by the weight of religion, which showed her face from the realms of heaven, lowering upon mortals with dreadful mien, 't was a man of Greece who dared first to raise his mortal eyes to meet her, and first to stand forth to meet her.]

There are other places too in the *prooemium* to Lucretius I (see vs. 83, 101 and 109) where *religio* is the culprit, oppressing and threatening human life from the high heavens. If it is true that the word *superstitio* means: *superstantium rerum, i.e. caelestium et divinarum, quae super nos stant, inanis et superfluus timor* (thus Servius at Vergil, *Aeneis* 8.187), then Lucretius must here be using the word *religio* in the exact sense of *superstitio*.[10] Because for him both words have the same meaning, the one term *religio* suffices. And that is exactly the point where Spinoza differs from Lucretius. Because he colours the whole of the *exordium* to the *praefatio* with his classical erudition, Spinoza here, we may assume, is conducting a polemic, albeit covertly, against Lucretius. Another indication for this is that in the first sentence of par. 5 he disputes with those who claim that superstition originates from a confused understanding of the divinity (*confusam quandam numinis ideam*), a view which is shared by Lucretius: *De rerum natura* 6.58-67. Moreover, he secularises *superstitio* in the sense that it originates from the nature-given uncertainty about all future events and not from the celestial and divine menaces mentioned by Servius.[11] Thus Spinoza proposes that men are *superstitioni obnoxii et religioni adversi* as soon as they see something unexpected (*praefatio* par. 4). To him, *superstitio*, originating exclusively from the affective life (fear), is always charged negatively, an evil which merely leads to disaster. On the other hand, *religio* in itself is positive, but may be poisoned in a thousand ways by being mixed with *superstitio*. In par. 6 he talks of a *religionem veram aut vanam* so strongly overgrown with *observantia* that – for example, in the Muslim world – it stifles every form of discussion. Further on, in par. 9, he writes about "the Christian religion, which is a religion of love, joy, peace, temperance and honest dealing with all men" [*Christianam religionem* [...], *hoc est, amorem, gaudium, pacem, continentiam et erga omnes fidem*], before, however, continuing with a glaring (rhetorical) rendition of its horrible disfigurement:

> fides jam nihil aliud sit quam credulitas et praejudicia; at quae praejudicia? quae homines ex rationalibus brutos reddunt, utpote quae omnino impediunt, quominus unusquisque libero suo judicio utatur, et verum a falso dignoscat, et quae veluti ad

[10] For the etymology and meaning of "religio" and "superstitio", see Bailey's commentary to Lucretius 1.63 (as in n. 5); R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 439ff., 510; but differently K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Munich, 1960, 1967[2]), p. 39 with note 3, p. 268 with note 1.

[11] For the secularisation of the concept "superstitio" see S. James, *Spinoza on Superstition. Coming to Terms with Fear*, Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis 88 (Budel, 2006).

> lumen intellectu penitus extinguendum data opera excogitata videntur. Pietas, proh deus immortalis, et religio in absurdis arcanis consistit, et qui rationem prorsum contemnunt et intellectum tanquam natura corruptum rejiciunt et aversantur, isti profecto, quod iniquissimum est, divinum lumen habere creduntur.
>
> [and that faith has become identical with credulity and biased dogma. But what dogma! – degrading rational man to beast, completely inhibiting man's free judgment and his capacity to distinguish true from false, and apparently devised with the set purpose of utterly extinguishing the light of reason. Piety and religion – O everlasting God – take the form of ridiculous mysteries, and men who utterly despise reason, who reject and turn away from the intellect as naturally corrupt – these are the men [...] who are believed to possess the divine light.][12]

Spinoza fills almost two pages with these allegations against the Christianity of his time; no wonder that he has come to count as its most formidable opponent. Nevertheless, all through the book he uses Jewish as well as Christian biblical texts to extract and explain his rational message. To him, this rational message is *religio*. I quote the sentence from *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, chapter 12, par. 10, quoted by Popkin:

> His ostendimus Scripturam ratione religionis tantum, sive ratione legis divinae universalis, proprie vocari verbum Dei.[13]
>
> [We have thus shown that it is only in respect of religion – i.e. in respect of the universal divine law – that Scripture can properly be called the Word of God.]

To the author of *Tractatus theologico-politicus* it is therefore completely self-evident to explain in chapter 4 the divine natural law with passages from the Bible – from the Old as well as the New Testament – as we shall see.

First, however, I should like to quote another place, one that is misunderstood and incorrectly translated by almost all modern translators, not only from insufficient knowledge of Latin but also because they are in too much of a hurry to perceive Spinoza as a fore-runner of the anti-religious Enlightenment thought that would emerge a century later. It concerns a sentence in chapter 14, par. 4:

> Quod cum manifestissimum sit, et quod ex hoc solo fundamento vel sola ratione omnia legitime possunt deduci, iudicet unusquisque qui fieri potuit, ut tot dissensiones in ecclesia ortae sint […].

One or both of the following mistakes are usually found: *omnia* is translated as "everything", though *omnia* here refers to *omnia fidei dogmata* in the previous sentence and thus means: "all these"; and *vel* is translated as "or", thus turning *ratio* into the "source" of "everything" or of religious dogmas. I must admit to

[12] *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), pp. 52f.

[13] R. H. Popkin, "Spinoza and Bible Scholarship", in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. D. Carret (Cambridge, 1996), pp 389-407, esp. p. 403; transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 211.

having left out in my Latin text edition the colon in front of *vel*, a colon which was quite common in the seventeenth-century edition and was maintained by Gebhardt, but which is misleading for the modern reader. One of the very few translators who has succeeded in avoiding both mistakes is A. G. Wernham, who translates:

> Since this is abundantly clear, and since men can legitimately deduce all these dogmas from this single basis merely by using their reason, let everyone judge for himself whether the many disputes that have arisen in the church [...].[14]

The issue here is that the seven *dogmata fidei*, which must form the basis of every faith, have to be derived from the Jewish-Christian Bible with the help of reason alone – and not through divine grace.[15] It is about faith, not about *religio*.

To sum up, we may say that for Lucretius *superstitio* and *religio* are equal. The basis for both is "the feeling of terror produced by belief in divine intervention, and also the rites of worship (for instance, in Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 1.101). It does not mean intellectual belief or faith in the existence of gods". Thus Bailey's admirable note.[16] For Spinoza, *superstitio* is the unreasonable feeling of fear of the uncertainty of fortune, from which proceed numerous foolish sacrifices, promises and prayers to the gods (*Tractatus theologico-politicus*, *praef.* 1-4). At the other extreme is the *vera religio* which consists of nothing else but the knowledge of the universal divine law, called *intellectualis amor Dei* in the *Ethica* (*Ethica* V, *Propositio* 32, *Corollarium* ff.). From this knowledge or love result the necessary *dogmata fidei*, which with the help of reason can also be derived from the Bible (*Tractatus theologico-politicus* 14.4ff.). The *vera religio* therefore is also the essence of Jewish-Christian religion. Elsewhere too he positively values this essence, for example in *Letter* 73, where he says that:

> Hoc tantum hic addo, me inter Religionem & Superstitionem hanc praecipuam agnoscere differentiam, quod haec ignorantiam, illa autem sapientiam pro fundamento habeat.
>
> [Here I will add only this, that the chief distinction I make between religion and superstition is that the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on wisdom.]

But the Christians turn their faith into superstition:

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[14] Benedict de Spinoza, *The Political Works*, ed., transl. A. G. Wernham (Oxford, 1958), pp. 113-114. I doubt, however, whether the second "quod" is here a causal conjunction. It could be the beginning of a subject clause; "vel" is here strenghtening "sola" (*Oxford Latin Dictionary*, s.v., entry no. 5).

[15] For a special grace as a source of faith or knowledge, which is denied by Spinoza, cf. *Tractatus theologico-politicus* 13.2 and 15.8; transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), pp. 214 and 235.

[16] Lucretius, *De rerum natura* (as in n. 5), vol. 2, at *De rerum natura* 1.63.

> & hanc causam esse credo, cur Christiani non fide, neque charitate, neque reliquis Spiritûs Sancti fructibus; sed solâ opinione inter reliquos dignoscuntur; nempe, quia, ut omnes, solis miraculis, hoc est ignorantiâ, quae omnis malitiae fons est, se defendunt; atque adeo fidem, licet veram, in superstitionem vertunt.
>
> [And this I believe is the reason why Christians are distinguished from other people not by faith, nor charity, nor the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but solely by an opinion they hold, namely, because, as they all do, they rest their case simply on miracles, that is, on ignorance, which is the source of all wickedness, and thus they turn their faith, true as it may be, into superstition.][17]

And the Christian faith is a true faith, "with regard to the eternal son of God, that is, God's eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things and chiefly in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus".[18]

If we survey the whole range of religious attitudes, from the *superstitio* in the *exordium* of the *praefatio* of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* to the *amor intellectualis Dei* in the *Ethica*, it is evident why there are so many quotations from and allusions to the classics in those first pages of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. There, in Antiquity, reigns *superstitio*, absolute superstition, which for Spinoza never reaches the status of religion. Spinoza fully agrees with Lucretius's criticism of ancient religion, but he refuses to call that particular religion *religio*, only *superstitio*. And between that phase of classical paganism and the elevation of his own concept of *religio* there comes Christianity, which – though good in itself, as is expressed everywhere in his writings, not only in *Letter* 73 and the *praefatio* to the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, par. 9 – was partly corrupted into superstition through ignorance and fear.

Here it is to be noted that for each of the quoted passages in the three sources mentioned (*Tractatus theologico-politicus*, *Ethica*, *Letter* 73) it would be unimaginable to find them in any other text than in the one in which they do appear, because their tone and images and wording are so heavily determined by the particular types of text which these sources represent. In the secondary literature on Spinoza little or no attention has been paid to the literary, humanistic determination of each type of text.

For the *praefatio* of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, a masterpiece of phrasing, composition and rhetorical strategy, I refer to the paper mentioned in note 3 above. It is now time to consider the composition of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* as a whole. In the introduction to my Dutch translation of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* I tentatively proposed that the book may be divided into thrice seven parts, in which the *praefatio* and chapters 7 and 14 serve as markers. The *praefatio* provides the rhetorical motivation for writing the book as well as a general survey of its contents and direct contact with the intended readers and the authorities of the author's country; chapter 7 treats the method that should be applied when studying the Bible, while chapter 14 dis-

[17] The Latin text is quoted from C. Gebhardt, *Opera omnia*, 5 vols. (Heidelberg, 1925), vol. 4, pp. 307f.; the translation from Spinoza, *The Letters*, transl. S. Shirley (Indianopolis, 1995), p. 333.

[18] *Letters*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 17), p. 333.

cusses the principles of faith and the radical separation of faith and science.[19] According to the author this last chapter (14) is the most important part of the book (14.2 and 14.14). This results in a construction of the book based on 1 + 6 + 1 + 6 + 1 + 6, that is 3 x 7 parts. Some harsh criticism[20] led me to embark upon further elaboration of the issue.[21] Extensive explanations of such numerical structures can be found in the secondary literature on the Bible as well as in Renaissance writing. For the modern period one only has to think of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, which is composed of 1 + 33 + 33 + 33 = 100 cantos. An excursus entitled "Zahlenkomposition", comprising eight pages in very small print in Ernst Robert Curtius's masterpiece *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*, provides dozens of examples of numerically composed poetical works.[22] They date mainly from the Middle Ages, are by no means unknown in Antiquity and in the Renaissance, but are found even up to the end of the eighteenth century. Literature, music, painting and architecture were much more closely connected with this composition technique than we are today accustomed to suppose. In Renaissance writing such precise formal structures are frequently encountered.[23] A pertinent case is that of the six *Meditations* of Descartes, derived from the (six) daily meditations he had to practise at school: these were related to the six days of divine creation, with the day of rest breaking up two series of six.[24] In the beginning of the second part of his *Discours de la Méthode*, Descartes compares the composition of spiritual life to architecture and city planning. In a book on Elizabethan poetry, full of extensive discussions of structural patterns, Alistair Fowler speaks about "the spatial character of renaissance thought".[25] In literature of and on the Bible the meaning of numbers is often discussed, for their own value as well as their use in composition.[26]

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[19] See my translation: Spinoza, *Theologisch-politiek traktaat* (Amsterdam, 1997), Inleiding, p. 21f.

[20] See W. Klever, *Definitie van het Christendom. Spinoza's* Tractatus theologico-politicus *opnieuw vertaald en toegelicht* (Delft, 1999), p. 6.

[21] F. Akkerman, "Dwaalwegen in de Spinoza-interpretatie", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 63.2 (2001), pp. 392-395.

[22] E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1969[7]), Excurs XV, pp. 491-498.

[23] An example is my paper "Marcantonio Flaminio's Voyage to Naples: On Carmen 2.7", in *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Hafniensis. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies. Copenhagen, 12 August to 17 August 1991*, ed. A. Moss *et al.* (Binghamton, New York, 1994), pp. 285-297.

[24] On the composition of Descartes's *Meditationes*, see A. O. Rorty, *Essays on Descartes' Meditationes* (California, 1986), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 10.

[25] A. Fowler, *Triumphal Forms. Structural Patterns in Elizabethan Poetry* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 17, 19, and esp. chapter 4 ("Numerology of the centre").

[26] For numerical symbolism in the Bible, I consulted C. Levias in *The Jewish Encyclopedia* (1903) under the entries "Gematria", "Cabbala", "Numbers and Numerals". For the Kabbala, see also H. Loewe in *Encycopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. J. Hastings (New York, 1928), and G. G. Scholem in *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1985). Two modern studies: H. Hutmacher, *Symbolik der biblischen Zahlen und Zeiten* (Pader-

Often the words from Solomon's *Book of Wisdom* 11:21 (20) are quoted: ***sed omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti***. It is well-known that in the Jewish school at Amsterdam much attention was given to this number symbolism. The part of the Kabbalah that Spinoza rejected was *gematria*, the substitution of letters of the Hebrew alphabet by numbers and the speculative juggling with the result which was thought to reveal a deeper truth: see his outburst in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* 9.13.[27] This numerical, or in any case well thought-out, composition can be detected everywhere in Spinoza's work, and extends even to the signet-ring which, with its rose and flower leaves and buds and with the letters BDS and CAUTE, is completely based on the numbers 3 and 5.[28] In the *Korte Verhandeling* as well as in the *Ethica* and in series of chapters of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* we meet such numbers: in chapters 16-20 of *Tractatus theologico-politicus* chapter 16 is the *propositio*, chapters 17, 18 and 19 are the *demonstratio* and chapter 20 is the *conclusio*. In chapter 16, the first paragraph serves as a short *propositio*, which is followed by five almost equally long parts discussing the following subjects: natural law (par. 8-11), the formation of the state (par. 5-7), forms of government (par. 8-11), some definitions (par. 12-18), sacred or divine law in the state of nature and in political order (par. 19-22). The treatment of these five subjects is built up from strictly rational principles, even though rhetorical elements are called in to support the force of conviction. It is, for example, wonderful to see how a small series of *exempla* derived from nature or history is used to illustrate the increasing degree of rationality that is present in the argument: the fish in the water (par. 2); the cat and the lion (par. 3); the robber and his victim (par. 6); the relation between parents and children (par. 10); the soldier leaving his post to save the fatherland (par. 18); the examples from the Bible and the agreements between the Dutch and the Japanese (par. 22).

Let us take a closer look at the first series of six chapters. To begin with, in his book *Imagination et religion chez Spinoza*, Henry Laux has already determined that these six chapters are set in a ring composition: 1 and 2 deals with prophecy, 6 with miracle.[29] Both these phenomena are incomprehensible to the rational mind. Spinoza accepts prophecy as a biblical given, even if he cannot give a natural explanation (chapter 1, par. 26); however, as we have noted earlier, he considers miracle, which so often occurs in the Bible, to be founded on ignorance, *quae omnis malitiae fons est* (*Epistola* 73.3) (see the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* 6.21). Both chapters in the middle, 3 and 5, treat the election of the Jewish people and the ceremonies or rituals. Spinoza does not reject these: they have been of great importance for the formation and maintenance of

born, 1993) and J. Labuschagne, *Numerical Secrets of the Bible. Rediscovering the Bible Codes* (North Richland Hils, Texas, 2000) with a great many other references.

[27] *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 180.

[28] See F. Mignini, "Il sigillo di Spinoza", *La Cultura* 19.2 (1981), pp. 351-389.

[29] H. Laux, *Imagination et religion chez Spinoza. La* potentia *dans l'histoire* (Paris, 1993), p. 49.

the Jewish state, but he does not accept their supernatural provenance or intention.

Chapter 1 is especially important. It begins with a definition of prophecy, which is explained with the joke drawn from *Exodus* 7:1, where God says to Moses, "See, I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet".[30] It is very fitting for the book to begin with *Exodus*, the flight from Egypt, because that is the beginning of all religion, of all theology and of all politics. Moses, who at first cannot find words, grows into the role of leader of his people, the creator of the Jewish state and of Jewish religion, the constituent of the state. He is one of the main characters in Spinoza's book. His name is the most often mentioned, up to the moving statement in *Adnotatio* 36, when he is old and tired and would prefer to share the burden of government with all the people: "Would God that all the Lord's people were prophets!" (*Numbers* 11:29), to which Spinoza adds: "That is to say, would that the right to consult God were vested in the entire people, who would thus be sovereign".[31] This is the start of democracy! In *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, chapter 5, par. 10, Spinoza had already narrated how the Jewish people in the desert, just after it had left Egypt, was really in an ideal position to establish a democracy, but "inexperienced in such matters and exhausted by the wretched conditions of slavery", [32] it was not capable of keeping the governing power to itself. The power of the state had to remain with one person: with Moses.

Immediately after the definition of prophecy and the joke from *Exodus* 7:1, which together occupy thirteen and a half lines, the author writes one and a half pages on natural knowledge and natural light, because they are founded on the certainty of the intellect and are therefore much more excellent than prophecy.[33] But prophecy and natural knowledge are not placed opposite each other at random, "for there is nothing to prevent God from communicating by other means to man that which we can know by the natural light".[34] In chapter 1, par. 6, he continues to explain how prophecy comes into being (par. 7-17). Moses is the only prophet to talk face to face with God. In par. 18-19 this speaking of Moses with God is set against Christ's manner of communicating with God, without visions or words, directly from mind to mind. This is a step closer to our own communication with God, which also occurs directly, but by derivation from the first principles of our knowledge. Thus there is a historical sequence of three phases in the communication with God: the prophecy to Moses, the direct revelation to Christ, and the natural knowledge given to us through derivation from the first principles of that knowledge. And in each new phase the essence of the former one is included. Spinoza's own religiousness has to be understood in this way. Then follows a long passage (par. 20-24) with a purely philological investigation of what "God's Spirit" means in a Biblical text. In closing,

[30] *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 59.
[31] *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 308.
[32] *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 118.
[33] *Tractatus theologico-politicus* 1.4, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 60.
[34] *Tractatus theologico-politicus* 1.5, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 60.

Spinoza draws some conclusions about prophecy in the sense of proceeding from the imagination. In this chapter the following subjects come up for discussion: prophecy, natural reason, Moses, Christ, and philological investigation of the Bible. It thus serves as an introduction to the contents of the first part, comprising chapters 1-6, and in some respects of the whole book as well. Spinoza himself says that the first chapter of the *Tractatus politicus* is intended as an introduction to the book (*Epistula* 84). Apparently, the case is the same here. If we recognise that chapter 1 stands somewhat apart from chapters 2-6, the ring composition of the first part becomes even more beautiful: the scheme a b c b' a' of chapters 2-6 is still more distinct.

The middle chapter (4) is summarily entitled *De lege divina*. The title alone is a fine contrast with the long titles of chapters 3 and 5. Of course *law* makes one think immediately of the *Torah*, the heart of Jewish divine doctrine, and the concept functions in this way here too, but just as the concept of God undergoes an endless widening and broadening in Spinoza's philosophy so does his concept of the law. Now, in chapter 4, the discussion is about the divine law of nature. In theory the author should have filled out here the whole *Ethica*, and he does indeed refer to that necessity (at the end of par. 4), but of course he cannot meet this demand in this place. What he can do is give a general explanation of the meaning of divine natural law which should form a life plan for the truly wise man, something like the Stoa's *vivere secundum naturam* [living according to nature], but then according to the concept of nature as it is expounded in the *Ethica*. It is strange to see how he explains this divine natural law and what is based upon it by citing a series of biblical places which together form another ring composition: first, very shortly, with Paul and Solomon (*Proverbs*) at the end of par. 2, then with Adam, "the first Jewish man" (according to Isaac la Peyrère) in par. 9, then, parallel with and contrasting to Adam, with Christ who was sent to teach not only the Jews but the whole human race (par. 10). "Christ freed the wise man from bondage to the law, while nevertheless giving further strength and stability to the law, inscribing it deep in their hearts".[35] In the same way it will appear later that once the wise man knows the cause of the divine commandments, to him the commandments pass into eternal truths and then "obedience forthwith passes into love, which arises from true knowledge by the same necessity as light arises from the sun".[36] In par. 11 he returns to Adam, and at the end, in par. 12, and this time more elaborately, to Solomon and then, again elaborately, to Paul. And this last text (*Romans* 1:20) is the most spinozistic text that can be found in the Bible: "For the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen through the intellect in the things that are made, even his power and his Godhead which is into eternity, so that they are without excuse".[37]

[35] *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 108.

[36] *Adnotatio* 34; *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, transl. Shirley (as in n. 4), p. 111.

[37] For this crucial text and the reading of the "Book of Nature", see the excellent book by E. Jorink, *"Het Boeck der Natuere". Nederlandse geleerden en de wonderen van Gods schepping, 1575-1715* (Leiden, 2007[2]).

The same quotation occurs in article 11 of the *Confession of Faith* of 1561, one of the basic texts of the reformed orthodoxy of the Dutch Republic. The Book of Nature and the Bible both refer to God's creation and strengthen each other's message. Spinoza's chapter 4 marvellously illustrates this double-entry bookkeeping of the seventeenth century.[38]

So this is another ring composition, one within the ring composition of chapters 1-6 as a whole: a b c d c' b' a', with Christ as the central subject in the chapter on divine natural law. In several places in Spinoza's work, in various contexts and wordings, but always appropriate to the type of text he is writing, the special meaning of Christ is indicated. He is the *sapientia Dei* and *via salutis* in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* 1.18, *os Dei* (4.10), *de aeterno illo filio Dei, hoc est, Dei aeterna sapientia* (*Epistula* 74.3). Spinoza always tries to bring Christ as close as possible to biblical language and biblical images, without placing him in a unnatural or supernatural position. The most Christian text is probably the one in *Ethica* IV, *propositio* 68, *scholium*, where it is told how the first man, Adam, lost his freedom by eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil "and that afterwards this freedom was recovered by the Patriarchs, guided by the Spirit of Christ, i.e., by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man should be free, and desire for other men the good he desires for himself".[39]

Chapter 7 on the method of Bible study and chapter 14 on the separation of faith and science are the marking-points of the book; the six chapters 8-13 mostly deal with concrete problems of Bible texts, always shot through with rational and philological comments. Much of what Spinoza has to say on Bible study had already been put forward in a concise or covered form in Jewish, Christian or humanist scholarly literature, but his clear and purposeful approach is highly admirable. He is not hindered at all by any ecclesiastical or dogmatic prejudice. He uses a perfectly classical humanist style of writing. To give one example: in chapter 10, par. 8, he writes a page on the book of *Job*, discussing a number of questions: Does it contain a real history or a parable (fiction)? Who wrote the book? When did Job live? Could the book have been translated from another language into Hebrew? What is the message of the story? Does the style of the dialogues refer to the poetical art of the Greeks? All this is contained in twenty-six lines of unforced, informal prose. Only someone whose art of writing has been formed by the reading of Sallust and Tacitus is capable of bringing this off.

Chapters 12, 13 and 14 discuss definitions of concepts: what is the sanctity of the Bible?; what is God's word?; what is faith? Faith coincides with obedience to the heart of the biblical message which is: neighbourly love and justice. From this principle of biblical stories it is possible to derive, with the help of reason, the seven articles of faith of Spinoza's humanist credo (see above). Very importantly, Spinoza postulates that there can and must be a great variety

[38] Jorink, *"Het Boeck der Natuere"* (as in n. 37), esp. pp. 30-31.

[39] *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed., transl. E. Curley, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1985), vol. 1, p. 585.

in the further interpretation of these articles of faith, because this belongs in the domain of *opinio*, where it is irrevocable that people greatly differ from each other. This freedom to think what one wants (and to say what one thinks) is the core of Spinoza's book, which in chapters 16-20 is extended from theology to politics and shaped into a tightly structured argument on the foundation of democratic freedom.

In this way the book as a whole is a plea for freedom, in a country where such a plea made sense, because freedom of religion had been guaranteed there by the Union of Utrecht of 1579 (see the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, *praefatio*, par. 7-8).

For this reason the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is a completely different book from the *Tractatus politicus*. The latter is a real *politica*, which the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is not, as the author clearly states in chapter 16, par. 11. That is why it is better not to speak too easily about a "development" from the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* to the *Tractatus politicus*, since they represent two different genres, even if Spinoza in the *Tractatus politicus* uses the principles of political life which he had laid down in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, especially in chapter 16.

As is the case with most writings of humanists, Spinoza's "Jewish-Christian humanism" has a practical-didactic goal. Departing from concrete reality, their aim is to incite people to improvement in education, use of language, morals, religion and politics. Spinoza too seizes people where they are, in their world darkened by ignorance and superstition, entrapped in their tastes and passions, and tries to lead them to more freedom and insight. In doing so – and in this he differs from many humanists who preceded him – he delves deeply into the Bible, faith and religion. In Erasmus's days the discussion largely took place between humanists and theologians, that is between well-educated people. In seventeenth-century Dutch society a much broader crowd of people had come into being who could read and write, who knew the Bible and discussed it, but who were not capable of reflecting on it at an intellectual level. In this context the philosopher was threatened – even personally – in his freedom by the *vulgus*: "who constantly accuse me of atheism. I am driven to avert this accusation, too, as far as I can" (*Epistula* 30, Shirley, *Letters*, p. 186). And in that sense Spinoza's work has a de-secularising tenor, in the same way but in the opposite direction as the work of his contemporary, whom he did not know, Blaise Pascal.[40]

[40] For a comparison between Spinoza and Pascal, see R. Mason, *Spinoza or Pascal? Two Views on Religion*, Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis 76 (Delft, 2000); idem, *Spinoza: Logic, Knowledge and Religion* (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 173-193 (chapter 10: "Two Views of Faith").

ERASMUS OF ROTTERDAM AND LATE MEDIEVAL THEOLOGIANS ON THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE

Christoph Burger*

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF GRACE, THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE, AND THE WISH NOT TO DISCOURAGE SINNERS IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

The aim of this article is to throw some light on possible late-medieval backgrounds of Erasmus' well-known propositions on the relationship between God's grace and human free will in his *De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio*. The similarities between the propositions of some late-medieval theologians and those of Erasmus invite such comparisons, notwithstanding the fact that Erasmus, with his brilliant knowledge of the writings of the church fathers, was not forced to depend on these writers in approaching the question.

When it comes to theories about the relationship between God's grace and the human free will, the writings of Augustine dominated the debate in the Christian theology of the western part of the Roman Empire for a millennium. His struggle against Pelagius, Julianus of Eclanum and later against monks in southern France who strove for perfection had a deep influence on most western theologians of the Early and High Middle Ages. Peter Lombard contributed greatly to this influence by quoting extensively from the writings of Augustine in his *Sentences*, a textbook used intensely by scholastic theologians. On the matter of the corruption of free will by sin, for example, he quoted Augustine's *Enchiridion*: "When man used his free will in a bad way, he corrupted himself and free will. When sin was committed through free will, sin prevailed, and free will was lost".[1]

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* I should like to thank Dr M. Sherwood-Smith for improving the English in this article.

[1] Augustine, *Enchiridion ad Laurentium sive de fide, spe et charitate liber unus*, 30: "Libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidit et ipsum. Cum enim libero arbitrio peccaretur, victore peccato, amissum est et liberum arbitrium". See *Aurelii Augustini* […] *opera omnia*, ed. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina [henceforth: PL], vol. 40 (Paris, 1861), col. 246; *Aurelii Augustini Opera; pars 13.2*, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [henceforth: CCSL], vol. 46 (Turnhout, 1969), p. 65; cited by Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2.7, tom. I, pars II, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV (Grottaferrata, 1971), p. 465, lines 18-20. Peter Lombard is not, however, one of the strictly anti-Pelagian theologians, cf. C. Burger, "Freiheit zur Liebe ist Geschenk Gottes. Hugolin von Orvieto († 1373) als Schüler Augustins", in *Augustine, the Harvest, and*

For a long time, western Christian theologians who disagreed with Augustine had to explain themselves. However, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, under the influence primarily of the writings of Aristotle, but also of the theological dispute about whether a mortal sinner had any chance whatsoever of doing good, the moral autonomy of man came to be emphasised more and more, even among western theologians.

Man came now to be seen not only as a member of the church, but also as a citizen of an earthly community. Many theologians accepted that, as such, man has to fulfil duties and is able to fulfil them without needing the help of God for every action that deserves the description "morally good". Many thus found it necessary to admit a merely natural domain, beneath the levels of an ethical domain and a domain meritorious for eternal life. Giving alms to the poor, for example, could now be judged as a good work (*actus bonus ex genere seu ex officio*). If motivated by love towards one's poor neighbour, such an act was even seen as a morally good work (*actus moraliter bonus*). If carried out in a state of grace and for the love of God, it was judged as meritorious for eternal life (*actus meritorius aeternae vitae*).[2]

Late-medieval adherents of Augustine's doctrine of grace opposed these theologians. They emphasised that every truly good act must be carried out for the love of God and for the sake of God himself (*ex amore Dei propter Deum ipsum*). Furthermore, they argued, a Christian had a strict duty to fulfil God's will according to God's own purpose.[3]

On the other hand, these adherents of Augustine's strictly anti-Pelagian doctrine of grace had to explain how they could evade the pitfalls of philosophical determinism. In the thirteenth century, the philosophers Boethius of Dacia († before 1284) and Siger of Brabant (c. 1240 – c. 1284) had tried to understand the writings of Aristotle, to which they had access, as precisely as possible. One of the results was philosophical determinism. Of course, in this way the philosophers risked coming into conflict with Christian convictions. Étienne Tem-

Theology (1300-1650). Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. K. Hagen (Leiden, 1990), pp. 21-40, at pp. 30-33.

[2] Cf. M. Santos Noya, *Die Sünden- und Gnadenlehre des Gregor von Rimini* (Frankfurt, 1990), p. 53.

[3] Cf. H. A. Oberman, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth-Century Augustinian: A Study of His Theology in Its Historical Context* (Utrecht, 1957; revised edition 1958). C. Burger, "Der Augustinschüler gegen die modernen Pelagianer: Das 'auxilium speciale dei' in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini", in *Gregor von Rimini. Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, ed. H. A. Oberman (Berlin, 1981), pp. 195-240. C. Burger, "Freiheit zur Liebe" (as in n. 1). For a short synopsis, see C. Burger, "Gregor, Hugolin und der junge Luther", *Augustiniana* 52 (2002), pp. 335-351, and C. Burger, "De receptie van Augustinus' genadeleer: Gregorius van Rimini, Hugolinus van Orvieto, Erasmus en Luther (tot 1518)", in *Augustiniana Neerlandica. Aspecten van Augustinus' spiritualiteit en haar doorwerking*, ed. P. van Geest and J. van Oort (Leuven, 2005), pp. 413-425.

pier, the Bishop of Paris, condemned some theses in 1270 and again in 1277.[4] For the discussions about the doctrine of grace, one of the most important was thesis 21: "Nothing happens by contingency, but everything by necessity".[5] Followers of Augustine's doctrine of grace had to prove that their claim of dependency on God's grace avoided such philosophical determinism.

Yet another line of argument threatened the Augustinian advocates of God's overwhelming grace. This was the discussion about whether a Christian who had fallen into deadly sin had any chance of doing good thereafter. The Franciscan Bonaventure († 1274) argued that men in their daily lives act for very different reasons. Natural love, social love, civil manners are all legitimate.[6] On the other hand, the same theologian said that a Christian who has fallen in deadly sin, cannot act on the basis of *caritas* and will therefore not be awarded eternal life for doing what God has commanded. Duns Scotus OFM († 1308) opposed Bonaventure with the view that even a Christian in a state of deadly sin must be able to hope. He did not wish to discourage deadly sinners by telling them that everything they did was sinful.[7] Adam Goddam OFM († 1358), a pupil of William of Ockham, went so far as to say that man is able to fulfil God's commandments merely on the basis of his natural powers. Man can do what God has assigned him to do and can avoid what God has assigned him to avoid.[8]

These are some philosophical and theological positions which Erasmus found when he entered the fray. Even though he very seldom mentions the names of scholastic theologians, his own formulations seem to show that he was familiar with their opinions.

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[4] Cf. V. Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham. Gelehrter, Streiter, Bettelmönch* (Darmstadt, 2003), pp. 27-29, and K. Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277. Das Dokument des Bischofs von Paris eingeleitet, übersetzt und erklärt* […] (Mainz 1989). K. Flasch, *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter. Von Augustin zu Machiavelli* (Stuttgart, 1986), p. 357: "Wenn man schon Aristoteles rezipierte […] sollte man ihm seine Konsequenz belassen".

[5] "Quod nichil fit a casu, sed omnia de necessitate eveniunt […]": Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter?* (as in n. 4), p. 117. According to Flasch, the condemnation is not aimed at Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant, but at Avicenna.

[6] Bonaventura, *In secundum Sententiarum*, dist. 41, art. 1, qu. 3, in *S.R.E. Cardinalis S. Bonaventurae* […] *opera omnia* […] *emendata*, ed. A. C. Peltier, vol. 3 (Paris, 1865), p. 578b: "sed multas actiones faciunt homines tota die, quas non faciunt ex libidine, nec ex caritate, immo vel ex amore naturali, vel sociali, vel ex quadam urbanitate civili, et consuetudine operandi: non videtur ergo quod omnis actio voluntaria sit immediate bona vel mala".

[7] Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura Oxoniensis: Ordinatio* 2, distinctio 28, quaestio 1, ed. L. Wadding, vol. VI/2 (Lugduni, 1639), p. 912.

[8] Adam Goddam (Wodeham), *Reportatio et Ordinatio Oxoniensis: In Sent.* 1- 4 lib. 1, dist. 1, qu. 10, art. 1, sub littera F (cod. Paris Université 193, fol. 50ra). I quote here from the critical edition of the commentary on the *Sentences* of his opponent Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*: *In 2 Sentiarum*, dist. 26-28, qu. 1, art. 2, ed. A. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1980), p. 60, line 14: "nos ex puris naturalibus posse elicere actus bonos moraliter […]".

THE ACQUAINTANCE OF ERASMUS WITH ORIGEN, JEROME AND AUGUSTINE: PHILOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL PREDILECTION

When Erasmus was eighteen years old, he became an Augustinian canon at the monastery of Steyn. There, the works of Jerome and Augustine were available to him. Moreover, he was encouraged to read them. In addition, however, he broadened his horizons by acquiring a knowledge of the Greek language which was outstanding for his time. This meant that he was able to read the writings of many Greek fathers and compare their exegesis with that of Latin fathers. The Greek fathers mostly stressed man's free will.[9] As a case study, one can consider the interpretation of the text of the gospel according to Luke, chapter 1. Irenaeus of Lyons, a Greek theologian, accentuated Mary's willingness to become God's mother: "And Eve [had necessarily to be restored] in Mary, that a virgin, by becoming the advocate of a virgin, should undo and destroy virginal disobedience by virginal obedience".[10]

Erasmus felt free to make his own choice between the exegesis of the Greek and the Latin fathers. Origen deeply impressed him, and he often relied on him. He esteemed Origen even more than Jerome.[11] Erasmus' enthusiasm for Origen did not cease with philological tools. Commenting on Galatians 2:11, he wrote that Origen's exegesis alone meant more to him than that of ten orthodox fathers.[12] The addition of the phrase "with the exception of some doctrines of

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[9] Two Eastern synods in 415 declared Pelagius orthodox, whereas a synod in Carthage in 418 condemned Pelagius and his followers.

[10] Irenaeus of Lyons, *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* 33 (transl. J. P. Smith, rev. in J. Pelikan, *Mary Through the Centuries. Her Place in the History of Culture* (New Haven, 1996), p. 43). Further examples from Irenaeus' *Adversus haereses* 3.22.4 and 5.19.1, in: *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, vol. 7 (Paris, 1857), cols. 959, 1175-1176. These are adduced by J. Vogt, "Ecce ancilla domini. Eine Untersuchung zum sozialen Motiv des antiken Marienbildes", *Vigiliae Christianae* 23 (1969), pp. 241-263, at p. 256.

[11] Erasmus, *Ratio verae theologiae*, in Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, ed. J. Clericus, 10 vols. (Leiden, 1703-1706), vol. 5, col. 133A: "Imo partem laboris adimat nobis Veterum labor, adjuvemur illorum commentariis, dummodo primum ex his deligamus optimos, velut Origenem, qui sic primus, ut nemo cum illo conferri possit […]". The fathers whose names follow first are all from the East. The sequence in which he lists the four Latin fathers is characteristic (Hieronymus, Ambrosius, Hilarius, Augustinus): Jerome first, Augustine last! Erasmus suggests reading these fathers with reverence, but also with discretion. Cf. C. Augustijn, *Erasmus von Rotterdam. Leben – Werk – Wirkung* (München, 1986), p. 92.

[12] Erasmus in his *Annotationes in Novum Testamentum*, Gal. 2:11, in Erasmus, *Opera omnia* (as in n. 11), vol. 6, col. 809D: "At ego in scripturarum enarratione unum Origenem decem orthodoxis anteposuerim, exceptis aliquot dogmatibus fidei". The authorised editions of 1519, 1522, 1527 and 1535 read "scripturarum", the Leiden edition: "Scripturam". For her advice, I would like to thank Dr M. L. van Poll-van de Lisdonk, who is currently working on a new critical edition of the *Annotationes in epistolam Pauli ad Galatas – In epistolas Pauli ad Thessalonicenses II* for the new *Opera omnia* edition (Amsterdam, 1969-). P. G. Bietenholz, "The Patristic Controversy about Gala-

faith" in this passage is very characteristic of Erasmus' wish not to come into conflict with the Christian beliefs of his own entourage (for the full quotation in Latin, see footnote 12). A comparable instance is his declaration in a letter to Thomas More: "The opinion that we can conceive 'grace' adequately, as they [the scholastic theologians] put it, merely on the basis of natural powers, without specific grace, would not displease me, were it not that Paul gets in the way. But not even the scholastics accept that meaning".[13]

Erasmus' familiarity, and even sense of affinity, with Jerome emerges from his earliest letters and from his first book, *De contemptu mundi*.[14] In 1514, Erasmus was invited to take on the general editorship of a major edition of the works of Jerome then in progress at Basle,[15] and which was subsequently published in 1516.

Erasmus was familiar with the writings of Augustine, too. He had an important part in the edition of the works of Augustine published by the printer Froben in Basle in 1528/29.[16] However, this does not mean that he agreed with the theological doctrines of the Church Father, especially his doctrine of grace.[17]

Erasmus understood himself above all as a *grammatistes*,[18] providing the knowledge to interpret the text of the Bible adequately, and for this purpose the

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tians 2:11-14 and the Reaction of Erasmus of Rotterdam", *Theological Studies* 50 (Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, 2003), pp. 171-183, at p. 179, refers to this sentence by Erasmus.

[13] Erasmus, *Letter to Thomas More*, 30 March 1527, in *Opus epistolarum Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, ed. P. S. Allen *et al.*, vol. 7 (Oxford, 1934), p. 8: "Mihi non displiceret opinio quae putat nos ex meris nature viribus absque peculiari gratia posse de congruo, ut illi [scil. theologi scholastici] loquuntur, gratiam instituere, nisi refragaretur Paulus; quanquam ne scholastici quidem hanc recipiunt sententiam". W. Lesowsky refers to this statement in his edition of the *Hyperaspistes diatribae liber primus* (in *Erasmus von Rotterdam. Ausgewählte Schriften. Lateinisch und deutsch*, ed. W. Welzig (Darmstadt 1969), vol. 4, p. 629, note 751).

[14] Cf. Bietenholz, "The Patristic Controversy" (as in n. 12), p. 175.

[15] Cf. C. Augustijn, "Erasmus-Promotion anno 1515: Die Erasmus-Stücke in *Iani Damiani* […] *elegeia*", in *Erasmus. Der Humanist als Theologe und Kirchenreformer*, ed. C. Augustijn (Leiden, 1996), pp. 41-52, at p. 43: "Im Hieronymus-Projekt war Froben der Initiator und hatte Erasmus zunächst ein Teilinteresse […]".

[16] Cf. Bietenholz: "The Patristic Controversy" (as in n. 12), p. 178.

[17] Drecoll provides a useful definition of a doctrine of grace: "Gnadenlehre ist die Darstellung des Sachverhaltes, wie es durch göttliche *gratia* dazu kommt, daß der Mensch, obwohl er dazu selbst nicht in der Lage ist, das Gute will und so erlöst werden wird". V. H. Drecoll, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins* (Tübingen, 1999), p. 22. The development of Augustine's theology in the course of his lifetime makes it possible to lay the stress on different writings, often with conflicting stances. In his *De libero arbitrio*, written in the years 388 and 391-395, for example, Augustine concedes much more to the free will of man than in his late anti-Pelagian writings.

[18] Cf. C. Augustijn, "Erasmus und seine Theologie: hatte Luther recht?" [1987], in *Erasmus* (as in n. 15), pp. 293-310, at p. 299: Erasmus wollte "der Heiligen Schrift den niedrigen Dienst des Schulmeisters besorgen, der sich darum kümmert, einfach den Text seinem Wortlaut nach zu verstehen und diese Kunst des Verstehens andere zu lehren".

writings of Jerome were more useful to him than those of Augustine.[19] However, though an expert on philology, Erasmus was nonetheless a theologian. He found Origen and Jerome convincing as philologists, and from this it followed that he took their theological concepts seriously.

In theological questions, Erasmus often agreed with Jerome, and he could take this to extremes.[20] His sympathies lay with Jerome rather than Augustine.[21] In this he was no exception, for in the decades leading up to the Lutheran Reformation, Jerome was generally more prominent than Augustine.[22]

When studying at Paris from 1495 until 1499, Erasmus had the opportunity to hear about the theological positions of theologians of the High and Late Middle Ages and to read their writings. In his *De libero arbitrio*, he mentions Bernard of Clairvaux as a theologian with whom he disagrees concerning the powers of human will after the fall of man. He refers, though only in passing, to Gregory of Rimini OESA († 1358), a fervent exponent of the strictly anti-Pelagian doctrine of Augustine.[23] Gregory had a substantial influence at the Sorbonne, even at the end of the fifteenth century, through copies of his commentary on the first two books of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.[24] Erasmus never refers by name to Hugolinus of Orvieto OESA († 1374), who was well known as an exponent of Augustine's doctrine of grace. However, it is evident that Erasmus was very well acquainted with the theological *status quaestionis*. His own most cautious definition of *liberum arbitrium* is astoundingly similar to that of Hugolinus.

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[19] "Man kann ohne Übertreibung sagen, daß Hieronymus innerhalb der lateinischen Kirche für die Schriftauslegung die gleiche Bedeutung hatte, wie Augustin für die Theologie". P. Nautin, "Hieronymus (347/8-420)", in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. 15 (Berlin, 1986), pp. 304-315, at p. 311, lines 28-30.

[20] Bietenholz, "The Patristic Controversy" (as in n. 12), p. 180: "Erasmus' own position is indeed singular. He knows that Jerome's argument is untenable, but he still sides with him in every point that he can. He knows that Augustine is right, but he finds fault with him wherever he can".

[21] Bietenholz, "The Patristic Controversy" (as in n. 12), p. 176: "Jerome, cultured, clever, congenial, a brilliant writer, always remained Erasmus' great ideal; Augustine, by contrast, he found difficult to handle".

[22] Hamm judges as follows: "Die Jahrzehnte vor der Reformation boten offensichtlich eine besondere, einmalige Konstellation für die Hochschätzung gerade des Hieronymus – eine Zwischenphase, der eine starke Dominanz Augustins vorausgeht und folgt". B. Hamm, "Hieronymus-Begeisterung und Augustinismus vor der Reformation. Beobachtungen zur Beziehung zwischen Humanismus und Frömmigkeitstheologie (am Beispiel Nürnbergs)", in *Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology* (as in n. 1), pp. 127-235, here p. 133.

[23] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio* I b 2 in *Erasmus von Rotterdam. Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. W. Welzig, vol. 4 (Darmstadt, 1969), pp. 22/24: "ne recenseam interim Thomas, Scotos, Durandos, Capreolos, Gabrieles, Aegidios, Gregorios, Alexandros, quorum in argumentando vim et argutiam non arbitror cuiquam esse prorsus contemnendam […]."

[24] Cf. M. Schulze, "'Via Gregorii' in Forschung und Quellen", in *Gregor von Rimini* (as in n. 3), pp. 1-126.

STATEMENTS OF ERASMUS IN *DE LIBERO ARBITRIO* AND POSSIBLE LATE-MEDIEVAL PARALLELS

When his critics forced Erasmus to make clear that he was not the brain behind Luther, he wrote his *De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio*.[25] At the very beginning of this work, he declares that he would prefer to behave as a sceptic, "wherever the inviolable authority of the Bible and the decrees of the church would allow it".[26] He then offers a provisional definition of "free will" (*liberum arbitrium*) and declares that "on the path of piety" (*in via pietatis*) Christians should ascribe the evil to themselves, the good entirely to the goodness of God.[27] He opposes Luther, who in his "*Assertio omnium articulorum* […]" had accepted a sentence of Wyclif's, condemned by the council of Constance, that all things occur by necessity.[28] Without explicitly joining ranks with Wyclif and Luther, Erasmus then contradicts Augustine, to whom he attributes the sentence that God remunerates his own good works in men and punishes his own bad works in them.[29]

Tentatively, Erasmus defines "freedom of decision" as the power of human will to address itself to what leads to eternal salvation or to avert itself from it.[30] He discusses the view of theologians who ascribe a large part to the grace of

[25] For a very precise and balanced outline of the history of the relation between Erasmus and Luther, see C. Augustijn, *Erasmus von Rotterdam* (as in n. 11), pp. 108-120 "X. Die Luthersache".

[26] Erasmus of Rotterdam, *De libero arbitrio* I a 4, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 6: "Et adeo non delector assertionibus, ut facile in Scepticorum sententiam pedibus discessurus sim, ubicumque per divinarum scripturarum inviolabilem auctoritatem et ecclesiae decreta liceat […]". Erasmus does not here specify whether he is speaking about radical sceptics or methodical sceptics.

[27] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* I a 8, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 12: „si quid mali est, nobis imputemus, si quid boni, totum ascribamus divinae benignitati, cui debemus et hoc ipsum, quod sumus […]".

[28] Martin Luther, *Assertio omnium articulorum* (1520), in *D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 7 (Weimar, 1897), p. 146, lines 6-8: "Quia nulli est in manu sua quippiam cogitare mali aut boni, sed omnia (ut Viglephi articulus Constantiae damnatus recte docet) de necessitate absoluta eveniunt". Evidence: Erasmus, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), vol. 4, p. 19, note 27. For the proposition of Wiclif, condemned in 1415 at the Council of Constance as 27th thesis, see H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* (Barcinone, 1976[36]), nr. 1177 (607).

[29] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* I a 10, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 18: "Fingamus igitur in aliquo sensu verum esse, quod docuit Vuyclevus, Lutherus asseruit, quicquid fit a nobis, non libero arbitrio, sed mera necessitate fieri […] Rursum fingamus esse verum iuxta sensum aliquem, quod alicubi scribit Augustinus, deum et bona et mala operari in nobis et sua bona opera remunerari in nobis et sua mala opera punire in nobis".

[30] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* I b 10, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 36: "Porro liberum arbitrium hoc loco sentimus vim humanae voluntatis, qua se possit homo applicare ad ea, quae perducunt ad aeternam salutem, aut ab iisdem avertere".

God and almost nothing to free will.[31] They deny that man could wish [to do] good without the special grace of God; they deny that he could begin, progress, or achieve [anything] without the constitutive and perpetual help of God's grace.[32] In his *Hyperaspistes diatribae*, Erasmus declares that this was the opinion of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.[33] More striking, however, is the parallel with a paragraph in the commentary on the *Sentences* of the above-mentioned Gregory of Rimini. Here we find a discussion of man's inability "to discern, to wish, or to accomplish" any morally good act without God's help.[34]

Erasmus considers the opinions of those who assure us that freedom of decision will only enable us to commit sin to be even harsher than those of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.[35] According to his own explanation in the *Hyperaspistes diatribae*, Erasmus is here referring to the opinions of Karlstadt.[36] The steeliest opinion holds that there is no freedom of decision at all.[37] By this, Erasmus means John Wyclif and Luther.[38] Later in his treatise, in dis-

[31] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* II a 12, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 56: "Ergo, qui longissime fugiunt a Pelagio, plurimum tribuunt gratiae, libero arbitrio pene nihil nec tamen in totum tollunt […]".

[32] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* II a 12, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 56: "negant hominem posse velle bonum sine gratia peculiari, negant posse *incipere*, negant posse *progredi*, negant posse *perficere* sine principali perpetuoque gratiae divinae praesidio". The italics are mine.

[33] Erasmus, *Hyperaspistes diatribae liber primus*, ed. W. Welzig (as in n. 13), p. 628: "Haec est opinio vel Augustini, vel Thomae […]", and p. 642: "Excussisti primam opinionem, quae est Thomae vel Augustini […]".

[34] Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum: In 2 Sententiarum* dist. 26-28 art. 1 concl. 1-3, ed. Trapp and Marcolino (as in n. 8), p. 24, lines 11-19: "nullus homo in statu praesenti, dei etiam generali influentia stante, potest absque speciali auxilio eius *agere* aliquem actum moraliter bonum. […] nullus homo etc. potest […] sufficienter *cognoscere* quid volendum vel nolendum, agendum vel vitandum sit. […] nullus homo etc, habita etiam sufficienti notitia de aliquo volendo vel nolendo, agendo vel vitando ex his, quae ad moralem vitam pertinent, potest absque speciali auxilio conformiter *velle* vel *agere*". The italics are mine. See C. Burger, "Erasmus' Auseinandersetzung mit Augustin im Streit mit Luther", in *Auctoritas patrum: Contributions on the Reception of the Church Fathers in the 15th and 16th century*, ed. L. Grane, A. Schindler and M. Wriedt (Mainz, 1993), pp. 1-13, at p. 6.

[35] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* II a 12, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 56: "Sed durior est istorum opinio, qui contendunt liberum arbitrium ad nihil valere nisi ad peccandum […]".

[36] Erasmus, *Hyperaspistes diatribae liber primus*, ed. Welzig (as in n. 13), p. 630: "Tertiam, quam recenseo, facio Carolstadii […]", and p. 642: "Augustini sententiae subjicio Carolstadii […]".

[37] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* II a 12, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 58: "Durissima videtur omnium sententia, qui dicunt liberum arbitrium inane nomen esse […]".

[38] Erasmus, *Hyperaspistes diatribae liber primus*; ed. Welzig (as in n. 13), p. 630: "Quartam facio tuam […]", and p. 642: "Tertio loco pono tuam et Wiclevi [sententiam] […]".

cussing the exegesis of 2 Corinthians 3:5,[39] Erasmus refines his stance somewhat. Some orthodox fathers subdivide human activity into three stages: planning, willing, and execution.[40] Erasmus states that he inclines to the concept that in the first and in the third stage of a morally good human action, God's grace works alone.[41] But in the second part, in willing the good, the human will must be able to cooperate under the guidance of God's grace.[42] It is, nevertheless, a gift from God, that man can assent and can cooperate with God's grace.[43] Later on, Erasmus again accepts the view that the human will can cooperate with God's grace under the guidance of that grace.[44]

What is striking here is the similarity of Erasmus' definition of *liberum arbitrium* to formulations of the above-mentioned Hugolinus of Orvieto, a fervent adherent of Augustine. This Augustinian hermit tried to avoid philosophical determinism, whilst simultaneously stressing the necessity of God's grace. His solution was that the human will is able to do evil (e.g. to steal) without the help of God. Nevertheless, in order to be able to love God, human will can only be a partial cause.[45] When Hugolinus reduces the contribution of human will to a good act to "partial semi 'concause'" (*semiconcausa partialis*), whereas God must lead a human being to love him, one may well be reminded of Erasmus' statements about human will as the "less principal cause" (*minus principalis nostra voluntas*) in man's consent to do anything good.[46]

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[39] 2 Cor. 3:5 (King James Version): "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God".

[40] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* III c 4, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 140: "Primum enim quidam orthodoxi patres tres gradus faciunt operis humani: primus est cogitare, secundus velle, tertius perficere".

[41] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* III c 4, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 140/142: "Atque in primo quidem ac tertio nullum locum tribuunt libero arbitrio quicquam operandi. Animus enim a sola gratia impellitur, ut cogitet bonum, et a sola gratia peragitur, ut perficiat, quod cogitavit".

[42] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* III c 4, ed. Welzig, vol. IV (as in n. 23), p. 142: "Ceterum in medio, hoc est in consensu simul agit gratia et humana voluntas, sic tamen, ut principalis causa sit gratia, minus principalis nostra voluntas".

[43] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* III c 4, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 142: "Quoniam autem summa rei tribuitur illi, qui totum contulit ad perficiendum, non est, quod homo ex bono opere sibi quicquam asserat, cum hoc ipsum, ut possit consentire et cooperari gratiae divinae, dei munus sit".

[44] Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio* IV, 8, ed. Welzig (as in n. 23), p. 170: "Hoc mihi videtur praestare illorum sententia, qui tractum, quo primum exstimulatur animus, totum attribuunt gratiae […]".

[45] Hugolinus of Orvieto, *Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum*, principium primum Sententiarum, quaestio, primus articulus, ed. W. Eckermann O.S.A., vol. 1 (Würzburg, 1980), p. 12, lines 54-58: "Exemplum. Sit A dilectio dei, sit B velle furari. Tunc utriusque entitatis deus est causa partialis et voluntas creata altera causa partialis, sed differenter. Nam respectu B est partialis, integra et sufficiens, sed respectu A est semiconcausa partialis et eget pro suo partiali coefficere vitae iuvamento seu complemento divino".

[46] Cf. the texts quoted in note 45 (Hugolinus) and note 42 (Erasmus).

SUMMARY

There can be no doubt that Erasmus was aware of the "state of the debate", in the writings of the apostle Paul, and the Church Fathers Origen, Jerome and Augustine, on the question of how to reconcile God's grace with the freedom of the human will. Nevertheless, some of his own proposed solutions in speaking about the compatibility of both grace and free will are so strongly reminiscent of the theses of late-medieval theologians, that it seems profitable to compare Erasmus' views not only with Gregory of Rimini, whom he names once in passing, but also with Hugolinus of Orvieto, whom he never explicitly mentions at all.

THE *PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI*, ITS ECHOES AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS ON VIRTUE AND NOBILITY

Han van Ruler

The way to virtue, Erasmus says in his *Enchiridion militis Christiani* of 1504, depends on two things: first, to "know yourself"; secondly, to act "not according to the passions, but the dictates of reason". Nothing is harder, Erasmus agrees, but then "no reward is greater". For it was with a view to higher pleasures ahead that actual hardships should be surmounted. As Plato had written: "whatever is excellent is also hard".[1]

The fact that, in his posthumous *Ethics* of 1677, Benedictus de Spinoza would likewise claim that "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare",[2] might be read as an indication of the continued presence of humanist training. It is actually much more than that. In Spinoza, as in Erasmus, what is considered difficult is the individual's ability to achieve a lasting type of moral transformation. And in Spinoza, too, the promise is made that whoever succeeds in this will find felicity. Both points form part of a particular combination of religious and philosophical discourse that dominated moral philosophy throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Though this early-modern intellectual attitude may be too broad for Erasmus' *Philosophia Christi* to be regarded as its archetype, this article will nevertheless take Erasmus' view on moral philosophy as its starting-point, in order to point out similarities with a number of other early-modern systems of morality that combined ancient philosophical norms with a fundamentally religious conception of mental transformation. It is my hope that, by presenting this broader picture of the early-modern amalgamation of reason and faith, we may get a better idea of the alternative positions that radically broke with it. In this paper, I shall offer the views of Blaise Pascal and Thomas Hobbes as two such alternatives, and argue that, since neither of these latter thinkers formulated their ideas along the lines of ancient philosophical schools, it was the broader early-modern conception of morality itself that should be seen as the necessary background for their views.

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[1] Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, *Enchiridion militis Christiani*, in *Ausgewählte Werke*, ed. H. and A. Holborn, vol. 1 (Munich, 1933, 1964[2]), p. 46. Translation from *The Enchiridion of Erasmus*, ed., transl. R. Himelick (Bloomington, 1963), pp. 70-71.

[2] Spinoza, *Ethica* V, Prop. 42, Scholium in *Opera*, ed. C. Gebhardt (Heidelberg, 1925), vol. 2, p. 308; *A Spinoza Reader: The* Ethics *and Other Works*, ed., transl. E. Curley (Princeton, 1994), p. 265.

The fact that there was such a thing as an early-modern amalgamation of reason and faith – and that this was in fact the broadly accepted position – indicates that it is by no means evident that early-modern philosophical debates may be explained on the basis of a choice between the acceptance or the rejection of pagan thought. Though few historians will readily subscribe to the thesis that Renaissance moral philosophy witnessed a rise of paganism that would triumph in the Enlightenment, or that the "making of modernity" was the outcome of a battle between philosophy and religion, it is rare that such popular theses are challenged. Yet crucial turning points in the history of Western morality, such as Pascal's "anti-humanism" and Hobbes' rejection of the ancient quest for mental tranquillity, were both closely related to theological ways of thinking and, if anything, fiercely opposed to the pagan tradition. If we are to understand the significance of these dissenting viewpoints, it will be necessary to evoke the background murmur against which they were heard.

Let us start out, however, by considering the humanist context itself and therefrom distilling some of the relevant aspects of Erasmus' *Philosophia Christi* – such as the compatibility of philosophy and religion and the notion of man's supreme good – by contrasting it with a form of humanism that was not of Erasmus' type.

THE AMALGAMATION OF REASON AND FAITH

If many a medieval, Renaissance or even seventeenth-century writer might have accepted the idea that moral excellence was a subject philosophy and religion shared, this does not mean that all would fit the "Erasmian" scheme. One of the most basic assumptions of all humanist thought was that classical examples might merge with the example of Christ. Rudolph Agricola, to take an example from Erasmus' immediate intellectual background, had stated that, with regard to ethics,

> you must not only look to what philosophers have written on this subject (philosophers such as Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, or any others that either wrote in Latin or were translated into an acceptable Latin). You must also seek it from historians and poets and orators. They do not actually teach, but by praising good deeds and criticising wrongdoing, they do so in effect, and most effectively: the examples they present mirror what is right or wrong.[3]

Erasmus mentions the same philosophers where he advises his Prince on the better kind of literature: Seneca, Aristotle and Cicero. He adds Plutarch as the best example in questions of politics and political biography, and Plato, who

[3] Rudolphus Agricola, *De formando studiis* (= Letter to Jacob Barbireau of 7 June 1484), in: *Lvcvbrationes aliqvot lectv dignissimae* (Cologne: Ioannes Gymnicus, 1539), facs. reprint *Opuscula orationes epistulae* (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 194. For a critical edition and translation, see Rudolph Agricola, *Letters*, ed. A. van der Laan and F. Akkerman (Assen and Tempe, 2002), pp. 204-205.

offers "the purer message" on the subject of political office. Erasmus is less enthusiastic than Agricola on the possibility of drawing the right examples from historians, poets and orators, but still agrees that their work offers much that may be used as a guide in questions of virtue and vice. Even the bad examples are useful! Promoting his own *De copia* of 1512 in *The Education of the Christian Prince*, Erasmus all but says that the reader may stick to this secondary work, where the right selection of ancient non-philosophical sources may already be found.[4]

Both Agricola and Erasmus, moreover, explicitly mention Scripture as the truer fount of moral knowledge. As Agricola argues, one has to take ethics "a step further, and look at Holy Writ", since "[everything] handed down by others contains mistaken ideas of one kind or another".[5] Erasmus likewise upholds the supremacy of Scripture:

> if any tutor wants my advice, as soon as the boy [i.e., the future Prince (HvR)] has a grasp of language he should present the proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, and the Book of Wisdom. […] Next the Gospels; and here it is very important in what way you kindle love of the author and the work in the boy's mind.[6]

Yet despite such obvious similarities where it comes to deriving moral lessons from the classics and using Holy Writ in moral education, Erasmus' and Agricola's positions differed in important respects. Although they agreed on the relative status of pagan sources, they did not agree on the ultimate aim of studying them. For Agricola, any subject would bind the orator to the accepted facts and presuppositions the specific subject was thought to have. In the case of moral philosophy, one might focus on the philosophical criteria of merit and moral worth. These, however, are themselves thought to be more or less self-evident. It only takes a rhetorical re-enactment of specific literary or Biblical examples to bring about a recognition of moral clues on the side of one's audience. Agricola's discussion of the story of Lucretia in the famous letter *De formando studio* is a fine example of this.[7] The public will be able to grasp the conclusions themselves.

Erasmus, on the other hand, did not share Agricola's confidence that moral growth might be won by a mere application of dialectical techniques. Indeed, in contrast to the latter's more or less *ad hoc* way of applying dialectics to ethics, Erasmus' moral theory is of an altogether more programmatic nature. The phrase *Philosophia Christi* itself links up with the idea that, even though they may differ in "quality" and in detail, the aims of philosophy and religion are, or

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[4] Desiderius Erasmus, *Institutio principis Christiani*, ed. O. Herding, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, series IV, vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1974), p. 181. Quotation from Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, transl. M. Cheshire and M. J. Heath, ed. L. Jardine (Cambridge, 1997), p. 62.

[5] Agricola (as in n. 3), *De formando studiis*, p. 194; *Letters*, pp. 205-207.

[6] Erasmus (as in n. 4), *Institutio principis Christiani*, p. 180; *The Education of a Christian Prince*, p. 61.

[7] Agricola (as in n. 3), *De formando studiis*, p. 198; *Letters*, pp. 214-215.

at least should be, the same – not in the sense that they offer similar literary examples (which they do), but in the sense that the New Testament message is thought to embody the essence of an ideal philosophy. Many of Erasmus' references to ancient examples and traditions are made with a view to convincing the reader that if pagans were as wise as they seem to have been from their writings, and if they had such high moral standards, then Christians should be all the wiser. A very pointed version of this idea is found in *The Education of a Christian Prince*: "Being a philosopher", Erasmus argues, "is in practice the same as being a Christian; only the terminology is different".[8]

The philosophical side of the equation brings with it a host of anthropological considerations that are presumed to be present, or at least to be implied, in the Biblical text. Purporting to explain in a concise way the New Testament theme of the flesh and the spirit in the *Enchiridion*, Erasmus for instance equates this Biblical vision of man with a Platonic theory of metaphysical dualism. Others have held such identifications to be characteristic more exclusively of Augustinian and Cartesian traditions. As the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has argued, in these latter schools

> [the] Pauline opposition of spirit and flesh is repeatedly being pulled out of its hinges and aligned with the Platonic-derived opposition between the immaterial and the bodily.[9]

Taylor seems to imply that the two should be distinguished. Yet if there are indeed differences between the Biblical and philosophical types of dualism, Erasmus certainly did not acknowledge them. Nor did he ever hesitate to interpret St. Paul's message in philosophical terms. On the contrary, "why mention one or two such passages?", he argues:

> Paul is engrossed in this point, that we should spurn the strife-ridden flesh and be firm in the spirit, the begetter of love and liberty. On the one hand, the flesh, bondage, unrest, contention are inseparable companions; on the other, the spirit, peace, love, freedom. This is what the Apostle teaches everywhere.[10]

It is true that there is a strange ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of the Pauline theme in Erasmus. In the purely theological sphere, the distinction between flesh and spirit could well serve to distinguish allegory from literalism, clearing the way for an allegorical reading of Scripture. Especially in the context of favourite subjects such as ritualism, Erasmus made ample use of this possibility and contrasted the letter of the Biblical text with its evangelical message. We thus find samples of anti-legalist next to anti-ritualist rhetoric in the *Enchiridion*, all concerned with a lenient notion of Christian charity that is

[8] Erasmus (as in n. 4), *Institutio principis Christiani*, p. 145; *The Education of a Christian Prince*, p. 15.

[9] C. Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 220.

[10] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, p. 82; *The Enchiridion*, p. 121.

phrased exclusively in terms of moral fairness and provides a rather abstract interpretation of what is "carnal" and what is "spiritual". A telling illustration of this is Erasmus' portrayal of the good, the neutral, and the evil judge:

> Suppose a judge gives short shrift to malefactors; he thinks of himself as a stern and incorruptible man. But would you care to look into him? If he is indulging his own disposition and yielding to a certain innate harshness, if he feels no distress of mind, but perhaps even a kind of pleasure, even though he never leaves off being a judge, then he should not be too highly pleased with himself. What he does is, morally, on a middle ground. If he is misusing the law for a private grudge or out of cupidity, then what he does is carnal and he is committing murder. But if he feels sharp grief of mind in being forced to destroy a man he would have preferred to reform and save, if he inflicts a merited punishment in the spirit of a father ordering his dearest son to be cut off and burned, then his action stems from the spiritual part.[11]

A selfish abuse of power is what is here defined as "carnal", and though the example does not entirely make clear in what way the bad judge "misuses" the law, the judges' respective positions are distinguished on the basis of their respective intentions instead of their decisions. Thus by emphasising the importance of mental intentions versus literal commandments, the example neatly affirms the difference between the spirit of the law and its literal formulation.

In other contexts, however, allegory and spiritual meaning form no part of Erasmus' explanations and a "strong", literal, interpretation of carnality takes the place of the "weaker" interpretation in terms of moral fairness. To be sure, the line is not even very sharp in the example of the judge, where Origen's tripartite division of man into spirit, soul and flesh, already crops up in a more literal way through the use of such terms as *indulgere* and *cupiditas*.[12] In other contexts, this alternative interpretation presents itself even more sharply, in such a way that the theme of the flesh and the spirit is wholly disconnected from questions of allegory and is linked instead to a philosophy of man that distinguishes free mental attitudes from those tainted by bodily drives.

Erasmus in fact often literally interprets the Pauline theme as a distinction between the mental and the physical. It is, moreover, in this way that he links Christian moral demands to pagan philosophical objectives. With pagan philosophical ideas substantiating Biblical truth, the *Enchiridion* time and again affirms the idea that there is no other aspect of human life that opposes Christian piety as much as carnality and the lures of the flesh – and Erasmus sees a clear parallel between ancient philosophers and the Apostle here:

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[11] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, p. 54; *The Enchiridion*, pp. 81-82.

[12] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, p. 54. Note, moreover, that the distinction between three types of immoral, neutral and ethically sound behaviour which occur in the example of the judge, reflects the anthropological view of man that Erasmus took over from Origen. Cf. J. D. Tracy, *Erasmus: The Growth of a Mind* (Geneva, 1972), pp. 86-87: "From Origen [Erasmus] adopted the tripartite division of human nature into flesh (corrupt), soul (neutral) and spirit (free from the taint of sin)".

> let the philosophers carry little weight, except for the fact all these things [i.e., the battles that result from knowing the difference between "reason" and "passion"] are taught in the Holy Scriptures, though not in the same terms. What the philosophers call reason Paul sometimes refers to as spirit, sometimes as the inner man, sometimes as the law of the mind. What they call passions he now calls the flesh, now the body, now the outward man, now the law of bodily members.[13]

Erasmus' position in moral philosophy was all about body and mind. With classical views on the bodily passions surfacing right at the heart of a book devoted to spiritual salvation and redemption, a complete harmony of philosophical and religious aims was suggested, as well as a complete identity of the means of attaining them. Nor is the philosophical interpretation of the Pauline theme limited to Platonism. In the *Enchiridion*, a hermeneutics of Biblical passages concerning the inner and the outer man is immediately preceded by an examination of the "Variety of Passions" such as they occur in the psychological models of Stoics and Peripatetics.[14] Again, the obvious link between the Pauline motif and the ontological distinction of body and soul is linked to the subject of reason and the passions, resulting in a rather blunt opposition of reason and virtue on the one hand and passion and sin on the other.

Reading the *Enchiridion* from the standpoint of an outsider, one would even be inclined to think that Christianity is essentially a life-long battle against the urges of the body. Inspired by the idea of the three parts of man, Erasmus evokes the dangers linked to bodily love. Reason, itself identified as the "immortal soul", is situated in "the loftiest part of the body [and] the one closest to heaven", while "the sensual appetite, which lusts for the pleasure of food and drink and which drives us into erotic love" has its place in lower regions, far from "that divine counselor presiding in the lofty citadel".[15] Small wonder then, that the nature of the "untamed and intractable beast" in the lower regions is demonstrated by the pudenda, more in particular by the part that "continually promotes rebellion in spite of the king's fruitless protests".[16] At times, Erasmus could out-do even Augustine as a champion of chastity.

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[13] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, p. 47; *The Enchiridion*, p. 72.

[14] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, chapters 6 and 7, respectively entitled "Concerning the Variety of Passions" and "Concerning the Inner and Outer Man and the Two Aspects of Man according to Holy Scripture"; *The Enchiridion*, pp. 67 and 72.

[15] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, pp. 43-44; *The Enchiridion*, pp. 66-67.

[16] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, pp. 43-44; *The Enchiridion*, p. 67. Though we may read into these words an emerging awareness of Erasmus' later notion that sexual activity is an obvious example of human folly, it does not explain Erasmus' very different tone of voice in the *Moriae Encomium*. Indeed, the latter book has understandably been regarded as giving expression to an "Epicurean" position that is wholly lacking in the *Enchiridion*. As I have argued elsewhere, however, Erasmus' so-called "Epicureanism" in the *Praise of Folly* is linked to a specific organisation of arguments, rather than to a specific position in moral philosophy. See my forthcoming article "*Quid aliud est, quam insanire?* Erasmus, Valla and the Stoic-Epicurean Controversy", to be published in the proceedings of the Conference *Erasmo e la Cultura Europea* that was held in Turin, Italy, on 7-8 September 2006.

If, however, we may conclude that Erasmus' position in moral philosophy was all about body and mind, this does not mean that the question of mind-versus-body was restricted to questions of sexuality. Far more important to the history of ethics is the fact that the question of body and mind was also linked to a specific set of ideas about the pleasurable gains to be won by choosing the road to virtue. In this, religion and philosophy could once more be combined, since the philosophical idea of a mental bonus on right choices in life mirrored the religious idea of beatification. Temperance with respect to primary human desires might release a type of mental energy far more positive, more steady and enduring. Had not all ancient philosophical schools, despite their apparent differences, affirmed this?

SWEET PIETY AND MORAL TRANSFORMATION

What fruits awaited the virtuous? In Erasmus' ***Epicureus*** colloquy, the character Hedonius personified both the Epicurean and the religious points of view in a battle between Stoicism and Epicureanism, the two giants of Hellenistic morality. Arguing that "there are no people more Epicurean than godly Christians", Hedonius' Epicureanism, however, is of an uncommon type.[17] On the basis of a dualism starker than that of Descartes, Erasmus has Hedonius and his Stoic interlocutor Spudaeus establish that, for humans at least, the power of the mind is the one and only fountain of pleasure. To prove this, Erasmus offers a questionable series of argumentative steps, focusing on the notion of conscience. Hedonius argues that nothing is happier than a good conscience since, as Plautus had said, "nothing is more wretched" than a bad one.[18] Next, the idea is introduced that there are pleasures that exceed and are more powerful than bodily pleasures. Having determined the peculiarity of mental delights in man and the inadequacy of purely bodily comforts for human needs, Erasmus goes on to conclude that it is in mental pleasures ***alone*** that a force resides which may overcome all pains and "render pleasant what is in itself bitter".[19]

Presenting the power of mind over matter as the only source of pleasure, Erasmus' Epicureanism is at variance with a key element of ancient Epicurean thought, namely the idea that the ultimate end of all human endeavour may be subsumed under a single concept of "pleasure". More important, however, than

[17] Desiderius Erasmus, ***Epicureus***, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, series I, vol. 3, ed. L.-E. Halkin, F. Bierlaire and R. Hoven (Amsterdam, 1972), p. 721. Quotation from *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 40: *The Colloquies*, ed. C. R. Thompson (Toronto, 1997), p. 1075; *The Colloquies of Erasmus*, ed. C. R. Thompson (Chicago, 1965), p. 538.

[18] Erasmus (as in n. 17), *Epicureus*, p. 721; *Collected Works*, pp. 1075-1076; *The Colloquies*, p. 539. Cf. Plautus, *Mostellaria* 3.1.544: "Nihil est miserius quam animus hominis conscius".

[19] Erasmus (as in n. 17), *Epicureus*, pp. 723-772 quotation from p. 723; *Collected Works*, pp. 1077-1079; quotation from p. 1077; *The Colloquies*, pp. 540-542; quotation from p. 540.

his inauspicious interpretation of Epicureanism, is the fact that Erasmus uses the Epicurean notion of *hêdonê* to highlight the contrast between what he regards as common and "unlawful" pleasures and their alternative, the pleasure he elsewhere calls "another kind" of pleasure – the pleasure "which will last, pure and unchanging, all through a man's life".[20] The idea that non-mental pleasures have no lasting effect is illustrated by the venereal diseases that "young men get from whoring".[21] And even if there will be no such negative effects, our mental make-up will ensure that every illicit indulgence has a bad taste to it. Erasmus tells us that a guilty conscience is "always the companion of unlawful pleasure" and adds the grim foresight of man's despair in old age when the threatening prospect of death will become ever more urgent.[22]

Again, however, the severe restriction on the enjoyment of alternative pleasures is subordinate to the positive message that there is a higher kind of pleasure to be found within the spiritual realm. Although Erasmus addresses philosophical arguments and borrows Epicurean notions to highlight this view, his defence of Epicureanism does not make him an Epicurean in philosophy. Rather, it is exemplary for the way in which the *Philosophia Christi* tied together religious and philosophical viewpoints. Indeed, Erasmus' philosophical outlook was never restricted to any philosophical school. Though he would always remain faithful to the Platonic maxim of distinguishing what is mental from what is physical, a further allegiance to Plato or other philosophers was a matter of lesser concern. Where Christ speaks to Erasmus, Plato is never far off, but Plato's spokesman could just as well be a Stoic, an Epicurean, or even an Aristotelian. In the *Epicureus* colloquy, the Stoic Spudaeus illustrates the strong power of mind over matter with the example of lovers defying the winter cold when they hold their vigils outside the beloved's house. Hedonius' reply to this is that the spirit of Christ is even more effective.[23] None of the pagan philosophical doctrines, in other words, could achieve what the New Testament might accomplish. Nevertheless, philosophical and religious types of spiritual transformation coincided, and the effects of both were essentially the same.

Erasmus repeatedly presented earthly higher pleasures as temporary forms of heavenly beatitude, borrowing an accepted idea of medieval philosophy and one which he had earlier copied from St. Bernard of Clairvaux.[24] Yet what hap-

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[20] Erasmus (as in n. 4), *Institutio principis Christiani*, p. 144; *The Education of a Christian Prince*, p. 14.

[21] Erasmus (as in n. 17), *Epicureus*, p. 727; *Collected Works*, p. 1080; *The Colloquies*, p. 543.

[22] Erasmus (as in n. 17), *Epicureus*, p. 727; *Collected Works*, p. 1081; *The Colloquies*, p. 544.

[23] Erasmus (as in n. 17), *Epicureus*, p. 723; *Collected Works*, p. 1077; *The Colloquies*, pp. 540-541.

[24] In *De contemptu mundi*, Erasmus borrowed form St. Bernard of Clairvaux the idea that he brief, but extreme delights a Christian believer may experience in this life are a prelude to the heavenly delights of the life to come. Cf. Erasmus, *De contemptv mvndi*, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, series V, vol. 1, ed. S. Dresden (Amsterdam and Oxford, 1977), p. 76.

pens in Erasmus, is that such earthly spiritual bliss is no longer confined to the mental state of the secluded divine. On the contrary, Erasmus had found a more universal target for spiritual transformation. Denying his fellow ecclesiastics a moral standing beyond that of other Christians, he sought to bestow on every Christian the moral ideals that he had earlier associated with the monastic life. Likewise, both in the *Praise of Folly* and the *Epicureus* colloquy, society as a whole is reminded of the "true" Epicurean pleasures that beatifying morality and Christian piety might produce.

At the same time, Erasmus regarded such a spiritual redirection of mental energy as an *uncommon* phenomenon. Though the *Praise of Folly* has been characterised as a turning point in Erasmus' oeuvre in that it marks a change from Stoic pessimism towards a more appreciative Epicurean regard of the Christian masses,[25] Erasmus in fact invariably held on to an element of moral elitism not only in the *Folly* itself, where he claimed (or rather complained) that "the number of really earnest devotees is so small compared with the grand total of the human race",[26] but also in the *Epicureus* colloquy, where he bluntly restates the idea that "what the common crowd hunt by fair means or foul are not true goods".[27] This, again, is a rather paradoxical opinion from the standpoint of Epicurean philosophy – but then, Erasmus did not seek to establish an Epicurean school within Christian thought. Rather, he saw a fundamental congruity between reason and faith in the way both philosophy and religion emphasised the need for breaking with a mental servitude to "bodily" desires in such a way that far worthier types of mental energy would be set free than those ordinarily craved for – especially those craved for by the *vulgus*.

Such a combination of moral optimism with mental elitism was a way of thinking as loosely linked to any of the philosophical schools as it was ubiquitously accepted in early-modern moral philosophical systems. As Erasmus' one-time pupil Juan Luis Vives stated in his widespread *Introduction to Wisdom* (1524) that functioned as a Christian Epictetus as much as a schoolboy's manual:

> Pleasure – a pure, total and continual delectation – arises only in those things which appertain to the mind.[28]

[25] Tracy, *Erasmus: The Growth of a Mind* (as in n. 12), p. 124.

[26] Cf. Erasmus, *Moriae encomivm id est Stvltitiae lavs*, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, series IV, vol. 3, ed. C. H. Miller (Amsterdam and Oxford, 1979), p. 190; translation from Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly and Other Writings*, ed. R. M. Adams (New York and London, 1989), p. 83.

[27] Erasmus (as in n. 17), *Epicureus*, p. 724; quotation from *Collected Works*, p. 1078; *The Colloquies*, p. 542.

[28] Juan Luis Vives, *Ad sapientiam introductio*, § 31. Quoted from *Vives' Introduction to Wisdom: A Renaissance Textbook*, ed. M. L. Torbiner (New York, 1968), p. 88.

PHILOSOPHICO-RELIGIOUS OPTIMISM

Higher pleasures had of course always played a role in moral philosophy. The Stoic *gaudium* that was the inherent result of the virtuous way, though not a reward to be aspired for its own sake, was nevertheless a bonus awaiting the wise. Platonic forms of assimilation to the divine and Aristotelian ideas on the pre-eminence of contemplation equally alluded to the idea that there was a mental advantage to such higher psychological states. On account of its identification of pagan philosophical ends with Christian religious aims, however, Erasmus' emphasis on the need and attainability of a moral transformation was more typical for the early-modern period. If humanist authors had always adopted a pedagogical stance toward the moral development of human individuals, those that exhibited philosophical beyond purely pedagogical interests could easily be inclined to identify piety with mental liberation, ignorance with sin, the *vulgus* with the damnable, the elect with the wise, and philosophical schooling with religious initiation. Likewise, in Giovanni Pico's manifesto of Renaissance moral thought, *De dignitate hominis*, exhortations to climb the stairs of philosophical development are accompanied by the idea that beatifying consequences may result. In becoming divine, one is promised the effects of sharing in divinity. Moral development, according to Pico, was a question of sensing and savouring the path to virtue to the point of becoming intoxicated and excited. "Who does not", Pico argues,

> set all human things at a lower value and, contemning the goods of fortune and neglecting the body, does not desire, while still continuing on earth, to become the drinking-companion of the gods; and, drunken in the nectar of eternity, to bestow the gift of immortality upon the mortal animal?

Pico also mentions the form of rapture that Plato saw as the privilege of the wise and as a higher form of madness:

> Who does not wish to have breathed into him the Socratic frenzies sung by Plato in the Phaedrus […]?[29]

Alluding to Jacob's ladder, one of Pico's favourite metaphors, as well as to the message of I Timothy 6:16, Erasmus explicitly linked the experience of beatitude to the idea of a divine repayment:

[29] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *De hominis dignitate*, in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Gian Francesco Pico, *Opera omnia* (Basel: Heinricus Petrus, 1557); repr. *Opera omnia*, ed. C. Vasoli (Hildesheim, 1996; 2005[2]), p. 319; G. Pico della Mirandola, *De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno e Scritti vari*, ed. E. Garin (Florence, 1942), p. 122. Translation from Pico della Mirandola, *On the Dignity of Man*, ed. G. Wallis, P. J. W. Miller and D. Carmichael (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 13.

> if you will try with all your might to rise out of the darkness and CONFUSION of your sensory experience, He will graciously come to meet you from His inaccessible Light and inscrutable Stillness […].

God's reward is found in the "prizes He gives for the efforts of those who contend for them".[30]

Whether it was Plato's ecstasy, the quasi-Epicurean idea of a higher pleasure, or simply the concept that virtue was its own reward, all such notions could equally serve as an expression for the idea that there was a divine dividend on moral growth. Erasmus described it in terms of the "rich harvest of all virtue": an "inward and secret joy known only by those who have achieved it, a joy which does not vanish and melt away with the delights of this world, but expands and swells into bliss everlasting".[31] Much like the paradigmatic *Philosophia Christi* itself, later articulations of the ancient ideas of a virtue-inspired *gaudium*, *laetitia intellectualis*, or *beatitudo*, suggest a similar fusion of religious and philosophical beliefs.

Close to Erasmus' own position is the "spiritualist" stance we find, for instance, in the work of Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert (1522-1590), the man who published what is generally held to be the first modern *Ethics* in a vernacular language, his *Zedekunst* of 1584. With an aim of advancing the moral upbringing of his contemporaries, Coornhert was ready to incorporate the lessons of all philosophical schools into the many pamphlets that he wrote. Even in his denunciation of Justus Lipsius' *Politicorum sive civilis doctrina libri sex* (1589), Coornhert appeals to the "manly constancy and Godly wisdom" (*manlyke standvastigheydt ende Godlyke wijsheydt*) of the Leiden burgomasters and city councils – the same classical ideals, in other words, that had been the focus of Lipsius' own philosophical interest. In a pamphlet, moreover, that summarises Coornhert's view of moral perfectibility under the heading *On the Origin of Sin: Plato's Testimony*, Stoic and Epicurean influences are just as apparent as Erasmian and Platonic themes.[32] His dialogue *In Pursuit of the Highest Good* (*Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe*, 1590) is again exemplary for this type of eclecticism in its way of adding one moral target on the other: tranquillity (*rust*), pleasure (*lust*, *wellust*), virtue (*deugd*) and love (*liefde*). Though the treatise includes subtle arguments for and against the various interpretations of the *summum bonum*, it ultimately does not reject any one of them in particular, but

[30] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, pp. 88 and 25; *The Enchiridion*, pp. 130 and 42, respectively. Note that, although Erasmus never shared in the metaphysical or cosmological views of Ficinian Platonism, he nevertheless, as M. A. Screech explains, "presents the bare bones of this doctrine [i.e., of Platonic *mania*] with considerable sympathy". The potential of this notion, for Erasmus, lay neither in metaphysics or cosmology, nor even in epistemology, but entirely in its moral application. Cf. M. A. Screech, *Ecstasy and the Praise of Folly* (London, 1980), p. 140.

[31] Erasmus (as in n. 1), *Enchiridion*, p. 40; *The Enchiridion*, p. 62.

[32] Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert, *Vande oorsaecke vande Zonde,'tghetuygh Platonis*, (c. 1560-1561), in *Dieryck Volckertsz. Coornherts Wercken*, ed. C. A. Boomgaert, vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1630), fol. 134r-v.

rather accepts them all as different aspects that may contribute in one way or another to a universal notion of moral growth.[33]

Coornhert presented a "secularised" form of moral thought in the sense that he combined a positive belief in spiritual reformation with a consciousness of its practical value. Reiterating the traditional Platonic idea we find in Erasmus, Pico and many others, that what is "beastly" in man should be replaced by what is "godlike", Coornhert adds that what is called "godlike" in moral philosophy is to be interpreted in social terms. In a community of men, becoming godlike is to attain a certain level of moral maturity. The difference between the adult and the child – another moral *fil rouge* of Pauline and Augustinian origin – thus becomes very prominent in Coornhert, and brings to light the fundamentally pedagogical core of his moral philosophy. Cornelis Boomgaert, one of Coornhert's interlocutors in *Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe*, offers the image of the young apple tree that lives only for itself and does not, as yet, bear any fruit. Likewise, the child does not yet know its goal in life; it is still unaware of its higher potentials and has necessarily to make use of its primary lusts and desires in order to survive. An adult, on the other hand, should know better.[34] "[Through] no fault of our own", Coornhert argues, "are we all born unwise, yet no one will stay unwise if not through his own fault".[35] Man becomes "godlike, that is godly", says Coornhert, "when he no longer lives for himself, but for others, and is most useful to most other people in respect of what is best".[36] Coornhert offers a precise standard for the age at which this godlikeness can be tested, and maturity be demanded of one's fellow men. It is at or around the age of twenty:

> Behold, then, how God justly demands to be loved by all adult people as the highest good, in that they have received from Him the possibility within themselves to do so; and that it is therefore a shortcoming when a human being that has come to the use of his reason – above his twentieth year, that is – loves himself, although he is a much more evil thing than God, more than [he loves] God […].[37]

The mature person is distinguished from the child by an ability to want for him or herself nothing but the divine nature that he or she may take part in, acquir-

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[33] Cf. Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert, *Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe* (Gouda, 1590). A modern edition may be found in Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed*, ed. H. Bonger, Geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte in Nederland, vol. 7 (Baarn, 1987), pp. 47-113.

[34] Cf. Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), pp. 83, 101.

[35] Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert, *Onverstandigh blijven is des Menschen eenighe zonde, oorsake van alle Dolinghe*, in *Dieryck Volckertsz. Coornherts Wercken*, ed. C. A. Boomgaert, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Jacob Aertsz. Colom, 1630), fol. 130r. Cf. H. Bonger, "Inleiding", in Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 26. Translation HvR.

[36] Cf. Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), pp. 101-102.

[37] Coornhert, *Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe* (as in n. 33), p. 107. Cf. Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 108.

ing the mental disposition of being "full of goodness, to the point of brimming over".[38]

In Coornhert, the promise of a spiritual dividend on moral transformation is also dealt with very explicitly. Testing the various candidates for the position of the *summum bonum* in *Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe*, Coornhert puts forward the question

> who would desire virtue, let alone with difficulty seek to acquire it and even excercise it with an effort, if it did not arouse a feeling of pleasure?[39]

The statement that virtue is not praised for itself, but rather on account of the pleasure that it kindles, is the classic position of the Epicurean in other examples of such debates. In Coornhert, however, the idea that there is a reward to virtue occurs in a more complicated fashion. In an imaginary dialogue with his Dutch friend Hendrick Laurensz Spieghel, Coornhert himself takes up the defence of pleasure. The concept of pleasure is criticised, however, and *Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe* ultimately focuses on virtue and unselfish love of God rather than on *lust*. Yet the notion of pleasure is not given up at any point.

Keeping the notion of pleasure aboard, albeit in a purely moralised and "mentalised" form, is characteristic of the broader, early-modern, concern for philosophical felicity – a concern that no longer accepted the typical Epicurean-Stoic antithesis as it was found in Cicero or Valla. Though the defence of pleasure in *Opperste ghoeds Nasporinghe* forms part of a presentation of the Epicurean position on ends, the self-conscious deployment of the pleasure-argument no longer functions as an argument against the Stoic view. If one accepts both an Erasmian emphasis on "higher" pleasures and the notion of a virtue that is its own reward, the concept of pleasure is easily reinterpreted as a spiritual reward for a morally acceptable attitude. Going beyond Erasmus himself, moreover, Coornhert consciously merged the Epicurean and Stoic positions. It is not the case, he argues, that there are now two types of *summum bonum*, "but wisdom, temperance, fortitude (*sterkte*) and justice are linked to pleasure in such a way that one cannot distinguish between them. Who has the one, must have the other".[40]

Though Coornhert's interlocutor in this part of the dialogue, Henrick Laurensz Spieghel, forces Coornhert to admit that not all pleasures are of a virtuous kind, the case for pleasure has nevertheless been made and its connection to virtue is never retracted. The idea, then, is that all morality is pleasure-driven, and instead of a choice for or against a specific school of thought, the focus of moral instruction is on the idea that nurtured mental dispositions have to be valued higher than natural ones, even if this is simply "for the pleasure that they produce".[41] As in Erasmus, such a position comes not only with a re-evaluation

[38] Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 112.

[39] Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 82. Cf. also p. 88: "Maar die [deugd] wordt niet om haarzelf geprezen, maar om de wellust die zij baart".

[40] Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 89.

[41] Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 88.

of classical philosophical views, but also with a reinterpretation of the concept of pleasure as such. Moral pleasure, a pleasure of a purely spiritual nature, is an earthly form of beatitude styled in the religious phraseology through which it is linked to St. Paul's notion of heavenly delights. It is a mental bonus sharply to be distinguished from lower enjoyments, to be identified with the religious type of inspiration that, as far as Coornhert is concerned, is the direct effect of a right understanding and knowledge of God.[42]

ORTHODOX OPTIMISTS

The idea that the aims and the effects of religion and philosophy coincided, is even found in books of a purely religious nature. Petrus Geesteranus' (ca. 1620-1673) *De constantia Christiana* of 1679, though it is not the Protestant reaction to Justus Lipsius' *De constantia* that it has been thought to be,[43] was in any case not intended as a defence of the Stoic position. Offering a biblical account of constancy instead, it traces the virtues of fortitude, temperance and perseverance as they are found in the Bible, whilst adding philosophical authorities (including Lipsius himself) to the authority of Holy Writ. True to his Christian position, Geesteranus insists that beatitude may only be found beyond this life – indeed, only after the resurrection of the body; a necessary specification of which even Erasmus had been aware.[44]

However, although a permanent *gaudium* is not to be found on earth, Geesteranus still explains his religious position in the Stoic terminology that he may have found in Lipsius. The latter had presented his own account of philosophico-religious mental training in the dark and pessimistic colours of bearing up heroically with life's austerities and God's punishments, rather than in the cheerful terms of pious joys. Here, too, however, the apparatus for overcoming hardships was to be found in our mental capacity to do so. The human

[42] As Coornhert explains in a passage that tries to salvage a certain notion of grace, the love of God is the direct effect of a true knowledge of God. Cf. Coornhert, *Op zoek naar het hoogste goed* (as in n. 33), p. 108: "Zo is ook de ware godskennis met de liefde tot God (haar gevolg) niet minder Gods eigendom in de ijverige mens dan de redelijkheid of de mogelijkheid tot de ware godskennis zelf". And *ibidem*: "Geef dan ook toe dat God met alle recht eist van de volwassen mens de vruchtbare woeker naar ieders vermogen tot de kennis en de liefde tot God, hoewel zij die niet zelf maar wel de mogelijkheid daartoe van God hebben".

[43] Lipsius's Dutch editor Piet Schrijvers characterised Geesteranus' posthumously published work (1679) as a Protestant reply to *De constantia*. Cf. Schrijvers, "Inleiding", in Justus Lipsius, *Over standvastigheid bij algemene rampspoed*, ed. P. H. Schrijvers (Baarn, 1983), pp. 18-19. On Geesteranus, see also my article in *The Dictionary of Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers* (Bristol, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 321-322.

[44] Erasmus, *Moriae Encomivm* (as in n. 26), p. 192: "Iam haec felicitas, quanquam tum demum perfecta contigit cum animi receptis pristinis corporibus immoralitate donabuntur […]".

mind is always in a situation of war, or at least "armed peace" with its dualistic counterpart, the body. Turned to God as a sunflower is turned to the Sun, it is reason, as the divine and heavenly part of the soul that, according to Lipsius, may set us free, may ease our pain, and make us "calm amidst wild billows".[45] Again, the aim of mental training is the positive bonus that awaits the wise – in Lipsius' case, tranquillity.

Though he rejected the notion of a permanent beatitude on earth, Geesteranus nevertheless interpreted our future bliss in similar philosophical terms. What one may experience in heaven will be a permanent type of "tranquillity", an ***absentia malorum*** and a ***bonorum possessio*** that "continually promotes and brings about a ***gaudium infinitum***" – a Christian view the author unproblematically substantiates by adding a reference to Seneca's description of mental peace and tranquillity beyond death.[46]

The idea that real beatitude is to be obtained only in heaven was a widespread idea, especially in the works of those theologians and philosophers who defended more orthodox religious positions. The Leiden theologian Antonius Walaeus (1573-1639), for instance, though forming part of the Aristotelian commentary tradition on account of his *Compendium ethicae Aristotelicae ad normam veritatis Christianae revocatum* (1620), rebutted Aristotle for not having seen, as Plato had, that the aspiration to virtue which is demanded in this life "is merely the path or means to eternal happiness in the future". Meanwhile, the idea that the combination of contemplative and active virtues leads to a perfect happiness in this life is not thereby rejected. Indeed, Walaeus accepted the Aristotelian virtues as "good works" which "are the means by which we should strive towards our future happiness".[47] This would seem to imply that earthly means to salvation are also efficacious in producing earthly forms of beatitude. Having praised Plato, who had argued that, to a certain degree, the highest good can be achieved in this life, although, according to the Christian truth, its perfection will only come in the next, Walaeus attempted to exonerate Aristotle as well, arguing that Aristotle, too, "where, in *Ethics*, book 10, contemplative beatitude is discussed", seems to have accepted the idea that the highest good comes in two different forms.[48]

Walaeus' case is also a significant example of early modern philosophical neutrality where it comes to evaluating ancient moral systems. In fact, with the exception of the Epicurean philosophy, which equates the ***summum bonum*** with

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[45] Justus Lipsius, *De constantia libri duo, qui alloquium praecipuè continent in publicis malis* (Antwerp, 1584), Book 1, chapters 5 and 6, pp. 14, 17.

[46] Petrus Geesteranus, *De constantia Christiana tam in secundis quam in adversis tractatus aequè utilis ac eximius*, ed. P. van Loon and T. Graswinckel (Leiden: Daniel van Gaesbeeck, 1679), pp. 67 and 55-56, respectively. Cf. Seneca, *De consolatione ad Marciam*, 19.6-20.2.

[47] Antonius Walaeus, *Compendium ethicae Aristotelicae ad normam veritatis Christianae revocatum* (Leiden: Elsevier, 1620), pp. 19 and 50, respectively. Translation by J. Monfasani from *Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts. Vol. 1: Moral Philosophy*, ed. J. Kraye (Cambridge, 1997), p. 124.

[48] Walaeus, *Compendium* (as in n. 47), p. 19.

pleasure, all others, though defining the highest good in a variety of ways as "a disposition to virtue" (Stoics), "the activity of virtue" (Peripatetics), or "the union of man with God" (Platonists), all come down to the same thing, namely that man's highest good is to be found in *virtue*, "the most agreeable, most honourable and utmost praiseworthy" of human potentials. Walaeus even shows a further allegiance to the broad current of early modern moral optimism, where he acknowledges that even Epicureanism may be included in this list, if it is interpreted in the way "modern" authors have interpreted it. These *recentiores* have vindicated the ancient Epicurean position by defining as "pleasure"

> not that kind of pleasure that humans have in common with animals, but the kind of pleasure of the mind that is pure and withdrawn from bodily things, which arises in the human mind from the knowledge of eminent things and the activity of honourable deeds.[49]

It would, Walaeus accordingly argues, "not be all too mistaken" to consider pleasure as the highest good if one interprets the Epicurean position in this modern way.[50] Virtue and pleasure, indeed, stand very close, so that the question should be answered whether it is the virtuous or the pleasurable aspects that form the essence of the *summum bonum*. Doing so, Walaeus grouped together all the various concepts early-modern philosophy accepted as expressions of the idea of a spiritual bonus on moral growth: *animi tranquillitas*, *laetitia*, *gaudium*, *voluptas animi*, *felicitas*, *beatitudo* – things not only philosophers, but also Holy Writ itself had promised to mankind as the *praemium* and *finis* of "our labours".[51]

In the end, Walaeus opts for the idea that, strictly speaking, mental tranquillity in itself does not make up the essence of the highest good. Nevertheless, it is intricately and inseparably linked to virtue as its "inseparable effect and unique correlative (*adiunctum proprium*)".[52] This discredits the view that virtue would simply be the cause of the highest good, and pleasure its essence, or *form*. At the same time, Walaeus' discussion of the *summum bonum*, and his acceptance of the idea that pleasurable aspects form an essential part of it, illustrates to what extent neo-scholastic discussions, too, had accepted the idea that all ancient philosophical schools had only offered different definitions of what was basically a single position. Where his object had been to explain Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea* in Christian terms, Walaeus in fact presented a treatise of ethics in which all pagan systems were seen as so many partial attempts to identify what man could achieve in terms of mental felicity. Even if post-Reformation and post-Tridentine theology kept philosophers from too easily

[49] Walaeus, *Compendium* (as in n. 47), p. 23.

[50] Walaeus, *Compendium* (as in n. 47), p. 24: "non esset vsque adeo absurda".

[51] Walaeus, *Compendium* (as in n. 47), pp. 41-42. For Biblical refrences, see, for instance, the use of *finis* in Proverbs 22:4 and the New Testament use of the term *merces* (rather than *praemium*) for the Greek *misthós*.

[52] Walaeus, *Compendium* (as in n. 47), p. 43.

equating the gift of grace with earthly beatitude – something of which Lipsius himself seems initially to have been remarkably unworried[53] – the essential identification of moral and theological bliss could nevertheless be maintained and explained within accepted philosophical and theological boundaries.

POST-CARTESIAN PARTISANS

Even when natural philosophy dramatically changed, philosophers still continued – at least for a generation or two – to search for the highest good, and to describe the state of bliss it was thought to produce in terms that linked philosophy to religion. Lipsius' image of the tranquil mind standing up to the wild waves of outer conditions would remain popular even with seventeenth-century Cartesians who explicitly distanced themselves from Stoicism. Thus, Lipsius' Cartesian successor, the Flemish metaphysician and moralist Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669), expressed a quasi-Stoic awareness of the need not to let oneself be enslaved by the pressure of outer conditions, knowing full well that

> there is this boundless ocean of miseries, on which I presently toss. I am hurled from one calamity to another, only to sink back as often as not from the latter to the former.[54]

Similarly, at the end of the third book of his *Ethics*, Spinoza argued it should by now be clear to the reader from what had been said

> that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and fate.[55]

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[53] In his own copy of *De constantia*, Lipsius was soon to scribble "and God" in the margin wherever right reason was discussed. Cf. Schrijvers, "Inleiding", p. 15. In line with this, the dedicatory letter to the second edition of *De constantia*, instead of simply mentioning "wisdom" as the true means of attaining "tranquillity" and "calm", was to mention "wisdom [...] together with Holy Writ". Cf. the original version of Lipsius' *De constantia* (as in n. 45), sig. *2v: "quoniam, nisi fallor, interclusam diu & spinis obsitam hanc Sapientiæ viam, sternere & munire aggredimur primi. quæ illa profectò est, quæ sola possit ducere ad Tranquillitatem & Quietem". In the 1585 edition a separate preface to the reader was added discussing the relationship between theology and philosophy. The text of the original dedication was changed to: "quæ illa profectò est, quæ cum diuinis litteris coniuncta, poßit ducere ad Tranquillitatem & Quietem". Justus Lipsius, *De constantia libri duo, qui alloquium praecipuè continent in publicis malis* (Antwerp, 1585), sig. *4v.

[54] A. Geulincx, *Opera philosophica*, ed. J. P. N. Land (The Hague, 1891-1893); *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. H. J. de Vleeschauwer (Stuttgart, 1965-1968), vol. 3, p. 55. Translation from A. Geulincx, *Ethics: With Samuel Beckett's Notes*, transl. M. Wilson, ed. H. van Ruler, A. Uhlmann, M. Wilson (Leiden, 2006), p. 54.

[55] Spinoza, *Ethica* III, Propositio 59, Scholium, in *Opera* (as in n. 2), vol. 2, p. 189. Translation from *A Spinoza Reader* (as in n. 2), p. 187.

Many more examples could be given of such classical ways of expression having become the standard jargon of seventeenth-century theories of ethics. However, the image of human life as a turbulent sea was, again, far more than an example of the remaining force of philological training. In philosophical terms, it expressed a shared conviction that solace in life was to be found in reason alone.

Likewise, seventeenth-century thinkers continued to emphasise the shared outlook of philosophy and religion. Both aimed at acquiring that uncanny form of happiness that only the virtuous were likely to taste. Geulincx' pupil Cornelis Bontekoe (c. 1644-1685) considered a "sweet affection" [***soete genegenheit***] to all things (and to God in particular) and a "lasting happiness" [***gedurige vreugde***] to be the ultimate goal of both the "good philosopher" and the "enlightened Christian".[56] Geulincx himself equally underlined the private and inexplicable character of delights known only to the virtuous:

> The chaste delights of a mind dedicated to God, of a mind sworn to God's Law, and completely forswearing itself; chaste delights (what can I say beyond the name of a thing that cannot be expressed by saying it?), dear delights, pure, generous delights. No-one can begin to be acquainted with such joys unless he rejoices in them: these joys are all joys of the heart.[57]

Depicting his new set of four cardinal virtues as Goddesses, "because they join and link us so closely with God", Geulincx accentuated in his ***Ethics*** that these virtues are a unique source of beatitude, indeed of "all our blessedness [***beatitudo***] and happiness [***felicitas***]".[58] Again, this is also what Spinoza would claim, arguing that our "salvation [***salus***], or blessedness [***beatitudo***], or freedom [***libertas***]" consists in a "constant and eternal love of God, or in God's love for men". Recognising that there was a fundamental likeness between philosophy and religion on this point, Spinoza added that such spiritual blessedness is identical to what "is called glory [***Gloria***] in the Sacred Scriptures".[59]

Elsewhere, I have pointed to the various psychological principles that accompanied this type of philosophical belief in the possibility of a morally induced form of mental detachment: the notion that happiness is intimately connected to a knowledge of the truth; that wilful abstinence and moderation are uniquely beneficial; that mental freedom may be won on the basis of insight alone; that there is a type of experience which is known only to the initiated and which is not communicable; that such exceptional experiences come in the form of an ecstatic joy; and, finally, that the latter is connected to some type of

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[56] Cornelis Bontekoe, ***Opbouw der Medicyne***, Chapter 13, "Van de middelen, om het Leven en de Gesondheid lang te bewaren, sich voor Siektens te hoeden, en d'Ouderdom en Dood een langen tijd af te weren", in ***Alle de Philosophische, Medicinale en Chymische Werken*** (Amsterdam: Jan ten Hoorn, 1689), vol. 2, part 3.231.

[57] Geulincx (as in n. 54), ***Opera philosophica***, vol. 3, p. 62; ***Ethics***, p. 61.

[58] Geulincx (as in n. 54), ***Opera philosophica***, vol. 3, p. 193; ***Ethics***, p. 210.

[59] Spinoza, ***Ethica***, V, Proposito 36, Scholium, in ***Opera*** (as in n. 2), vol. 2, p. 303. Translations from ***A Spinoza Reader*** (as in n. 2), pp. 260-261.

ego-loss.[60] All these were common aspects of an attitude that was as pessimistic about the human condition itself as it was optimistic in its belief in the philosophical means and goals that promised salvation. Moral growth was a question of mental training associated with the idea that, as Arnold Geulincx was to repeat in the manner of Coornhert, "we are born infants; and as a result will cleave first to sensations and Passions rather than Reason".[61]

Meanwhile, more scholastically inclined authors continued to compare philosophical to theological virtues and to discuss and rank the various philosophical schools accordingly. In his *Synopsis ethices* (first published in 1675), Descartes' translator, the Remonstrant theologian Étienne de Courcelles (1586-1659), refused to accept the bifurcation of ethics into a philosophical and a theological branch. Neatly distinguishing mental from corporeal, and praiseworthy from base and indifferent joys, Courcelles took position inbetween the supposed Epicurean acclaims and Platonico-Stoic condemnations of pleasure. He also added a chapter on beatitude in which all the various aspects of the *summum bonum* were considered.[62] The accent in this eudaemonology is on the imperfection of beatitude in this life. Nevertheless, De Courcelles argues once again that all philosophers concur in finding beatitude in virtue, and that they disagree "in word rather than in the thing itself".[63] In addition, he sanctions Epicurus, who, he says, was misread with respect to pleasure and had only sought the kind of *indolentia* that all agreed was "a companion and supplement to the supreme good".

If De Courcelles showed his theological background by putting the afterlife firmly back on the agenda, he did so for psychologically interesting reasons. It is, he argued, only through the *hope* for a life beyond that peace and quiet can be found in the present. This argument actually implies that, rather than virtue, it is "mental tranquillity and pleasure" that make up the essence of the *summum bonum*. One can, De Courcelles argues, be virtuous and "suffer great misfortunes" at the same time. Only virtue accompanied by a religious consolation of hope will ultimately work and have the beatifying effect that may rightfully claim the name of "highest good".[64] It is thus no surprise that De Courcelles argued that ethics belongs to philosophy and theology alike, at least if one accepts these as being distinct disciplines. If, however,

> Philosophy is considered as a collection of all praiseworthy arts, in such a way as not only pleased Cicero and Plato, but also many of the early Christians, who assigned the Christian religion the name of Evangelic Philosophy, there is no doubt but that

[60] Cf. my "Le sage et l'amour de Dieu: Conceptions philosophiques de la béatitude d'Érasme à Spinoza", in *Spinoza et la Renaissance*, ed. S. Ansaldi (Paris, 2007), pp. 57-80.

[61] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, p. 106; *Ethics*, p. 111.

[62] Cf. Stephanus Curcellaeus, *Synopsis ethices*, in *Opera theologica*, ed. Philippus van Limborch (Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevier, 1675), pp. 983, 994 and 1016-1018, respectively.

[63] Curcellaeus, *Synopsis ethices* (as in n. 62), p. 1017. Translation HvR.

[64] Curcellaeus, *Synopsis ethices* (as in n. 62), pp. 1017-1018.

> Ethics belongs to the province of Philosophy, as even Theology itself belongs to the same.[65]

Thus, the idea of a *Philosophia Christi* re-enters the stage in a purely philosophical context. Yet if the idea remained widespread that the aims of religion and philosophy coincided, and if entire generations accepted the notion that the path to virtue promised pleasurable effects,[66] such standpoints had not therefore received universal approval even in early modern times.

POSITIVE DOUBTS

Dissent was fuelled, and moral philosophy revolutionised, not so much by philosophical considerations, as by a form of pessimism that was crucial to the Christian religion itself. Two main alternatives to the accepted philosophico-religious stance were based on related, though not identical, considerations: either the attainability of moral happiness with the help of reason was called into doubt, or the concept of a moral happiness as such was flatly rejected. In either case, the alliance of religious and philosophical motivations was regarded deceptive on the grounds that it bred moral illusions.

The first position was in itself more widespread than the radical view it gave rise to. Inspired by the Judeo-Christian notion of man's fallen state, many early-modern thinkers were sceptical of the high-flying ideals of ancient philosophy – the ideal of the Stoic wise man in particular. Even Erasmus, in the *Enchiridion*, depicted the life of the virtuous Christian soldier in terms of a continued battle against sin. More than a century later, the Christian apologist Petrus Geesteranus, arguing that the subject of temptation (*peirasmós*, *Tentatio*) was one of the main subjects in the Bible,[67] would equally emphasise the need to keep fighting the devil, the world and the flesh. The case of Geulincx proves that similar ideas were found in philosophical treatises. Geulincx puts what he calls "the devil" last in his enumeration of disreputable pleasures, interpreting "the flesh" as something related to "the pleasures of the table and venery", "the world" to "fame" and, lastly, and most conspicuously, "the devil" to the human desire to resist any wilful change of conduct, in other words, to what Geulincx calls "a certain stubbornness or persistence in what one has begun".[68]

Though in Geulincx we thus find a naturalistic, or "philosophical", interpretation of Biblical concepts wholly alien to Geesteranus, he shares the latter's

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[65] Curcellaeus, *Synopsis ethices* (as in n. 62), p. 983.

[66] In my introduction to Arnold Geulincx, *Ethics: With Samuel Beckett's Notes* (Leiden, 2007), I have tried to indentify some of the social and philosophical factors involved in the disappearance of the concept of beatitude from mainstream philosophy after 1700.

[67] Geesteranus, *De constantia Christiana* (as in n. 46), p. 34.

[68] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, p. 109; *Ethics*, p. 115. See also his more detailed account of "The Flesh", "The World" and "The Devil" in Treatise 4.6-8, *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3, pp. 113-119; *Ethics*, pp. 119-126.

moral pessimism in so far as his analysis, too, satisfies the Christian rule that the battle against vice will never be over, nor sinful proclivities be overcome. In Geulincx, this position is intricately linked to the Augustinian idea – now strengthened by Cartesian physiology – that the passions in themselves are neither good nor bad, but wholly neutral:

> Passions are, then, so far as nature is concerned, quite good, though some of them are unpleasant to us or affect us adversely (such as pain, fear, etc.); but so far as morality is concerned they are neither good nor bad for us, but have the same character as seeing and hearing, etc., on account of which no-one is called either virtuous or vicious.[69]

Since it is of the essence of our human condition to have passions, the Stoic notion of *apatheia* is nonsensical within the Cartesian context. Yet, although these passions themselves are wholly neutral, we have "a great propensity" always to act upon them (which Geulincx calls "a sort of weakness of ours").[70] This makes us continually prone to sin – so much so, in fact, that the positive aim of the Stoic wise man eventually to overcome all mental disturbances is ruled out from the start.

Others have claimed that this was the point on which Spinoza diverged from the philosophy of his ancient Stoic examples. As Alexandre Matheron wrote, "in contrast to what the Stoics believed, *we cannot make* […] *sadness disappear*", since it is the effect of exterior causes that shatter our rational desires.[71] As we have seen, two of his Leiden contemporaries accepted the same thing on Christian grounds. Whether or not Spinoza was right in believing that the Stoic tradition had itself ignored such caveats with respect to the attainability of a lasting mental peace, Geesteranus at least was convinced that the Stoics, and Seneca in particular, had understood very well that in order to find virtue one had to fight a perpetual battle.[72] Geesteranus himself, of course, held a lasting tranquillity to be beyond our powers, arguing that, in this life at least, peace of mind could be only a short, imperfect and limited affair.[73] Likewise, Geulincx argued that to search for a lasting peace would lead to a conflict with the cardinal virtue of humility. The whole idea of being virtuous, according to Geulincx, was to accept willingly what one has to endure. The virtuous man is a reasonable man, and will train himself to be always "minded to" what is reasonable:

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[69] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, p. 105; *Ethics*, p. 110.

[70] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, p. 105; *Ethics*, p. 111.

[71] A. Matheron, "Le moment stoïcien de l'Éthique de Spinoza", in *Le Stoïcisme aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, ed. P.-Fr. Moreau and J. Lagrée (Caen, 1994), pp. 159-160. Quotation from p. 159. Translation HvR.

[72] The Bible itself had affirmed this: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 6:34). Cf. Geesteranus, *De constantia Christiana* (as in n. 46), p. 54. Geesteranus quotes Seneca's *De constantia sapientis*, 10.4: "nulla virtus est, quæ non sentias perpeti". Geesteranus, *De constantia Christiana* (as in n. 46), pp. 226-227. Cf. *L. Annaei Senecae opera qvae svpersvnt*, ed. E. Hermes, vol. 1, fasc. 1 (Leipzig, 1905), p. 34: "nulla virtus est, quae non sentiat [sc. sapiens] se perpeti".

[73] Geesteranus, *De constantia Christiana* (as in n. 46), p. 54.

> Therefore, whatever the virtuous man does, he does willingly, since nothing is at liberty to act on him apart from what Reason dictates is to be done. Whatever he suffers, he suffers willingly, since in Passion, as such (and considered only in itself), there is nothing contrary to Reason, and accordingly neither is there anything to which he is not minded.[74]

Yet despite their pessimism with regard to the possibility of arriving at a lasting happiness, all these authors at least accepted the difficulties concerned as necessary obstacles to be overcome. What Geesteranus, Geulincx and Spinoza shared with Stoicism was that all reasonable efforts at overcoming life and nature's obstacles, even if there would always be moments of despair, were at least always steps in the right direction. A very different and a far more "discordant" type of pessimism is the one that we find in Blaise Pascal.

DISHARMONY

Pascal's criticism of the supposed similarity between philosophy and religion leads to a direct confrontation between reason and religious inspiration. According to the French philosopher-scientist, the philosophical means that are aimed at the good life are not so much lacking force in comparison to religious means, but actually prevent the individual from attaining the intended end of a lasting beatitude. Beatitude is considered a psychological goal beyond human achievement not for the fact that it aims too high, but because of the mentally damaging consequences of the attempts to attain it.

Though some of Pascal's aphorisms seem hardly to rise above the complaints of contemporary pietistic faultfinders, for instance where he denounces sports and art as idle preoccupations,[75] the preeminence of his analysis of human vanity lies in its way of presenting as mental delusions the projects that psychologically attract us. Yet, if Pascal is the "anti-humanist" he is reported to be,[76] his anti-humanism nonetheless involved a very serious interpretation of the aims and aspirations of ancient and early-modern philosophy. More than that, he accepted some of the most basic assumptions of the philosophical tradi-

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[74] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, p. 123; *Ethics*, p. 130.

[75] Blaise Pascal, *Pensées* §§ 73 and 74 according to P. Sellier's edition: *Pensées: Nouvelle Édition établie pour la première fois d'après la copie de référence de Gilberte Pascal* (Paris, 1976); Blaise Pascal, *Pensées: Édition établie d'après la copie de référence de Gilberte Pascal* (Paris, 1999). The passages correspond to §§ 39 and 40 in the edition by Louis Lafuma: Blaise Pascal, *Pensées sur la religion et sur quelques autres sujets*, in 3 vols. (Paris, 1951); and to §§ 141 and 134 according to Léon Brunschvicg's edition: *Opuscules et pensées de Pascal* (Paris, 1897); Blaise Pascal, *Pensées et opuscules* (Paris, 1904[3]), an edition that may also be found in the last three volumes of the *Œuvres de Blaise Pascal*, ed. L. Brunschvicg, P. Boutroux and F. Gazier, 14 vols. (Paris, 1904-1914).

[76] Sellier, "Introduction", in Pascal, *Pensées* (as in n. 75), p. 5: "ce brûlot anti-humaniste".

tion as being all too human, and therefore inescapable, assumptions. Even in criticising such things as human vanity and moral philosophical goals, Pascal was not entirely negative about human intentions as such, nor indeed about the philosophical traditions that had canonised specific forms of psychological motivation as indicators at the crossroads of human choice. What he argued, however, was that such indicators only lead us deeper into the labyrinths and blind alleys of reason.

Instead of borrowing his example from Augustine, Pascal quotes from Montaigne Varro's famous calculus of philosophical sects based on the many candidates for the ***summum bonum***.[77] Yet Pascal stands much closer to Augustine than to Montaigne. Indeed, the passage in his own work that discusses the philosophical search for the ***souverain bien*** immediately leads to an exposition of man's Fall, since no knowledge of the ***véritable bien*** can be had without some idea of man's ***véritable état***.[78] Pascal's problem with the philosophical enterprise of trying to define and to find man's ***summum bonum***, is that the search for happiness leads us astray and makes us follow ineffectual rules and erroneous beliefs that will only increase our suffering. Not being able to achieve what we want to achieve, and being able to achieve only what we should not want to aspire for, man's state is characterised by the same split aspects of ***grandeur*** and ***bassesse*** Pascal finds in so many parts of both everyday life and the sciences.[79]

Indeed, true to his scientific way of thinking, Pascal conceives of the Christian religion primarily in terms of the right ***solution*** to a specific problem: the problem of man's absurd position. The ineffectiveness of human efforts can elegantly be explained by a hypothesis that all philosophers had overlooked, but which was uniquely included in the hypothetico-deductive model of Christian theory: the notion of man's fallen state.[80] The Christian position, according to Pascal, is the only alternative that accepts the idea of a fundamental friction between the human will and its abilities, and may thus explain the split charac-

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[77] Pascal (as in n. 75), ***Pensées***, §§ 27, 111, and 714; ed. Lafuma §§ 408, 76 and 479; ed. Brunschvicg §§ 74, 73, and 74 bis. Varro had calculated that the various interpretations of the ***summum bonum*** would lead to a total of 288 philosophical sects. Cf. Augustine, ***De civitate Dei*** 19.1. Leibniz would offer the computation as an example of his combinatorial art. Cf. G. W. Leibniz, ***Dissertatio de arte combinatoria*** (Leipzig: Fickius and Seuboldus, 1666), pp. 50-51.

[78] Pascal (as in n. 75), ***Pensées***, § 181; ed. Lafuma § 148; ed. Brunschvicg § 425, esp. Quotation from § 182; ed. Lafuma § 149; ed. Brunschvicg § 430.

[79] Cf., for example, Pascal (as in n. 75), ***Pensées*** § 20; ed. Lafuma § 401; ed. Brunschvicg § 437: "Nous sommes incapables de ne pas souhaiter la vérité et le bonheur et sommes incapables ni de certitude ni de bonheur".

[80] Cf., for example, Pascal (as in n. 75), ***Pensées*** § 17; ed. Lafuma § 398; ed. Brunschvicg § 525: "Les philosophes ne prescrivaient point des sentiments proportionnés aux deux états [etc.]", and especially § 182; ed. Lafuma § 149; ed. Brunschvicg § 430: "Sera-ce les philosophes, qui nous proposent pour tout bien les biens qui sont en nous?", as well as § 680; ed. Lafuma § 421; ed. Brunschvicg § 606: "Nulle religion que la nôtre n'a enseigné que l'homme naît en péché. Nulle sect de philosophes ne l'a dit. Nulle n'a donc dit vrai". See also § 237; ed. Lafuma § 205; ed. Brunschvicg § 489.

ter of all human strivings. At the same time, this indicates to what extent Pascal's position is essentially Jansenist, and thus of a theological nature. As he argued on the basis of his reading of Augustine and the latter's biographer Jansenius, only an infinite Being can repair the hiatus between man's wishes and man's powers.[81] Only God may help us avoid frustration.

This may explain the absence, in the *Pensées*, of a detailed philosophical or psychological explanation of man's messy mind. Not even in the case of such interesting and typically Pascalian notions as the idea of man's search for *divertissement*, though it points towards a notion of inauthenticity that links his philosophy to later existentialist ideas, do we find an explanation for the supposed ineffectiveness of man's search for beatitude. Rather, Pascal consistently interprets *divertissement* simply as a kind of mental distraction, a temporary care or *soin* for the self, that keeps the human being from having to see and recognise its own condition – above all the *Faktizität* of its mortality.[82]

As a result, Pascal presents the tension between the philosophical norms and man's real goal in life as a more or less accidental fact: God made it impossible to arrive at the one by means of the other. There is no manifest contradiction between the philosophical motivation and the religious solution as such. At times, Pascal even presents Stoic moral norms as simply too difficult to achieve,[83] or at least too difficult to achieve without grace.[84] If one reads his criticism of the beastly aspects of human striving (*Bassesse de l'homme jusqu'à se soumettre aux bêtes, jusques à les adorer*[85]), one would hope to find him thinking that philosophical wisdom itself is something incongruous with human nature. In fact, however, Pascal only affirms the standard Pico-like position regarding man's tendency to slip back to a form of animal existence. Due to the fact that the highest level of wisdom is necessarily missed, philosophical alternatives are tested that effectively degrade man and bring him back to the level of beasts. What, in other words, Pascal reintroduces here, is a simple denunciation of Epicureanism, which, in his case, is linked to an even stronger denunciation of Islamic thought as a fundamentally hedonistic type of religion on account of its promise of virgins in paradise.[86]

Thus, misguided and vain though philosophers may have been, Pascal still accepted their view that there was some moral level that rose above sheer hu-

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[81] For the references to Jansenius and Augustine, see Sellier's editorial footnote in Pascal, *Pensées* (Paris, 1999; as in n. 75), p. 226, note 4.

[82] Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* § 171; ed. Lafuma § 139; ed. Brunschvicg § 143, and especially § 102; ed. Lafuma § 68; ed. Brunschvicg § 205.

[83] Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* §§ 133, 177 and 179; ed. Lafuma §§ 100, 144 and 146; ed. Brunschvicg §§ 467, 360 and 350, respectively.

[84] Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* § 174; ed. Lafuma § 141; ed. Brunschvicg § 466.

[85] Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* § 86; ed. Lafuma § 53; ed. Brunschvicg § 429.

[86] Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* § 182; ed. Lafuma § 149; ed. Brunschvicg § 430: "Ceux qui nous ont égalés aux bêtes et les mahométans, qui nous ont donné les plaisirs de la terre pour tout bien même dans l'éternité, ont-ils apporté le remède à nos concupiscences?" See also § 251; ed. Lafuma § 218; ed. Brunschvicg § 598.

man vanity.[87] In comparison, Thomas Hobbes' attack on philosophical wisdom was of an even more radical type.

DENIAL

Based on a theology that questioned whether religion and philosophy were in the same league, Pascal's position was a moderate one compared to the view that saw no logic in moral philosophy as such and altogether refused the notion of mental fruits to be gained on the road to virtue. There is, however, an interesting similarity between Hobbes' and Pascal's forms of pessimism. True to the Augustinian practice of attributing all human natural motivation to *philautia*, Pascal would state in the *Pensées*:

> Concupiscence and Violence are the Sources of all of our Actions, merely Human. From the former arise those which are voluntary; and those which are involuntary from the latter.[88]

As far as man himself was concerned, there was no limit to his egoism. In his straightforward statement, however, that "of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some *Good to himself*",[89] Hobbes seems to have taken up arms against the prevalent philosophico-religious optimism in a way that defied even the most radical Calvinist.

Indeed, Hobbes' radicalisation of self-love marks a break with the social aspect evident in all of the more optimistic positions within early-modern moral philosophy. Whether we take Pico's view, who saw in Moses' political order the ideal expression of a system based on philosophical initiation and the cleansing of the soul;[90] Walaeus' idea that in civil life, in family life and in private life, ethical norms differentiated human society not only from that of beasts, but from a society of criminals, too;[91] Geulincx' view that "Friendship with Virtu-

[87] Cf. Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* § 519; ed. Lafuma § 626; ed. Brunschvicg § 462: "Le commun des hommes met le bien dans la fortune et dans les biens du dehors, ou au moins dans le divertissement. Les philosophes ont montré la vanité de tout cela, et l'ont mis où ils ont pu".

[88] Pascal (as in n. 75), *Pensées* § 131; ed. Lafuma § 97; ed. Brunschvicg § 334. Translation from [Blaise] Pascal, *Thoughts on Religion, and Other Subjects*, ed. B. Kennet (London, 1704), p. 293.

[89] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, Part I, Chapter 14, in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, vol. 3 (London, 1839), p. 120; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, 1981), p. 192.

[90] Pico della Mirandola (as in n. 29), *De hominis dignitate, Opera omnia*, p. 319; ed. Garin, pp. 120 and 122.

[91] Walaeus, *Compendium* (as in n. 47), sigs. †2v-†3.

ous Men" is one of the rewards of virtue besides "Friendship with God";[92] Spinoza's political notion of "right religion", which is based on the proposition that "[the] good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men";[93] or the more obvious identifications of piety and virtue that we find in Erasmus and Coornhert – all of these authors show a concern with the social side-effect of philosophico-religious growth that is completely lost in Hobbes.

Hobbes' straightforward denial of the idea that social unification is enhanced by the development of a moral stance conflicts not only with the view of most of his contemporaries, but also with ancient philosophical positions. Plato's contention that, for the ideal Republic, it is the type of education that counts; Aristotle's view that the wise man is justly praised for his moral excellence; Stoicism's emphasis on what is intrinsically *honestum*; and even the Epicurean belief that *ataraxia* rests partly on the benefits of social life – all of these considerations are absent from Hobbes' reduction of all human desires to egoistic drives. An author like Machiavelli might still represent a classical position in as far as he takes into account the emotional outcome of a certain behaviour. Valla, too, saw in a tyrant's miscalculations the Epicurean source of his mental unease.[94] Classic discussions between the Stoic and the Epicurean views had focused on the question, to what extent it was necessary to reform one's natural inclinations in order to arrive at the highest level of personal contentment. Arguing that there was never such a thing as a spiritual bonus on moral conduct, let alone a form of beatitude that accompanies our pious and moral ways, Hobbes, on the other hand, totally disconnected social behaviour from mental effect.

Instead, a *Common-wealth*, according to Hobbes, is never formed by nature, but only "by Institution", since "our naturall Passions" only "carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge and the like".[95] Not only is the early-modern bond between philosophy and religion thereby dissolved, but so too are the humanistic ties that had linked early-modern philosophy to the philosophy of the ancients. Denying that there is such a thing as a mental compensation for higher moral objectives, Hobbes even expressly blamed the ancients for having introduced such a fantasy notion:

> To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such *Finis ultimus* (utmost ayme), nor

[92] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, pp. 128-130; *Ethics*, pp. 137-139. See also "The Accidental Reward", *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, pp. 131-132; *Ethics*, pp. 139-141.

[93] Spinoza, *Ethica* IV, 37. Translation from Curley (as in n. 2), p. 218.

[94] Examples may be found in Lorenzo Valla, *De voluptate, sive de vero bono* II, XVI,1; XXII, 1-2; XXIII, 1; XXVI, 13-15; in the modern edition of P. M. Schenkel, *Von der Lust oder Vom wahren Guten; De voluptate sive De vero bono* (Munich, 2004), pp. 174-176, 186-188, 190 and 204, respectively.

[95] Hobbes (as in n. 89), *Leviathan*, Part II, Chapter 17 and 18. Quotations from *The English Works*, pp. 159 and 153-154, respectively; ed. Macpherson, pp. 228 and 223.

> *Summum Bonum* (greatest Good), as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers.[96]

If we are to understand the development of moral philosophy in the early modern period and the impact of pagan philosophy on Renaissance thought, it is essential to see that Hobbes' position was not directed against any one of the ancient schools in particular. Rather, it should be read against the background of a conception that, although it was based on "the Books of the old Morall Philosophers", had in fact spread throughout the philosophical systems of his contemporaries. What had become almost universally accepted and was now presented as something all ancient philosophers had actually agreed upon, was the idea that virtue went accompanied by some spiritual pleasure and that there were mental compensations for moral continence.

CONCLUSIONS

Early-modern moral philosophy had been very consistent in its claim that it paid to be virtuous. If the historical period from Erasmus to Spinoza saw as many different positions in moral philosophy as any other period, *beatitudo*-inspired forms of self-management nevertheless formed a very prominent theme. Educated early moderns were well versed in the idea that there was a psychological dividend on their abstention from lower pleasures, and that human dignity demanded the kind of transformation typically described in the part of ethics that Arnold Geulincx would call "monarchics"[97] – the part that primarily concerned itself with the cognitive and spiritual development of the individual and the philosophical goal of attaining the right mental attitude to life, rather than with social rules or ethical maxims. Moral education started with the reform of the moral *persona*.

Even when philosophy itself underwent remarkable changes, moral philosophers continued to argue that there was a higher-than-ordinary type of felicity awaiting those who kept on the right track on the road to virtue. Accepting the idea that a redirection of mental energy was not only possible, but fruitful to the individual, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century moralists eagerly appropriated classical ideals, and advocated the development of "masculine" reserve and of "virtue" as effective forms of psychological empowerment within their own, Christian, tradition. Yet if the idea of a moral *felicitas* had already been advocated in classical philosophy, the early-modern context brought with it not only the idea that the aims and the effects of God and Reason were the same and that a sincere lover of God would elicit God's love in return; it also ushered in a new set of issues that did not fit the classical discussions. Shedding doubt on the view that moral training was mentally attractive, dissidents like Pascal

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[96] Hobbes (as in n. 89), *Leviathan*, *The English Works*, p. 85; ed. Macpherson, p. 160.

[97] Geulincx (as in n. 54), *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, p. 240; *Ethics*, p. 264.

and Hobbes formulated their views in counterpoint to the general sentiment. As a result, the dividing lines in early-modern moral philosophy were very different from those most prominent in ancient times – less, that is, along the lines of competing philosophical schools, all of which brought forth their own definition of the *summum bonum*, and more along the lines of a support for, or a rejection of, the belief in a moral beatitude. Given the widespread philosophical optimism, doubts such as those voiced by Pascal and Hobbes no longer called for an alternative philosophical notion of man's highest good, but for a more radical alternative – an exclusively religious position in Pascal's case and a basically anti-philosophical view in the case of Hobbes.

If, thus far, we have not said much about Christian humanism, this is because the type of theoretical friction that we have been scrutinising, though it is linked to Christian humanism in the stricter sense of the word (the combination, that is, of humanist engagement and religious reform as personified in Erasmus[98]), it is only accidentally linked to Christian humanism in the broader sense – the tradition that supplied it with scholarly tools and pedagogical force. Indeed, while Pascal confronted philosophy's high demands with the idea that human moral potentials were severely limited, and Hobbes granted human self-love inalienable rights of its own, they did so in ways closely related to contemporary views on the interconnectedness of philosophy and religion, but quite independently of the project of humanism as such. A humanist pedagogue might all the while keep a more unproblematic view of bettering his fellow men on the basis of literary examples and, following Agricola's advice, maintain a Ciceronian preference for the more charitable and humane philosophies of the Ancient Academy and the Peripatetics, for instance, as against the vain ideas of "the Epicureans, who are content with the insignificant", or "the gruesome rigour of the Stoics".[99]

The tendency within moral theory, however, was to go beyond such purely classical debates. Fuelling the philosophical quest that promised some ultimate conceptual grasp of the good life, humanist learning may have contributed to the awakening of rival theories that shed doubt on the attainability and even the desirability of these high-flying philosophical aims. Yet from the standpoint of Christian humanism in the broader sense of the word, these consequences were of an accidental nature. They involved new and rather ideological developments if seen from the original humanist perspective. Hobbes' denial that there was anything pleasurable in making a moral choice was a far cry indeed from the Renaissance view that saw moral development as an integral part of human

[98] For an account of this stricter interpretation of "Christian humanism" as a movement that combined "Italianate classical interests with reforms that addressed [the] longing for both personal spiritual renewal and reform of the church", and Erasmus' role in this movement, see C. G. Nauert, "Rethinking "Christian Humanism"", in *Interpretations of Renaissance Humanism*, ed. A. Mazzocco (Leiden, 2006). Quotation from p. 159.

[99] Rudolphus Agricola, *In laudem philosophiae*, in: *Lvcvbrationes aliqvot lectv dignissimae* (Cologne: Ioannes Gymnicus, 1539); *Opuscula orationes epistulae* (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), pp. 155-156. Translation HvR.

education in general. As Cicero had Piso argue in ***De finibus***, learning was a natural and self-sufficient activity – a view to which the Stoic character Cato was just as willing to subscribe:

> Acts of cognition […] we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it.[100]

The kinds of pessimism we find in such authors as Pascal and Hobbes were voices from a different world – preludes to a modern perspective.

[100] Cicero, ***De finibus bonorum et malorum*** 3.5.17. Translation from Cicero, ***On Ends***, ed. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., 1914), p. 235. Piso's position can be found in Book 5.15 and 20-22 esp.

MODERN HUMANISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY: PRETENDING AND UNDERSTANDING SELFHOOD IN DESCARTES AND FICHTE

Detlev Pätzold

Like other people, philosophers have occasionally attempted to tell the story of their own lives. Since, on the whole, they do not consider this their main business, it is not surprising that, in most cases, autobiographical remarks are scattered amongst their philosophical works, letters and later records. What is more, these do not tell the story of their lives the way most other people would tell it, namely as a narrative about life in society or, on the contrary, close to the bosom of nature. Indeed, nobody will be shocked to find that a *philosopher* usually talks about his life as one at the bosom of *reason*. At least in modern philosophy such philosophical life stories are often linked to some consideration about how the authors became what they were as philosophers, what it means to let oneself be guided by one's own reason and as a consequence what it means to be *oneself*. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, in the very title of his autobiography, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, made it clear that every life story must be a mixture of *inventing* the truth or essence of a life and *recounting* the true facts of historical development. But the "true story" of the discovery and revelation of truth in the autobiographical texts of modern[1] philosophers is a very special genre of autobiographical writing. Briefly, it is the "fictional and true" story of becoming oneself by finding the *principle of selfhood*.

DESCARTES: REFLECTIONS ON DREAMING

René Descartes invented this modern genre of philosophical autobiography and he did so in a very sophisticated way. Others, like Leibniz and Fichte, tried to imitate him in a much more explicit and simple manner, which shows how the

[1] If one were to compare the modern way with premodern examples, then Augustine's famous *Confessiones* could serve as a rich source for the early medieval times, whereas Petrarch's *Letter to Diogini da Borgo* (about 1343) would be an example for the late medieval period or even for the beginning of the Renaissance. My learned colleague Arjo Vanderjagt pointed out earlier that Petrarch's letter can even be read as an example of the modern autobiographical attitude: "de brief die kennelijk een verslag is maar ook weer geen verslag"; see A. Vanderjagt, *Cadmus zaaide Draketanden. Ideeëngeschiedenis en de vermenigvuldiging van teksten* (Groningen, 1995), p. 2.

Cartesian story of selfhood became a topos in modern philosophy relatively quickly (meaning one- respectively two-hundred years later).[2]

The main Cartesian text relating to this subject is the *Discours de la Méthode* (1637). It is the first of Descartes's published works and has intentional autobiographical aspects, including an allusion to an experience he had much earlier, in the year 1619, and which was crucial to his intellectual development. Descartes does not want to impose a method for the correct use of reason, but merely wishes to show the path that ***he himself*** followed: "My present aim, then, is not to teach the method which everyone must follow in order to direct his reason correctly, but only to reveal how I have tried to direct my own".[3] Thus he presents his *Discours* "only as a history or, if you prefer, a fable".[4] In this fable – his life history – he recounts at the end of the first chapter how, after having finished his studies and having concluded extensive traveling, in order to study "in the book of the world", he struck out in a new direction, in which he wanted to study ***himself:*** "I resolved one day to undertake studies within myself too and to use all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I should follow".[5] Apparently neither Academia nor social life had succeeded in showing him the right way, so that he was wholly thrown back upon himself. This seems on the one hand very modest, but it is actually very audacious, since it portends a great discovery that suddenly comes upon him, but nevertheless arises entirely from his own being. At the end of the second chapter he recounts the immediate circumstances: "At that time I was in Germany, where I had been called by the wars" and staying there "the onset of winter detained me in quarters where, finding no conversation to divert me and fortunately having no cares or passions to trouble me, I stayed all day shut up alone in a room heated by a stove (*poêle*), where I was completely free to converse with myself about my own thoughts".[6] Is this merely a fable? At any rate ***this*** fable, from the year 1637, refers back to ***another*** earlier fable from the year 1619. Descartes is at least consistent in his various stories.

This earlier fable was recorded in a fragment entitled *Olympica*, depicting a sudden change in Descartes's life, that came about on a November evening as a result of three successive dreams. Unfortunately we possess this fragment only

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[2] Cf. Leibniz's letter to Remond, January 10, 1714, in G. W. Leibniz, *Die philosophischen Schriften*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin, 1875-1890), vol. 3 (1887), pp. 606-607.

[3] See René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, transl. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1984-1991), vol. 1 (1985), vol. 2 (1984 [sic]), vol. 3 (1991); here vol. 1, p. 112. Also *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, nouvelle présentation, 11 vols. (Paris, 1964-1974) [hereafter: AT I-XI], vol. VI, p. 4.

[4] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 112 (AT VI, p. 4).

[5] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 116 (AT VI, p. 10).

[6] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 116 (AT VI, p. 11). A *poêle* in these times was a room with very modern heating by stoves which worked without the continual support of a servant who had to keep the fire burning as in the traditional manner. That means that Descartes indeed could be quite alone in his room for hours.

through a text from 1690 that Descartes's first biographer, Adrien Baillet, has left us. However, we know that Baillet had seen Descartes's writings and, moreover, that the publishers of the standard edition of Descartes's work are convinced that in this case Baillet's record is reliable.[7]

In this fragment Descartes reports that, on November 10, 1619, he discovered the basic features of a remarkable science: *X Novembris 1619, cum* [...] *mirabilis scientiae fundamenta reperirem*.[8] This discovery probably does not yet refer to the methodological rules first laid down in the fragment *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* (around 1628), the essentials of which were summarized at the end of the second chapter of the *Discours* (1637). Much less is it concerned with the philosophical or methodological process of doubt, which culminates in the certainty of the *cogito ergo sum*, as he tersely indicates in the third chapter of the *Discours*, and then describes at length in the year 1641 in the *Meditationes de prima philosophia*.[9] But Descartes himself wanted to make this connection, at any rate in 1637, as is clear from the following recollection: "But regarding the opinions to which I had hitherto given credence, I thought that I could not do better than undertake to get rid of them, all at one go, in order to replace them afterwards with better ones, or with the same ones once I had squared them with the standards of reason".[10] This methodological skepticism, namely to doubt everything that could not be tested by the standards of reason, yielding affirmative results, is to be found explicitly formulated in the first Rule of Method of the *Discours*, with respect to the *cogito* argument at the beginning of the fourth chapter.[11] But these are connections that Descartes made in the year 1637! In 1619 he was mainly engaged in mathematical considerations, and his remark in *Olympica* on the foundations of an admirable science presumably refers to the construction of a universal mathematics (*mathesis universalis*).

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[7] See Descartes (as in n. 3), AT X, p. 175: "*Olympica*, contains such particular circumstances and such singular details, that he [Baillet] does not appear to have invented anything. One can thus believe that we possess, thanks to him, at least the essence of Descartes's address". I quote Baillet's record of *Olympica* in his *La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes* (Paris 1690) from the Adam and Tannery edition of Descartes's works.

[8] Descartes (as in n. 3), AT X, p. 179.

[9] The first place where Descartes gives a short hint that the existence of the "I" could be demonstrated by its own understanding is in his unpublished *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* (around 1628); see Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 46 (AT X, p. 422): "Again, there are many instances of things which are necessarily conjoined, even though most people count them as contingent, failing to notice the relation between them: for example the proposition, 'I am, therefore God exists', or 'I understand, therefore I have a mind distinct from my body'. Finally, we must note that very many necessary propositions, when inverted, are contingent. Thus from the fact that I exist I may conclude with certainty that God exists, but from the fact that God exists I cannot legitimately assert that I too exist."

[10] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 117 (AT VI, pp. 13-14).

[11] See Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, pp. 120; 126-127 (AT VI, pp. 18; 31-32; see also the beginning of the *Meditationes*, in Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, p. 12 (AT VII, pp. 17-18).

Nevertheless, the third dream that was recorded in *Olympica* had clearly at least something to do with his later method of doubt and with the *cogito* argument, notably the dream argument. The dream argument, as part of the process of doubt, asserts that the existence of one's own "I" is independent of the claim to truth of one's own thoughts (in the sense of the correspondence theory), and thus is independent of a possible supposition that all one's thoughts could also be images in a dream that have nothing to do with anything in the external world. This argument made it possible for Descartes to elevate, as a first principle of his new philosophy, a thinking "I" that is completely separate from the material world.

> Lastly, considering that the very thoughts we have while we are awake may also occur while we sleep without any of them being at the same time true, I resolved to pretend that all the things that had ever entered my mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something. And observing that this truth "*I am thinking, therefore I exist*" was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.[12]

Accordingly, we can distinguish between the content of our thoughts, when we think of particular objects, and the process of thought itself. Or expressed in a somewhat more modern manner: there is a difference between intentional thought, or the intentional object of our thought (thinking of something), and reflexive thinking (reflecting about thinking of something). The point is that the latter act of reflexive thinking as such is immune to every doubt and it thereby transcends the line of demarcation that is carefully drawn in intentional thinking between dreaming and waking, and which distinguishes reality from fiction (mathematical and logical thinking apart).

This fundamental idea is also particularly clear in the description of Descartes's third dream in *Olympica* (1619), and perhaps in an even more extreme form. Baillet reports: "Ce qu'il y a de singulier à remarquer, c'est que, doutant si ce qu'il venoit de voir étoit songe ou vision, non seulement il décida, en dormant, que c'étoit un songe, mais il en fit l'interprétation avant que le sommeil le quittàt".[13] Here the reflexive act of thinking is not only immune to the doubt that is sown by the argument that one might just be dreaming, but it can even think about dreaming during the dream state. For it is claimed here that it is possible, ***within a dream***, to realize that one is actually dreaming. Indeed that

[12] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 127 (AT VI, p. 32). Later on in 1641 in his *Meditationes* Descartes becomes aware of the fact that this argument could not even be broken down by a possible third hypersceptic counterargument: the hypothesis of a most powerful but malicious deceiver which is always misleading me even in my most clear and distinct ideas about mathematical and logical entities; see Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, p. 12 (AT VII, p. 18).

[13] Descartes (as in n. 3), AT X, p. 184.

one is not only conscious of the fact that one dreams, but one can interpret a dream while still dreaming. This is why in reflexive thinking there is no demarcation line any more between dreaming and waking, for in the act of waking the activity is apparently continued without interruption:

> M. Descartes, continuant d'interpréter son songe dans le sommeil, estimoit que la pièce de vers sur l'incertitude du genre de vie qu'on doit choisir, & qui commence par *Quod vitae sectabor iter*, marquoit le bon conseil d'une personne sage, ou même la Théologie Morale. Là dessus, doutant s'il révoit ou s'il méditoit, il se réveilla sans émotion, & continua, les yeux ouverts, l'interprétation de son songe sur la même idée.[14]

Aside from all the philosophical problems, we have from a *philological* viewpoint the decisive question: Did Baillet reproduce in 1690 precisely what he had read in *Olympica*? Does it correspond to Descartes's own words? We will never be sure. There are, however, only two possibilities.

1. If it is merely a matter of Baillet's interpretation, then it is clear that Baillet (perhaps unconsciously) brightened up a picture that Descartes himself in the year 1637 had painted in his *Discours*: the dreams that Descartes had described in 1619 were connected in Baillet's reconstruction with Descartes's later philosophical method.
2. The alternative is that Descartes, already in 1619, through dreaming had a certain intuition of his subsequent main argument concerning the special status of reflexive thinking, even if the full range was not yet clear, and it was in no sense yet a part of his methodological plan. The detailed elaboration of that started only ten years later.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Descartes had at any rate created a fashion with his autobiographical fables, which was taken over not only by his first biographer, Baillet, but also much later by a thoroughly German transcendental philosopher such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

FICHTE: UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELFHOOD

In Fichte, the representative of the purest form of the philosophy of the ego ("egology") in German idealism, we find, almost two hundred years later, a faithful echo of the Cartesian autobiographical fashion. Indeed it is still a fashion, since once more it concerns not only the philosopher himself, but also his first biographers. Thus again we have in the case of Fichte a philological problem, in that the story of his decisive philosophical discovery of 1793 comes mainly from later reports, i.e. at second or even at third hand. Nevertheless the philological difficulty concerning the discovery of his philosophy of the "I", as in the case of Descartes, is compensated for by several autobiographical documents, for we possess some relevant letters in Fichte's own hand. In particular,

[14] Descartes (as in n. 3), AT X, p. 184.

we have letters from the winter of 1793/94, in which he indicates that during these months he had understood the need to base philosophy on the concept of the "I" as the first and only unconditional principle. In these letters he does not yet name the "I-principle", probably for reasons of secrecy; rather he announces that he had discovered *the* principle.[15] In this vein he writes in November/December 1793 to Flatt: "I have convinced myself that only by means of development from a single axiom can philosophy become scientific, that only then can it have a demonstrability like that of geometry, that there is such an axiom, which however *as such* has not yet been formulated: I believe I have discovered it".[16] And in mid-December he announces in a letter to Stephani: "I have discovered a new basis, from which the whole of philosophy can be developed".[17] This is confirmed by notes in a diary that Jens Baggesen made of a conversation that he had had with Fichte on December 7, 1793, in which the "I-principle" was named as the basis: "'Now tell me your first principle, the principle of all philosophy, your first axiom:' – Here it is! I am. – In I the I is opposed to the not-I".[18] As early as the next year (May 1794) Fichte became a professor in Jena, and he published the lectures that he gave in the first two semesters in his book *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer* (1794), in the first three sections of which the "I-principle" was systematically developed as the basis of his new philosophy, and which he called "Wissenschaftslehre".

Before returning to this new philosophy, let us cast a first glance at two later reports of his discovery in the winter of 1793, which originate from Fichte's early biographers. It is obvious that both very consciously follow the Cartesian genre. The historically later report of his grandson Eduard Fichte in his work, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Lichtstrahlen aus seinen Werken nebst einem Lebensabriss* (Leipzig 1863), is a pure imitation of what is evidently the original, namely Descartes's report in *Olympica*. We have here the report of an hour long meditation which suddenly changes into an insight that seizes the thinker with such evidential force that he succeeds in reaching the unfalsifiable notion of the "I" as basic principle, as principle of reflection (the "pure subject-objective"). Even the famous catalyst of this remarkable event is present: the winter and the hot stove (at the time of this work Fichte was living in Zurich,

[15] The key passages of these letters are given by the editors in their introduction to: J. G. Fichte, *Nachgelassene Schriften 1793-1795*, in: J. G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.3, ed. R. Lauth and H. Jacob (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1971), pp. 13-15.

[16] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.3 (as in n. 15), p. 14: "Ich habe mich überzeugt, daß nur durch Entwikelung aus einem einzigen Grundsatze Philosophie Wißenschaft werden kann, daß sie aber dann eine Evidenz erhalten muß, wie die Geometrie, daß es einen solchen Grundsatz giebt, daß er aber *als solcher* noch nicht aufgestellt ist: ich glaube ihn gefunden zu haben".

[17] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.3 (as in n. 15), p. 14: "Ich habe ein neues Fundament entdeckt, aus welchem sich die ganze Philosophie entwickeln lässt".

[18] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.3 (as in n. 15), p. 13: "'Jetzt sagen Sie mir Ihr erstes Princip, das Princip der gesammten Philosophie, ihren ersten Satz:' – Hier haben Sie ihn! Ich bin. – Im Ich wird das Ich dem Nicht-Ich entgegen gesetzt".

where it was indubitably very cold); these very much resemble the winter and the *poêle* described in Descartes's *Discours*. Incidentally we note that there seems to be a certain relation between great philosophical discoveries and carbon monoxide, which these stoves undoubtedly give off in great quantities. Fichte's grandson continues:

> Here […] mention is made of a communication, which he [J. G. Fichte] later made among a circle of friends, how at that time, meditating long and continuously on the highest principle of philosophy, he was seized by the thought and immediately impressed by the evidence, while he stood by a hot stove, that only the *I*, the concept of pure subject-objective, could be the highest principle.[19]

Independently of the question as to whether or not Fichte himself told this story to his intimate friends, this quote establishes that 70 years later he was portrayed by his grandson as the new hero of modern philosophy. Certainly not as the first, since that honour remains Descartes's, but at any rate as the one who first fully understood the Cartesian fundamental idea and who implemented it in all its ramifications. The Cartesian certainty of the existence of the "I" by means of the reflexivity of the *cogito*, which proved itself immune even to the dream argument, was made scientifically fruitful in Descartes's work as the basis of all further indubitable judgments. This was possible only by simultaneously underpinning it by a sequence of innate, clear and precise ideas, for which finally Descartes felt himself required to produce even a proof of God's existence. In contrast, in Fichte the claim was elevated to 'only the *I* [...] could be the highest principle'. Moreover for Fichte the self-posing of the "I" was not merely as a thought, the ego judgment, but at the same time a deed, as we shall see in Fichte's own texts and as was already presaged in the other, historically earlier note of Henrik Steffens.

This note too feigns reference to Fichte's own narratives within the circle of his friends. It can be found in Steffens's autobiography, ***Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben***, from the year 1841. This text describes the basic philosophical idea at great length, which Fichte's grandson only indicated via the concept of "pure subject-objectivity". Once more allusion was made to Descartes when it was reported that for Fichte there was sudden insight; and, as in the case of Descartes, the "Wissenschaftslehre" that arose claimed the certainty of mathematical judgment:

> The thought suddenly surprised him that the deed, with which self-consciousness grasps and holds itself, is clearly a conscious realization. The I recognizes itself in the act of engendering itself, the thinking and the thought "I" are one, realization and

[19] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.3 (as in n. 15), p. 11: "Hier sei […] einer Mittheilung erwähnt, welche er [J.G. Fichte] später in Freundeskreisen machte, daß er damals, über das höchste Princip der Philosophie lange und anhaltend meditirend, wie mit einer plötzlich ihn ergreifenden Evidenz, während er am warmen Winterofen stand, von dem Gedanken ergriffen worden sei, nur das *Ich*, der Begriff der reinen Subject-Objectivität, könne das höchste Princip sein".

> object of realizing, and from this point of unity do flow all judgments, not from mere dissipated considerations, caused by space and time and categories. He asked himself: if you now bring out, in all its pristine purity, this first act of self-judgment, which is assumed in all human thinking and acting, and which is hidden in all fragmented opinions and deeds, and if you follow it in its abstract consequences, must you not discover represented in it, living, active and procreative, the same certainty as that possessed by mathematics? This thought seized him with such clarity, power and confidence, as if he were overpowered by his spirit, that he could not give up the attempt to formulate the I as the principle of philosophy. Thus originated the plan and content of a Wissenschaftslehre.[20]

Nevertheless, as the highest principle of Fichte's new "Wissenschaftslehre", the "I" is not, as Steffens expressed it, merely a mental "act of self-realization", it is rather the result of an original deed ("Thathandlung"), as Fichte put it in the first version of his ***Wissenschaftslehre*** in the year 1794. In this way he tries to avoid Descartes's difficulties in focusing on reflexive thinking. For indeed reflection on the thinking "I", as object of reflection, presupposes the thinking "I".[21] In other words: intentional thinking always precedes reflexive thinking, since otherwise there would be no process of doubt, thus no reflexive thinking, and hence no possibility of overcoming doubt. On the other hand, when Fichte says that the ego ***poses*** itself, this indicates that it cannot already be ***presupposed***, as if a reflecting subject were taking part in a sort of self-observation, as of an object. Fichte does not place the act of ***reflection*** but rather the act of ***identification*** at the fulcrum of his argument. This identification is thereby un-

[20] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.3 (as in n. 15), pp. 11-12: "Da überraschte ihn plötzlich der Gedanke, daß die That, mit welcher das Selbstbewußtsein sich selbst ergreift und festhält, doch offenbar ein Erkennen sei. Das Ich erkennt sich als erzeugt durch sich selber, das denkende und das gedachte Ich, Erkennen und Gegenstand des Erkennens, sind eins, und von diesem Punkte der Einheit, nicht von einer zerstreuenden Betrachtung, die Zeit und Raum und Kategorieen sich geben läßt, geht alles Erkennen aus. Wenn Du nun, fragt[e] er sich, diesen ersten Act des Selbsterkennens, der in allem Denken und Thun der Menschen vorausgesetzt wird, der, in den zersplitterten Meinungen und Handlungen verborgen liegt, rein für sich heraushöbest, und in seiner reinen Consequenz verfolgtest, müßte nicht in ihm, als lebendig thätig und erzeugend, dieselbe Gewißheit sich entdecken und darstellen lassen, die wir in der Mathematik besitzen? Dieser Gedanke ergriff ihn mit einer solchen Klarheit, Macht und Zuversicht, daß er den Versuch, das Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie aufzustellen, wie bezwungen, von dem ihm mächtig gewordenen Geiste, nicht aufgeben konnte. So entstand der Entwurf einer Wissenschafts-Lehre und diese selbst".

[21] The paradox that is contained in the Cartesian model of reflection has been acutely analyzed by Dieter Henrich, who has shown to what extent Fichte tried to avoid it; see D. Henrich, "Fichtes »Ich«", in: D. Henrich, *Selbstverhältnisse. Gedanken und Auslegungen zu den Grundlagen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 57-82. In her excellent book, Karen Gloy gives an extensive analysis of several modern theories of self-consciousness. She distinguishes between the reflective model (Descartes), the stream model (Hume) and the production model (Fichte); see K. Gloy, *Bewußtseinstheorien. Zur Problematik und Problemgeschichte des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins* (Freiburg, München, 1998).

derstood as an action that does not presuppose the related elements that are identified with one another, but rather constitutes them. The point is that this operation only works with the concept of the ego, i.e. the (ontologically interpreted!) identity relation "I am I". Briefly summarized, Fichte's line of argument is as follows:

> The posing of the I as itself is the purest deed. [...] It is at the same time the actor and the product of the act; the activator and that which is brought forth by the activity; action and deed are one and the same; and hence the proposition "*I am*" is the expression of a *Thathandlung*; moreover the only possible one that has to be admitted to the whole of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. [...] As it *poses* itself, it *is*; and as it *is*, it *poses* itself; and the I is thus for the I both sufficient and necessary. What is not for itself, is no I. [...] Sometimes one hears the question raised: *what* was I then, before I came to self-consciousness? The natural answer to that is: *I* was not at all; for I was not "I". The I is only insofar as, and to the degree that it is conscious of itself. [...] One can think of nothing at all, without one's I, conscious of itself, thinking about itself; one can never abstract from one's self-consciousness. [...] Setting this fable [sic!, D.P.] of the *Thathandlung* at the pinnacle of a *Wissenschaftslehre*, one would have to put it something like this: *The I originally simply poses its own existence.*[22]

To put it somewhat more simply: a tree, for example, was naturally a tree before someone said "the tree is a tree", and similarly for a man, before someone said "the man is a man". But this does not apply to the "I", i.e. the self-consciousness of a man about his own individuality or personality, which is created in the act of self-identification. It does not matter here whether it is a feeling or an explicit statement "I am I".

This exclusivity of the ego concept is for Fichte equally the reason why the "I" must be the highest principle, from which all others can be deduced. For this original act of identification, that is performed as the genesis of the ego consciousness, is indeed for Fichte the basis according to which humans can execute and realize the principle of identity "A=A", i.e. the consciousness of "I" is the basis of the principle of identity, and not the other way around. Fur-

[22] J. G. Fichte, *Werke 1793-1795*, in: J. G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Werke* I.2, ed. R. Lauth and H. Jacob (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1965), pp. 259-261: "Also das Setzen des Ich durch sich selbst ist die reine Thätigkeit desselben […] Es ist zugleich das Handelnde, und das Produkt der Handlung; das Thätige, und das, was durch die Thätigkeit hervorgebracht wird; Handlung, und That sind Eins und eben dasselbe; und daher ist das: *Ich bin*, Ausdruk einer Thathandlung; aber auch der einzigen möglichen, wie sich aus der ganzen Wissenschaftslehre ergeben muß. […] So wie es sich *sezt*, *ist* es; und so wie es *ist*, *sezt* es sich; und das Ich ist demnach für das Ich schlechthin, und nothwendig. Was für sich selbst nicht ist, ist kein Ich. […] Man hört wohl die Frage aufwerfen; *was* war ich wohl, ehe ich zum Selbstbewußtseyn kam? Die natürliche Antwort darauf ist: *ich* war gar nicht; denn ich war nicht Ich. Das Ich ist nur insofern; inwiefern es sich seiner bewußt ist. […] Man kann gar nichts denken, ohne sein Ich, als sich seiner selbst bewußt, mit hinzu zu denken; man kann von seinem Selbstbewußtseyn nie abstrahiren […] Denkt man sich die Erzählung von dieser Thathandlung an die Spitze einer Wissenschaftslehre, so müste sie etwa folgendermaaßen ausgedrükt werden: *Das Ich sezt ursprünglich schlechhin sein eignes Seyn*".

thermore he deduces a second fundamental operation from the self-posing of the ego, namely opposition or negation. For the statement "I am I" implies for him the statement "a not-I is opposed to the I". Because of this second deed of the "I", the original "absolute I" is divided into a "divisible I" and a "divisible not-I"; or if one wishes, the "I and the other".[23] How one is supposed to interpret the "not-I", e.g. the other (the you), the unconscious, or even nature, is – as Fontane said – a wide field in which I do not wish to lose myself any further.

At the beginning I spoke about the individual way of finding the *principle* of selfhood. It should be clear that, at any rate for the two philosophers discussed, the principle itself is superindividual. Neither Descartes's *cogito*, nor Fichte's self-posing "absolute I" recount the personal histories of their discoverers or give even the essentials of their personal existence. The philosophical "I-principle" has in the first instance nothing to do with a particular empirical "I". It has to do with a *transcendental* ego or self-consciousness in the sense of Kant. But if we describe it in this way, we should take cognizance of the specifically Kantian sense of the word "transcendental". The transcendental ego is *not transcendent* with respect to a concrete empirical person, it is immanent in such a person, in that it is the condition under which one can speak at all of ideas like "mine": "I think that, I feel that, I see that, I will that, etc."

It is not by chance that it has become a fashion in post-modern times to make fun of an exponential stance concerning the notion of the ego; and I too have been unable to suppress one or two ironic comments in this essay. At any rate one should be clear about the consequences. If one takes the exponential stance concerning "I", then one is forced to say: "It thinks in me", etc. However, in Heidegger's words, this would mean that one is subjected to the dictatorship of "one": "to think what *one* thinks, to say what *one* says, to do what *one* does, etc". "The One extends its true dictatorship in this unnoticed and unobserved way. We enjoy and delight ourselves, as *one* enjoys; we read, see, and judge literature and art, as *one* sees and judges; we withdraw also from the 'great crowd', as *one* withdraws; we find 'outrageous', what *one* finds outrageous. The One, that is no particular but the All, although not as the sum, dictates the nature of everyday being".[24] And this would only be a tragedy at the cultural level. One can imagine what a real personal tragedy would be from the physiological and psychological account given by, for example, Antonio Damasio, who describes persons who completely lost their self-consciousness by neurological defects.[25]

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[23] See Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Werke* I.2 (as in n. 22), pp. 266, 271, 272.

[24] M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit (1927)* (Tübingen, 1986), pp. 126-127: "In dieser Unauffälligkeit und Nichtfeststellbarkeit entfaltet das Man seine eigentliche Diktatur. Wir genießen und vergnügen uns, wie *man* genießt; wir lesen, sehen, und urteilen über Literatur und Kunst, wie *man* sieht und urteilt; wir ziehen uns aber auch vom 'großen Haufen' zurück, wie *man* sich zurückzieht; wir finden 'empörend', was *man* empörend findet. Das Man, das kein bestimmtes ist und das Alle, obzwar nicht als Summe, sind, schreibt die Seinsart der Alltäglichkeit vor".

[25] See A. R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York, 1999).

CHRISTIAN HUMANISM OR MODERN SELFHOOD WITHOUT A GOD?

But let us return to Descartes and Fichte, the two heroes of early modern and modern egology, to ask some final questions. Can their reflection upon the thinking I as principle of selfhood be successful without any aid of a further metaphysical principle? How autonomous is the human self in constituting its own being epistemologically? Does the Christian God disappear from that kind of modern humanism completely, a God whose infinite wisdom was looked at for ages as the divine source of finite human thinking and as the guarantee for at least the possibility of its truth? Yet, it is well known that in the end both Descartes and Fichte incorporated a *philosophical* concept of God into their argumentation, albeit in a different way because of the increasing secularisation called "enlightenment" that took place in the period between Descartes and Fichte.

Hence it is well known that Descartes in his *Meditationes* and elsewhere developed no less than two proofs for the existence of God, the first one in the third and the second one in the fifth *Meditation*. One might ask him whether or not his argument from the second *Meditation* for the indubitable existence of the I, at least as a pure thinking thing (*res cogitans*), is independent of his proofs for the existence of God. A first answer might certainly be that it is, since the argument remains, also under the assumption of the strongest possible methodical doubt, which Descartes had developed in his first *Meditation*. The pure thinking I also exists under the assumption that in stead of a good and truthful God there is an equally "supremely powerful, and if it is permissible to say so, malicious deceiver"[26] who will always deceive it, even in regard of its simplest mathematical knowledge. But it is also clear that the acquired certainty of the existence of one's own I as a thinking thing is epistemologically hardly productive. For certain is the I only as "a thing that doubts", i.e. "in this restricting sense of the term it is simply thinking".[27] What remains uncertain, on the other hand, is all *content* of thought and for that reason Descartes's main purpose, in order to generate true knowledge (science), is to refute the assumption of the malicious deceiver. This task should be taken over by the proofs for the existence of God from the third and the fifth *Meditation*. They have primarily not a theological, but an epistemological function to overcome the threat of solipsism in which Descartes had manoeuvred himself with his strong hypothesis of doubt.

Yet, apart from the independence of at least the I as a doubting thing from the malicious deceiver and consequently from the proofs for the existence of God, it is also a fact that this most radical hypothesis of doubt is adduced by Descartes only in the *Meditationes*. This means that the proofs for the existence of God given there can only be interpreted as an answer to the hypothesis of doubt *in that text*. For in writings both earlier and later than the *Meditationes*, Descartes produces proofs for God's existence without the necessity to refute a

[26] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, p. 18 (AT VII, p. 26).
[27] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, p. 19 (AT VII, pp. 28, 29).

malicious deceiver (since the existence of such a deceiver was not posited in these other texts). As we have seen earlier, this is already the case in the ***Regulae*** (1628) where he at least indicates the possibility of a proof for God's existence which he elaborates in the ***Discours*** (1637).[28] Here the proof is developed directly, without the detour of assuming and refuting the existence of a malicious deceiver, from the proper defects of the doubting I:

> Next, reflecting upon the fact that I was doubting and that consequently my being was not wholly perfect (for I saw clearly that it is a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I decided to inquire into the source of my ability to think of something more perfect than I was; and I recognized very clearly that this had to come from some nature that was in fact more perfect. […] So there remained only the possibility that the idea had been put into me by a nature truly more perfect than I was and even possessing in itself all the perfections of which I could have any idea, that is – to explain myself in one word – by God.[29]

Also after the ***Meditationes*** (1641), in the ***Principia Philosophiae*** (1644),[30] Descartes repeats his argumentation from the above quoted ***Discours*** (1637) and not, in stead, the argument with the malicious deceiver from the ***Meditationes***. We may conclude therefore that Descartes throughout assumes the independent existence of a pure thinking and doubting I, whilst at the same time offering proofs for the existence of God, whether or not these are necessary on epistemological grounds. The possible reasons for this double strategy should be looked for on a philosophical and not in the first instance on a theological level. In spite of his emphasis on the independence of a ***pure thinking*** I, Descartes does not forget the existence of a ***bodily*** I. And for the latter, proofs for the existence of God seem to him of immediate necessity. In the ***Meditationes*** he fowards a so-called aposteriori argument: when one assumes that "I was produced either by my parents or other causes less perfect than God", then this will lead to "an infinite regress".[31] A more refined argument can be found in the ***Principia***: "Now it is certainly very evident by the natural light that a thing which recognizes something more perfect than itself is not the source of its own being; for if so, it would have given itself all the perfections of which it has an idea".[32] In this case the epistemological level would be moved into the ontological level, or rather the thinking I into the physical I. Body based sense perception, among other things, would no longer be doubtful, but perfect, since there would be no cause for doubt. The assumption that the thinking I is "the source of its own being" leads to a contradiction with the earlier assumption

[28] See above note 9; and Descartes (as in n. 3), ***Philosophical Writings***, vol. 1, pp. 128-131 (AT VI, pp. 34-40).

[29] Descartes (as in n. 3), ***Philosophical Writings***, vol. 1, pp. 128, 129 (AT VI, pp. 33, 34).

[30] See Descartes (as in n. 3), ***Philosophical Writings***, vol. 1, pp. 197-200 (AT VIII A, pp. 9-13).

[31] Descartes (as in n. 3), ***Philosophical Writings***, vol. 2, p. 34 (AT VII, pp. 59, 60).

[32] Descartes (as in n. 3), ***Philosophical Writings***, vol. 1, p. 200 (AT VIII A, p. 12).

that it "recognizes something more perfect than itself". There can only be one conclusion: "Hence, the source of its being can only be something which possesses within itself all these perfections – that is, God".[33]

Whether or not one is convinced by Descartes' many proofs for the existence of God, it is nevertheless clear (as the fable of his *Discours* is telling us) that "the first principle of the philosophy [he] was seeking" and which he finally found in the certainty of the existence of a pure thinking I, was supplemented by him with a further metaphysical principle, namely the very traditional concept of God as "a supremely perfect being".[34]

With Fichte the situation is slightly different; for in the first version of his main work, the *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* from the year 1794, he asserts emphatically that the existence of a pure I as a principle of all knowledge cannot be supplemented with a divine principle. The I-principle is the first and unconditional basis because the pure absolute I is embedded in the empirical I – i.e. it is immanent and not transcendent. Transcendence will unavoidably entail a concept of God, and it is no coincidence that as an example of such objectionable "Dogmatism"[35] Fichte adduces a rationalist from the seventeenth century. Intentionally he relies in his critique not on Descartes but on Spinoza.[36]

Yet, a couple of years later things have changed for Fichte and by way of example he points out, in his *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre aus den Jahren 1801/02*, that even though knowledge in itself is absolute, it is not the absolute itself.[37] A background for Fichte's new position is surely the competition with the positions of Schelling and Hegel, who developed their absolute idealism in Jena in precisely these years, and thereby left way behind them Kant's critical transcendental idealism. One can gather this context from the correspondence between Fichte and Schelling.[38] In a letter from the summer of 1801 in response to Schelling, who had sent him a copy of his new *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801), Fichte asserts, by way of example, that his own system of knowledge is by no means complete. What is still lacking is the final synthesis, to unite the single I with absolute knowledge, or, as he puts it, the individual ("Individuum") with the spiritual world ("Geisterwelt"). Surprisingly, for him, this highest synthesis lies in God; i.e. the ungraspable ground for the separateness of singularities and the ideal bond of all things is

[33] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 200 (AT VIII A, p. 12).

[34] Descartes (as in n. 3), *Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 198 (AT VIII A, p. 10).

[35] See Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Werke* I.2 (as in n. 22), pp. 280, 281-282.

[36] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Werke* I.2 (as in n. 22), p. 263: "Er [Spinoza] trennt das *reine*, und das *empirische* Bewußtseyn. Das erstere setzt er in Gott [...] das lezte in die besondern Modificationen der Gottheit".

[37] J. G. Fichte, *Nachgelassene Schriften 1800-1803*, in: J. G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.6, ed. R. Lauth and H. Gliwitzky (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1983), p. 153: "Das Wissen ist nicht das Absolute, aber es ist selbst als Wissen absolut".

[38] See D. Pätzold, *Spinoza – Aufklärung – Idealismus. Die Substanz der Moderne* (Assen, 2002[2]), pp. 123-127.

God ("[der] unbegreifliche[n] RealGrund der Getrenntheit der Einzelnen, und ideales Band aller = Gott").[39]

From this moment on, the trinity of individual, spiritual world and God is a permanent structure in all later versions of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, even when he develops new concepts to replace them. Thus, for instance, in the later *Wissenschaftslehre. Vorgetragen im Jahre 1812* he speaks of the "IchForm" or the "sichForm".[40] This I-form is a secondary form or image deduced from a first form or "UrBild" (original image) or "Urschema" (original schema) resp.; i.e. the latter forms itself in the I as the second form.[41] This "UrBild" or "Urschema" represents what was earlier identified as the spiritual world. It is not on the highest but on an intermediate level and is designated by Fichte as appearance.[42] The highest element in the trinitarian structure is for him the absolute which consists of two parts: the inner being of the absolute and its image.[43] By the latter he means the earlier mentioned "UrBild" or "Urschema", i.e. the appearance or the image of the absolute. The former, that is the inner being of the absolute, is God. Speaking of the relation between both, Fichte poses the rhetorical question:

> is the appearance in itself contingent: can God both appear or not appear; […] or is it necessary? It is easy to see that the latter is the case: God is what he is, simply because he is: through his purely formal being his complete being is given: now he appears among others; so sure this is through his absolute being, and, after he has once appeared, he cannot not appear. That fact is an absolute necessity.[44]

Unlike Descartes, Fichte does not produce proofs for the existence of God – for he was and remained a Kantian – but from approximately 1801 onwards the pure I of the *Wissenschaftslehre* was for him no longer absolute, which means that it became unthinkable without the concept of the appearance of God as the true absolute.

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[39] See J. G. Fichte, *Briefwechsel 1801-1806*, in: J. G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Briefe* III.5, ed. R. Lauth and H. Gliwitzky (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1982), pp. 45, 48.

[40] See J. G. Fichte, *Nachgelassene Schriften 1812*, in: J. G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.13, ed. R. Lauth and H. Jacob (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 2002), pp. 145, 147; and p. 66.

[41] See Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.13 (as in n. 40), p. 62.

[42] Fichte nennt daher auch die an erster Stelle genannte zweite Form oder IchForm das "SichErscheinen der Erscheinung". Sie ist und bleibt für ihn das Hauptthema der Wissenschaftslehre: "*Die Analyse dieser zweiten Form, des SichErscheinens* der Erscheinung ist nun die eigentliche Aufgabe der W.L.". See Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.13 (as in n. 40), p. 62.

[43] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.13 (as in n. 40), p. 58.

[44] Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe Nachlaßband* II.13 (as in n. 40), p. 66: "ist die Erscheinung an sich zufällig: kann Gott erscheinen oder auch nicht; [...] oder ist sie nothwendig? Es ist leicht einzusehen, das letztere: Gott ist, was er ist, schlechthin dadurch daß er ist: durch sein blosses formales Seyn ist sein ganzes Seyn gegeben: nun erscheint er unter anderm; so gewiß pp ist dies durch sein absolutes Seyn, u. er kann, nachdem er einmal erscheint, nicht nicht erscheinen. Das Faktum ist ein absolut nothwendiges".

HUMANISM, ARTS AND SCIENCES

TYPES OF INCONSISTENCY IN THE ASTROLOGY OF FICINO AND OTHERS

John North[†]

> Thus I should like to take it for established that Renaissance humanism was often incidentally, but never primarily or consistently, concerned with theology or speculative philosophy, with law or the natural sciences, and that therefore it cannot be closely associated with the medieval traditions of these other doctrines.
> [P. O. Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 151-152.]

Kristeller's wish to detach Renaissance humanism from medieval and earlier theology and natural science may seem reasonable enough in the light of what humanists professed to value most, but is weakened by his admission that theology and speculative philosophy could be considered "incidentally". It could be said that he was tacitly *defining* humanism, that is, distinguishing between genuinely humanistic concerns and the alien remainder, but even definitions need to be justified, especially those of widely used terms. Is it true that those writings by Ficino, Pico, and Savonarola, for example, that are compounded out of natural astrology and theology, are only feebly incidental to their authors' distinctive world views? Can they be neatly separated from a medieval or patristic inheritance? It is with reference to some of those writings and traditions that I shall consider a handful of broadly astrological themes, making no attempt to define Renaissance humanism, but asking how they were treated by individuals who have been considered as at the very pinnacle of that movement.

Whatever one means by humanism – a modern philosophy of man, perhaps, or one of its Renaissance counterparts, or some *studia humanitatis*, or even a certain part of religious teaching – it has a kind of academic respectability that astrology lacks. Both are easily brought under the umbrella of history, but it would be a rash academic move indeed to try to elevate astrology to the status of a philosophical system. Even when it was taught formally, for instance as a tool of medicine, it lacked pretensions to the nobility of purpose boasted by some calling themselves "humanist". Described as unscientific, irreligious, illogical, and filled with inconsistencies, astrologers have very often defended themselves with a rearguard action of a quasi-historical sort, turning to past authorities rather than setting out criteria for what qualifies as good empirical science, and measuring astrology against those criteria. Some have defended astrology by claiming that its critics have failed to understand its doctrines, and that it is more than just an empirical science. Among its supposed positive vir-

tues, it has been held capable of providing knowledge of practical value, even knowledge desirable in itself, knowledge about the future, as well as an explanation of how the past turned out as it did. Rarely do we find any early philosophical discussion of the *character* of the knowledge in question.

Like everyone else, astrologers use the word "knowledge" of pronouncements as to what has already happened as well as of what will happen; and they also use it of the laws explaining how things happen. It is a common historical mistake to suppose that such laws changed little, or not at all, over time. (Astrologers, differing from most natural scientists in stressing the importance of past wisdom as against hopes of future improvements, are themselves largely to blame for this wrong historical assumption.) In fact, astrological theory underwent many changes in its long history, and Christian theology played its part in effecting many of those changes. Corresponding to the two levels at which we speak of astrological knowledge, there have been two classes of theological criticism of astrology, one saying that it is wrong to claim knowledge of what will happen at a future time, the other that it is wrong to make general pronouncements as to the method of investigating future or even past happenings, with reference to the heavens. These two embargoes, one on foretelling, the other on using the heavens as a tool, helped to induce a sense of guilt in some scholars, and series of casuistical responses that only made worse a subject that was independently riddled with inconsistency. I hope to show, however, that there are many fundamentally different types of inconsistency at stake, and that historians should take them into account when discussing astrological writings and practices.

SOME BASIC TYPES OF INCONSISTENCY

While history shows that Christianity and astrology can enter into a forced marriage, they are anything but natural companions, and only the cynic who regards them merely as different forms of superstition is likely to disagree. How is it, then, that so many intelligent people in the past – scholars and theologians, princes and paupers – were able to hold to these two systems of belief concurrently? Is this truly a case of an inconsistency in belief-systems? Astrology is at heart a form of divination, of foretelling future events. As such, it pretends to a form of knowledge that most theologians reserve to God alone. Of course we all predict future events in a small way, dozens of times every day, while in the sciences predictions are, and were, made regularly on a much grander scale, and to this no one objects. Divination, however, in the sense considered here, has been concerned almost entirely with predictions having a fairly immediate *human* connection, and that is where it differs from the more innocuous sciences.

The early Christians were not especially hostile to it, despite various scriptural prohibitions and the writings of many of the Church Fathers. There have been Christian astrologers who have argued that to ignore those signs of God's mind that he has planted in the heavens would itself be ungrateful, if not impi-

ous. Melanchthon and Calvin put forward different versions of this view. Generally speaking, to be consistent with the commandments of Scripture was almost invariably regarded as a *sine qua non*. That the category of scriptural inconsistency needs qualification, however, is obvious, and is nowhere better illustrated than in the story of the Magi visiting the infant Christ, in Matthew 2. The story of the Magi was not a report of some trivial incident that could be explained in a footnote, for it was usually taken to be an intrinsic part of the case for Christ's divinity. Were the Magi led to the infant Christ by a star? No, say a hundred different authorities, but by some other heavenly apparition, even a miraculous one. There are dozens of different astronomical identifications of the "star", and new ones are found, by Christian astronomers especially, every time Christmas approaches. Was it a comet, the planet Mars, a meteorite, a nova or supernova, the Aurora Borealis, or some other meteorological event? Was it not a simple *object* at all, but an astrological event, such as a conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, a lunar occultation of Jupiter? Was it a *miraculous sign*, in no further need of explanation? Or nothing at all, beyond an item in a deliberate and well-understood piece of story-telling, a mythic fiction?[1] As we see, with scriptural inconsistency it is almost always possible to save appearances by careful reinterpretation.

Far more common has been the accusation that astrology is self-contradictory, *internally inconsistent* in some plain and straightforward logical sense, so that the astrological techniques actually employed are inevitably flawed, or even wholly worthless. Abu Ma'shar, for example, an important medieval astrological authority in Islam, but the supremely important astrologer in the medieval West, having drawn material uncritically from several different sources without ironing out inconsistencies in them, opened himself up to limited criticism of this type by many writers. Pierre d'Ailly (1350-1420) is a rich source of examples, but there are many others, far too many for them to be listed here.[2] Those who write histories of astrology coming from the direction of history of *astronomy* tend to emphasise this type of inconsistency. Some write as though there was no other kind. Astrology has only itself to blame, to the extent that it sets itself up as an empirical science with a formal scientific structure.

There have always been others who, while firmly believing in the reality of celestial influence, have nevertheless considered it to be outside the reach of a

[1] See http://www.phys.uu.nl/~vgent/stellamagorum for a very extensive bibliography of mostly modern materials, compiled by Robert H. van Gent of Utrecht University. K. Paffenroth, "The Star of Bethlehem Casts Light on its Modern Interpreters", *Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society* 34 (1993), pp. 449-460, contains a useful short survey of various broad types of explanation, the author opting (p. 456) for the Jewish "Midrash", explained as "a story that reveals what the author of Matthew's gospel feels is the truth about the man whose story he is telling", namely Jesus.

[2] Pierre d'Ailly, *Tractatus de legibus et sectis contra supersticiosos astrologos*, cap. iv., in *Opera* (1483), originally written in 1410. See also L. A. Smoller, *History, Prophecy and the Stars: The Christian Astrology of Pierre d'Ailly, 1350-1420* (Princeton, 1994).

workable science. There are even instances of hostility to the subject shown by complete believers in its validity. They have often objected because they have felt threatened by it, to some degree. The practice of astrology has often been inconsistent with civil or religious law. One could say that they considered astrology to be inconsistent with a quiet life. Those who are not threatened with assassination – as were many rulers – or capital punishment – as were many of their subjects – may find it easy to smile at the paranoia of those who were so threatened. Some of their fears were still justified in Renaissance Italy: we need only think of the execution of Savonarola in 1498, a prophet of doom who suffered the same fate as that to which he had previously condemned others. In that same year, 1498, we find Marsilio Ficino using astrology to prove that Savonarola was possessed of a devil. Ficino's argument comes in a letter to the College of Cardinals, a letter that he never actually sent. The irony is that Savonarola had previously helped him to turn him away from astrology, for a time, at least, and had been commended by Ficino whilst he was alive.

ASTROLOGY AND MORAL DETERMINISM

Undoubtedly the most intellectually demanding type of theological criticism of astrology was that which related to the problem of astral determinism, and the constraints on free-will that it seemed to impose. Since Christianity makes much of the idea of personal responsibility for salvation, therefore determinism – I prefer the word to "fatalism" – is especially important to the Christian. Both in the world of the early Church, and in the Middle Ages and after, when the argument was accorded a thorough philosophical airing, it was commonly linked to a weak kind of voluntarism, a doctrine that will is a more basic entity than body, and that it is out of reach of corporeal influence.

It is impossible to discuss the question of astral determinism, historically at least, without mentioning the secondary debate as to whether the stars and other heavenly phenomena are *signs* or *causes*. Scholars liked the idea of signs, because they seemed remote from anything that could cause human actions directly, in the way causes might. This is a subject that deserves study in its own right, for the difference in the ontological levels of sign and cause is relevant to the very notion of inconsistency, and seems to me to demand a third entity, the *language describing causes*, which is not quite what the advocates of a sign-theory of astrology have in mind. If you see a cross in the sky, that seems like a simple sign, something non-causal and safe from science, as one might say. We can draw it, perhaps, reproduce it without a language, but as soon as we start saying what it *means*, then we have opened up a linguistic Pandora's box, opened ourselves up to being found guilty of various sorts of inconsistency, scientific or otherwise. Historically too, the subject is full of surprises. Take Origen, for instance, for whom the signs are placed in the heavens not for us but for divine powers to gain knowledge, and so to aid human beings in attain-

ing salvation.[3] I have not yet come across a logician who advocates two versions of the *tertium non datur*, one for us and one for angels.

One would expect the conflict of Christian belief with astrology to have become more acute, perhaps, but not to have altered in character, with the arrival of Islamic astrological treatises in the medieval West. This might have happened more obviously had astrology's history been more continuous, and had it always carried with it the censures and caveats of late antiquity, but when Islamic astrology arrived on the scene in the twelfth century, the intellectual excitement it caused was enough to hide, for a time, its spiritual dangers.

The problem of moral determinism was at first generally overlooked, except by those who were versed in Augustine, but it came to philosophical prominence with Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. His arguments depended on a particular psychological view of the human will as an entity that is distinct from human instinct. It could be argued that he removed the problem of astral causation from the determinism–free-will debate, and in a sense turned part of astrology into a serious part of science. There were other important medieval commentaries on astrological plausibility, of course, and Nicole Oresme's attack in the following century is noteworthy, as is Pierre d'Ailly's counterattack. Oresme makes one especially pertinent remark in his *Livre de divinacions*, in which he says that he will show that divination is foolish, wicked, and dangerous.[4] He will do so, he says, in three ways: from experience, from human reason, and from authority. In short, he is effectively promising to reveal three distinct types of inconsistency. It is a sad fact that most of astrology's critics persisted in failing to draw a line between the three.

FICINO'S TWO WORLDS

Most of those Italian humanist scholars who touched on these themes in the fifteenth century were well aware of the medieval debate, but for long it was disregarded by historians of humanism. One of the more striking qualities of many of these has been a manifest ambition to remove all taint of an association with astrology, which in turn has often been lumped together with magic. Writings on Petrarch suffered from this kind of cleansing, to take one example, until Lynn Thorndike showed how much evidence there was for the opposite

[3] Origen, *Philocalia*, 23.1-21. (He goes on to warn us that the signs are unfortunately open to examination by evil powers.) More generally, note A. B. Scott, *Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea* (Oxford, 1991), in which the author examines Pre-Socratic and Aristotelian ideas about stars and their possible connection with souls, a connection which Origen liked, but which was condemned by the Church Council of Laodicea. Origen is said to have been motivated by a wish to move away from astrological fatalism in his attempt to build a natural theology.

[4] G. W. Coopland, *Nicole Oresme and the Astrologers: A Study of his Livre de Divinacions* (Liverpool, 1952), p. 51.

point of view.[5] What no one could do easily was whitewash Marsilio Ficino, the philosopher, theologian, astrologer and magician who scarcely needs any introduction here. As head of the Platonic Academy in Florence from 1462, Ficino could not be presented as an odd bystander to the humanist movement, however that was to be defined. It hardly needs to be said that Ficino's translations of the writings of Plato and other Greek authors, and commentaries on them, stimulated the Renaissance movement that influenced European thought for two centuries. By the time he was ordained priest in 1473, he was already embarking on a rewriting of Plato's ideas, and increasingly he was drawn to astrological interpretations.

A key work in this respect was his *De triplici vita* published in 1489, of which the first two books have a medical slant, concerning the preservation of scholars' health and lives, while the third, *De vita coelitus comparanda*, concerned astral influences on them. Here he presented something akin to a Stoic reading of cosmic influence, modified by his theology. He insisted that there is a cosmic spirit in the universe which mediates between the one-animal world and our bodies. The influence, a "very subtle body", works also on our spirit, but there was a line that had to be drawn, for the soul and the mind are not similarly open to its influence. This was his simple way of preserving human freedom, as he believed. In fact, it was a way he had already adopted in a treatise he wrote in 1477 but never published, his *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum*.[6]

That Plotinus was a writer after his own heart, Ficino showed when he included ideas from his *Disputatio* in his Commentaries on the *Enneads*, the collection of Plotinus' writings assembled by Porphyry. In several chapters of the second of the *Enneads* Plotinus had gently dismantled several typical doctrines of astrology, but in the seventh chapter he made it plain that he accepted the idea that the stars may signify the future ("as we hold of many other things also").[7] This being so, "what explanation of the cause have we to offer?", asked Plotinus. His answer was that the stars are elements in a complex organic and coordinated structure, the universe. He spoke of there being a sympathy and correspondence between its parts, and of the wise man as being able, from one part of the chain, to read another. (It is true that he spoke of the stars as something we may think of as having a symbolic function, but that was merely his way of getting his point across.) Ficino was at times more dismissive of causation than Plotinus had been, but the two men shared a rather vague and impressionistic view of a universe with completely interrelated parts that could somehow be understood, understood by people with a gift for seeing the relations. A

[5] L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, 8 vols. (New York & London, 1923-1958), vol. 3, pp. 220-222.

[6] *Supplementum Ficinianum*, ed. P. O. Kristeller, 2 vols. (Florence, 1949), vol. 2, pp. 11-76. See also *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino*, transl. members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, London, 7 vols. (London, 1975-), vol. 3, pp. 63-64, 75-77.

[7] Plotinus, *Enneads*, transl. S. MacKenna (London, 1921), II.3, esp. ch. 7.

commentary on this writer was the perfect medium for a declaration by Ficino that the human soul is above the material world, and that our minds are above the causal workings of the stars.

The *Disputatio* of 1477 and his later astrological and magical writings of the *De vita* show him to have been particularly anxious about his religious orthodoxy. The latter, the most important statement of magical theory written in the Renaissance, was strongly influenced by the *Hermetica*, Ficino's *Enneads* commentary, Proclus, other Neoplatonists, and even Aquinas.[8] No doubt Ficino was conscious of the fact that Thomas would be viewed by his own contemporaries as a pillar of theological rectitude, and chose him for that reason. When he wrote on medicine he likewise theorised along philosophical lines, giving his readers a suitable dose of macrocosm and microcosm, as well as more specific doctrine drawn from medieval astrological medicine. In the third book of *De vita* he plays a dangerous game, for instance when he lists magical objects that he supposed to be capable of attracting celestial influence. An important source here was yet again Neoplatonic writing on the hierarchies linking God above to inferior matter, the human soul being in a central, bonding, position.[9] Just as medieval and Renaissance astrologers often drew a careful distinction between natural and judicial astrology, putting as much as possible into the former, relatively safe, category, so, when considering the Hermetic *Asclepius*, Ficino treated astrology wherever possible as natural philosophy. Where that was difficult, he did the next best thing, and made it out to be an account of the workings of a different sort of cosmic influence, but not that associated with the heretical notion of a cosmos filled with stars and planets embodying active souls.[10]

FICINO VACILLATOR

With good reason, Ficino has acquired a reputation for having changed his mind repeatedly. His *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum* of 1477, for instance, was strongly critical of astrological practice. He attacked its reliance on metaphor and simile, and its sheer arbitrariness, and produced the standard commonsense criticisms of it, and yet a year later we find him making political

[8] B. P. Copenhaver, "Scholastic Philosophy and Renaissance Magic in the *De vita* of Marsilio Ficino", *Renaissance Quarterly* 37/4 (1984), pp. 523-554.

[9] Marsilius Ficinus, *De vita coelitus comparanda* (Venice, 1498); in *Opera omnia*, 2 vols. (Basel, 1576), vol. 1, pp. 493-572, esp. 532, 562-563, 570-572. *De vita* III.14, *De ordinibus rerum a stellis pendentium* (*Opera*, vol. 1, pp. 549-550), is drawn largely from his translation of Proclus. I need not go any further here into the difference between Ficino's ontological hierarchy and his astrological series, but the two are not entirely identical, and the latter has a decidedly second-class quality. See *Opera*, vol. 1, p. 551.

[10] For the relevant works of Aquinas, Proclus, Iamblichus, Augustine and Porphyry, and their bearing on the use of talismans, see Copenhaver, "Scholastic Philosophy" (as in n. 8), pp. 552-553.

predictions on an astrological basis, in a letter to Pope Sixtus IV.[11] This is one of numerous instances of letters and other writings in which he reveals great familiarity with the subject he had so severely criticised in his *Disputatio*. Had he never penned such a sceptical work, the system of astrological magic he worked out later in life would have surprised no historian. As matters stand, it is not surprising to find him being regularly accused of inconsistency and irresolution.

Ficino's vacillations were still in evidence in the last decade of his life. Having in 1489, in the third book of *De vita*, put forward his case for medical "astrology", in 1494 he found himself confronted with Pico's massive treatise against astrology, of which I shall say more shortly. In a much discussed letter to Poliziano, Ficino thereupon expressed agreement with Pico, and made a feeble attempt to reconcile the views he had expressed in *De vita* with Pico's. Pointing out that Poliziano was sceptical of his self-justification, Kristeller suggests that, rather than accuse Ficino of inconsistency or weakness we should try to understand the "contrasting intellectual motives which drove him in various directions".[12] Why should we not do all of these things? If indeed Ficino was as influential on later generations as has been claimed, is it not instructive to point out the inconsistencies and weaknesses that later scholars were prepared to swallow? May a historian not record human frailty without being accused of anachronism?

His apparent inconstancy seems less venial when his attacks are seen as having been made on specific shortcomings of astrologers, rather than on their subject as it should have been practised. In a letter to Bernardo Bembo, for instance, he criticises astrologers who remove providence and freedom.[13] He is writing a book on the providence of God and the freedom of human will, he says, and he later sent the preface to Francesco Ippoliti, filled with polemics that were largely directed, one feels, against straw men.[14] He wanted to legitimise astrology, in the face of orthodox scholastic theological opinion, which generally took the same stance as Aquinas and Augustine before him, condemning all prediction of human affairs without the help of divine revelation, as an activity likely to attract demonic help, and as therefore sinful.[15] Ficino thought it possible to avoid this charge, believing that there were three ways of making predictions that were not dependent on evil spirits. There was the possibility of direct knowledge from God, he thought, although perhaps we might

[11] *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 6), vol. 5, pp.15-19. He explains that he considered the last conjunction of Saturn and Mars in Virgo, and the next following, the next entry of the Sun into Aries (a typical "revolution of times" calculation), lunar eclipses in Aquarius, future solar eclipses, and unfortunate conjunctions of Mars and Jupiter, "besides much else". This is all conventional astrology.

[12] P. O. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, transl. V. Conant (Colombia UP, 1943), p. 311.

[13] *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 6), vol. 3, pp. 48-49.

[14] *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 6), vol. 3, pp. 75-76.

[15] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.2, q. 95, art. 5 quotes Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 2.7.

be helped along with some magical assistance. There was a kind of psychic introspection into the human soul, with its divine aspect. And there was astrology as a study of celestial signification, especially through a study of archetypal patterns – and this is the back door through which much of *traditional* astrology could enter, the very doctrine that he had so often criticised.

FICINO'S NEW ASTROLOGY

Throughout his writings, Ficino flirted with ideas that had a pagan origin. When he lamented divination's loss of its sacred character, he had in mind a rosy image of the subject before the advent of Christianity, and this was bound up with his vision of the *prisca theologia*, the genealogy of which was not overtly astrological.[16] It should not be necessary to repeat here the familiar story of Ficino's vision of an Ancient Theology; or of his treatment of Plato as an oracle; or of the way in which he fell under the spell of Hermeticism in the 1460s; or of the heady mixture of myth and philosophy by which he was led to the idea that Man is a god, whose relations with fate change as soon as that simple truth is recognised. The consequences for astrology of his wild poetic imaginings were that it was covered with a gloss that tended to conceal its causal pretensions. The early Ficino did not solve the free-will problem, but simply sidestepped it.

To have coalesced past, present, and future, into one, in the way advocated in some Hermetic works, would have had the effect of removing from the heavens their astrological status as efficient causes – at least on a naive understanding of causes preceding their effects in time. Drawing on medieval discussions of the theology of eternity, Ficino drew a distinction between the corporeal world, in which there are past, present, and future, and an intelligible world, which is somehow superior to time. At first sight, one would be inclined to say that he had made his astrological task impossible. Surely, had he been ruthlessly true to his new conception of the world, he would have been unable to speak of changing astrological configurations – of conjunctions of Saturn and Jupiter, for example, or a thousand other things in the astrological calendar. How could he speak of astral causes as operating on the body in the sensual world (although not on the will)? How, as an astrologer, could he evaluate them? He said that the heavens are *symbols* with human relevance. Yes, but how is their signification to be determined? Here Ficino made use of a devious

[16] On the *prisca theologia*, and different potential genealogies for it (key figures being Plato, Zoroaster, and Gemistus Pletho), see D. P. Walker, "The *Prisca Theologia* in France", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 17 (1956), pp. 204-259. For a more accessible overview, see D. P. Walker, *The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth Century to the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1972). For Ficino's disillusionment, see also L. Valcke, "Jean Pic de la Mirandole lu par Thomas More", in *Miscellanea Moreana: Essays for Germain Marc'hadour* (Binghamton, 1989), pp. 192-193.

philosophical gambit: human life is both contemplative and sensual, and the rational soul sits on the borderline between eternity and time.[17] The idea seems to be – I follow Kristeller here – that the soul partakes of both types of world. The meaning of the heavens, Ficino insists, is not to be found by a perceived pattern, but somehow through God communicating with us at the spiritual level.[18] One could fill a book with examples of philosophers who have made use of this "foot-in-two-worlds" gambit. It usually rests, as in this case, on a play on words, with ambiguity in the middle (bridging) term.

How did Ficino's proposal translate into practice? If his programme had ever been carried through in the form he recommended, the would-be practising astrologer would have been left high and dry. Ficino had not transformed astrology, but had cooked up a new subject with a shared vocabulary, a subject that was irrelevant to what he had written when he had earlier donned the cap of the astrological guru. It is tempting for historians to ignore the more conventional side of his life, and to concentrate on his new vision of a subject that is given the same name as the old, "astrology". It is also tempting to ignore the question of astrological practice, or at least to focus only on the relatively few examples he provides of his new symbolic astrology. The most famous of them relates to those great events in his life, the publication of his translations of Plato and the simultaneous visit of Pico della Mirandola to Florence. This was the occasion on which Ficino was persuaded to translate Plotinus, and he famously interpreted the event in terms of Saturn-Jupiter symbolism, in an exercise strongly resembling the activities of metaphor-mongering that he had criticised so severely in others.[19]

Not content to leave traditional astrology where he found it, Ficino purported to be able to rewrite it, and to give new meanings to old concepts. He re-examined horoscopes, for instance, his own in particular, in a way that illustrates the folly of this exercise, judged by his old criteria, for he was every bit as arbitrary as the astrologers he had criticised not long before. It was easy enough to get rid of the old maleficent image of the planet under which he was born (Aquarius is a domicile of the maleficent Saturn), but on what grounds did he substitute his own interpretation, turning Saturn into a planet – he occasionally seems to be thinking of it as a god – that favours those who have laid aside an ordinary, worldly life in preference for a contemplative recollection of divine matters? His was just as capricious as the doctrine he was hoping to replace.

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[17] See Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 12), p. 295.

[18] P. Moffit Watts, "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and three Renaissance Neoplatonists Cusanus, Ficino, and Pico on Mind and Cosmos", in *Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honour of P. O. Kristeller*, ed. J. Hankins (Binghamton, New York, 1987), pp. 279-298.

[19] Plato was thus "being re-born". Pico was born under Saturn in Aquarius and was born under the same sign. See the preface to his commentary on Plotinus, *Opera omnia* (Basel, 1572), p. 1537. There is a modern reprint of this edition (Turin, 1971). There were other editions: Strassburg, 1504, Basel, 1557, and Venice, 1557.

In his defence, it might be said that I am not doing justice to the subtlety and complexity of his statements about Saturn. He ascribed powers to the planet on a sliding scale, for example, related to the attributes of the human subject. He put himself, of course, at the religious end of the human spectrum, where the human soul manages to free itself from material impediments and sees itself as an image of God. He also accepted his destiny as a melancholic, which certainly affected the outcome.[20] Was this not a case of extrapolating to all mankind from his own circumstances, without investigating whether they were typical? By what other route was he offering us properties for the planet, which seem just as arbitrary as those against which he had earlier preached? Ficino would probably have answered that, just as the religious person may claim to be directly inspired by God, so he had an innate power to read the relevant signs in the heavens. It could be said that he had cleaned out some of the more obvious pagan elements from traditional astrology, but his own version was neither rational nor recognisably Christian in character. I shall return to it after considering the commotion induced by the writings of Pico della Mirandola.

PICO AND ACCEPTABLE ASTROLOGY

Pico, who so disturbed Ficino's peace of mind in the 1490s, owed much to him, and not only because the older man had stirred up so much interest in the distinction between licit and illicit divinatory activity. It is well known how the precocious young Pico shocked his Florentine friends and the Church by his notorious 900 theses, how he published the theses themselves in December 1486, and invited an open debate of them in Rome, composing his famous *Oration on the Dignity of Man* to accompany the first published version of them.[21] The second part of the work contains five hundred propositions, *conclusiones*, on which he does not insist, unless the Church agrees. Many of these are actually expressed as *quaestiones*. The very last has it that "just as true astrology teaches us to read in the book of God, so the Cabala teaches us to read in the book of the Law". Pope Innocent VIII prevented the proposed debate, and a papal commission eventually condemned thirteen of the theses. In his subsequent retraction, Pico did no more than pay lip-service to the commission, as is

[20] He discusses the second effect in a letter to Giovanni Cavalcanti, *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 6), vol. 2, p. 34. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 12), pp. 212-213, notes a passage in the *Theologia* in which Ficino claims that a melancholic temperament frees the soul from external events, creating a favourable condition for prophecy. On the role of Saturn in Ficino's own horoscope, see *Opera* (as in n. 9), vol. 1, pp. 731-732, 871, 901.

[21] Pico was born in 1463. The *Conclusiones philosophicae, cabalasticae et theologicae* (Rome, 1486) have been translated and expertly commented upon at length by S. A. Farmer in his *Syncretism in the West: Pico's 900 theses (1486). The Evolution of Traditional, Religious, and Philosophical Systems, with Text, Translation, and Commentary* (Phoenix, 1998).

shown by the *Apologia* which he wrote in his own defence and which was published in 1489.[22] In it he defended species of pious magic, distinguishing between the "execrable and portentous" magic that relied on demons, and a kind of natural magic that is none other than the "absolute consummation of natural philosophy". The latter was even held to be necessary for intellectual support for faith, on the grounds that it allowed people to distinguish between true miracles and extraordinary events.

This distinction between natural and divinatory occult practice was one that had often been drawn before, and five years later it was given great publicity in a Parisian proclamation in regard to astrology: in February 1494 the Paris faculty of theology published a judgement on Simon de Phares in response to a request by Parliament.[23] Despite his having earlier had royal patronage, the faculty condemned Simon's divinatory astrology, of the sort that was supposed to reveal both past and future secrets, and that was largely based on nativities, horoscopes more generally, and – in its most pernicious form – the use of images. Set against this was "true astronomy", which also made conjectures about the effects of the heavens, but only *natural* effects, of a *general* kind.[24] There was a good deal of wishful thinking in all this, for there were no explicit criteria offered for drawing the dividing line between those aspects of human life that were natural and those that were not. The old problem of moral determinism therefore remained in the background to both of these two *causes célèbres*. Pico's approach to it was neither direct nor profound. Like so many influential works throughout history, its rhetorical content was what ensured its fame. He used a common academic strategy, making a series of strong or even outrageous claims, and then making (or hinting at) ways of salvaging most of what his readers were likely to want. Like so much brilliant writing, it does not stand up to close scrutiny.

The astrology in the theses is surprisingly thin, in view of the great attention paid to it by historians of astrology in modern times. Their interest in it has usually stemmed the noise made by his later work, in which he ostensibly attacked astrology, and of which I shall say more in a moment. He was never a complete sceptic. He never questioned the reality of celestial influence, in some

[22] *Apologia J. Pici Mirandolani, Concordiae comitis*, 1489.

[23] On the biography and condemnation of Simon de Phares, see especially J.-P. Boudet, *Lire dans le ciel: la bibliothèque de Simon de Phares, astrologue du XVe siècle* (Brussels, 1994), pp. v-xi; and also Thorndike, *History of Magic* (as in n. 5), vol. 4, pp. 544-561.

[24] Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus* (Paris, 1728-36), vol 1, p. 325b: "Veram Astronomiam, quae corporum coelestium magnitudinem, oppositiones, motusque considerat, quae solis & lunae aliorumque planetarum conjunctiones vel oppositiones caeterasve habitudines praedicit, quae item effectus quosdam eorum naturales probabiliter ac prudenter in universali conjicit (quam ut liberalem, nobilem, utilemque Artem veneramur)". The Bishop of Tulle's descriptions of "true astronomy" and of "divinatory astrology" are very reminiscent of the view taken by Jean Gerson in his *Trilogium astrologie theologizate* (1419), composed for the future Charles VII.

vague sense. He spoke of the fact that the planets could influence human beings in characteristic ways, with which his readers could be assumed familiar – Venus predisposing her subjects to the venereal, Mars to the martial, and so on. (There is something rather pathetic about his attempts to present such platitudinous insights as "Platonic".) He never went deeply into the finer points made by the astrologers, but he could be defended on the grounds that he considered them futile. Any criticism of his technical knowledge will no doubt be considered irrelevant to his supposed philosophical depth, but there is no doubt that he was lacking in Ficino's knowledge of the traditional subject. Mistakes he makes in the ordering of the planets (*conclusio* 11>48, with the notation used in Farmer's edition), for example, are more than can be explained by slips of the pen. Putting such matters aside, how could he escape the dire consequences of assuming that there is celestial influence on the human intellect as well as the human body? In his book of 900 theses, he turned back to Porphyry's views, as reported in Proclus's commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*: the skills we have, and which are more developed in some people than in others, are because of the participation of an animated heaven in the souls of individuals.[25] That is easily said, but it leaves far too much unsaid.

PICO AND THE ASTROLOGY OF THE PARTICULAR

Pico died on 17 November 1494, a memorable date in Florentine history. It was the day on which the armies of Charles VIII of France marched into the city of Florence, presaging the meteoric rise of Savonarola, with his notorious claim to have been directed by God to rule the city. (After a three-year power struggle with the pope and the Holy League, Savonarola was eventually executed in May 1498.) At Pico's death, he left behind his most lauded work on, or rather against, astrology, the *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem*.[26] Published posthumously in Strassburg in 1504 in his *Opera*, by his nephew and editor Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, the *Disputationes* is a strange work in many respects, filled with inconsistencies in the same way as his 900 theses had been. No ordinary scholar could claim support from authors as diverse as Averroes and Albertus Magnus, Avicenna and Aquinas, without running that risk, and the clever equivocation of Pico all too often failed him. The contents of the *Disputationes* have nevertheless been gone over repeatedly, as though it was some sacred text. Like so many sacred texts, it has been excused on the grounds that it was very probably greatly modified by its editor Gianfrancesco, perhaps even with the assistance of Savonarola – who could not be indifferent to astrology, since his enemies had used astrological analysis to prove him a heretic. Savonarola's *Trattato contra li astrologi*, written around this time, is to some extent a summary of Pico. As Farmer points out, it goes beyond the *Dis-*

[25] Farmer, *Syncretism in the West* (as in n. 21), pp. 306-309.

[26] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, libri I-XII*, ed. E. Garin, 2 vols. (Florence, 1946-1952).

putationes in attacking all "natural" forms of prophecy. Remo Catani has argued at length that Savonarola's role was close but not (*pace* Garin) subservient, and notes that he reminds his readers of his longstanding attacks on astrology from the pulpit. Catani shows how his wrath quickly developed, and draws attention to passages in which he advocated burning, stabbing, or decapitating astrologers. They were, of course, in many ways his rivals in divination, and being a humanist did not demand behaviour that would now pass as humane.[27]

Pico's contemporaries were disturbed by hints of determinism in his last, as well as in his earlier writings, and his modern supporters have turned somersaults to save him from himself. A favourite text with two of his most important interpreters, Ernst Cassirer and Eugenio Garin, was the speech he planned to deliver in the Roman assembly where he hoped his 900 theses would be discussed. Cassirer and Garin took this as a rallying call to all Renaissance humanists, expressing their core belief in the dignity of man, and for good or ill the work in question is now almost always known as the *Oratio de hominis dignitate*.[28] In this speech "*On the Dignity of Man*" Pico takes a high-flown view of his right to make any assertion that he is prepared to defend, with numerous references to past thinkers who have asserted that right. He hints broadly at man's ability to shape his own destiny, and control the natural world, but the *Oratio* will be disappointing to anyone seeking a coherent and detailed argument by Pico on the fundamental problem of astrology and free will. In the *Disputationes* we get a better idea of his attitude to this problem, and there he seems surprisingly close to Ficino in many respects, not least in his apparent inconsistencies. D. P. Walker probably came closest to exposing Pico's method, and – hardly realising it – Pico's failure. Drawing attention to Pico's insistence on the close and beneficial connection of celestial to animal spirits, Walker considered that he would have disagreed with Ficino over whether the spirit of an individual person could be transformed by herbs having celestial connections, and be subjected to the influence of a particular planet. What does Pico offer as an alternative, however? Walker wrote as follows:

> Pico insists that celestial influences are only a universal cause of sublunar phenomena; all specific differences of quality or motion are due to differences inherent in the receiving matter or soul.[29]

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[27] Farmer, *Syncretism in the West* (as in n. 21), pp. 172-176, argues strongly for the adulteration of Pico's work by his editor and Savonarola, who produced "an extraordinary literary fraud", and for the political importance of astrology in the fortunes of the fiery Dominican. That Savonarola had helped Pico with advice and judgement was already being claimed by one of the friars supporters, Giovanni Nesi. See R. Catani, "Girolamo Savonarola and astrology", *The Italianist* 18 (1998), pp. 50-75, *passim.*

[28] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oratio* "*De hominis dignitate*", transl. E. L. Forbes in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller and J. H. Randall (Chicago, 1948). In the posthumous Bologna edition of Pico's works (1496) it carries the running title *Oratio in coetu Romanorum.*

[29] D. P. Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella* (London, 1958), p. 56.

This being so, Walker argued, Pico would have disagreed with the *specificity* of Ficino's astrology.

Statements of general causes are in one sense meaningless if they are not specific, but they are not necessarily finely-textured. There is a universal (causal) law relating the heavens (or influences due to them) to sublunar things (matter, spirit). Those sublunar things (and their initial conditions) are not all alike, and assuming that their differences decide the effects the heavens will have on them, any law worth its salt will set out the connection in as much detail as possible. To be unable to provide laws that cover real cases in great detail – which Walker no doubt had in mind – is a perfectly understandable situation, but it does not affect the determinism issue one jot. The astrologer's sublunar things are not all alike, but they must have some identifiable common property for the universal law to operate, for it to be phrased at all. Not all massive objects move in the same way under the universal law of gravitation, but their movements are – as traditionally conceived – determined partly by gravitational attractions and partly by other forces. The presence of the other forces does not alter that.

Of course we know that Pico, like all those astrologers before him who had been embarrassed by the threat of moral determinism, wanted the external forces in the astrological case to be subjected to human will in some way. It is precisely here that the case differs from my physical example. The physicist hopes to be able to handle the additional forces in much the same way as the gravitational forces; but a parallel tactic is not open to the Piconian astrologer, as long as the human will is intrinsically unpredictable. We are back with the old adage, that the stars incline but do not compel. The physicist lives in the hope of accounting for unknown factors. The astrologer, as long as the human will is intrinsically unpredictable, is doomed to failure, except as a prophet of tendencies; and with every tendency there is an escape clause in individual cases. A science with arbitrary escape clauses attaching to its every pronouncement is no science at all.

One of the many ways in which astrologers have commonly tried to escape censure has been by saying that they did not pretend to forecast *particular* events. This is not necessarily the same as saying that they are able only to speak of celestial influence as *tending* to make people behave in certain ways, although many did speak in this way. Consider the person who believes that the human will is an unreckonable factor in the human situation that makes all definite astrological forecasting impossible. Consider the yet more difficult case, as put by a later sympathiser with astrology, the Florentine Dominican theologian Tommaso Buoninsegni, according to whom the unknown will of God was another obstacle to astrological precision.[30] In both cases, it is the es-

[30] Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic* (as in n. 29), p. 57, explains that Buoninsegni, while ostensibly making an *apologia* for Pico and Savanorola, is rather pleading for leniency. They were, he says, so anxious to condemn making the will subject to the stars that they were over-zealous, and attacked good astrology. The result was that Buoninsegni, annotating their work, turned it into a defence of good astrology.

sential *unknowability* of a key factor in human behaviour that stands in the way. This has nothing to do with poor precision in forecasting, for example, although of course that has been a continuing serious astronomical – and therefore astrological – problem. What is more, pleading essential unknowability cannot be considered as a plea for a statistical reading of predictions, which some have in mind when speaking of tendencies in this context. When modern scientists lay down laws with the rider that they are not meant for predicting particular events, that is often a covert way of saying that the laws are only *statistically* valid – possibly because there are unknown factors that seem to vary the result in an apparently random way. When Renaissance astrologers pleaded that they were innocent of making precise predictions, however, they were certainly not thinking of themselves as statisticians.

ACCOUNTING FOR FICINO'S VOLATILITY

Whatever we think of the quality of Pico's arguments, it has to be said that they were at the very focus of much later argument for and against astrology as a whole. Reactions to them were very varied. Pomponazzi, for example, thought them vapid, and Agrippa thought that no one had answered them, but quite apart from the arguments themselves there is the question of Pico's ultimate reasons for rejecting astrology, a question that numerous historians have addressed. Steven Vanden Broecke was very probably right to see his shift from a programme of astrological reform to one of outright rejection as having been triggered by social forces, "popular astrological practice in the 1480s and 1490s" having "threatened to compromise the relations between religion and natural science, and between God and human society".[31] Whatever his motives, Pico left an opening for others to accept the option of reform, and of course his most famous convert, if that is the right word, was his senior, Ficino. I have already mentioned some of Ficino's waverings, real or apparent. He outlived Pico by five years, dying in 1499 at the age of almost 66. Ficino's extensive correspondence before the mid-1490s is filled with traditional astrological reference, despite the fact that – as we have seen – in 1477 he had written his *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum* attacking equally traditional astrological practices. He repeated some of his hostile arguments in his Plotinus commentaries of the mid-1480s, and yet in the third book of the *De vita*, the *De vita coelitus comparanda*, written in 1489, he sanctioned certain astrological practices for medical use. His final prevarication came after reading Pico's bombshell – his *Disputationes* against astrology. Ficino then appeared to change course yet again, and to adopt a more hostile stance.

Historians of Florentine humanism have worried greatly about Ficino's changes of heart on the subject of astrology, which were no doubt thought to detract from the glories of the humanist cause. In 1990, Melissa Bullard made a

[31] S. Vanden Broecke, *The Limits of Influence: Pico, Louvain, and the Crisis of Renaissance Astrology* (Leiden, 2003), p. 65. On Pico more generally, see pp. 55-80.

brief but pertinent survey of the thoughts of earlier scholars on the subject.[32] She opened by mentioning Arnaldo Della Torre, who in 1902 suggested that Ficino had undergone a religious crisis that led him to abandon the pagan beliefs of his youth and take holy orders. In a footnote, she also referred to Giovanni Corsi, Ficino's sixteenth-century biographer, who suggested that he was plagued by a bitterness of spirit similar to Saint Jerome's anguish over his intense love of Cicero. Tacit in these references is the idea that "the seeming inconsistencies in his thought" can be explained in terms of his mental state. When referring to "the next generation of scholars, including Thorndike, Sarton, Kristeller, Garin, Walker, and Yates", she mentions their use of adjectives like "inconsistent", "melancholic", "wavering", and "anxious". She herself speaks more weakly of "Ficino's eclectic tendencies", a phrase that seems to warn of incoherence, but she also sees unifying themes in his work which modern scholars can use to explain away Ficino's intellectual behaviour. She refers to the views of Charles Trinkaus, who argued that the alleged inconsistencies in Ficino's astrology fade when the *Disputatio* and the *De vita coelitus comparanda* are examined in light of basic themes that Ficino had already developed in his earlier masterpiece, the *Theologia platonica*.[33] What she fails to do is to show how very different in character are the ways, not only of accounting for Ficino's undoubted inconsistencies, but of appreciating their nature.

How are we to characterise Ficino's changes of mind? According to George Sarton,

> The ambiguity of his attitude is easy to understand considering his Platonic and Plotinian training and his lack of scientific knowledge; it is to his credit rather than the opposite.[34]

From another book by Sarton, written at much the same time:

> The Platonic tradition was full of ambiguities and of prevarications; these were increased by Marsilio when he tried to reconcile Plato with Christianity. The comedy of errors and the tragedy of lies which that tradition implied were not started by Marsilio, far from it, but he intensified them.[35]

From these remarks, we gather that Sarton did not think highly of Christian Neoplatonism, and that ambiguity is a virtue in those so ignorant of science that they contradict themselves. This does not take us very far.

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[32] M. M. Bullard, "The Inward Zodiac: A Development in Ficino's Thought on Astrology", *Renaissance Quarterly* 43 (1990), pp. 687-708.

[33] C. Trinkaus, "Marsilio Ficino and the Ideal of Human Autonomy", in *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone*, ed. G. C. Garfagnini, 2 vols. (Florence, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 197-210.

[34] G. Sarton, *Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance* (London, 1957), p. 102. He refers to Kristeller, but the sentiments were not Kristeller's.

[35] G. Sarton, *The Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science During the Renaissance (1450-1600)* (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 135. Also quoted by Bullard.

Next on Bullard's list is Lynn Thorndike, who is said to have been "no less convinced of Ficino's weakness as a thinker", although he "did admit Ficino might be less inconsistent than he first appeared".[36] This I think is a misreading of Thorndike, for although he does use more or less the words quoted – concerning Ficino's inconsistency, at least – he goes on to give numerous examples of Ficino's astrological assertions, and a few more anti-astrological remarks, before passing judgement. By "less inconsistent" Thorndike was signalling that while Ficino's words were thoroughly inconsistent, he did not really mean them. Thorndike's view, briefly expressed, is that Ficino believed, and continued to believe, most of astrology, as long as it did not maintain "the doctrine of fatal necessity to the prejudice of divine providence and human freedom".[37] Stars for him were signs, not causes, and the eclipse at the crucifixion was miraculous. Thorndike had some difficulty with Pico's assertion that Ficino was on his side, and that this senior scholar egged him on in his anti-astrological writing, but in his final analysis Thorndike virtually accused Ficino of having dissembled. He even hinted at the proposition that the same was true of Pico. In short, Thorndike's view was that Ficino was "somewhat double-faced".[38]

Having devoted a whole chapter to this question, Thorndike could not be easily ignored. Kristeller, perhaps surprisingly, came up with rather similar remarks in a work mentioned above, a work ready for the press in 1937 but published in English translation only in 1943. Ficino's practice during his entire lifetime, said this leading authority on the man, "shows that he was not at all opposed to astrology", given the usual qualifications – signs not causes, human will not subject to stellar influence, and so on. (What is influence, we might ask, if it is not causative?) He added, however, that rather than assume "inconsistency or weakness" we should try to understand the "contrasting intellectual motives which drove him in different directions".[39] No historian of ideas would deny that, but all of us are subjected to opposing forces of one sort or another, and we do not all succumb to their influence – especially those of us who sign up to the *Oration on the Dignity of Man*! Kristeller, like so many Ficinists, did his best to save his hero's face, when he said that the "contradiction" (his quotation marks) in reality "merely reflects the difference between nature and spirit". In other words, there is astral influence on the body, but not on the will. That is a very partial rendering of what others have meant by Ficino's inconsistency.

Eugenio Garin was deferential to Kristeller, but he was at the same time plainly uneasy. He supported the idea of a diachronic analysis of Ficino's writings – I fail to see how this could alter the situation – adding this caveat:

> Two things above all should not be forgotten: firstly the motives of prudence which sometimes helped to make an argument deliberately obscure; secondly, [...] the huge

[36] Thorndike, *History of Magic* (as in n. 5), vol. 4, pp. 566-567.
[37] Thorndike, *History of Magic* (as in n. 5), vol. 4, p. 570.
[38] Thorndike, *History of Magic* (as in n. 5), vol. 4, p. 572.
[39] Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (as in n. 12), pp. 310-311.

> diversity – contrasts even – between the themes and theories within astrology and magic themselves, and the difficulty in making strict distinctions between them.[40]

He added that Ficino, in his later years, was most active in using astrology for medical purposes. While Garin did not like Thorndike's analysis, and certainly not the title of his relevant chapter, "Ficino the Philophaster", his solution seems to me to resemble Thorndike's very strongly. It was that Ficino was a prudent dissembler, who cloaked his real opinion. As for the question of the diversity of doctrines, that is a separate issue. The diversity, one of elements that are often incompatible, was very real, but that is not an excuse for accepting a system, then rejecting it, then accepting it, and again rejecting it.

In various places over the following decades, D. P. Walker made great inroads into our understanding of Ficino's sources, although it has to be said that the Ficino industry was growing at such a pace that it soon became virtually impossible to say anything that had not been said before on this matter. He noted Ficino's vacillations, and the fact that for him the highest part of man that could be directly influenced by the stars was the spirit; but he stressed that in the *De vita coelitus comparanda* the concept of spirit was much widened beyond the bounds of its technical medical meaning. Ficino there postulates a cosmic spirit flowing through the whole sensible universe, in true Neoplatonic style, the spirit serving to link the heavenly bodies with the sublunar world. It is not body, and not soul, although it is almost soul. It can be breathed and captured, especially with the help of music – and here a whole new branch of astrology opens up, with the theory of planetary music.[41]

Since Della Torre, more than a century ago, first suggested that Ficino's vacillations had more to do with psychology, or mental equilibrium, than with logic, that thesis too has appeared in many guises. There have been other suggestions of human weakness, or deviousness. Carol Kaske, for example, proposed *personal* motives involving Ficino's rejection of Savonarola.[42] Right or wrong, why are so many modern historians uneasy with hints of moral weakness? This clearly has something to do with their academic upbringing, in which sins against logical or moral propriety are not easily countenanced. They are doubly hard to accept in someone on whose work one has invested much time and effort. Sarton had made no deep study of Ficino, and casually saying that inconsistency did not matter in his case cost Sarton nothing. Thorndike was perhaps the most frank and honest: Ficino was not inconsistent, but merely a liar. Trinkaus, on the other hand, was following an entirely different line.

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[40] E. Garin, *Astrology in the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life*, transl. C. Jackson and J. Allen (London, 1983; Bari, 1976[1]), p. 63.

[41] Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic* (as in n. 29), pp. 12-15, and later for the musical theory.

[42] C. V. Kaske, "Ficino's Shifting Attitude Towards Astrology in the *De Vita coelitus Comparanda*, the Letter to Poliziano, and the *Apologia to the Cardinals*", in *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone* (as in n. 33), vol. 1, pp. 371-381.

He was addressing – as others have done, of course – inconsistencies of another sort, that is, between the man's earlier and later writings. Historians of ideas are often strangely reluctant to admit that their subjects may change their minds, even drastically. To do so in a directed way is not weakness of character, but something in which all intelligent beings indulge, in an ongoing process of self-correction. One may call it inconstancy, and in certain circumstances it is a very irritating habit, but it should not be treated as a case of simple logical inconsistency. It may require a person's behaviour to be excused, or explained away, and of course doing so becomes increasingly difficult when changes of mind are numerous, as they seem to be in Ficino's case. Having admitted that there is inconsistency between early and late writings, however, Trinkaus could not let matters rest, but had to find what he considered a way of harmonising them, "by examining the later treatises hermeneutically in terms of the question of man's place in the cosmos and his free will", in Bullard's words. This is the Kristeller programme in action, and several writers have worked at it in the last half century. It is almost as though they have been convinced by Ficino's syncretism that they must follow a similar course.

TYPES OF INCONSISTENCY: A SUMMARY

Whether or not the conclusions of the harmonisers are convincing, they tend to hide from view one of the most interesting of all "inconsistencies" in astrology, which is that last mentioned, between astrology old and astrology new. If they could be viewed as intimations of a laudable scientific advance, or even a case of regression, more notice would no doubt be taken of them by historians. In Ficino's case, a close examination of his writings by worshippers at the shrine of humanism might reveal more precisely why he changed his mind, detail by detail. The less committed are left with the impression that he is a straw blowing in the wind, first one way and then another – which is precisely why some have turned from a historical to a psychological account of the man. This is unobjectionable, as long as it does not obscure the many other kinds of inconsistency with which astrology is permeated, and of which we have given examples here. We have seen internal self-contradiction within an astrological system, which may be unequivocal, its refutation requiring only reference to logic; or which may require interpretation, for its proof or disproof. As mentioned earlier, Pierre d'Ailly drew attention to the problem of plain inconsistency, although a few examples have always been fairly obvious.

Whenever interpretation is called forth, logic tends to be blunted, and victory in argument goes to the best casuists. Modern scholarship – despite the best efforts of postmodernism – is relatively innocent here. Like Dante, that other great Florentine, Ficino and Pico were perfectly capable of going to the root meaning of two seemingly conflicting authors, such as Avicenna and Averroes, and claiming to show that they were really saying the same thing. The humanists were even prepared to invoke the notorious double-truth doctrine, usually associated with the name of Averroes but developed further by

many medieval Latin authors. And when they adopted Cabalistic methods, of course, almost anything was possible.[43]

That astrology may contradict Scripture gives us another sort of inconsistency, which for some – we earlier mentioned Melanchthon and Calvin – is tantamount to a proof of falsity. Here again, it is almost always possible to save appearances by careful reinterpretation. The same goes for inconsistency with civil or religious law. Here we might say that we have an incompatibility between astrological practice and peaceable existence – of a sort that Savonarola's pope feared as much as Honorius and Theodosius had done a thousand years before, when they decreed punishments of death, torture, or banishment, for divinatory acts.

Astrological doctrine may obviously be contradicted by common sense, that is, by broadly accepted (and possibly mistaken) general principles. Such principles may be rational or empirical. In 1477, as mentioned earlier, Ficino produced commonsense criticisms of astrology, but these had long been a commonplace. Rather different from this last is astrology's potential incompatibility with almost any well-formulated belief system on a particular and critical issue. Conflict with the Christian belief in free-will is one of numerous possible examples – and they are numerous because past astrology has made so many outrageously wide-ranging claims. Astrology may obviously be incompatible with a philosophical system – as with that of Plotinus. In many cases, the day may be saved by minor adjustment, but that proved to be impossible with the problem of moral determinism, which was usually dodged rather than solved. Even astrology's incompatibility with received natural science, which today is almost always ranked as the most serious of kinds, was before the seventeenth century considered relatively insignificant, especially when most of humanity was barely conscious of the notion that the world is governed by scientific principles. Even then, it was possible to judge one astrological principle by another. In Ficino's case, it was at first a question of conflict with an older tradition and later one of conflict with his former self. If this makes us uncomfortable with Ficino, the fact that he provides examples of inconsistency of every one of the other kinds listed here does not improve matters.

Why it is so important to distinguish between the several kinds is because they have very different temporal characters. Broadly speaking, what was illogical in antiquity is illogical today. Religious doctrine, on the other hand, has been by no means constant, and the numbers of people who care about it, and the intensity of their feelings, has changed dramatically with time. Scientific systems have also changed out of all recognition over the same period of time, but unlike religion, science is for most moderns the perfect shibboleth when dealing with what most regard as a pseudo-science. By contrast, conflict between the civil law and astrology, as in the case of conflict many other deeply held beliefs, counts for little; but since politicians no longer forbid it, that is of no consequence. Even attitudes to psychological inconstancy have changed

[43] Farmer, *Syncretism in the West* (as in n. 21), pp. 59-73, gives a masterly analysis of these and other strategies of syncretism adopted by Pico in various places.

over time: what was once a sign of weakness may now be viewed with sympathy, even – for reasons just given – as a strength. It should by now be obvious that, in view of the different temporal characters of our various "inconsistencies", they should be clearly differentiated in historical writing about them.

THE METAPHYSICAL UNITY OF MUSIC, MOTION, AND TIME IN AUGUSTINE'S *DE MUSICA*

Stephen Gersh*

Few scholars would challenge the general thesis that musical thinking is central to Augustine's philosophical and religious project. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that the exploitation of musical paradigms and the employment of musical methods remain idiomatic within Augustine's thought from his earliest days as a rhetorician in Carthage, through the period of the sojourns in Rome and Milan, to his final period as bishop of Hippo. Some modern interpreters have suggested that there is an evolution in Augustine's approach to music from an earlier attitude, inspired by his study of the pagan Platonic and Pythagorean texts, in which a confidence in the cognitive value of the discipline is expressed, to a later position, influenced by the moral precepts learned through biblical study, which is marked by caution with respect to the art's deceptive pleasures.[1] This later position is thought to be implied in passages describing his response to the Church's hymns and canticles: for example, *Confessiones*, IX.6.14-7.25 where the sensuous process of singing and the inner truth of what is sung are contrasted, and *Confessiones*, X.23.49-50 where the fact that the sensuous process and the inner truth are now viewed as two opposing forces leads to his vacillation between prohibition and advocacy of musical performance.[2] But as a thinker in the Platonic tradition and perhaps the pre-eminent Latin representative of that tradition, Augustine always maintains a clear dis-

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[1] See H. M. Schueller, *The Idea of Music. An Introduction to Musical Aesthetics in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Kalamazoo, 1988), pp. 252-253 for an example of this approach. Showing some impatience with the church father, Schueller writes: "Consistency […] thy name was not Augustine". For a more balanced approach see E. Fubini, *The History of Musical Aesthetics*, transl. M. Hatwell (Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 63-72. R. J. O'Connell, *Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) is a good study of Augustinian aesthetics which includes a treatment of music.

[2] A cautious attitude towards music is also expressed at *De doctrina Christiana. 2*.17.26-28, ed. J. Martin, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [henceforth: CCSL] 32 (Turnhout, 1962). But in accordance with the general theory of the liberal arts worked out in this text, music seems to be treated here strictly as a semantic system relative to the exegesis of Scripture. The ontological implications of the discipline are therefore not at issue.

tinction between the practical application of music which is relative to sound and melody in the world of sense – this music being the exclusive topic of the passages mentioned – and the theoretical principles of the same discipline which are relative to number and ratios in the realm of intellect. It is the latter which persists as the real common denominator of Augustinian thought.[3]

In this paper, we shall attempt to summarise Augustine's philosophical theory of music with special reference to his great early treatise *De musica* in order to remove doubts not only with regard to its continuity but also its consistency.[4] The summary will be followed by some brief notes on the application of the musical paradigm in other Augustinian texts, and on the influence of that paradigm in medieval musical and philosophical theory.[5]

Augustine's *De musica* – the first part of a projected double treatise on rhythm and melody, itself to be complemented by treatments of the other liberal arts[6] – defines music as "the science of mensurating well" (*scientia bene modu-*

[3] For a useful collection of Augustinian passages relative to music in English translation, see J. McKinnon, *Music in Early Christian Literature* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 153-167.

[4] Augustine, *De musica*, ed. J.-P Migne, Patrologia Latina 32 (Paris, 1841), 1081-1194. For an excellent critical edition of the final book, see now M. Jacobsson, *Aurelius Augustinus, De musica liber VI. A Critical Edition with Translation and an Introduction* (Stockholm, 2002). For a complete English version, see *Augustine, On Music*, transl. R. Catesby Taliaferro, *The Fathers of the Church* 4 (Washington, 1947). One may also now profitably consult *Aurelio Agostino, Musica*, introd., transl., comm. M. Bettetini (Milano, 1997). For bibliography of scholarship on the text, see M. Bettetini, "Stato della questione e bibliografia ragionata sul dialogo *De musica* di Sant' Agostino (1940-1990)", *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 83 (1991), pp. 430-469. Among studies of Augustine's musical doctrine, F. Amerio, *Il 'De musica' di S. Agostino* (Torino, 1929) is perhaps the best of the older works. Recent studies include U. Pizzani and G. Milanese, *De musica di Agostino d'Ippona* (Palermo, 1990) and A. Keller, *Aurelius Augustinus und die Musik* (Würzburg, 1993).

[5] The interpretation of *De musica* was for some time plagued by doubts about the consistency of the work itself, an issue sometimes connected with the problem regarding the consistency of Augustine's attitude to music in general mentioned above. The perceived difficulty arises from the fact that book VI begins with a preface where the writer seemingly tries to appeal to a theological audience while distancing himself from the preoccupation with the liberal arts in the earlier books. It was therefore suggested (by H. Edelstein and others) that books I and VI represented a different composition and contained a doctrine different from that of books II-V. However, the consensus among modern scholars (based on the proposal of H.-I. Marrou) is that Augustine himself produced a revised edition of *De musica* and wrote the additional preface at that point, the existence of the preface therefore not representing any denial of the conceptual unity of the original composition. For a detailed summary and appraisal of this controversy, see Jacobsson, *Aurelius Augustinus* (as in n. 4), pp. x-xxviii.

[6] For the larger project of which *De musica* is a part – a complete study of rhythm and scales – see *Epistula* CI.3-4, ed. A. Goldbacher, Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [henceforth CSEL] 34/2 (Vienna, 1898) and *Retractationes* I.6 and I.11, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, CCSL (as in n. 2) 57 (Turnhout, 1994). The issue of the larger project is examined in detail by Jacobsson, *Aurelius Augustinus* (as in n. 4), pp. xiii-xiv.

landi).[7] The implications of this definition are unfolded in the pages which follow. Music as science is distinguished primarily as a theoretical study rather than as a practical activity.[8] More specifically it represents a study guided on the one hand by intellect rather than by sensation and on the other by reason rather than by authority or custom.[9] Music as science of mensurating implies a connection between music and "measure" (*modus*) together with the further associations between measure and time or motion.[10] Music as science of mensurating *well* also implies the connection between music and measure although here there is not only the associations between measure and time or motion but also that between measure and fittingness of occasion.[11] The most important part of the definition is undoubtedly the establishment of the connection between measure, time, and motion. This shows that the science is applicable not only to sounding but also to non-sounding phenomena: for example, the figures of choreography.

Augustine makes clear the relation between music and motion when he defines mensuration itself as "a certain skill in moving" (*movendi quaedam peritia*).[12] These motions can be determined according to varying lengthy periods of time such as one hour or two hours and to varying brief periods of time such as the short and long units of metrical feet.[13] Such motions can also be compared with one another as ratios.[14] It is important to note that *De musica* envisages not only corporeal motions – as probably implied in the above examples – but also incorporeal ones. Later in the text we read about the soul's motions or activities in general,[15] the motions imparted to body and of which, when imparted to the body, the soul is aware,[16] and the soul's motions or activities specifically in the case of memory.[17] These incorporeal motions are also determined according to longer or shorter periods of time and compared among themselves as ratios.[18]

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[7] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.2.2-I.4.5. As scholars have frequently noted in the past, the Latin term *modulari* is difficult to render in English – it having nothing to do with the notion of "modulating" i.e. moving from one tonality to another in modern music. Here, we shall employ the neologism "mensurating" in order to capture the important sense of measure in the original Latin term.

[8] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.4.6, I.4.8-I.6.12.

[9] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.1.1-II.2.2, II.7.14, II.11.21, III.3.5, V.5.9. On the epistemological questions associated with music in Augustine, see F. Hentschel, "Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft in Augustins 'De musica'", *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 57, pp. 189-200.

[10] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.2.2-3.

[11] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.3.4.

[12] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.2.3. Augustine adds that music is concerned with motion which is sought for itself.

[13] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.7.13-I.8.14. Cf. I.13.27.

[14] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.9.15ff.

[15] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.5.13, VI.13.42.

[16] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.5.11.

[17] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.8.22-VI.9.24, VI.11.32.

[18] See n. 21 below.

When Augustine talks about motions containing numbers which are found by "the measure of time" (*temporis mensura*), he makes clear that the relation between music and motion is inextricably connected with the relation between music and time through the notions of measurement and number.[19] In fact, time represents the numerical measurement of motion. The text of *De musica* most frequently refers to "times" (*tempora*) in the plural when the discussion is concerned with the basic units comprising metrical structures in general.[20] In this case, time is understood more in terms of its discreteness. However, the Augustinian text occasionally indicates "time" (*tempus*) in the singular: for example, in speaking of the earlier and later of the two components of a verse.[21] In this case, time is understood more in terms of its continuity. Just as motion arises within both the incorporeal and corporeal spheres, so does time as the numerical measurement of motion. As the writer explains, times can be found not only in sound, but also in sensation, in memory, and on higher psychic levels.[22] Moreover, there are certain judicial numbers which can measure greater or lesser periods of time.[23]

The relations between music and motion and between music and time underlie a division between what we shall term the "horizontal" and "vertical" analyses of music. The former is concerned with the articulations of the musical phenomenon into units of increasing complexity and the latter with articulation of that same phenomenon into a hierarchy of ontological levels.

The horizontal analysis of Augustine's *De musica* is developed through books I-V. Here, "number" (*numerus*) is employed as a generic term for all the measures whereby time relates to motion, being applied to numbers per se, to ratios, to feet, to rhythms, to metres, and to verses.[24]

In addition to the basic sense of number – which he expounds with special reference to the harmony among the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, to the articulatory function of the number 10, and to the relation between the first four numbers and the decad[25] – Augustine discusses the following items:

1. "Ratio" (*ratio*). This term is not formally defined. However, a classification is utilised in which pairs of numbers are divided into those related by a ratio and those not so related, within the former into those which are unequal and those which are equal, within the former into those based on aliquot parts and those not so based, and so on. According to Augustine, ratios underlie all the larger units.[26]

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[19] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.3.3. Cf. I.2.3, I.7.13-I.8.14, I.13.27. For the general question of the relation between music and time in Augustine see J. Guitton, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1959[3]), pp. 110-116.

[20] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.1.1, I.3.4.

[21] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), V.3.3.

[22] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.2.2.

[23] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.7.18. Cf. VI.17.57-58.

[24] Cf. Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.10.17 (ratios), III.1.2 (rhythm), III.2.3 (metre), etc.

[25] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.12.20-26.

[26] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.9.15-I.11.19, II.4.4, V.5.9.

2. "Foot" (*pes*). This is defined as a group of times embodying a ratio.[27]

3. "Rhythm" (*rhythmus*). This is defined as a sequence of definite feet.[28]

4. "Metre" (*metrum*). This is defined as a sequence of definite feet with a measure of continuance and a definite ending.[29]

5. "Verse" (*versus*). This is defined as a sequence of definite feet with a measure of continuance, a definite ending, and a division into two segments.[30]

Although these five terms represent units of increasing complexity, in order to understand the relation between micro-structure and macro-structure – a fundamental aspect of Augustinian aesthetics – we must supplement these terms with additional criteria drawn from the text. In fact the macro-structure is revealed in four ways. First, there are the processes of marking larger time-units: the duality of arsis and thesis which assures the integrity of rhythm, the line-division resulting from the insertion of a final foot which determines the metre, and the duality of non-convertible preceding and subsequent segments which guarantees the integrity of verse.[31] Secondly, there is the practice of substitution.[32] The fact that metrical unit *A* can replace metrical unit *B* results from the presence of a macro-structure *C* which contains both of them. Third, there is the analogical relation between two of the processes marking larger time-units: the duality of arsis and thesis assuring the integrity of rhythm and the duality of non-convertible preceding and subsequent segments guaranteeing the integrity of verse.[33] Finally, there is the function of silence.[34] That silence can replace sound results from the fact that there exists a macro-structure which can be realised as either of these alternatives. The presence of macro-structural elements is of great philosophical importance. This is because the relation between the micro-structure and the macro-structure – often manifested as a tension or ambiguity – shifts the focus from the cognitive to the interpretive. In several passages, Augustine himself refers to such interpretative questions.[35] But unfortunately, his particular model of rationalism stands in the way of their exploration. Despite the programme of explaining musical phenomena strictly in terms of theoretical-rational rather than practical-authoritative criteria, he ultimately

[27] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.4.4, II.5.7, II.6.10 deal with the structure of feet; *ibid.*, II.7.14, II.9.16, II.11.21, II.13.24 deal with combinations of feet.

[28] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), III.1.2-III.2.4.

[29] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), III.1.2-III.2.4, IV.1.1ff.

[30] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), III.1.2-III.2.4, V.2.2-V.3.4, V.4.7ff.

[31] For 'arsis' (*levatio*) and 'thesis' (*positio*) see *ibid.*, II.10.18, II.11.20, III.4.8. These terms differ from the five listed above in representing accent rather than time. For insertion of the final foot see n. 23. For duality of preceding and subsequent segments see n. 30.

[32] See Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), IV.16.31ff., V.7.14, V.9.18.

[33] Augustine himself does not mention the analogy although it is perfectly apparent to his reader.

[34] See Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), III.7.16ff. Cf. *ibid.*, VI.3.4, VI.10.27.

[35] See Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), III.3.6-III.4.8.

fuses the realm of ambiguity with the realm of the sensory with a view to transcending both in the usual Platonic manner.[36]

Augustine's discussions so far have been concerned with time – and the motion relating to it – rather that with space. However, towards the end of book VI a distinction is made between the temporal and the spatial realms.[37] According to this argument, temporal numbers of soul are superior to and causative of spatial numbers of body, the former being associated with motion and the latter not associated with motion. Obviously, this restricts the discussion of the bodily to non-moving things like earth, leaving out of the reckoning bodily and moving things like fire. Considered more broadly, temporal numbers of soul would be superior to and causative of temporal and spatial numbers of body, the former being associated with motion and the latter both associated with and not associated with body.[38]

However, the simple attribution of time, number, and motion to soul and of space, number and non-motion to body evades a difficulty: that, since number itself implies a certain spatiality as measure, space must be assigned in some sense to both soul and body. Augustine's language reveals the true situation when he refers – naturally in the prevailing context of psychic motions – to the "dimensions of times" (*dimensiones temporum*) which constitute the subject-matter of music,[39] the "identity of space within time" (*idem spatium…in tempore*) permitting the combination of different metrical feet,[40] and the "space of time" (*spatium temporis*) which is evaluated by the judicial numbers.[41] Clearly there is an analogical relation between this psychic space which measures time and physical space. As Augustine explains, the diffusion of psychic "light" from the memory enables us to comprehend temporal extensions, just as the diffusion of physical light from the eye allows us to grasp spatial extensions: indeed memory "is a kind of 'light' of temporal spaces" (*quasi lumen est temporalium spatiorum*).[42]

The analogy between time and space which permits the transfer of certain attributes from the latter to the former is pursued further in another passage of book VI. Here, we learn that in relation to the time and space of soul and in relation to the time and space of body there is a proportion between the individual and the universe. Moreover, there is an analogy between the relativity within

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[36] See Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.10.28, VI.12.34-35.

[37] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.17.57-58.

[38] Augustine's geometrical discussion of space – which is in some respects the counterpart of his musical discussion of time – can be found in *De quantitate animae*. See especially *De quantitate animae* 3.4-15.25, ed. W. Hörmann, CSEL (as in n. 6) 89 (Vienna, 1986).

[39] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.3.4. Cf. I.1.1, I.7.13-I.8.14, II.3.3.

[40] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.11.20.

[41] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.9.23. Cf. VI.10.27 – VI.11.29. On this question see the recent study of U. Störmer-Caysa, *Augustins philologischer Zeitbegriff. Ein Vorschlag zum Verständnis der 'distentio animae' im Lichte von 'De musica'* (Berlin, 1996).

[42] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.8.21.

time and space themselves. Nothing is large of itself in time or space but only in relation to something smaller, and again nothing is small of itself in time or space but only with respect to something larger.[43]

Augustine's *De musica* also includes a vertical analysis of music. This is concentrated in book VI and can be divided into two parts. First, consideration of the hierarchy of levels of number and secondly, consideration of the interrelations between these levels of number. On the lower levels, at least, "number" (*numerus*) maintains the earlier sense.[44]

At least six levels of number are distinguished at some point in the text. Although the author emphasises that what names are chosen for these levels is a matter of relative unimportance, we find the levels in one summary labelled as: 1. "sounding" (*sonantes*), 2. "encountering" (*occursores*), 3. "progressive" (*progressores*), 4. "recollective" (*recordabiles*), and 5. "judicial" (*iudiciales*);[45] and in another listing – where a further level is added – as: 1. "corporeal" (*corporales*), 2. "encountering" (*occursores*), 3. "progressive" (*progressores*), 4. "recollective" (*recordabiles*), 5. "sensual" (*sensuales*), and 6. "judicial" (*iudiciales*).[46] Level 1 is described as occurring in sound, level 2 as arising in the sense of the auditor, and level 3 as occurring in the act of pronunciation.[47] Although level 4 and level 6 are associated with memory and reason respectively while level 5 has some unspecified position in between,[48] the status of these higher types of number can be further clarified by considering the relation between the entire hierarchy and three dichotomies specified by Augustine. Thus according to the dichotomy of bodily and psychic, level 1 is bodily while levels 2-6 are psychic in nature;[49] according to the dichotomy of sensory and rational, levels 1-5 are sensory while level 6 is rational in character;[50] and according to the dichotomy of mortal and immortal, levels 1-4 are mortal while level 5 is either mortal or immortal in nature.[51] One or two passages suggest the existence of even higher levels of number. For example, there are "intellectual" (*intellectuales*) numbers[52] and "divine" (*divini*) numbers.[53]

Augustine has much to say concerning the interrelations within the hierarchy of numbers. In one passage, he explains that sounding numbers can exist without encountering numbers but that encountering numbers cannot exist without sounding numbers.[54] However, that progressive numbers can exist

[43] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.7.19.
[44] See n. 24 above.
[45] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.6.16.
[46] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.9.24.
[47] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.2.2. Cf. VI.3.4-VI.4.7.
[48] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.11.31.
[49] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.4.7-VI.5.9, VI.5.13, VI.13.38-40.
[50] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.9.23-24, VI.10.26, VI.17.57. Cf. I.13.27.
[51] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.7.17, VI.11.29, VI.12.34-35, VI.13.40, VI.14. 47-48, VI.17.58.
[52] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.17.58.
[53] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.4.7.
[54] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.2.3.

without encountering and without recollective numbers is shown by the silent articulation of verse and the unconscious rhythm of breathing.[55] In another passage, he argues that judicial numbers are applied to encountering numbers only in conjunction with the recollective and that judicial numbers are applied to the recollective always in conjunction with the progressive.[56] However, that judicial numbers can be applied to progressive numbers without the intervention of other numbers is shown by the automatism of walking with equal steps.[57] It is undoubtedly the problem of explaining the relation between body and soul which motivates much of this. Since the Augustinian doctrine that the bodily cannot affect the psychic – because of their respective positions within the ontological hierarchy – is inconsistent with the obvious mechanism of sense-perception, it is necessary to argue that the soul is affected not by the bodily but by what the psychic imparts to the bodily.[58] The result is the famous active theory of sensation which is prominent in *De musica* and certain other works.[59]

Not only with respect to the general definition of music but also in the specific contexts of its horizontal and vertical analysis, we find that the course of argument has been strongly influenced by the presence of certain further metaphysical assumptions derived from the Neoplatonic background. The twofold emanative schema of "procession" (*progressus, progredi*) and "reversion" (*reditus, reversio*) can be read between the lines of Augustine's definition of music itself when he describes the science as somehow proceeding from the innermost recesses down to our senses and when he speaks of the infinite motion which achieves limit in the ratios[60] and of the infinite number which achieves limit in the articulations.[61] The threefold Trinitarian schema of "unity" (*unum*), "equality" (*aequalitas*), and "order" (*ordo*) moves from a peripheral position in books I-V to a central position in book VI where it emerges as the divine foundation not only of temporal and higher numbers but also of spatial and lower numbers.[62] Turning to the horizontal analysis of music, we find that it is with the maximum number of 4 time-units that the progression of feet reaches its point of return,[63] and that the relation between rhythm and metre themselves corresponds to the relation between "rolling forward" (*provolutio*) and a "distinct end" (*insignis finis*).[64] The employment of the emanative schema is complemented by that of the Trinitarian schema. Thus, the sequences of time-units

[55] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.3.4.
[56] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.8.21, VI.8.22.
[57] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.8.20.
[58] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.5.13. For the doctrine that soul cannot be passive in relation to body see *ibid*., VI.5.9-12. Augustine elsewhere argues that soul can become somehow subject to body because of sin. See *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.4.7.
[59] On this doctrine, see M. A. I. Gannon, "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine", *New Scholasticism* 30 (1956), pp. 154-180.
[60] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.7.13-13.28.
[61] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.11.19, I.12.26.
[62] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.17.56.
[63] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.4.4-5, III.5.11-13. Cf. III.1.1.
[64] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), III.1.2. Cf. V.4.5.

within feet are governed by the principle of unity,[65] the hierarchies among numbers and ratios and the division of the verse into two non-convertible segments by the principle of equality.[66] In the case of the vertical analysis of music, we find several references to the contrasting moments of the soul's turning towards body and turning towards God which correspond to the contrasting aspects of the numbers' infinity and limit – the emanationist schema[67] – and also some references to the divine foundation of both the temporal and the spatial numbers mentioned earlier – the Trinitarian schema.[68]

The relations between music, motion, and time on which the horizontal and vertical analyses of music in Augustine's *De musica* depend also figure quite extensively in his other texts. The dialogue *De ordine* is a case in point. Here, the notion of "order" (*ordo)* is simultaneously the rational sequence of cosmic events, the pedagogical sequence of the liberal arts, and the rational sequence of moral choices[69] – all these representing a kind of complex emanation which is in a mysterious way both contained within and subsequent to the divine nature.[70] Most significantly, this notion of order is introduced into the discussion as a whole by Augustine's auditory experience during a sleepless night at Cassiciacum of a rhythmic progression: namely, the intermittent sequence of drips and silences produced in a nearby water course.[71] In other words, Augustine is employing music as a kind of cosmic analogy. It is perhaps now worth looking at several illustrations of this philosophical theory of music extrapolated to the macrocosmic dimension in somewhat greater detail.

As an instance of a musical structure involving temporal[72] units but not a difference of ratios, we may consider Augustine's interpretation of the six days of creation in *De Genesi ad litteram*. If we read this discussion in light of the theories summarised above, the biblical narrative in the opening verses of *Genesis* is a horizontal musical structure comprising 6 units marked by the presence of the word "day" each of which is potentially subdivided into 4 units marked by the presence of the words "And God said 'Let there be'", "And God

[65] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.5.7, II.6.10.

[66] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.10.19; V.4.7-V.5.9; V.7.13.

[67] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.5.13, VI.11.29, VI.11.33, VI.12.36-VI.13.42.

[68] See n. 62 above.

[69] Augustine, *De ordine* I.1.1-II.7.23 (order of providence), ed. W. M. Green, CCSL (as in n. 2) 29 (Turnhout, 1970), II.9.26ff. (order of liberal arts), II.8.24-25 (order of moral choices). In fact, the situation is even more complex since 1. order is equivalent to "reason" (*ratio)* – which at this point in Augustine's career forms the third member of a triad: unity, intellect, order which is ambivalently Neoplatonic and Trinitarian –; 2. order is also exemplified in the unfolding of the dialogue itself. On such questions, see J. Rief, *Der Ordobegriff des jungen Augustinus* (Paderborn, 1962) and W. Hübner, "Der 'ordo' der Realien in Augustins Frühdialog 'De ordine'", in *Revue des études augustiniennes* 33 (1987), pp. 23-48.

[70] This problem is raised at Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.1.1-3.

[71] Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.2.6-13.

[72] In this illustration, what is temporal is the verbal expression. The reality expressed is either atemporal or quasi-temporal.

made", "And so it was made", and "And God saw that it was good".[73] The distinction between macro-structure and micro-structure is combined with the notion of non-convertible preceding and subsequent segments, as indicated by the meanings extracted from the placing of the word "earth" before the word "spirit" and the words "it was good" before the words "divided the light from the darkness" on day 1 and the placing of the word "earth" before the word "stars" on days 3 and 4 respectively.[74] The distinction between macro-structure and microstructure is also combined with the notion of a contrast of sound and silence, as indicated by the meanings extracted from the absence of the words "And God made" on day 1, of the words "And God saw that it was good" on day 2, of the words "And so it was made" and "And God saw that it was good" on day 6, and so forth.[75] All these structural features are typical of the horizontal analysis in *De musica*. But the biblical account also implies the latter's vertical analysis. Thus, the signifying words "day", "And God said 'Let there be'", "And God made", "And so it was made", and "And God saw that it was good" would correspond to sounding numbers regulated by all the higher levels up to judicial numbers, while the things signified by those words – the angelic substance, the creation of the angelic substance, the creation of other things in the angelic contemplation itself, in the angelic contemplation of other things' corporeal forms without reference to God, and in the angelic contemplation of their corporeal forms with reference to God respectively – would correspond to intellectual numbers which rank above judicial numbers.[76] Finally, the number 6 which can govern the entire process of divine creation because it is perfect as the sum of its divisors must correspond to a divine number ranking above judicial numbers.

As a further instance of a musical structure involving temporal[77] units but not a difference of ratios, we may consider the analogy between the composer's relation to his song and God's relation to the created which is a persistent theme running especially through such polemical works as *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, *De Genesi liber imperfectus*, *Contra epistulam Manichaei quem vocant fundamenti*, *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum*, *De natura boni*, *Epistula* CLXVI, and *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*[78] According to the

[73] The four phrases are (in the Latin of Augustine's Bible): 1. *Et dixit Deus, Fiat*, 2. *Et fecit Deus*, 3. *Et sic est factum*, 4. *Et vidit Deus quia bonum est*. See Augustine: *De Genesi ad litteram* II.6.14-18.16, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL (as in n. 6) 28/1 (Vienna, 1894) for a summary of the four phases.

[74] See Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), I.7.13-8.14 and I.15.30-17.35. Cf. II.13.26-27.

[75] See Augustine, *De musica* (as in n. 4), II.6.14-8. 16 and III.8.31-32.

[76] For the intellectual numbers which constitute a seventh level of number, see, p. 8.

[77] In this illustration, both the verbal expression (the analogiser) and the reality expressed (the analogised) are temporal.

[78] The exact references are: *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I.21.32, ed. D. Weber, CSEL (as in n. 6), 91 (Vienna, 1998), *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber* 5, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL (as in n. 6), 28/1 (Vienna, 1894), *Contra epistulam Manichaei quem vocant fundamenti* 41, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL (as in n. 6) 25/1 (Vienna, 1891) *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum* 15, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL (as in n. 6) 25/2 (Vienna, 1892), *De Natura*

Augustine of such texts, the sequence of syllables and silences constituting the vocal utterance and the sequence of birth and decay characterising the temporal world imply similar horizontal musical structures. Here, a distinction between macro-structure and micro-structure is combined with the notion of contrasts of sound and silence and of generation and destruction, for just as the individual syllables which pass into silence contribute to the beauty of the entire song, so the individual things which pass into non-being enhance the perfection of the universe. The sequence of syllables and silences constituting the vocal utterance and the sequence of birth and decay characterising the temporal world also imply similar vertical musical structures. Here, the distinction between macro-structure and micro-structure is combined with the notion of a relation between the enunciated syllable which may be temporally lengthened or shortened and the atemporal measure in the composer's mind and between the temporally shorter or longer life of the nascent thing and the atemporal measure in God's mind. The relation between the enunciated syllable and the measure in the composer's mind would undoubtedly correspond to the association between numbers of levels 1-5 and the judicial numbers, and the relation between the nascent thing and the measure in God's mind to the association between numbers of levels 1-6 and the divine numbers.

There is among Augustine's writings perhaps one instance of a musical structure involving difference of ratios but not temporal units – the reverse of the examples considered above – within an important theological argument in *De trinitate*.[79] The author has here been demonstrating that there are two "deaths" of man: the spiritual death of wickedness in the soul and the physical death as punishment for that wickedness in the body, but that Christ's one death has brought us salvation for both. At this point he introduces the parallel of what the Greeks call "harmony" (ἁρμονία). Thus, the consonance of higher and lower notes produced by the ratio of 2:1 – something from which any departure offends both the musical discipline itself and the untutored sense of hearing – demonstrates the power of the relation between the double and the single in general. By inviting his reader to test this statement with the instrument known as the monochord, Augustine is introducing here almost uniquely an illustration from the field of melody to complement his usual examples from the field of rhythm.[80]

These texts provide sufficient evidence that the exploitation of musical paradigms and the employment of musical methods remain central to Augustine's philosophical and religious project, and that the particular relations

Boni 8 and 16, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL (as in n. 6) 25/2 (Vienna, 1892) *Epistula* 166, CSEL (as in n. 6) 34/2, and *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* I.6.8, ed. K. D. Daur, CCSL (as in n. 2) 49 (Turnhout, 1985). For a fuller discussion of these passages, see S. Gersh, *Concord in Discourse. Harmonics and Semiotics in Late Classical and Early Medieval Platonism* (Berlin, 1998), pp. 34-40.

[79] Augustine, *De trinitate* IV.2.4, ed. W. J. Mountain and F. Glorie, CCSL (as in n. 2) 50-50A (Turnhout, 1968).

[80] Presumably such things would have been discussed by Augustine if he had continued with the *De musica* project. See above n. 6.

between music, motion, and time established by *De musica* underlie the application of such paradigms and methods. Obviously, we are not suggesting here that every detail of the musical discipline analysed in Augustine's early technical treatise can be read into the philosophical and theological arguments of other works. Nevertheless close inspection of works like *De Genesi ad litteram* and *De trinitate* shows that the notions of musical *concordia* and divine providence maintain indissoluble albeit sometimes subliminal links with one another.

The intellectual attractiveness of such a unified conception represents one half of the explanation of *De musica*'s influence on medieval and Renaissance thought. The other half of that explanation is represented by the peculiar nature of the literary tradition of which *De musica* is a founding member. It is generally understood by modern scholars that most medieval pedagogy before the period of the universities (beginning in the thirteenth century) and some pedagogy after that period is dominated first, by the notion of a corpus of liberal arts which serves as the necessary preliminary for the reading of scripture – Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*, together with works influenced by the latter like Cassiodorus' *Institutiones* and Isidore of Seville's *Etymologiae*, had established this model –; secondly, by the idea that the liberal arts could be arranged into a set of three verbal arts comprising grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (the *Trivium*) and a set of four real arts comprising arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy (the *Quadrivium*), and that this ratio between 3 and 4 was harmonically significant – a point established by the popular albeit pagan textbook of Martianus Capella entitled *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* –; and thirdly, by the idea that the corpus of the liberal arts in general or at least significant parts of it corresponded to the discipline called "philosophy" (*philosophia*) in the ancient sources. Given that it codified one of the liberal arts, explained the harmonic structure of the corpus itself, and exemplified the ancient philosophy, Augustine's *De musica* could not fail to play a central role in medieval thought.

Because of its position within the literary tradition described, we may look for influences of the Augustinian treatise both within what we would term musical theory and within what we would call philosophy proper.[81] A few examples will illustrate this.

Within the sphere of musical theory, Augustine's definition of music as "the science of mensurating well" is repeated and amplified in countless discussions of the discipline from Aurelian of Réôme's *Musica disciplina*[82] in the ninth,

[81] Important indices of the influence of Augustine's *De musica* during the Middle Ages are references to the work in catalogues of medieval libraries and the existence of manuscripts. For a brief but careful summary of the tradition, see M. Bernhard, *Rezeption des antiken Fachs im Mittelalter* (= *Geschichte der Musiktheorie, Band 3*) (Darmstadt, 1990), pp. 14-18. For more detail see the unpublished dissertation of P. le Boeuf, *La tradition manuscrite du 'De musica' de Saint Augustin et son influence sur la pensée et l'esthéthique médiévale* (Paris, 1986).

[82] Aurelian, *Musica disciplina*, ed. Lawrence Gushee (American Institute of Musicology, 1975), 2.

through the anonymous *Musica enchiriadis*[83] and Remigius of Auxerre's *Commentary on Martianus Capella's De nuptiis*[84] in the ninth and tenth, to Berno of Reichenau's *Prologus in tonarium*[85]in the eleventh century. However, one should probably concede that during the early medieval period Augustine is mostly cited as an ecclesiastical authority able to confer legitimacy on the discipline of music, whereas in the strictly technical sphere the influence of Boethius' *De institutione musica* with its discussion of scales tends to predominate over that of Augustine's *De musica* with its concentration on rhythm. Everything changes when Walter Odington's *Summa de speculatione musicae* in the thirteenth century associates the enormous advances in the development of the so-called "modal rhythm" which had taken place in the century before his own time with the rhythmical and metrical system explained in Augustine's treatise.[86] Here, there is a controversy among musicologists. Did the great composers of the Notre Dame School of polyphony in the late twelfth century themselves derive their rhythmic theory from Augustine or else did the writer Odington associate a practice which had been derived from other sources or found empirically by Léonin and Pérotin with the earlier authority in order to provide further intellectual justification?[87] From our viewpoint, at least, this interesting scholarly dispute does not have to be resolved. The evidence provided by Odington, together with other material in theorists like John of Garland and the so-called "Anonymous IV", is sufficient to prove that Augustine's *De musica* was being studied carefully in professional musical circles at least by the late thirteenth century.

Within the sphere of philosophy, it is Augustine's vertical analysis of music which is especially influential. Thus, three passages in Iohannes Scottus Eriugena's treatise *Periphyseon* repeat and develop the doctrine concerning the various levels of number in *De musica* VI by combining it with the teaching regarding the human soul in Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine*, the immediate pretext for the combination of authorities being the latter's statement that the soul's employment of the body for perception is analogous with a musician's performance on his instrument.[88] In the first two passages, Eriugena explains

[83] *Musica et scolica enchiriadis*, ed. H. Schmid (München, 1981), 60.1ff.

[84] Remigius, *Commentum in Martianum Capellam*, ed. C. E. Lutz (Leiden, 1962-1965), IX.

[85] Berno, *Prologus in tonarium.* The modern edition is: A. Rausch, *Die Musiktraktate des Abtes Bern von Reichenau* (Tutzing, 1999).

[86] Walter Odington, *De speculatione musicae*. The modern edition is F. F. Hammond: *Walter Odington, Summa de speculatione musicae* (American Institute of Musicology, n.p., 1970).

[87] For this discussion see W. G. Waite, *The Rhythm of Twelfth-Century Polyphony. Its Theory and Practice* (New Haven, 1954), pp. 13-55. Waite advocates the derivation of the twelfth-century modal system from the ancient metrical system described by Augustine. The notion of such a derivation was attacked by W. Apel, *The Notation of Polyphonic Music 900-1600* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 222.

[88] For more detailed analysis of this material see Gersh, *Concord in Discourse* (as in n. 78), pp. 97-103.

the mechanism of the five senses by establishing an eightfold hierarchy of corporeal, sensory, encountering, progressive, recalling, rational, intellectual, and divine numbers among which the first two levels are declared to be below the soul, the next five within the soul, and the last above the soul; by comparing the functional relations between these different numbers in the soul to the functional relations between the various officials of a city-state;[89] and by arguing in response to a question about the status of man as the image of God that the human soul is present as a whole in each of the successive levels of number.[90] The third passage deals with a different topic, the authority of Augustine being invoked in a rather loose paraphrase. Here, it is argued that the "number of places and times" (*numerus* […] *locorum et temporum*) precedes all things, because number represents measure, and created things are subsequent to the measure by which they are created.[91]

This reworking of Augustine's vertical analysis of music seems to have exercised some influence. For example, there are glosses on *De musica* in a Bamberg manuscript datable to the eleventh century which deal extensively with the material in book VI and combine significant departures from the original Augustinian text in the style of Eriugena's metaphysical elaborations with more obvious retreats to the letter and spirit of the original.[92] Thus on the one hand, the glossator places special emphasis on the role of the rational and intellectual numbers within the hierarchy,[93] on the relation between the numbers and the divine image in the human soul,[94] and on the priority of number to space and time[95] along the lines of the corresponding arguments in *Periphyseon*. On the other hand, he reduces the eight levels of number advocated in the latter text to five in order to remain within the discursive framework of the glossed text,[96] and indeed further reduces those five levels to four so that Augustine's original notion of the progressive numbers as arising in pronunciation might re-emerge from metaphysical extrapolations.[97]

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[89] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, III.730C-732A, ed. É. Jeauneau, CCSL (as in n. 2) 161-165 (Turnhout, 1996-2003)

[90] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, IV.786C-787C.

[91] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, I.482B-C. The reference here is probably to Augustine: *De musica* (as in n. 4), VI.17.58.

[92] MS *Bamberg Staatsbibliothek, Class. 36*. An edition of the text (*In Augustini De musica*) can be found in Patrick le Boeuff, "Un commentaire d'inspiration érigénienne du 'De musica' de saint Augustin", in *Recherches augustiniennes* 22 (1987), pp. 243-316.

[93] Anonymous, *In Augustini De musica* (as in n. 92), VI.155, ll. 340-343.

[94] Anonymous, *In Augustini De musica* (as in n. 92), ll. 160-168, 411-419.

[95] Anonymous, *In Augustini De musica* (as in n. 92), ll. 12-20.

[96] Anonymous, *In Augustini De musica* (as in n. 92), ll. 251-256, 319-326, 444-455.

[97] Anonymous, *In Augustini De musica* (as in n. 92), ll. 332-347.

WORLD WITHOUT END
NICHOLAS OF CUSA'S VIEW OF TIME AND ETERNITY

Matthieu van der Meer*

In his preface to the first printed edition of Apuleius' works, Giovanni Andrea Bussi, librarian of the Vatican Library, praised his former patron Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) as a connoisseur, not only of authors from ancient times, but also from the *media tempestas*.[1] Until recently, Bussi's remark was considered to be the first witness of Renaissance self-awareness.[2] No doubt, many authors (e.g. Petrarch, Salutati, Bruni) at that time were striving for the realisation of a new concept of man in which human dependence on God (*oratio*) and independence through man's own rational powers (*ratio*) were united.[3] Subsequently, the study of what it means to be human, the *studia humanitatis*, changed the traditional curricula and opened new intellectual horizons.

Even if Bussi's phrase *media tempestas* is less new than it has been presumed to be, it characterises Nicholas of Cusa as a figure at the crossroads of the middle ages and the age of humanism.[4] Ever since the renewed interest in

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[1] M. Miglio, *Giovanni Andrea Bussi. Prefazioni alle edizioni di Sweynheym e Pannartz* (Milan, 1978), p. 17: "Vir ipse, quod rarum est in Germanis, supra opinionem eloquens et latinus, historias idem omnes non priscas modo, sed mediae tempestatis, tum veteres, tum recentiores usque ad nostra tempora, memoria, retinebat".

[2] T. Ricklin, "Giovanni Andrea Bussi und die *media tempestas* oder was die Geschichte von einem Esel lehrt", in *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (2004), pp. 5-47.

[3] P. R. Blum, "Humanismus", in *Enzyklopädie Philosophie*, ed. H. J. Sandkühler (Hamburg, 1999), pp. 266-270, at p. 267.

[4] Works by Nicholas of Cusa are cited from *Nicolai de Cusa opera omnia iussu et auctoritate academiae litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita* (Leipzig, 1932-) [henceforth: h]: *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, h, vol. 2, ed. R. Klibansky (Leipzig, 1932); *Coniectura de ultimis diebus*, h, vol. 4, Opuscula I, ed. P. Wilpert (Hamburg, 1959); *De docta ignorantia*, h, vol. 1, ed. E. Hoffmann and R. Klibansky (Leipzig, 1932-); *De ludo globi*, h, vol. 9, ed. H.-G. Senger (Hamburg, 1998); *De venatione sapientiae*, h, vol. 12, ed. R. Klibansky and H.-G. Senger (Hamburg, 1982); *Sermones* CCIV-CCXVI, h, vol. 19, Sermones IV, fasciculus 1, ed. Kl. Reinhardt and W. Euler (Hamburg, 1996); *Trialogus de possest*, h, vol. 11/2, ed. R. Steiger (Hamburg, 1973). With regard to *De docta ignorantia*, I will first give the edition of Nikolaus von Kues, *Philosophisch-theologische Werke, Lateinisch-Deutsch*, Philosophische Biblio-

Cusanus at the beginning of the twentieth century,[5] it has been a question as to which of these realms Cusanus belongs and how meaningful the distinction between them is with regard to Cusanus.[6] These questions cannot be solved in this article, but Bussi's image of the Cardinal as connoisseur of ancient and medieval authors does justice to the way he appears to a modern reader in search for his ideas on the end of time. This topic, scarcely discussed in Cusanus-scholarship,[7] is especially relevant in the context of the question of the compatibility of classical philosophical ideas with Christian teaching, a question that is intrinsically connected with the term "Christian humanism".

In fifteenth-century Italy, the *studia humanitatis*, with its emphasis on the study of classical authors, had caused a renewed interest in the practical branches of philosophy: rhetoric, ethics, economics and politics. As a result, purely theoretical disciplines, especially in their scholastic form, lost interest and legitimacy. The study of classical authors also led to a controversy about the question of which philosopher was more compatible with Christianity: Plato or Aristotle. This dispute primarily took place among emigrés from Byzantium, but it also involved Nicholas of Cusa.[8]

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thek 264, (Hamburg, 1994-1999), which is based on the critical edition h, vol. 1, but is provided with paragraph numbers that lack in the 1932. Subsequently, the identical place in h, vol. 1, will be given.

[5] Even though Cusanus had never been "forgotten", the study of his philosophy received an important incentive through the publications of Pierre Duhem (1909) and Ernst Cassirer (1906). See K. Flasch, *Nikolaus Cusanus* (Munich, 2001), p. 149ff.

[6] See K. Flasch, *Nikolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer Entwicklung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), pp. 324-329 *et alibi*.

[7] The most important articles in which this topic is discussed are M. Weichenhan, "Spannungsvolle Endzeit. Überlegungen zur 'Coniectura de ultimis diebus' des Nicolaus Cusanus", in *Lebenstechnologie und Selbstverständnis*, ed. I. Hübner *et al.* (Münster, 2004), pp. 75-98; H.-G. Senger, "Das Zeit- und Ewigkeitsverständnis bei Nikolaus von Kues im Hinblick auf die Auferstehung der Toten", in *Unsterblichkeit und Eschatologie im Denken des Nikolaus von Kues*, ed. K. Kremer and K. Reinhardt, Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft [henceforth MFCG] 23 (Trier, 1996), pp. 139-157 and G. Santinello, "In welchem Sinne versteht Cusanus Charakter und wechselseitige Bezogenheit von Leib und Seele im Menschen? Wie versteht er den Tod?", ibid., pp. 3-20.

[8] The Platonist Georgios Gemistos Pletho (1360-1452) instigated a controvery over the question of which philosophical paradigm suits Christianity better: Platonism or Aristotelianism. Soon after the publication of *De differentiis Aristotelis et Platonis*, in which he showed his preference for Plato, Pletho was attacked by the Aristotle-scholars Georgios Scholarios and George of Trebizond. They accused him of integrating the ancient gods of the Greeks into his philosophy. See J. Monfasani, *George of Trebizond. A Biography and A Study of His Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden, 1974), pp. 201-229; C. H. Lohr, "Metaphysics", in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C. B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner and E. Kessler (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 535-638, at p. 559; P. Schulz, "Georgios Gemistos Plethon, Georgius Trapezuntios, Kardinal Bessarion. Die Kontroverse zwischen Platonikern und Aristotelikern im 15. Jahrhundert", in *Philosophen der Renaissance. Eine Einführung*, ed. P. R. Blum (Darmstadt, 1999), pp. 22-23, at p. 23. The dispute that fol-

A life-long friend of the Greek-born platonist Cardinal Bessarion, Cusanus borrowed from Platonic literature what he could use for his own Christian philosophy and was, unlike the famous George Gemistus Pletho, quite critical of the pagan elements in Plato and Proclus. This attitude is clearly expressed in his later work *De venatione sapientiae* (1463), where he disapproves of Proclus' idea that the Greek gods are to be considered as auxiliary deities of the unspeakable One.[9] In spite of his critical attitude to pagan Platonists, Cusanus promoted new translations of both Christian and non-Christian Platonic works. He commissioned, for instance, George of Trebizond to translate Plato's *Parmenides* and Pietro Balbi to translate Proclus' *Platonic Theology*.[10] Cusanus was not the only one who prompted scholars to translate Greek works into Latin. Another example is Pope Nicholas V (1397-1455), who enlisted George of Trebizond for his project to make the Greek classical and patristic heritage available in Latin.[11] In so doing, both Pope Nicholas and Cardinal Nicholas significantly stimulated the revival of Platonism in Italy.

Even though Cusanus is aware of the differences between his Christian philosophy and pagan Neoplatonic philosophy, we can discern a two-fold approach in Cusanus towards the theological doctrine of the end of time and Christ's last judgment. On the one hand, Cusanus engages in speculation on the date of this event and in reflection on its meaning. On the other hand we see that in his philosophical works, Cusanus rules out the possibility of the world having an end. We can even discern a development in this matter. Comparing his earlier work, *De docta ignorantia*, with his most important later work, *De venatione sapientiae*, we see remarkable shifts in Cusanus' metaphysics. First, whereas there is room for Christian ideas about the *eschata* in the early work, this theme is absent in the later work. Second, Christ is the metaphysical centre of the universe and the link between the finite and the infinite realms in *De docta ignorantia*. In *De venatione sapientiae*, however, Christ is mentioned only in the margin. Third, while stressing the eternal duration of the world in

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lowed "concerned less the respective merits of the two classical philosophers than it did the role of philosophy in theology" (Lohr, "Metaphysics", p. 561).

[9] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 21.62, lines 7-12: "Supervacuos igitur fecit Proclus labores in sex libris De theologia Platonis volens investigare ex coniecturis incertis deorum illorum aeternorum differentias et ordinem ad unum deum deorum, cum non sit nisi deus unus aeternus, qui ad omnia, propter quae ipse deos ponit, sufficientissimus est huius totius mundi administrator". For Nicholas of Cusa's general evaluation of Plato and Aristotle and for his position in the controversy around them in Quattrocento Italy, see H.-G. Senger, "Aristotelismus vs. Platonismus. Zur Konkurrenz von zwei Archetypen in der Philosophie im Spätmittelalter", in *Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter. Übersetzungen, Kommentare, Interpretationen*, ed. A. Zimmermann (Berlin, 1986), pp. 53-80.

[10] See I. Ruocco, *Il Platone latino. Il Parmenide: Giorgio di Trebisonda e il cardinale Cusano* (Florence, 2003), p. 13; H. D. Saffrey, "Pietro Balbi et la première traduction latine de la Théologie platonicienne de Proclus", in *Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata*, ed. P. Cockshaw (Ghent, 1980), pp. 425-437.

[11] Lohr, "Metaphysics" (as in n. 8), pp. 561-563.

the later work, Cusanus withdraws from his earlier, more daring ideas about the universe and ends with a view in line with tradition.

SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST

Before I examine these shifts, I shall give an outline of the way in which Cusanus treats the theme of duration or end of the world. There are two genres in which he writes about this. The first consists of his philosophical works. Among them, *De docta ignorantia* and *De venatione sapientiae* treat the question of time and duration of the world most extensively.[12] The second group consists of a short treatise and several sermons. Here, Cusanus makes calculations about the date of the end of the world. I shall start with giving an outline of the second group of works, followed by a discussion of their relationship to Cusanus' philosophical ideas about the world. The subsequent part of this article treats the philosophical approach.

The most important work in which Cusanus speculates about the last day is *Coniectura de ultimis diebus* (1446). Here, Cusanus distinguishes four equal epochs of 1700 years: from creation until the flood, from the flood until Moses' death, from there until God's incarnation in Christ, and, finally, from the resurrection until the year 1734. Cusanus expects in the *Coniectura* that Christ will come after this date. He surmises that the pilgrimage of the Church unfolds itself in agreement with the life of Christ, each year of whose life represents a jubilee or fifty years. Thus, the history of the Church will end 34 times 50 years after his death, which determines the year 1734 as end-date, *after* which Christ will return.[13] Similarly, in a note to the sermon *Iterum venturus est* (Sermo CCX, Dec. 7, 1455) he states on the basis of the book of the Apocalypse that "the beast" will reign for 42 "months". On the basis of the assumption that each day of the month equals a year in real time, it will take from 1455 another 400 years before the end will come.[14] In this case, the end-date will lie around the year 1855.

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[12] *De ludo globi*, written shortly before *De venatione sapientiae*, deals with these themes in a very similar way as *De venatione sapientiae.* See note 55.

[13] *Coniectura de ultimus diebus* (as in n. 4), 133, lines 9-13: "Et hoc erit post annum nativitatis 1700 ante annum 1734. Post illud autem tempus ascensio ecclesia futura est Christo sponso ad iudicium veniente. Sed quando veniet, nemo sciet. Erit enim ille adventus ita omnibus ante incognitus quoad temporis praecisionem, sicut adventus eius in mundum fuit in temporis praecisione omnibus ignotus". Cf. Senger, "Das Zeit- und Ewigkeitsverständnis" (as in n. 7), p. 146. Like in *Coniectura de ultimis diebus*, Cusanus surmises in *Sermo XXIII* (Jan. 1, 1444) that each year of Christ's life corresponds with 50 years in the history of the church.

[14] *Sermo CCX* (as in n. 4), 22, line 39: "Nota: Dicit Iohannes in Apocalypsi, quo modo bestia regnabit 42 mensibus, diem pro anno erunt anni 1260, et secundum hoc adhuc regnaturus esset quasi quadringentis annis". Cf. *Sermo CCXI* (as in n. 4), 17: "Venit igitur post quinque milia et fere ducentos; forte tantum durabit in medio annorum".

As mentioned before, Cusanus' philosophical reflections on the end of time not only seem to ignore the possibility of the end of time, but even seem to exclude this idea. In order to explain the differences between the *Coniectura* and sermons on the one hand and the philosophical work on the other, we must realise that Cusanus expressses in the *Coniectura* cautiousness about speculation about the future. Cusanus states that "almost everyone who has written so far about the order of times, has been deceived by faulty surmising".[15] Therefore, it is only with reluctance that he allows himself to indulge in this kind of thinking. Cusanus does not take his own speculations very seriously. The reason why he nevertheless speculates about the last day of the world, seems to me to be grounded in his philosophical concept of Christ. Christ is the divine and perfect model (*exemplar*), in whose image and likeness all beings are created. In the *Coniectura*, Cusanus for the first time relates human history to this structure of exemplar and image: the history of the church is an explication and image of Christ's life. However, the *Coniectura* remains only an exercise and was never followed up by a more serious account of human history, just as little as Cusanus integrated his church-political ideas of *De concordantia catholica* (1434) into his philosophical works from 1440 and later.

The note to sermon *Iterum venturus est* (CCX) is related to the prophet Mohammed, whom Cusanus identifies as the precursor of the Antichrist. At this time (1455), Cusanus was very much occupied by the question of the meaning of the success of Islam. Constantinople had fallen not long before (May 29, 1453). This occasioned him to write the works *De pace fidei* (September 1453) and *Cribratio Alchorani* (1460-1461). Sermon CCX is addressed to an audience that needs to be assured that, in spite of the successes of the Ottomans, the end of the world is not imminent.[16]

Cusanus developed and changed his ideas in the course of his lifetime. The last text in which he speculated about the date of the end of the world is this *Sermo* CCXI, which dates from December 1455. Cusanus may have ceased speculating about the question of the last day because his view on the duration of the world was increasingly influenced by other works than the Bible. As will be shown below, his philosophical ideas about the duration of the world replace biblical eschatological scenarios in the later work.

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[15] *Coniectura de ultimis diebus* (as in n. 4), 123, lines 7-14: "[...] debeatque nos sanctimonia vitae et litterarum intelligentia prorsus patrum comparatione carentes maxime a futurorum curiali inquisitione retrahere eo, quod paene omnes, qui hactenus aliquid de temporum ratione scripserunt, fallaci quadam coniectura decepti sunt, tamen semota arrogantia pia atque aedificatoria investigatione ex sanctis litteris futura conicere, inquantum nostrae peregrinationi consolatoriam affert refectionem, non arbitror reprehensibile".

[16] *Sermo CCX*, 20 (as in n. 14): "Ubi nota: Primam bestiam de aqua seu mari ascendentem posse Mahimmet intelligi, cuius nomen ex maiim, hoc est aqua, ortum est, et secundam bestiam esse antichristum, qui in specie agni et in verbo draconis veniet cum signis, ut ibidem. Dicit autem Iohannes in fine capituli 13 numerum nominis eius esse 666. Loquitur forte de prima bestia principali, scilicet Mahimmet, cuius imaginem facit secunda bestia adorare, qui in tot annis Arabum post Christum populum seduxit".

THE INCORRUPTIBLE COSMOS IN *DE DOCTA IGNORANTIA*

In the philosophical works, the end of time appears in the context of the question about the relationship between the finite (creation) and the infinite (God). His *magnum opus*, in which he for the first time extensively elaborates on this question is *De docta ignorantia* (1440). It consists of three books. In the first book, Cusanus presents his theory of knowledge of God: since God is infinite and human knowledge can only be based on finite things, ideas and insights, God cannot be understood by man. Cusanus calls this axiom "learned unknowing" (*docta ignorantia*). In the second book, he explains how the universe can, by approximation, be understood to be created by and related to God. The third book of *De docta ignorantia* describes Christ as the centre of the universe and goal of all finite being. In this third book the topic of the end of time appears in chapter 10, called "On the sentence of the judge", which deals with the resurrection and the final judgement. Having stated in the previous chapter that the devotion of the human spirit to Christ implies a virtuous life and the abandonment of this world, Cusanus presents the last judgement as an event that will take place beyond time, and therefore, beyond man's grasp.[17] The outcome of the judgement – glorification or damnation – is the result of the human spirit's success or failure in concentrating on the divine truth. If it fails, the spirit falls into the "chaos of confusion" where it suffers eternal pains. If it is successful, both the spirit and the resurrected, spiritualised body receive eternal joy.[18]

Cusanus regards the last judgement as a purely spiritual transformation, taking place after the separation of the spirit from the body. He does not consider it to take place at a moment at the end of time and history. If we look at an earlier chapter in the third book, we find a confirmation of this thesis. In chapter 8, the end of time is treated in a hypothetical way as part of an argument about the necessity of Christ as the one who will enable resurrection. Cusanus argues as follows: the Jews and Saracens confess that the messiah is a perfect, immortal man, but deny that he is God. They also believe in a general resurrection but do not believe that this can be realised through the mediation of this godly man. Now, suppose that the motion of generation and corruption stopped and that the whole circular mechanism of the cosmos were to stop. Then, if Christ – as the union of God and man – is the essential part of the universe, the universe would not exist any more after the motions of the celestial orbs have come to a halt. And if that were to happen, there would be no resurrection. Therefore Christ is

[17] *De docta ignorantia* 3.10.239, lines 3-7 (h [as in n. 4], p. 149, lines 11-17): "Neminem mortalium comprehendere iudicium illud ac eius iudicis sententiam manifestum est, quoniam, cum sit supra omne tempus et motum, non discussione comparativa vel praesumptiva ac prolatione vocali et signis talibus expeditur, quae moram et protractionem capiunt. Sed sicut in Verbo omnia creata sunt – quoniam dixit et facta sunt –, ita in eodem Verbo, quod et ratio dicitur, omnia iudicantur".

[18] *De docta ignorantia*, 3.10.241-243 (h [as in n. 4], p. 150, line 5 – p. 151, line 24).

necessary for the resurrection. He enables the resurrection, being the most perfect man and having conquered death in his resurrection from the dead.[19]

The resurrection and the last judgement require that the human spirit be imperishable. The nature of the spirit must therefore be without matter and not be subjected to time.

> The intellect is not temporal and mundane but is free of time and of the world. The senses are temporally subject to the motions of the world. With respect to the intellect, reason is on the horizon, so to speak; but with respect to the senses, it is at the zenith, as it were; thus, things that are within time and things that are beyond coincide in reason.[20]

The intellect has access to the realm in which the divine "events" of creation and incarnation take place. There, it can learn the meaning of these mysteries. After its release from the body, the intellect can pursue its way to understanding and perfection in a timeless process.[21]

The question of whether the universe as a whole can physically come to an end in time is treated in the second book of *De docta ignorantia.* There, Nicholas of Cusa expounds a view on the universe that has often been qualified as a significant step in the history of science, because of the fact that he leaves the traditional model of a closed universe behind and anticipates to some extent the revolution of Copernicus.[22] Recent scholarship has demonstrated, however, that Cusanus was neither original, nor that he had a significant influence on Copernicus.[23]

A key principle of Cusanus' metaphysics is that no created being is absolutely perfect. Therefore, the universe or the entirety of beings is imperfect and finite. It is nevertheless infinite in the sense that it has no boundaries. If it were to have them, it would be complete and perfect. Here, Cusanus aligns with the Aristotelian tradition of regarding an object as complete when its matter is shaped into the right form: the essence of a thing lies in its form. However, according to Nicholas, no created being has a perfect form nor does the universe

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[19] *De docta ignorantia* 3.8.230 (h [as in n. 4], p. 144, line 14 – p. 145, line 5).

[20] *De docta ignorantia*, 3.6.215 (h [as in n. 4], p. 136, lines 7-10): "Intellectus de tempore et mundo non est, sed absolutus ab hiis; sensus de mundo sub tempore motibus subiectus existit; ratio quasi in horizonte est quoad intellectum, sed in auge quoad sensum, ut in ipsa coincidant, quae sunt infra et supra tempus". J. Hopkins, transl., *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance. A Translation and Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia* (Minneapolis, 1990[2]), p. 138.

[21] *De docta ignorantia* 3.12.259, lines 1-8 (h [as in n. 4], p. 160, lines 16-22).

[22] Cf. A. Gierer, *Cusanus. Philosophie im Vorfeld moderner Naturwissenschaft* (Würzburg, 2002).

[23] The presumed novelty of Cusanus' cosmology has been relativised by F. Krafft, "Das kosmologische Weltbild des Nikolaus von Kues zwischen Antike und Moderne", in *Nikolaus von Kues 1401 – 2001*, ed. K. Kremer and K. Reinhardt, MFCG (as in note 7), 28 (Trier, 2003), pp. 249-289.

have one. If it had, it would have a centre, a circumference, a beginning and an end.[24]

Since the universe is imperfect and without a clear shape, Cusanus rejects the traditional concept of the universe as a closed system with celestial bodies that make perfect circles.[25] He states that the earth moves; it is not the fixed centre of the universe.[26] Moreover, he does not distinguish between the nature of the sun, the moon, the earth, the stars and other celestial bodies: they are all equally noble, but material stars. These stars are composed of the four main elements. They are not intellectual beings.[27]

The universe or *machina mundi* is so built that its centre is everywhere and its circumference is nowhere. Its true centre and circumference is God, the invisible metaphysical centre and circumference of the visible universe.[28] Being an expression of the divine mind, the universe cannot perish. It is built according to the principles of arithmetic, geometry and music.[29] However, if it is imperishable, is it also coeternal with God? Cusanus answers this question in a twofold way: if you look at the world from the perspective of God and as it is in God, then it is eternal. If you look at it as it is in itself, that is, as it is created by and different from God, then it is not eternal. "It falls short of eternity, as what is contracted [falls short] of what is absolute – the two being infinitely different".[30]

Cusanus uses two terms to explain the relationship – that essentially is not a relationship – between God and creation: *absolutum* and *contractum*. These terms require explanation because they are important for the comparison between *De docta ignorantia* and *De venatione sapientiae.* In the latter work, as we shall see, Cusanus uses a completely different set of terms for explaining the relationship between God and the world. "Contraction" is a term Cusanus

[24] *De docta ignorantia* 2.1.97 (h [as in n. 4], p. 64, line 14 – p. 65, line 6).

[25] *De docta ignorantia* 2.11.160, lines 5-13 (h [as in n. 4], p. 102, lines 19-26).

[26] *De docta ignorantia* 2.11.157, lines 1-7 (h [as in n. 4], p. 100, lines 15-20). This idea is different from cosmologies based on the earth-centred system developed by Ptolomy. Cusanus, however, was not the first to consider the earth as movable. As Senger has shown, this idea most likely came to Cusanus from the Paduan astronomer Prosdocimus de Beldomandis: see H.-G. Senger, *Die Philosophie des Nikolaus von Kues vor dem Jahre 1440* (Münster, 1971), p. 152. See also G. Federici Vescovini, "Cusanus und das wissenschaftliche Studium in Padua", in *Nicolaus Cusanus zwischen Deutschland und Italien. Beiträge eines deutsch-italienischen Symposiums in der Villa Vigoni*, ed. M. Thurner (Munich, 2002), pp. 93-113.

[27] *De docta ignorantia* 2.12.165-166 (h [as in n. 4], p. 105, line 9 – p. 106, line 11).

[28] *De docta ignorantia*, 2.12.162, lines 15-17 (h [as in n. 4], p. 103, line 21 – p. 104, line 3): "Unde erit machina mundi quasi habens undique centrum et nullibi circumferentiam, quoniam eius circumferentia et centrum est Deus, qui est undique et nullibi".

[29] *De docta ignorantia*, 2.13.175, lines 19-20 (h [as in n. 4], p. 111, line 3): "Ex quo evenit mundi machinam perire non posse".

[30] *De docta ignorantia*, 2.8.140, lines 6-8 (h [as in n. 4], p. 89, line 21): "[...] cadens ab ipsa, ut contractum ab absoluto, quae distant per infinitum". J. Hopkins, transl., *Nicholas of Cusa* (as in n. 20), p. 107.

uses to refer to the limited nature of every created being. "The absolute" refers to the opposite: God is "absolute", that is, completely detached from created beings and limitations. God is called the absolute greatest (*maximum absolutum*) as a reference to the fact that He, despite being completely different from created being, encompasses all beings, not as their sum, but as their origin and goal. He creates the world in such a way that he contracts ("shrinks") his plenitude of being (actuality) into his creation. Cusanus calls this process the contraction of God's infinite possibility into a limited possibility.[31] The first result of this act is the *maximum contractum*. This is the boundless universe in which all beings are included and – reversed –which is present in every individual being. The universe is called a *maximum* because it is the greatest thinkable unit that contains all that is. Since all beings in it are related to one another, they bear each other's features in either a close or a very remote way: everything is in everything (*quodlibet in quolibet*) thanks to the mediation of the universe.

As Cusanus was well aware, it is not very clear what he means with possibility:

> What is said about potency or possibility or matter needs to be qualified, in the foregoing manner, according to the rules of learned ignorance. How it is that possibility proceeds by steps to actuality, I leave to be dealt with in the book *Conjectures.*[32]

Cusanus does not elaborate these terms in *De docta ignorantia* because he is not sure about the exact definition of the term *possibilitas.* He states that God created all beings by imposing forms onto the prime matter. He regards "matter" in equal terms as the Aristotelian concept of *materia prima*, that is pure passive possibility, the abstract concept of the ability to change and to become realised. It is not clear, however, where this matter has its place: is it part of God or is it created? If it is part of God, how can God be considered to be without realisation? And if it is not part of God, how can there be something absolute – pure possibility – outside God, who is the only absolute being?[33]

The question of the definition of matter and possibility and of the relationship of matter and possibility to God engages Cusanus' attention during the rest

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[31] *De docta ignorantia*, 2.8.137 (h [as in n. 4], p. 88, lines 9-18): "Omnis igitur possibilitas contracta est; per actum autem contrahitur. Quare non reperitur pura possibilitas, penitus indeterminata per quemcumque actum; neque aptitudo possibilitatis potest esse infinita et absoluta, omni carens contractione. Deus enim, cum sit actus infinitus, non est nisi causa actus. Sed possibilitas essendi est contingenter. Si igitur possibilitas est absoluta, cui contingit? Contingit autem possibilitas per hoc, quod esse a primo non potest esse penitus et simpliciter et absolute actus. Quare contrahitur actus per possibilitatem, ut non sit absolute nisi in potentia; et potentia non est absolute, nisi per actum sit contracta".

[32] *De docta ignorantia*, 2.8.140, lines 1-8 (h [as in n. 4], p. 9, lines 16-21): "Hoc enim modo ea, quae de potentia aut possibilitate sive materia dicuntur, secundum regulas doctae ignorantiae limitari necesse est. Quomodo autem possibilitas ad actum gradatim progrediatur, libro De coniecturis tangendum relinquimus". Hopkins, transl., *Nicholas of Cusa* (as in n. 20), p. 81.

[33] *De docta ignorantia* 2.8.136-137 (h [as in n. 4], p. 87, line 21 – p. 88, line 18).

of his life and forms the most important source for his later philosophical reflections, especially in *De possest* (1460), *De venatione sapientiae* (1462/1463) and *De apice theoriae* (1463).[34] In the next part, we shall see how Cusanus solves this matter in *De venatione sapientiae.*

So far we have demonstrated that for Cusanus in *De docta ignorantia*, neither man nor the universe will stop existing after the dissolution of the spirit from the body in what could metaphorically be called the last day. Both of them will be transformed into an incorruptible state. The material world will be spiritualised and as such continue to exist, united with man, whose immortal soul will then continuously move closer to God. The death of the human body is therefore merely the dissolution of matter after its corruption: "For death seems to be nothing except a composite thing's being resolved into its components". [35]

In conclusion, we can say that for Cusanus, the notion of the end of time does not play a role in the metaphysical speculation on the universe. It does function in book three of *De docta ignorantia* in a hypothetical and metaphorical sense, but it is not reflected upon with regard to the nature of the universe.

ACT AND POTENCY IN DE VENATIONE SAPIENTIAE (1462-1463)

In his effort to determine the relationship between act and potency, Cusanus invents a new name for God, *possest.* With this name, Cusanus defines God as the One who unites absolute actuality (*actus purus*) and absolute potency, in the sense of the power to create. *Possest* is a combination of the infinitive *posse* and the third person singular from *esse*, and can be rendered in English as "the-possibility-to-be is" or, in Hopkins' translation, "actualised possibility".[36] With this name, first deployed in the book with the same title, *De possest* (1460), Cusanus intends to modify the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of God as pure

[34] For Cusanus' philosophy of potency, see A. Brüntrup, *Können und Sein. Der Zusammenhang der Spätschriften des Nikolaus von Kues* (Munich, 1973); P. Casarella, "Nicholas of Cusa and the Power of the Possible", *The American Catholic Philosophical Quaterly*, 64 (1990), pp. 7-34; S. Meier-Oeser, "Potentia vs. Possibilitas? Posse! Zur cusanischen Konzeption der Möglichkeit" in *Potentialität und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik*, ed. T. Buchheim, C. H. Kneepkens and K. Lorenz (Suttgart, 2001), pp. 237-253, and H. L. Bond, "The changing face of *posse*: Another look at Nicholas Cusanus' *De apice theoriae* (1464)", in *Nicholas of Cusa. A Medieval Thinker for the Modern Age*, ed. K. Yamaki (Richmond, 2002), pp. 35-46. See for prime matter in Aristotle: *Metaphysics* 7.1029 a 20.

[35] *De docta ignorantia*, 2.12.172, lines 18-19 (h [as in n. 4], p. 109, lines 5-6): "Mors enim nihil esse videtur nisi ut compositum ad componentia resolvatur". Hopkins, transl. (as in n. 20), p. 120. For a discussion of the possible ways to understand the dissolution mentioned by Cusanus in paragraph 173, see Senger, "Das Zeit- und Ewigkeitsverständnis" (as in n. 7), pp. 153-154.

[36] J. Hopkins, transl., *A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa* (Minneapolis, 1978). For the problems with the translation of *possest*, see Casarella, "Nicholas of Cusa and the Power of the Possible" (as in n. 34), p. 7.

actuality.[37] Different from the term *actus purus*, the name *possest* does not imply an opposition between act and potency, but it refers to the foundation upon which this opposition rests. In the name *possest* act and potency are opposites that coincide (*coincidentia oppositorum*).[38] *Possest* is the perfect realisation of its own possibilities. Therefore, it is a potency that is purely actual: *possest est actu omne posse*.[39] However, its actuality is not a static final point of a motion from possibility to actuality, but it is *posse*, which bears the connotation of both activity and of power that realises a possibility.[40] Determining God as *possest*, Cusanus intends to understand Him both as the coincidence of being (*est*) and potency (*posse*) *and* as the One who precedes this coincidence. In the created world, act and potency are different forms of being. Their distinctiveness permeates through the entire creation. In God, however, all oppositions are unified. In Him, each distinction has its foundation.[41]

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[37] Casarella notes about the relationship between act and potency ("Nicholas of Cusa and the Power of the Possible" [as in n. 34], p. 13): "In neither *De possest* nor *De apice theoriae* is the figure of the Cardinal asked by his interlocutors whether his positions represent a reversal of the traditional theory. It can nonetheless be argued that in the main Nicholas moves away from the contention that God's pure act is devoid of possibility. At the same time, one must assert that the formulation *possest* does advance an underdeveloped aspect of the Aristotelian tradition, namely, the admission of *potentia activa* in God". Detlev Pätzold argues that Cusanus holds on to the idea of God as *actus purus*, especially in *De venatione sapientia.* The source of being is the infinite *possest*, not the finite *posse fieri.* See D. Pätzold, *Einheit und Andersheit. Die Bedeutung kategorialer Neubildungen in der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus* (Cologne, 1981), p. 73. Casarella seems to agree with this, when he writes: "Even when he terminologically drifts away from the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of God's pure actuality, Cusanus is still in fundamental agreement with many aspects of the theory" (p. 20). See also W. Beierwaltes, *Identität und Differenz. Zum Prinzip cusanischen Denkens* (Opladen, 1977), p. 21.

[38] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 13.35, lines 5-10: "Est enim ante differentiam omnem: ante differentiam actus et potentiae, ante differentiam posse fieri et posse facere, ante differentiam lucis et tenebrae, immo ante differentiam esse et non esse, aliquid et nihil, atque ante differentiam indifferentiae et differentiae, aequalitatis et inaequalitatis, et ita de cunctis".

[39] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 13.36, lines 1-2.

[40] Already Plotinus considers active power/potency as quality of the One (*Enneads* 5.3.15). Cf. Casarella, "Nicholas of Cusa and the Power of the Possible" (as in n. 34), p. 16 and J. Stallmach, "Sein und das Können Selbst bei Nikolaus von Kues", in *Parusia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für J. Hirschberger*, ed. K. Flasch (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), pp. 407-421, at pp. 411-412.

[41] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 13.35, lines 5-10. See Meier-Oeser, "Potentia vs. Possibilitas?" (as in n. 34), p. 243: "Das *possest* ist daher nicht nur der Ort des Ineinfalls von Möglichsein und Wirklichsein; das ganze Spektrum der zur Beschreibung und Differenzierung der verschiedenen Möglichkeitskonzepte verfügbaren Termini (*possibilitas, potentia, posse, posse facere, posse fieri*) wird – offenbar mit Bedacht – in die Koinzidenzbewegung mit einbezogen […]".

An often recurring phrase in Cusanus' works is that God is everything that He can be and everything that can exist in creation (*Deus est omne quod esse potest*).[42] This does not imply that God is what is traditionally known as *potentia passiva*. i.e. the difference between the actual state in which a thing is and the plenitude of its realised possibilities.[43] A contracted, created being never exhausts the entirety of its possibilities. In God, however, all possibilities are realised and therefore the distinction between being and possibility is dissolved.[44] Nevertheless, it is in the creatures' state of imperfection that God becomes visible, for each actually existing being realises only one possibility of infinitely many (e.g. Plato actually was a philosopher, but he might also have been a musician or a geographer). In these infinitely many possibilities God as the source of infinity manifests Himself.

In order to safeguard the difference between God and His creation, Cusanus introduces a new term for the *potentia passiva* that characterises created being. This is the *posse fieri*, which can be translated as "the possibility to become".[45] Cusanus stresses that the *posse fieri* itself is a creature, even though it is the first and greatest of all creatures. Out of this *posse fieri* all other created beings have subsequently been made. In God there is no *potentia passiva*, no susceptibility or matter that He moulds and makes. This possibility has been created as the *posse fieri*.[46] As we shall see below, the concept of *posse fieri* enables Cusanus to develop a notion of the world as both created and everlasting. In so doing, the christological dimension of his earlier cosmology entirely disappears from Cusanus' philosophical speculation.

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[42] E.g. *De possest* (as in n. 4) 7, line 8, lines 6-8; *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 3.7, line 11; *De docta ignorantia* 1.4.11, line 14 (h [as in n. 4], p. 10, line 11); *De ludo globi* (as in n. 4), 1.46, lines 8-9.

[43] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 13.36, lines 8-10; 13.37, lines 1-6. Cf. J. Stallmach, "Sein und das Können-Selbst" (as in n. 40), p. 416: "Im Gedanken 'possest' hat sich Cusanus eine Möglichkeit eröffnet, nicht nur über die platonischen Ideen in ihrer Vielheit und in ihrer Angewiesenheit (als Formprinzipien) auf ein Wirkprinzip hinauszugelangen zu der einen ‚allvermögenden Form', sondern auch über die aristotelische Grundspannung von Materie und Form, von Potenz und Akt zu der – noch jenseits eines bloßen Zusammenfalls von Nichtidentischem liegenden – Identität des absoluten Könnens mit dem absoluten Wirklichsein in der Einheit und Einfachheit des Unendlichen".

[44] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 13.36, lines 2-4.

[45] J. Hopkins translates *posse fieri* with "the possibility of being made" in *Nicholas of Cusa*. *Metaphysical Speculation* (Minneapolis, 1998), p. 1302.

[46] Meier-Oeser, "Potentia vs. Possibilitas?" (as in n. 34) p. 243. Referring to the work *De possest*, Meier-Oeser argues that „der im *possest* mit dem *esse actu* koinzidierende Begriff des Könnens (*posse*) nicht allein der aktive (*potentia activa*), sondern auch der passive Möglichkeitsbegriff (*potentia passiva*) ist". Even if this may be true for *De possest*, Cusanus clearly revised this idea in *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4). Cf. 13.34, lines 1-13: "Nihil igitur omnium, quae sequuntur posse fieri, umquam a posse fieri aliud, quam est, absolvitur. Solus deus est possest, quia est actu quod esse potest". See also 38.110, lines 14-18.

TIME AND COSMOLOGY IN *DE VENATIONE SAPIENTIAE*

On the basis of the concepts of the *possest* and *posse fieri*, Nicholas of Cusa develops a view of time and universe in *De venatione sapientiae* that is distinctively different from *De docta ignorantia.*[47]

In *De docta ignorantia*, the earth is instable and the celestial bodies do not make perfect circles. In the later work, we see that the earth takes up its traditional place as the immobile centre of the universe.

> Divine Wisdom has determined the species, the orbit or the place for each individual thing. It has placed the earth in the middle, and it has determined that the earth be heavy and be moved toward the centre of the world so that in this way it would always exist in the middle and never veer either upwards or sideways. Divine Wisdom has determined for every creature its measure, its weight, and its number. And in this way the Divine Mind has most wisely determined all things, so that no thing lacks a reason for existing in the way it does rather than in some other way. And if things were to lack such a reason, then all things would be disordered".[48]

The idea that the entire creation has been formed according to laws and principles in the divine mind, finds its biblical expression in the words of Wisdom, that God made everything according to "measure, weight and number".[49] The human mind is capable of recognising the laws, the structures and the beauty of the natural order that refers to its origin. According to its ordered structure, the whole creation can be described in mathematical terms.[50] For this reason, mathematics plays a central role in Cusanus' philosophy.[51]

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[47] Cusanus wrote the first dialogue of *De ludo globi* in the summer or fall of 1462, the second in the winter of 1463, see h [as in n. 4], p. xxiv. In the time in-between or, more likely, immediately afterwards he wrote *De venatione sapientiae*, see h [as in n. 4], pp. xi-xiii. In this article I concentrate on *De venatione sapientiae.* Apart from a slightly different use of terminology, Cusanus writes in the same way on time and eternity in *De ludo globi.*

[48] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 28.83, lines 6-13: "Determinavit speciem, orbem seu locum singulis. Posuit terram in medio, quam gravem esse et ad centrum mundi moveri determinavit, ut sic semper in medio subsisteret et neque sursum neque lateraliter declinaret. Determinavit omni creaturae suam mensuram, suum pondus et numerum. Et ita omnia mens divina determinavit sapientissime, ita quod nihil caret ratione cur sic et non aliter; et si aliter, omnia confusa". Hopkins, transl., *Nicholas of Cusa* (as in n. 45), p. 1348.

[49] Sap. 11:21.

[50] Cf. A. Zimmermann, "Belehrte Unwissenheit als Ziel der Naturforschung", in *Nikolaus von Kues. Einführung in sein philosophisches Denken*, ed. H. Meinhardt and K. Jacobi (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1979), pp. 121-37, at p. 125.

[51] Cf. Das Mathematikverständnis des Nikolaus von Kues. Mathematische, naturwissenschaftliche und philosophisch-theologische Dimensionen. Akten der Tagung im Schwäbischen Tagungs- und Bildungszentrum Kloster Irsee vom 8.-10. Dezember 2003, ed. F. Pukelsheim and H. Schwaetzer, MFCG (as in n. 7), 29 (Trier, 2005).

Calling Moses as his witness, Cusanus states that the celestial bodies have been made first. They are not modelled after another created being. Therefore, he writes, they last forever; for they do not imitate more perfect, older beings, as the other creatures do. They are perpetual and intended to shine forever. So, next to the ultimate perfection that is called God, we see in the realm of creation another form of perfection, embodied in the stars and planets. But there is a difference in the perfection of each of these two: the stars and planets have once been created, whereas God is not created. Even in the case of the perpetual celestial bodies, who have realised all their possibilities, there is a chasm between their state of actualised-possibility and the full actuality of God.

Everlasting time is the hallmark both of the celestial bodies and of their foundation, the *posse fieri*. Cusanus calls them here "intellectual natures", which he declined to do in *De docta ignorantia.*[52] The other beings imitate them, but, since no sensitive being can adequately imitate an intellectual nature, these secondary beings imitate the sun, the stars etcetera, in an imperfect manner. Whereas the stars are everlasting or perpetual, the other beings are finite or temporal.[53] Their imitation of the perfect intelligent beings can never be completed, because beings subjected to time cannot realise all their possibilities at a single moment in time. Cusanus illustrates this with the example of the man Plato, who is the fulfilment of being-Plato, but not of being-man. If Plato had fulfilled all the possibilities of being-man, he would, apart from being a philosopher, also have been a musician and a geographer, etcetera.[54]

Thus, we see in *De venatione sapientiae* a distinction between eternity, perpetuity and time: God is eternal, the *posse fieri* and the stars are perpetual, and the other created beings are subjected to change in time.[55] Cusanus' concept of *posse fieri* can be understood as his answer to the question that was left unsolved in *De docta ignorantia*, whether the possibility is to be situated within God or his creation. Here, in *De venatione sapientiae*, he determines God's first creation as *posse fieri*, "being able to become".[56] All created beings are part of the *posse fieri*, which is the realm of unlimited possibilities. It is both in all beings as their common feature and it is the entirety of them. The only limit set to

[52] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 38.109, lines 3-16. Cf. note 27.

[53] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 38.109, lines 17-23.

[54] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 37.108, lines 3-12.

[55] In *De ludo globi*, Cusanus calls the existence of the world eternal. Nevertheless, similar to *De venatione sapientiae*, he distinguishes between God's eternity and the eternity of the world, see *De ludo globi* (as in n. 4), 1.18, lines 8-17.

[56] Hopkins' translation of *posse fieri* with "the possibility of being made" (Hopkins [as in n. 45], p. 1302) is inadequate insofar as the more active aspect of *posse fieri*, viz. the potency of created being to realise itself and imitate its exemplars, does not resound in it. Cusanus mentions the *posse fieri* once in *De ludo globi* (as in n. 4), 1.46, lines 1-5 "IOANNES: Intelligisne per posse fieri, possibilitatem seu materiam, aliquid, de quo factus est mundus, ut de ligno globus? CARDINALIS: Nequaquam. Sed quod mundus de modo, qui possibilitas seu posse fieri aut materia dicitur, ad modum, qui actu esse dicitur, transivit. Nihil enim fit actu, quod fieri non potuit".

this realm is its origin. What has been created can become everything, except its own creator.[57]

As a whole, the *posse fieri* is not a creature like the other creatures, but rather the first of all creation and the example to all.[58] It is like the light of the sun (God) that spreads over the earth and allows everything to grow.[59] Being created, the *posse fieri* is not eternal (*aeternum*). Nevertheless, it is the source of all temporal beings and modes of time (past, present, future). Therefore, it is *perpetuum*. As such, it cannot cease to exist, for if it could, it would have to be able to change from something into nothing and thus require a "being able to become" (*posse fieri*).[60] So, the possibility to become is the most general feature that all created beings have. It is perpetual and cannot change from what it is: the perfect image of God, who predetermined everything in the *posse fieri*.[61]

Cusanus develops his concepts of *posse fieri*, eternity and time while he discusses similar concepts in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The concept of *posse fieri* is not only a correction to Cusanus' own unclear ideas of possibility and potency in *De docta ignorantia*, but also a correction to Aristotle's concept of the *materia prima*. Aristotle writes that matter, motion, time are eternal (*Metaphysics* 12.6). He assumes that possibility requires motion in order to be realised. Therefore, Aristotle believes that motion is an eternal, beginning-less part of the world. But according to Cusanus, mo-

[57] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 6.14, lines 3-6. According to Brüntrup, the *posse fieri* is only confined by God and can only be understood in relation to God's omnipotence. It does not contain any power itself: „Von sich selbst her kann dem Werden-Können keine Dynamik zukommen, denn wie sollte es als Noch-nicht-Wirkliches Macht und Kraft enthalten und entfalten können?" (Brüntrup, *Können und Sein* [as in n. 34], p. 84). Quite a different view is expounded by Detlev Pätzold, who stresses the similarity between the *possest* and its highest similitude, the *posse fieri* (*Einheit und Andersheit* [as in n. 37], pp. 58-65). Pätzold considers the forces of living, understanding and of the forms to be part of the *posse fieri*. With Brüntrup and against Pätzold, it must be underlined that Cusanus considers the *posse fieri* to be created by God, and the singular beings to have been produced and made (*productum* and *facta*) by God as well. Pätzold's presentation of God as having once created the *posse fieri* and subsequently having withdrawn Himself from his creative activity like a "Dieu horloger" does not concord with the following passage from *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 7.17, lines 3-9: „Et quia posse fieri non potest se ipsum in actum producere – nam producere ex actu est –, implicat igitur dicere potentiam passivam se ipsam in actum producere, quare ante potentiam est actus. Non est igitur posse fieri aeternum principium. Recte dicebat quidam doctor sanctus: Affirmare potentiam passivam semper fuisse haeresis est. Sequitur igitur primam causam".

[58] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 6.15, lines 15-18.

[59] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 6.16, line 115.

[60] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 3.7, lines 19-21: "Tamen non potest deficere posse fieri. Si enim deficeret, hoc fieri psset. Non igitur posse fieri deficeret. Posse fieri igitur initiatum in aevum manet et perpetuum est".

[61] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 3.8, lines 11-14: "Cum in aevum et perpetuum intueor, intellectualiter video ipsum posse fieri et in ipso naturam omnium et singulorum, ut secundum perfectam explicationem praedestinationis divinae mentis fieri debent".

tion, matter and time are not beginningless, but created by God. Together, they are part of the *posse fieri*.

Because it is created, the *posse fieri* is not eternal. Cusanus approvingly cites Thomas Aquinas, who had written that passive potency (prime matter) cannot have existed eternally: "The holy teacher [Aquinas] rightly said: it is heresy to affirm that passive potency has always existed".[62] Fifteen years earlier, in the *Apologia doctae ignorantia*, Cusanus would most likely have considered Thomas an exponent of the "Aristotelian sect" which he loathed.[63] Now he quotes him twice in a highly approving manner.[64] Nicholas cites from Thomas' *De aeternitate mundi*, a treatise on the philosophical possibility of an eternal world. In this treatise, Thomas asks whether the concept of a created world excludes the concept of having no beginning in time.[65] He argues that being created and not having a beginning in time are compatible and not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the eternity of the world is philosophically possible. However, on the basis of faith Aquinas does not believe that it really is eternal.[66] In *De venatione sapientiae*, Cusanus uses Thomas' argument for his definition of *posse fieri.* The *posse fieri* is created, but it is not created in time and therefore it is everlasting:

> How, then, would the possibility-of-being-made have been annihilated? Therefore, it is perpetual, since it has a beginning and it cannot be annihilated but its end-point is its beginning-point.[67]

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[62] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 7.17, lines 7-8: "Recte dicebat doctor sanctus: Affirmare potentiam passivam semper fuisse haeresis est". Hopkins, transl. (as in n. 45), p. 1308. N.B. Hopkins translates: "A certain holy teacher". This seems to me to be incorrect. I have corrected this in the translation above. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Opuscula philosophica*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1954): *De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes*, pp. 105-108, at 296, p. 105 b, line 7-8: "quia hoc ponere esset ponere potentiam passivam semper fuisse: quod haereticum est".

[63] *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, h [as in n. 4], p. 6, lines 7-12.

[64] The other place is *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 26.77, lines 6-10: "Et clarius dicit sanctus Thomas in libello De aeternitate mundi sic aiens: "Cum enim ad omnipotentiam dei pertineat, ut omnem intellectum et virtutem excedat, expresse omnipotentiae derogat, qui dicit aliquid posse intelligi in creaturis, quod a deo fieri non possit".

[65] Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi* (as in n. 62), 298, p. 106 a, line 14-18: "In hoc ergo tota consistit quaestio, utrum esse creatum a Deo secundum totam substantiam, et non habere durationis principium, repugnent ad invicem, vel non".

[66] Cf. *De aeternitate mundi* (as in n. 62), 295, p. 105a, lines 1-7: "Supposito, secundum fidem Catholicam, quod mundus durationis initium habuit, dubitatio mota est, utrum potuerit semper fuisse".

[67] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 39.117, lines 2-4: "Quomodo tunc posse fieri annihilaretur? Est igitur perpetuum, cum habeat initium et annihilari non possit, sed terminus eius sit suum initium". Hopkins, transl. (as in n. 45), p. 1369 (modified by M. H. van der Meer).

Aquinas acknowledges the philosophical possibility of an eternal world but adheres to the theological truth that the world is created, and therefore finite. In the *Summa contra gentiles* he discusses the end of the world, that, according to him, will involve the cessation of motion of the celestial spheres. This however, will not lead to their final destruction, but rather to their transformation into a state of perpetual rest. The celestial bodies are moving for the sake of man, and since man is about to be made into God's image after the last judgement, their motion would not be needed any more.[68] For Cusanus, the situation is completely different: neither the *posse fieri* as a whole nor the celestial bodies will cease to exist as they are now. Moreover, it is a misunderstanding, he states, that the celestial bodies move for the sake of this world (and so for man): they do so in order to praise their creator.[69]

Cusanus clearly considers Plato as a higher authority than Thomas and Aristotle, for he rightly saw that "time is the image of perpetuity" (*imago sempiterni*).[70] Whereas Plato speaks of time as the image of eternity, Cusanus subtly calls time the image of perpetuity.[71] In his concept of the threefold universe, time does not immediately imitate eternity, but there is a mediator between both of them, the *posse fieri.* Cusanus follows Plato closely with respect to the perpetuity of the heavens and therefore of time. Both Plato and Cusanus state that the heavens and time were made and therefore in principle could be dissolved. Even so, they assume that time and the heavens will last forever. In Plato's words:

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[68] Thomas Aquinas, *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium seu summa contra gentiles*, vol. 3, ed. C. Pera (Turin, 1961), 4.97.4287, p. 416b, line 42 – p. 417 a, line 1: "Omnia autem generabilia et corruptibilia, quae causantur per motum caeli, ad hominem ordinantur quodammodo sicut in finem ut in Tertio est ostensum. Motus igitur caeli praecipue est propter generationum hominum".

[69] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 22.63, lines 1-13: "Videntur philosophi venatores in omni eorum discursu ex hoc sensibili mundo et his quae illi necessaria sunt, ut id sit quod est, meliori modo quo hoc fieri potest, de deo, de diis, de caelo et eius motu et fato, intelligentiis, spiritibus et ideis atque ipsa natura inquirere, quasi haec omnia sint necessaria huic mundo terreno et hic mundus sit omnium operum illorum finis. Sic Aristoteles deum ut Plato; quem sua providentia caelos administrare posuit; caelos vero ob hunc mundum esse et moveri per intelligentias, ut generationes et cuncta ad huius mundi conservationem necessaria ordinem et motum caeli sequentia naturaliter fiant et continuentur; non attendentes tot innumerabiles stellas huic terrae habitabili maiores et tot intelligentias non esse conditas ad finem huius terreni mundi, sed ad laudem creatoris, ut supra tactum est".

[70] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 9.26, line 10. Cusanus seems to refer to *Timaeus* 37D: "But he took thought to make, as it were, a moving likeness of eternity; and, at the same time that he ordered the Heaven, he made, of eternity that abides in unity, an everlasting likeness moving according to number – that to which we have given the name Time". Plato, *Timaeus*, 37D, transl. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (New York, 1957), p. 98.

[71] In *De ludo globi*, however, Cusanus calls the world to be *aeternum.* Yet, even here he makes sure that he does not identify the world with the *aeternitas.* See *De ludo globi* (as in n. 4), 1.17.

> [...] and it [time] is made after the pattern of the ever-enduring nature, in order that it may be as like that pattern as possible; for the pattern is a thing that has being for all eternity, whereas the Heaven has been and is and shall be perpetually throughout all time.[72]

While praising Plato as "a pursuer who is distinguished in a wonderful manner",[73] Cusanus rebukes Aristotle when he discusses his ideas about time and eternity.[74] First, according to Aristotle corruptible things never can become incorruptible. Cusanus, however, argues that natural materials (gold and glass) can become incorruptible,[75] which is also the case for the human body. After death the human body is transformed into an incorruptible, spiritual body.[76] The second point of criticism concerns the eternity of the world. Aristotle denies the possibility of a beginning and therefore assumes that the world is eternal. According to Cusanus this would imply that there exists independently and co-eternally with God pure uninformed matter. This matter would have no degree of realisation at all and be purely potential. With Thomas Aquinas, however, Cusanus states that this cannot be the case. Aristotle's position is a heresy since it implies the existence of an eternal principle next to and different from God.[77]

Next to Cusanus' dismissal of his previous ideas about the structure of the universe, the motion of the earth, and the stress on the perpetuity of the world, there is a difference between *De docta ignorantia* and *De venatione sapientiae* concerning the role of Jesus Christ. In *De docta ignorantia* Christ is considered as the *maximum absolutum et contractum*, the union of creator and creation. Everything is created in and through him and through him everything strives back to God. The entire third book of *De docta ignorantia* is devoted to him. In *De venatione sapientiae*, Christ is mentioned only once and does not play any systematic role in the work. In his stead, the *posse fieri* functions as the hinge between God and creation.[78] The minor place of traditional Christian doctrine and the many references to non-Christian philosophers have an important im-

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[72] *Timaeus* 38 B-C; transl. Cornford (as in n. 70), p. 99. For Cusanus, see *De ludo globi* (as in n. 4), 1.18.

[73] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 8.19, line 3: "Plato, venator miro modo circumspectus [...]"; Hopkins, transl. (as in n. 45), p. 1309.

[74] This is a common pattern in Cusanus' works, especially in *De beryllo* (1458) and *De li non aliud* (1461). Cusanus' main objection to Aristotle is that he had not grasped the truth behind the rule of non-contradiction. See Flasch, *Nikolaus von Kues*, pp. 468-477, 572-575.

[75] *Sermo CLXV, Caelum et terra transibunt*, h [as in n. 4], p. 8, lines 18–25 (pp. 206-207).

[76] *De docta ignorantia*, 3.7.221 (h 1 [as in n. 4], p. 139, lines 5-14).

[77] It was this model that Augustine rejected as a manichaeic heresy. See Augustine, *Confessiones* 5.10.

[78] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 32.96, lines 1-7: "Quinimo scimus mortalem naturam soluta moriendi possibilitate per nexum, quo mortali nectitur, posse ad vitam immortalis spiritus resurgere in virtute verbi dei, per quod omnia facta sunt, in homine Iesu Christo incarnati – in quo humanitas non solum medium est conexionis inferioris et superioris naturae, temporalis et perpetuae, sed et dei creatoris et aeternae immortalitatis –, si ipsi mediatori nostro conformes fuerimus; quod fide fit et amore.

pact on the tone of the work. Cusanus is directly debating with philosophers from the past. His main interest is to developing the best possible concept of God's infinite potency, that is a concept that is as little as possible entangled in pairs of oppositions. In *De venatione sapientiae*, it is the name *possest* that expresses the idea of God as actual power, beyond the distinction of act and potency. While exposing his philosophy, Cusanus is less concerned about aligning his ideas with Christian doctrine than in *De docta ignorantia*.

CONCLUSION

The difference between the cosmologies and metaphysics in *De docta ignorantia* and *De venatione sapientiae* consists mainly in the fact that Cusanus in the latter work employs a terminology of time (*tempus, aeternitas, sempiternum, perpetuum*), that does not yet appear in *De docta ignorantia.* In *De venatione sapientiae* the everlasting existence of the world receives much more stress than in the earlier work. A reason for this could be that the idea that an everlasting world is, even if it is created, a more appropriate image or expression of God's eternity than a world that is finite. A world that is perpetual is better able to function as a manifestation of the eternal God than a world that ends.

Even though Christ and the last judgment have almost disappeared from Cusanus' scope in *De venatione sapientiae*, it would be premature to conclude that the importance of Christology in Cusanus' philosophy has decreased in the later period. On the one hand, *De venatione sapientiae* deals extensively with early Greek philosophy in response to Diogenes Laertius' *De vitis philosophorum*, a work that Cusanus had read immediately before he composed the *De venatione*. So the small number of references to Christian doctrine is partly determined by the character of the book. On the other hand, there is also a different picture than *De venatione*, namely the one given in *De ludo globi*, a work he wrote shortly before *De venatione sapientiae*. In spite of the fact that Cusanus does not present Christ as the metaphysical link between God and creation in this work either, he does portray him here as the secure foundation and goal of knowledge and spiritual motion.[79] This brings us to the question of how Nicholas of Cusa's Christology is developed in his later works and whether it is possible to find a consistent Christology at all. This should be examined in his

[79] *De ludo globi* (as in n. 4), 2.69, lines 5-15: "Unde sicut nec notitia nec essentia rotundi seu perpetui sciri aut haberi potest nisi a centro, super quo volvitur motus perpetuus, ita quod eo non exsistente non potest nec perpetuitas nec motus vitae perpetuae, qui in aequalitate ad identitatem centri refertur, aut nosci aut esse, sic se habet centrum, quod Christus est, ad omnes circulationes. Circuli igitur hic motum vitae figurant. Et vivaciores motus designantur per circulos centro, quod vita est, propinquiores, quoniam vita, quod centrum est, quo nec maior nec minor dari potest. In ipso enim continetur omnis motus vitalis, qui extra vitam esse nequit. Nisi enim sit in omni motu vitali vita, nequaquam vitalis erit".

other later works, most notably the sermons.[80] But even if it were true that traditional Christian teaching makes way for abstract philosophical concepts, it would not necessarily implicate that the later Cusanus embraces non-Christian philosophy unreservedly. He remains critical of doctrines that possibly cannot be reconciled with Christian teaching, as has been shown in his reaction to Proclus' polytheism in *De venatione sapientiae*.

Returning to the fact that Cusanus' philosophy is rooted in fifteenth-century Christian humanism, I conclude with the question as to how the ***humanum*** is related to these metaphysical speculations on time and eternity. Both in *De docta ignorantia* and in *De venatione sapientiae* the different modes of being that pervade the universe (existence, living and understanding) are united in man, who is "the tie of the universe and the microcosm" (*copula universi et microsmus*).[81] As an intellectual being, man is aware of the task allotted to him: namely to regard the creation as a eulogy to God. Creation can only be this because it is on the one hand the result of a free act of God's will and not the necessary product of God's existence,[82] but on the other hand God made the world after the model of the divine ideas. Thus, the world has not been created out of a sudden whim.[83] In this way, Cusanus keeps the middle between extreme voluntarism (a whimsical God) and necessitarism (a God whose divinity rests in His creative activity).

Now, if man praises God by regarding creation as the result of God's free and well deliberated decision to express Himself, he increases his own praiseworthiness. Thus, God's and man's laudability concur: doing justice to God increases His image in man. Being endowed with reason implicates the possession of a free will. How else could man praise God, if his praise were not given in freedom? Therefore, man could, if he wanted, choose to ignore the references to the creator in the created things, and use them as if they serve only man. However, opting for an existence displeasing to God, man does not lose his free will,[84] but retains his ability to return to his origin and destination, the

[80] This development runs parallel with the increasing importance of the notion of God's immediate presence in everything. Kurt Flasch convincingly retraces the course of this development in his work *Nicolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer Entwicklung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998). His thesis restricts itself to Cusanus' philosophical works and needs corroboration from the sermons. Cf. M.-A. Aris in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 55 (2001), pp. 297-301.

[81] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 32.95, line 9.

[82] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 27.82, lines 10-11: „Sed quia ipsa mens aeterna libera ad creandum et non creandum vel sic vel aliter, suam omnipotentiam, ut voluit, intra se ab aeterno determinavit".

[83] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 27.81, lines 6-8: „Haec rerum exemplaria diffinivit, quae sunt – ut optime vidit Dionysius De divinis scribens nominibus – rerum rationes in ipsa praeexsistentes, secundum quas divina sapientia omnia praedestinavit seu praedeterminavit produxitque".

[84] A very different picture is presented by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), who attributes to man the inalienable capacity to preserve the rightness (*rectitudo*) of the will, but considers this capacity as powerless against the slavery of sin, that keeps man chained up ever since Adam's fall. See Anselm of Canterbury, *De libertate arbitrii* c.3 in

almighty God.[85] It is only in agreement with God's will that man truly realises his freedom. The modern concept of freedom as the possibility to rebel against the divine order ("Faust") is absent from Cusanus' anthropology, which is firmly rooted in Christian and classical thinking.[86] Even if the notion of infinity and boundlessness plays a crucial role in Cusanus' concept of God, this notion is applied to man only in regard to his boundless creativity and rationality, the actualisation of which makes him God's true image. In ethical terms, man is restricted to the predetermined order, within the limits of which he can unfold these endless intellectual and artistic capacities.

Opera omnia, vol. 1, ed. F. R. Schmitt (Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt, 1968), pp. 201-226, at pp. 210-213. Cf. Anselmus, *Over keuzevrijheid*, ed. A. J. Vanderjagt (Kampen, 1997), p. 144.

[85] *De venatione sapientiae* (as in n. 4), 20.58, lines 1-8: "Scit etiam homo, quod ipsum oporteat liberum arbitrium suum per laudabilia determinare, ut sit ex electione sicut a natura laudabilis. Bonitas, virtus, veritas, honestas, aequitas et cetera talia laudabilia sunt, possuntque eligi per liberum arbitrium aut eorum contrarium. Si eliguntur, totus homo tam ex naturalibus quam arbitrii electione laudabilis perfecte deum laudat. Si vero vitia et laudabilibus adversa eligit, non est laudabilis, sed sibi deoque contrarius".

[86] Vgl. N. Herold, "Die Willensfreiheit des Menschen im Kontext sittlichen Handelns bei Nikolaus von Kues" in *Sein und Sollen. Die Ethik des Nikolaus von Kues*, ed. K. Kremer and K. Reinhardt, MFCG (as in n. 7), 26 (Trier, 2000), pp. 145-185, at p. 156.

COPERNICUS' *PRAEFATIO IN LIBROS REVOLUTIONUM* HUMANISM AND SCHOLARLY DEBATE

Marc van der Poel

When Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) proposed his heliocentric system as an alternative to the geocentric system of Ptolemy, he knew that he was not only contradicting both common perception and the current view among scientists, but also the teaching of the Church based on the official interpretation of some passages in the Bible.[1] The first edition of *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (1543) includes a *Praefatio* dedicated to Pope Paul III, in which he explains why he had the audacity to publish his deeply controversial work. The point Copernicus makes in this *Praefatio in Libros Revolutionum* is that the geocentric system has not provided a conclusive explanation of the movements of the celestial bodies, but is philosophically speaking merely a theory (or an *opinio* as Copernicus puts it), in the face of which he defends his own *opinio*. In this paper I propose to analyse Copernicus' strategy in the *Praefatio* to present his work as a contribution to scientific debate, not a provocation against the authority of the Church. I argue that Copernicus adopts the attitude of a scholar who courageously defends his opinion in an age of increasing religious intolerance, a position that is comparable to that taken by the humanists Erasmus and Agrippa von Nettesheim in the first decades of the sixteenth century, when they were forced to defend their writings against the censure of conservative theologians.[2]

Copernicus is not usually associated with renaissance humanism, but we know that he was well acquainted with this intellectual movement. During his years of study in Italy (Bologna, Padua, Ferrara; he also visited Rome) he must have been in touch with humanists and humanist ideas. After his return to Poland, he counted some Polish humanists among his friends, such as Tidemann Giese, mentioned in the *Praefatio* (line 28 in the text included in the Appendix). As far as we know, he did not possess any books by Erasmus,[3] but Fernand Hallyn has argued in a recent article, in which the *Praefatio* is also discussed, that Copernicus knew the *Adagia*. Hallyn stresses, and this is relevant

[1] I wish to thank Dr P. Tuynman for his remarks on this paper and Dr B. Breij for the same and for help with my English.

[2] See M. van der Poel, *Cornelius Agrippa. The Humanist Theologian and his Declamations* (Leiden, 1997), especially chapter 5.

[3] P. Czartoryski, "The library of Copernicus", in *Science and History. Studies in Honor of Edward Rosen* (Warsaw, 1978), pp. 356-385.

for my argument, that Copernicus was aware of Erasmus' struggle with the opponents of his humanistic theology, usually conservative theologians belonging to one of the mendicant orders. In his letters and his numerous polemics with these scholastic opponents, Erasmus often referred to them as *fuci inter apes* (drones among bees) and *sycophantae* (false accusers), stressing their ignorance and unfairness.[4] Hallyn points out that these terms also occur in Copernicus' *Praefatio* (lines 22 and 114 in the text included in the Appendix) with the similar purpose of denoting malevolent and ignorant opponents of his ideas. Hallyn thus suggests that there exists a kind of similarity or affinity between Erasmus and Copernicus. I think he is right, and I hope to develop his point in the following observations on the *Praefatio*.

The *Praefatio* is carefully written in accordance with the rhetorical rules set down for a dedicatory epistle. Its Latin is polished and appropriately embellished with classical reminiscences. To mention the most noteworthy example, Copernicus refers to Horace's famous line *nonum prematur in annum* (*Ars poetica* 388-9) to introduce his remark that he has kept his work on the celestial bodies suppressed for thirty-five years (line 32). The letter's style is, however, remarkably sober. It lacks the verbosity and the overstatements in praising the dedicatee, emphasising the author's modesty, or in extolling the importance of the subject matter which spoil the dedicatory letters of so many humanists. Copernicus presents himself very straightforwardly, as one might expect from the true scholar and practical-minded person that he was.

Unlike Westman,[5] I do not believe that there is irony involved in the opening sentences of the *Praefatio*, where Copernicus states that he is going against tradition and that his theories will surely be repudiated. Quite the reverse, these statements constitute the beginning of a very prudent and thoughtful discourse, in which the author courageously launches his demonstration of the heliocentric theory, in full awareness of its controversial nature. Copernicus had set forth his heliocentric theory for the first time in the *Commentariolus*, a brief manuscript of six leaves of unknown date, but which circulated certainly as early as 1514.[6] Copernicus undoubtedly realised that this manuscript had not only evoked mixed reactions among experts in the field of astronomy,[7] but that his view on the movement of the earth had also brought him notoriety among the common people. In 1531 he had been the object of ridicule in a *Fastnachtspiel* (Mardi Gras play) performed in the Roman Catholic town of Elbing (in former

[4] F. Hallyn, "Copernic et Erasme", *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 49 (2000), pp. 89-100.

[5] R. Westman, "Proof, poetics and patronage: Copernicus's preface to De revolutionibus", in *Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution*, ed. D. C. Lindberg and R. S. Westman (Cambridge, 1990), p. 179.

[6] N. Copernicus, *Das neue Weltbild. Drei Texte, Commentariolus, Brief gegen Werner, De revolutionibus I* […], ed., transl. H. G. Zekl (Hamburg, 1990), introduction, pp. lxi-lxii.

[7] Copernicus, *Das neue Weltbild* (as in n. 6), introduction, pp. lxii-lxiii.

East Prussia), a place he occasionally visited as representative of his chapter in Frauenburg (today Frombork).[8]

Although the Church had not yet publicly opposed his views, Copernicus was undoubtedly aware of the aversion to his scientific work. Given the atmosphere of religious intolerance which prevailed at the time of its publication, he must have realised that his demonstration of the heliocentric theory in print might very well become the object of censure by the Church. Such a condemnation would not only frustrate the scholarly debate on the issue, but would also endanger his position as a canon and possibly his life. By 1543, the first heretics had already gone to the stake and many more were to follow. Hence his decision to address a letter to the pope, in which he claimed his right to contribute to the scholarly discussion about open scientific questions involving a premise that the Church regarded as truth revealed in Scripture.

Two points in Copernicus' address to the pope are essential. First, he stresses that his work, although it goes against the received opinion of astronomers (*contra receptam opinionem mathematicorum*, line 45) and practically against the general feeling *(propemodum contra communem sensum*, lines 45-46), in fact contributes to a scholarly discussion about a topic which is not yet settled, and therefore a topic about which scholars are permitted to have a debate (lines 87-92). Secondly, the question of the movement of the planets being a debatable topic, it is inappropriate to make it into a matter of faith, something that only vain talkers (ματαιολόγοι, line 115) will do. Copernicus concludes the *Praefatio* with the view that his work is not only a contribution to science, but also to the Christian community, the *respublica ecclesiastica* (line 124). He alludes to the fact that the results of his investigations make it possible to determine the length of the months and years with more accuracy. He had already been working on this problem in 1515 for a committee of the Lateran Council which had been set up to investigate a calendar reform (lines 125-128).

In order to understand how Copernicus accounts for his work as a contribution to a scholarly debate on an uncertain matter, we must take a closer look at the structure and content of the *Praefatio*. The latter consists of three sections. In the introductory section, Copernicus begins by stating his initial hesitation to publish his work, because the theory that the earth moves will be judged absurd (lines 1-25). His friends, however, have persuaded him to publish his demonstration of the theory and thus to remove the cloud of absurdity that obscures it (lines 26-40).

Then comes the second and main part of the text, in which Copernicus explains how the thought that it is the earth that moves had come to him (lines 41-108). This section is a brief but complete statement of the scientific method followed by Copernicus. The following steps can be discerned:

1. Lines 41-71: Copernicus has ascertained that astronomers are consistent in neither their calculations of planetary movements nor in the principles and assumptions underpinning them, because they do not follow fixed principles

[8] L. Prowe, *Nicolaus Coppernicus* [*sic* MvdP)], *Bnd. I: Das Leben, Teil II: 1512-1543* (Berlin, 1883; repr. Osnabrück 1967), pp. 231-244.

(*certa principia*; line 68). In other words, Copernicus stresses that concerning the matter at hand the truth has not been established.

2. Lines 72-92: Frustrated by the uncertain explanations of the movements of the celestial bodies, he read through all the available literature on the matter in search of views other than the one generally accepted. In so doing, he came across the view of Hiketas, mentioned by Cicero,[9] and the views of Philolaos (of Croton), Herakleides and Ekphantos, all three mentioned in a compilation of philosophical opinions attributed to Plutarch.[10]

3. Lines 87-92: Copernicus then started to think for himself about the motion of the earth, fully realising how senseless this assumption might seem, but feeling that he, like the ancient authors mentioned, would be permitted to try and find better explanations for the movements of the celestial bodies by presuming that the earth moves.

4. Lines 93-108: The result of his investigations is included in his book *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, of which he briefly presents the content. If one takes the movement of the earth as a premise, then the movement of the celestial bodies can be explained satisfactorily. In full confidence that they will support him, he asks his colleagues thoroughly to examine and weigh his demonstration.

In the third, and final section (lines 109-134), Copernicus asks for the pope's support against vain talkers (ματαιολόγοι, line 115, a citation from the New Testament, Titus 1:10, quoted with polemical force), who, although they are ignorant in astronomy, are sure to misrepresent some Biblical passage for their own purpose when censuring his work. Self-assuredly, Copernicus states that he will pay no attention to these men and feels contempt for their judgement; his book has been written for specialists only (*mathemata mathematicis scribuntur*, lines 122-123). Finally, Copernicus points out that his work will prove to be beneficial to the Church, in that it will help make the liturgical calendar more accurate.

On the whole, the *Praefatio* contains a well-structured and clear argument. A few points deserve to be highlighted.

Copernicus stresses that the current view on the solar system may be time-honoured and seemingly confirmed by common perception, but he denies that it must be understood to be certain. The notions *certus/incertus* and their compounds are used several times in this context (lines 49, 57, 72, 74). Although Copernicus seems quite confident that he has found a better foundation for calculating the planetary movements (*certior ratio*, line 74), he is careful not to claim to have found the truth about the matter, witness his choice of words: *haec mea doctrina de terrae motu* (line 36), *meas cogitationes de terrae motu* (line 43), and even the verb *imaginari aliquem motum terrae* (line 46). The use of the verb *imaginari* (to picture to oneself) is remarkable, because it conveys the impression that Copernicus does not go beyond earlier philosophers who had speculated about the circular movements of the celestial bodies (cf. lines

[9] Cicero, *Academica priora II (Lucullus)*, 123.
[10] Plutarch, *De placitis philosophorum*, 3.13.

89-90). The terms used by Copernicus imply that he takes it for granted that his arguments for the movement of the earth must be put to the test and that he takes into account the possibility of their being refuted.

Opinio is another significant word in this context. Copernicus uses it several times to refer both to the current view (lines 10, 45) and to the opposite view that he supports (lines 4, 23, 81, 88). *Opinio* means a view held on the basis of probabilities; it is the opposite of *scientia*, certain knowledge, as is clear, for instance, from Cicero, *De oratore*, 2.30, where Antonius says: *oratoris autem omnis actio opinionibus, non scientia continetur*. In Copernicus' time, *opinio* is a technical term in the context of university disputations; it goes back to the time of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) and means *actus intellectus qui fertur in unam partem contradictionis cum formidine alterius* (Aquinas), *alicuius cum incertitudine credulitas* (J. Clichtove, 1472-1543) and *infirmus inconstansque assensus* (J. Lefèvre d'Étaples, c. 1455-1536); it is a position one defends on the basis of arguments or authorities, with the caveat that one might be wrong.[11] It is unnecessary to point out that this principle of debate, of arguing your own point while expressing willingness to listen to the arguments of others, is essential to the method of research explained by Copernicus in the *Praefatio*.

The opportunity of presenting his findings to the community of astronomers and thus contributing to the debate necessary for scientific progress must have constituted an important motive for Copernicus to follow his friends' advice and finally publish his work after thirty-five years (lines 26-33). The self-confidence which exudes from the closing part of the *Praefatio* indicates Copernicus' eagerness to share his results with other astronomers and to help develop our knowledge and understanding of the universe. But obviously Copernicus realised that his book would also be discussed by non-specialists and that chances were that adversaries might want to denounce his work. We do in fact have examples of such denunciations. The *Tischreden* from 1539 show that the theory of Copernicus was discussed in Luther's home. Luther stated that he for his part could only believe the astronomical statements in the Bible. According to Aurifaber's version of the *Tischreden* Luther even ridiculed Copernicus as a fool (Narr) who wanted to throw astronomy into complete disorder.[12] Melanchthon went a tragic step further in his opposition to Copernicus' ideas. Already in a letter to Burkhard Mithoff on 16 October 1541, two years before the publi-

[11] For a discussion of the term *opinio* in the context of scholarly debate, see Van der Poel, *Cornelius Agrippa* (as in n. 2), pp. 179-182.

[12] "Es ward gedacht eines neuen Astrologi, der wollte beweisen, dass die Erde bewegt würde und umginge, nicht der Himmel oder das Firmament, Sonne und Monde; gleich als wenn einer auf einem Wagen oder in einem Schiff sitzt und bewegt wird, meinete er sässe still und ruhete, das Erdreich aber und die Bäume gingen um und bewegten sich. Aber es gehet jetzt also: wer da will klug seyn, der soll ihm nichts lassen gefallen, was Andere machen, er muss ihm etwas Eigens machen, das muss das Allerbeste seyn, wie ers machet. Der Narr will die ganze Kunst Astronomiae umkehren! Aber wie die heilige Schrift anzeiget, so hiess Josua die Sonne still stehen und nicht das Erdreich" (Luther, *Werke*, Weimar edition, vol. 1, p. 429 [855], quotation taken from W. Norlind, "Copernicus and Luther: A Critical Study", *Isis* 44 (1953), p. 275).

cation of *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, he had called for coercive measures of the government against the impudence of scholars who support absurd things, like Copernicus (referred to with derision as that infamous Polish astronomer), who has the earth move and the sun stand still:

> Quidam putant esse egregium κατόρθωμα rem tam absurdam exornare, sicut ille Sarmaticus Astronomus qui movet terram et figit solem. Profecto sapientes gubernatores deberent ingeniorum petulantiam cohercere.[13]

This letter voices the spirit of his *Initia doctrinae physicae* (1549) in which he was to condemn altogether any scholarly discussion about the problem raised by Copernicus. In his textbook on natural philosophy, Melanchthon brands the view that the earth moves instead of the sun an absurd opinion, held by people who are fond of novelties or who merely want to show off their talent, an opinion only suitable for exercising the mind. He considered it shameful and dangerous to investigate such views seriously, and, referring to several Biblical passages indicating that the sun moves and the earth stands still, proclaimed that it is honourable to be content with the truth revealed by God and to let our minds be guided by it without asking questions.[14]

We do not know whether Copernicus knew about the views of Luther and Melanchthon, but the passages discussed by Hallyn leave no doubt about the fact that he did indeed face up to criticism, and that he did so, in my view, rather bravely in defence of freedom of opinion in the context of scholarly debate. In these passages he adopts the already mentioned terms used by Erasmus in his controversies with theologians: the *fuci inter apes* of line 22 and the *sycophanta* of line 114; and finally the ματαιολόγοι (empty talkers) of line 115, a term adopted from Titus 1:10. Copernicus perhaps knew that Erasmus had used the words ματαιολόγος and ματαιολογία (idle chatter) to characterise his

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[13] Melanchthon, *Opera quae supersunt omnia*, 28 vols., ed. C. G. Bretchneier (Halle, 1834-1860), vol. 4, no. 2391, c. 679). Melanchthon, *Briefwechsel. Bnd. 3: Regesten 2336-3420*, ed. H. Scheible (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1979), no. 2830, p. 232.

[14] "Nunc de coelo dicendum est: Coelum moveri motu circulari, quod iisdem argumentis confirmatur, quae iam recitata sunt de figura. Nam corpori sphaericae figurae convenit motus circularis. Et oculi sunt testes, coelum circumagi viginti quatuor horis. Sed hic aliqui vel amore novitatis, vel ut ostentarent ingenia, disputarunt moveri terram, et contendunt nec octavam sphaeram, nec Solem moveri, cum quidem caeteris coelestibus orbibus motum tribuant, Terram etiam inter sidera collocant. Nec recens hi ludi conficti sunt […]. Etsi autem artifices acuti multa exercendorum ingeniorum causa quaerunt, tamen adseverare palam absurdas sententias, non est honestum, et nocet exemplo. Bonae mentis est veritatem a Deo monstratam reverenter amplecti et in ea acquiscere, et Deo gratias agere, aliquam accendenti lucem, et servanti in hominum mentibus, ac deinde considerare, quis ad Deum aditus sit per eam lucem, et quomodo vita regenda et iuvanda sit agnitione veritatis". (*Initia doctrinae physicae*, chapter "Quis est motus mundi?", in Melanchthon, *Opera* (as in n. 13), vol. 13, no. 1846, c. 216.) Melanchthon cites Psalm 19 (18):6 and Ecclesiastes 1:5 as proof of the movement of the sun, Psalm 104 (103):5 as proof of the immobility of the earth.

scholastic opponents and their habit of focusing on minor points in theological discussions.[15]

These passages in the *Praefatio* reveal that Copernicus defied courageously the ignorants who wanted to suppress scholarly debate. Nevertheless, Copernicus had to be careful, and for this reason he stressed his own integrity and sincerity immediately at the beginning of the letter, in lines 5-8:

> Et quamvis sciam hominis philosophi cogitationes esse remotas a iudicio vulgi, propterea quod illius studium sit veritatem omnibus in rebus, quatenus id a Deo rationi humanae permissum est, inquirere, tamen alienas prorsus a rectitudine opiniones fugiendas censeo.

In this sentence Copernicus points out the rights and duties of scholars (*philosophi*) in the practice of their research. They ignore the views of common people and of the ignorant, because they aim at finding the truth in all subjects (*illius studium* […] *veritatem in omnibus rebus* […] *inquirere*). This implies that it is their privilege freely to use their reason (*ratio*) in search for the truth in all matters (cf. lines 87-92), even though they must realise that God puts a certain limit to this freedom (*quatenus id a Deo rationi humanae permissum est*). The verb *permittere* (allow, permit) clearly points not to a finiteness of the mind itself, but to a limit that is imposed on the intellect from outside. This concerns first of all the fundamental mysteries of faith such as the Holy Trinity, the transubstantiation and the resurrection.

Most translations that I have been able to consult (by Menzzner, Prowe, Dobson, Kuhn, Klaus, Duncan, Zekl, Wallis, and Rosen) interpret the collocation *alienas a rectitudine* as meaning "erroneous", "mistaken", "untrue",[16] as if

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[15] For instance Erasmus' long note on the word ματαιολογία (idle chatter) in 1 Tim. 1:6, where he lashed out at scholastic theology (Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, 10 vols., ed. J. Clericus (Leiden, 1703; repr. 1961-1962), vol. 6, pp. 926D-928E). Cf. F. Hallyn, "Copernic et Erasme" (as in n. 4), 96, who additionally refers to relevant places in Erasmus' correspondence. See for the term "mataelogia" R. Hoven, *Lexique de la prose latine de la Renaissance* (Leiden, 2006[2]), s.v. (Hoven refers to a passage from Erasmus' *Colloquia*).

[16] Nicolaus Copernicus […], *Über die Kreisbewegungen der Weltkörper*, transl., comm. C. L. Menzzner […] (Thorn, 1879), p. 4: "Meinungen die von der Richtigkeit ganz entfernt sind". Prowe, *Nicolaus Coppernicus* (as in n. 8), p. 495: "von dem Wahren und Richtigen völlig abweichende Ansichten". Nicolaus Copernicus: *De revolutionibus*, Preface and Book I, transl. J. F. Dobson and S. Brodetsky, in *Occasional Notes of the Royal Astronomical Society*, vol. 2, no. 10 (1947), p. 3: "quite erroneous". T. Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge* (London, 1957), p. 137: "quite erroneous". N. Copernicus, *Über die Kreisbewegungen der Weltkörper, erstes Buch*, ed., introd. G. Klaus (Berlin, 1959), p. 5: "(Meinungen […]) die weit davon entfernt sind, richtig zu sein". Copernicus, *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, transl. A. M. Duncan (London and New York, 1976), p. 23: "opinions which are totally incorrect". N. Copernicus, *Das neue Weltbild* (as in n. 6), p. 67: "Ansichten fern von aller Richtigkeit". N. Copernicus, *On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres*, transl. C. G. Wallis (Chicago, 1990[2]), p. 506: "opinions utterly foreign to rightness". N. Copernicus, *On the Revolutions*, transl. and comm. E. Rosen (Baltimore, 1992), p. 3: "completely erroneous".

Copernicus had simply written something like *falsus* or *mendosus*. Given the context of the sentence and the entire text of which it is a part, I am inclined to think that this is not what Copernicus means here. First of all, the collocation seems a rather laborious one to express the simple notion of factual error and untruthfulness. Moreover this notion would not fit the scientific method Copernicus explains further on in the *Praefatio*. Indeed, as a matter of principle, all opinions – even faulty ones – may contribute to further our knowledge in any scholarly debate concerning probabilities. So what does *rectitudo* mean in the present context?

Rectitudo is a rare and late word. In its most literal sense it refers to the straightness of, e.g., roads (*rectitudo itinerum*);[17] metaphorically it is used for the correctness of spelling (*rectitudo scribendi*)[18] or justice.[19] In patristic Latin it can metaphorically refer to rightness of truth or orthodoxy (*rectitudo fidei*),[20] or, more generally, righteousness, uprightness (*rectitudo cordis*).[21] These two last metaphorical uses of the word persist in Medieval Latin.[22]

I have not found any conclusive testimonies for the use of the word in Copernicus' time, but given the context of the *Praefatio*, it seems to me that Copernicus is using *rectitudo* metaphorically in the sense of righteousness, moral rectitude; it is the equivalent of the classical concept *rectum* (e.g. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 3.2.3) or *rectum et honestum* (e.g. Cicero, *De amicitia*, 76; *De finibus*, 1.25). If so, he is expressing the belief that while research in the field of philosophy and science must not in any way be curtailed by any authorities including the Church, there does exist a natural, inborn reserve or sense of what is right (*rectitudo*) that must keep the researcher's *ratio* from crossing certain undefined ethical limits. These limits are not imposed on the human *ratio* from outside, but to observe them is each researcher's duty and thus his own responsibility towards God and mankind.

With this statement placed at the very beginning of the *Praefatio* Copernicus stresses his own ethos: he is in search of the truth in an unresolved matter for the sake of truth itself, without any intention to cause disorder. His disdain for his ignorant opponents (the *vulgus*, the *fuci inter apes*, the *sycophanta* and the ματαιολόγοι, lines 6, 22, 114, 115) is not incompatible with this ethos. It must not be taken as a deliberate display of arrogance, but be seen as the author's attempt to make it clear that his work is addressed only to specialists in the field who know their subject and who share the same ethos (cf. *mathemata*

[17] Isidorus, *Etymologiae*, 15.16.6.

[18] Cassiodorus, *De orthographia*, praef., in *Grammatici latini*, 8 vols., ed. H. Keil (1855-1879), vol. 7, p. 144, l. 25.

[19] Iustinianus, *Novellae*, 13, praef. 8.

[20] A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens* (Strasbourg and Paris, 1954), s.v. rectitudo 3 with reference to Augustine, *De baptismo contra Donatistas* 4.10.14; *Epistulae* 9.

[21] Blaise, *Dictionnaire* (as in n. 20), s.v. rectitudo 4 (examples Augustine, *De baptismo contra Donatistas* 6.1.1; *Confessiones* 5.2.2).

[22] J. F. Niermeyer, *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus* (Leiden, 2000), s.v. rectitudo 1 and 11.

mathematicis scibuntur, lines 122-123).[23] In lines 72ff., where Copernicus says that his own research was prompted by a feeling of regret that astronomers did not have a definite explanation of the motions of the universe, created by God for the sake of human kind (*propter nos*, line 74), he seems in my view to state again his conviction that his own research on the basis of the opposite assumption that the earth moves was permissible within these unspecified ethical boundaries, because his sole motive was finding out the truth.

If I am right, we can discern a parallel between Copernicus and the humanists Erasmus and Agrippa von Nettesheim. The latter were both independent, non-clerical but qualified scholars who penetrated into the field of study which professional theologians considered to be their own. A good example is Erasmus' *Encomium matrimonii*, a declamation in which he defended the position that marriage could in principle be a better choice even than sacerdotal or monastic celibacy. This work, published in 1518, caused a polemic between Erasmus and the conservative theologians which lasted until 1532.[24] In this and his numerous other polemics with theologians, Erasmus consistently vindicated the right to publish soundly argued and morally acceptable opinions about important issues of his own choice. The same can be said about Agrippa's *Apologia* (1533), in which he defended himself against the Louvain theologians, who had condemned some passages in his *Declamatio de incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium* (1526).[25] Erasmus and Agrippa used the *declamatio*, the rhetorical genre that lends itself pre-eminently to open debate, even about abstract topics (*quaestiones infinitae* or *theses*), which quibblers from both the Catholic and the Protestant side judged to be pernicious. Copernicus, for his part, did not appeal to the freedom of opinion which rhetoric claimed for itself, but he was facing opponents just as powerful as Erasmus and Agrippa. As is shown by the letter quoted above, Melanchthon called on the authorities to silence Copernicus ("that impudent Polish astronomer") who claimed that the earth moves and the sun stands still. Copernicus never entered into a polemic with Melanchthon or any other opponent, but in the *Praefatio in Libros Revolutionum* he unequivocally offered resistance to the intolerance against uncommon opinions in general that was symptomatic of the intellectual life in his time. In this respect, he put himself on a par with Erasmus and Agrippa, by claiming on principle the freedom to search for answers to open questions, even if this implied the denial of truths that were generally accepted and considered to have their foundation in the Bible.

[23] Cf. Copernicus' use of the word ἀκρόαμα (line 9) to denote the theory of the movement of the earth; ἀκρόαμα refers to a discourse reserved for specialists only (see F. Hallyn, "L'«absurdum ἀκρόαμα» de Copernic", in: *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 62 (2000), pp. 7-24).

[24] M. van der Poel, "'For Freedom of Opinion: Erasmus' Defense of the *Encomium matrimonii*", *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 25 (2005), pp. 1-17.

[25] Van der Poel, *Cornelius Agrippa* (as in n. 2), chapters 4 and 5.

APPENDIX

Ad Sanctissimum Dominum Paulum III Pontificem Maximum Nicolai Copernici praefatio in libros revolutionum.

The first edition of the *Praefatio* was published in *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium libri VI* (Nuremberg, 1543), fols. ij^{v} - iiij^{v} . The present text was taken from the website "Mémoire de la Pologne", published as a part of the UNESCO-programme "Mémoire du monde" (downloaded August 2, 2006). Spelling, punctuation and the division into paragraphs have been slightly modified).

Satis equidem, Sanctissime Pater, aestimare possum futurum esse, ut simulatque quidam acceperint me hisce meis libris, quos de revolutionibus sphaerarum mundi scripsi, terrae globo tribuere quosdam motus, statim me explodendum cum tali opinione clamitent. Neque enim ita mihi mea placent, ut non perpendam quid alii de illis iudicaturi sint. Et quamvis sciam hominis philosophi cogitationes esse remotas a iudicio vulgi, propterea quod illius studium sit veritatem omnibus in rebus, quatenus id a Deo rationi humanae permissum est, inquirere, tamen alienas prorsus a rectitudine opiniones fugiendas censeo. Itaque cum mecum ipse cogitarem, quam absurdum ἀκρόαμα existimaturi essent illi, qui multorum saeculorum iudiciis hanc opinionem confirmatam norunt, quod terra immobilis in medio caeli tamquam centrum illius posita sit, si ego contra assererem terram moveri, diu mecum haesi, an meos commentarios in eius motus demonstrationem conscriptos in lucem darem, an vero satius esset Pythagoreorum et quorundam aliorum sequi exemplum, qui non per litteras, sed per manus tradere soliti sunt mysteria philosophiae propinquis et amicis dumtaxat, sicut Lysidis ad Hipparchum epistola testatur. Ac mihi quidem videntur id fecisse non, ut quidam arbitrantur, ex quadam invidentia communicandarum doctrinarum, sed ne res pulcherrimae et multo studio magnorum virorum investigatae ab illis contemnerentur, quos aut piget ullis litteris bonam operam impendere nisi quaestuosis, aut si exhortationibus et exemplo aliorum ad liberale studium philosophiae excitentur, tamen propter stupiditatem ingenii inter philosophos tamquam fuci inter apes versantur. Cum igitur haec mecum perpenderem, contemptus, qui mihi propter novitatem et absurditatem opinionis metuendus erat, propemodum impulerat me, ut institutum opus prorsus intermitterem.

Verum amici me diu cunctantem atque etiam reluctantem retraxerunt. Inter quos primus fuit Nicolaus Schonbergius, cardinalis Capuanus, in omni genere doctrinarum celebris. Proximus illi vir mei amantissimus Tidemannus Gisius, episcopus Culmensis, sacrarum ut est et omnium bonarum litterarum studiosissimus. Is etenim saepenumero me adhortatus est et conviciis interdum additis efflagitavit, ut librum hunc ederem et in lucem tandem prodire sinerem, qui apud me pressus non in nonum annum solum, sed iam in quartum novennium

latitasset. Idem apud me egerunt alii non pauci viri eminentissimi et doctissimi, adhortantes ut meam operam ad communem studiosorum mathematices utilitatem propter conceptum metum conferre non recusarem diutius. Fore ut quanto absurdior plerisque nunc haec mea doctrina de terrae motu videretur, tanto plus admirationis atque gratiae habitura esset, postquam per editionem commentariorum meorum caliginem absurditatis sublatam viderent liquidissimis demonstrationibus. His igitur persuasoribus eaque spe adductus tandem amicis permisi, ut editionem operis, quam diu a me petissent, facerent.

At non tam mirabitur fortasse Sanctitas tua, quod has meas lucubrationes edere in lucem ausus sim posteaquam tantum operae in illis elaborandis mihi sumpsi, ut meas cogitationes de terrae motu etiam litteris committere non dubitaverim, sed quod magis ex me audire expectat, qui mihi in mentem venerit, ut contra receptam opinionem mathematicorum ac propemodum contra communem sensum ausus fuerim imaginari aliquem motum terrae. Itaque nolo Sanctitatem tuam latere me nihil aliud movisse ad cogitandum de alia ratione subducendorum motuum sphaerarum mundi, quam quod intellexi mathematicos sibi ipsis non constare in illis perquirendis. Primum enim usque adeo incerti sunt de motu Solis et Lunae, ut nec vertentis anni perpetuam magnitudinem demonstrare et observare possint. Deinde in constituendis motibus cum illarum tum aliarum quinque errantium stellarum neque iisdem principiis et assumptionibus ac apparentium revolutionum motuumque demonstrationibus utuntur. Alii namque circulis homocentris solum, alii eccentris et epicyclis, quibus tamen quaesita ad plenum non assequuntur. Nam qui homocentris confisi sunt, etsi motus aliquos diversos ex eis componi posse demonstraverint, nihil tamen certi, quod nimirum phaenomenis responderet, inde statuere potuerunt. Qui vero excogitaverunt eccentrica, etsi magna ex parte apparentes motus congruentibus per ea numeris absolvisse videantur, pleraque tamen interim admiserunt, quae primis principiis de motus aequalitate videntur contravenire. Rem quoque praecipuam, hoc est mundi formam ac partium eius certam symmetriam, non potuerunt invenire vel ex illis colligere, sed accidit eis, perinde ac si quis e diversis locis manus, pedes, caput aliaque membra optime quidem, sed non unius corporis comparatione depicta sumeret, nullatenus invicem sibi respondentibus, ut monstrum potius quam homo ex illis componeretur. Itaque in processu demonstrationis quam μέθοδον vocant, vel praeteriisse aliquid necessariorum vel alienum quid et ad rem minime pertinens admisisse inveniuntur. Id quod illis minime accidisset, si certa principia secuti essent. Nam si assumptae illorum hypotheses non essent fallaces, omnia quae ex illis sequuntur, verificarentur proculdubio. Obscura autem licet haec sint, quae nunc dico, tamen suo loco fient apertiora.

Hanc igitur incertitudinem mathematicarum traditionum de colligendis motibus sphaerarum orbis cum diu mecum revolverem, coepit me taedere, quod nulla certior ratio motuum machinae mundi, qui propter nos ab optimo et regularissimo omnium opifice conditus esset, philosophis constaret, qui alioqui rerum minutissima respectu eius orbis tam exquisite scrutarentur. Quare hanc mihi operam sumpsi, ut omnium philosophorum, quos habere possem, libros relegerem, indagaturus anne ullus unquam opinatus esset alios esse motus

sphaerarum mundi quam illi ponerent, qui in scholis mathemata profiterentur. Ac repperi quidem apud Ciceronem primum Nicetum sensisse terram moveri. Postea et apud Plutarchum inueni quosdam alios in ea fuisse opinione, cuius verba, ut sint omnibus obvia, placuit hic adscribere: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι μένειν τὴν γῆν, Φιλόλαος δὲ κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι περὶ τὸ πῦρ κατὰ κύκλου λοξοῦ ὁμοιοτρόπως ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ. Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἐκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τῆν γῆν, οὐ μήν γε μεταβατικῶς τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπὶ ἀνατολάς, περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον.

Inde igitur occasionem nactus coepi et ego de terrae mobilitate cogitare. Et quamvis absurda opinio videbatur, tamen quia sciebam aliis ante me hanc concessam libertatem, ut quoslibet fingerent circulos ad demonstrandum phaenomena astrorum, existimavi mihi quoque facile permitti, ut experirer an, posito terrae aliquo motu, firmiores demonstrationes quam illorum essent, inveniri in revolutione orbium caelestium possent.

Atque ita ego positis motibus quos terrae infra in opere tribuo, multa et longa observatione tandem repperi, quod si reliquorum syderum errantium motus ad terrae circulationem conferantur et supputentur pro cuiusque syderis revolutione, non modo illorum phaenomena inde sequantur, sed et syderum atque orbium omnium ordines et magnitudines et caelum ipsum ita connectantur, ut in nulla sui parte possit transponi aliquid sine reliquarum partium ac totius universitatis confusione. Proinde quoque et in progressu operis hunc secutus sum ordinem, ut in primo libro describam omnes positiones orbium cum terrae, quos ei tribuo, motibus, ut is liber contineat communem quasi constitutionem universi. In reliquis vero libris postea confero reliquorum syderum atque omnium orbium motus cum terrae mobilitate, ut inde colligi possit, quatenus reliquorum syderum atque orbium motus et apparentiae salvari possint, si ad terrae motus conferantur. Neque dubito quin ingeniosi atque docti mathematici mihi astipulaturi sint, si quod haec philosophia in primis exigit, non obiter, sed penitus ea quae ad harum rerum demonstrationem a me in hoc opere adferuntur, cognoscere atque expendere voluerint.

Ut vero pariter docti atque indocti viderent me nullius omnino subterfugere iudicium, malui tuae Sanctitati quam cuiquam alteri has meas lucubrationes dedicare, propterea quod et in hoc remotissimo angulo terrae, in quo ego ago, ordinis dignitate et litterarum omnium atque mathematices etiam amore eminentissimus habearis, ut facile tua authoritate et iudicio calumniantium morsus reprimere possis, etsi in proverbio sit non esse remedium adversus sycophantae morsum. Si fortasse erunt ματαιολόγοι qui, cum omnium mathematum ignari sint, tamen de illis iudicium sibi sumunt propter aliquem locum Scripturae male ad suum propositum detortum, ausi fuerint meum hoc institutum reprehendere ac insectari, illos nihil moror, adeo ut etiam illorum iudicium tamquam temerarium contemnam. Non enim obscurum est Lactantium, celebrem alioqui scriptorem, sed mathematicum parum, admodum pueriliter de forma terrae loqui, cum deridet eos, qui terram globi formam habere prodiderunt. Itaque non debet mirum videri studiosis, si qui tales nos etiam ridebunt. Mathemata mathematicis scribuntur, quibus et hi nostri labores, si me non fallit opinio, videbuntur etiam reipublicae ecclesiasticae conducere aliquid, cuius principatum tua Sanc-

titas nunc tenet. Nam non ita multo ante sub Leone X cum in Concilio Lateranensi versabatur quaestio de emendando Calendario Ecclesiastico, quae tum indecisa hanc solummodo ob causam mansit, quod annorum et mensium magnitudines atque Solis et Lunae motus nondum satis dimensi haberentur. Ex quo equidem tempore his accuratius observandis animum intendi admonitus a praeclarissimo viro D. Paulo, episcopo Semproniensi, qui tum isti negotio praeerat. Quid autem praestiterim ea in re, tuae Sanctitatis praecipue atque omnium aliorum doctorum mathematicorum iudicio relinquo, et ne plura de utilitate operis promittere tuae Sanctitati videar quam praestare possim, nunc ad institutum transeo.

JACQUES LEFÈVRE D'ÉTAPLES
HUMANISM AND HERMETICISM IN THE *DE MAGIA NATURALI*

Jan R. Veenstra

The last decades of the fifteenth century and the first decades of the sixteenth are a period of great intellectual vacillation. The debates of that era were dominated by the time-honoured differences and frictions between Platonism and Aristotelianism, but both philosophical currents underwent radical rejuvenations. Humanist scholarship and the printing press aided a renewed upsurge of the Averroist controversy[1] in peripatetic quarters, and the followers of Plato were well served by the recently discovered doctrines of Hermes Trismegistus. An Aristotle scholar such as Agostino Nifo saw to the publication of important Averroist works, and Pietro Pomponazzi radicalised the Averroist controversy with the publication of his immortality treatise. Such radicalism rarely met with general approval, and it is telling that someone like Nicoletto Vernia (a teacher of both Nifo and Pomponazzi) was scared off by ecclesiastical censure. In 1489 he published an Averroist treatise which greatly upset the bishop of Padua (Pietro Barozzi), so that Vernia retracted his positions a few years later (in 1492) in an anti-Averroist treatise for which the bishop obligingly provided a preface in 1499.[2] Platonism likewise had its radical *avant garde*, first and foremost in the persons of Ficino and Pico. Its radicalism, however, did not manifest itself in the logical deduction of undesirable consequences from philosophical premises, but rather in the abstruse claims of a totalising world view. One of the lures of Hermetic *omniscience* was the promise of the harmony of all sciences, the foremost being the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. When drawing up his famous theses, the young Giovanni Pico della Mirandola claimed to have studied all schools of philosophy, and the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle was one of his intended projects. Pico had a strong Platonic

[1] Averroes was the most important of the Arabic Aristotle commentators and was chiefly responsible for heated debates on questions concerning the mortality of the soul and the eternity of the world. See the overview of philosophical positions in D. A. Iorio, *The Aristotelians of Renaissance Italy: A Philosophical Exposition* (Lewiston, 1991).

[2] Essential on Vernia is E. P. Mahoney, *Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance: Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo* (Aldershot, 2000). In opposing Averroism, Vernia was influenced by the Platonising tendencies of his age; see J. R. Veenstra, 'Thomas Aquinas and Nicoletto Vernia on the Unity and Plurality of the Intellect', in *Philosophy, Theology, Culture: Problems and Perspectives, Jubilee volume dedicated to the 75th anniversary of Guram Tevzadze*, ed. T. Iremadze, T. Iskhadadze and G. Kheoshvili (Tbilisi, 2007), pp. 128-141.

inclination to begin with, so that Hermetic thought and ideals came to him quite naturally. But even sceptical minds could fall for Hermeticism. Agostino Steuco da Gubbio (one of Pomponazzi's students), after writing books against Platonic theology and kabbalah, became quite an adept of the *prisca theologia*. Awareness, however, that not all angels in Plato's or Hermes's heaven are Christian, did on occasion cause the more heated enthusiasm for Hermetic and Platonic doctrines to chill. Pico is again a case in point, for instead of rejoicing in the easy and happy harmony of the celestial and terrestrial worlds, elaborating on the correspondences and medicinal cures for procuring health and happiness, he wrote, at the end of his life, the incisive *Disputations against divinatory astrology*, quite rightly called the 'most extensive attack on astrology that the world had yet seen'.[3] A comparable change of heart can be witnessed in the scholar who is the focus of this contribution, namely the French humanist and Bible translator Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (c. 1460-1536).

Lefèvre visited Italy in 1491-92, where he met Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro, and where he underwent the influence of Marsilio Ficino, whom (so he would confess later) he venerated as a father. In the years that followed, his scholarly production moved across the philosophical spectrum of Aristotelianism and Platonism where Pico had aspired to forge a harmony that more critical minds would deem impossible. Lefèvre wrote a number of textbooks on Aristotle such as an *Introduction to metaphysics*, *Paraphrases* of Aristotle's natural philosophy, an *Introduction to Aristotle's Ethics* and a commentary on Sacrobosco's *De Sphaera*. He also wrote a commentary on Ficino's *Pimander* and a lengthy treatise on natural magic, the *De magia naturali*.[4] It is this latter work, breathing the spirit of Ficino's *De vita*, from which Lefèvre distanced himself in later years. As with Vernia, an official censure, in this case the condemnation of all occult arts by the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris on 19 February 1494, compelled Lefèvre to refrain from ever publishing his book on magic. Arguably, it may also have triggered a

[3] See S. Vanden Broecke, *The Limits of Influence: Pico, Louvain, and the Crisis of Renaissance Astrology* (Leiden, 2003), p. 2.

[4] Essential publications for this topic are L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, vol. 4 (New York, 1934), pp. 512-517; A. Renaudet, 'Un problème historique: la pensée religieuse de J. Lefèvre d'Étaples', in: *idem, Humanisme et Renaissance* (Genève, 1958), pp. 201-216; E. F. Rice, 'The *De magia naturali* of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples', in *Philosophy and Humanism: Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, ed. E. P. Mahoney (Leiden, 1976), pp. 19-29; E. F. Rice, 'Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and the medieval Christian mystics', in *Florilegium Historiale: Essays presented to Wallace K. Ferguson*, ed. J. G. Rowe and W. H. Stockdale (Toronto, 1971), pp. 89-124; L. Pierozzi and J.-M. Mandosio, 'L'interprétation alchimique de deux travaux d'Hercule dans le *De magia naturali* de Lefèvre d'Étaples', in *Chrysopœia*, tome 5 (1992-1996), pp. 190-264 (this article contains three chapters: L. Pierozzi, 'Le *De magia naturali* de Lefèvre d'Étaples'; *De magia naturali* III,6 et IV,18, Textes édités et traduits par L. Pierozzi et J.-M. Mandosio; J.-M. Mandosio, 'Commentaire'). An illustrated overview of Lefèvre's editorial work can be found in T. Harmsen, *'Drink from this fountain': Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, inspired humanist and dedicated editor*, exhibition catalogue of the Bibliotheca Philosophica Hermetica (Amsterdam, 2004).

gradual disenchantment on his part with the intended project of his book. A cursory glance at the many tables and figures detailing the correspondences between celestial and sublunar bodies will give readers the impression that the *De magia* is essentially a book on astrological medicine. This is only partly true, since at the very beginning of the work Lefèvre speaks of natural philosophers as magi, whose discipline comprises on the one hand theoretical science and on the other natural magic. Whatever astrological, medical or even alchemical knowledge was collected to add to the substance of the treatise, its operative value is always subsumed under a general and elevated notion of what a magus actually is. Especially the second book of the *De magia naturali* contributes to this notion as it gathers Neoplatonic, Hermetic and Pythagorean doctrines to suggest that the magician is an initiate in divine mysteries. These, rather than the doctrines on heavenly and earthly correspondences, helped to create an image of the magus as a philosopher, physician, astronomer and theologian in one,[5] – an image which Lefèvre later sought to supplant by the image of a scholar devoid of mystical experience himself, but nevertheless a careful student of a more orthodox Dionysian mysticism. In discussing Lefèvre's ideas on magic and his rejection of magic a decade after he had written the *De magia naturali*, I focus on the Hermetic claims in the second book of the treatise, since it is precisely the combination of operative science and the ideal of the magus that contributed to Lefèvre's later disenchantment.

Lefèvre's *De magia naturali* is extent in four manuscripts, two of which contain only a fragment of the text.[6] The third is a Vatican Library manuscript (MS Reg. Lat. 1115), formerly in the possession of Queen Christina of Sweden, and the fourth is a manuscript from the University Library of Olomouc (M I 119) in the Czech Republic. Though the incipit of the *De magia* makes clear that it is a text in six books, the Vatican manuscript only contains the first four, whereas the Olomouc copy is complete. This latter manuscript is by far the most reliable, since it predates the Vatican copy by thirty years and was written a year after Lefèvre's death. On top of that the Czech manuscript is easy to read whereas the Vatican book (already judged a difficult book to handle by Thorndike and Rice) is in its present condition gradually decomposing as a result of ink corrosion. Nevertheless, both manuscripts are important witnesses to the reception and interpretation of the *De magia*. Two incipits in the Vatican manuscript make clear that the book was written by Josef Zgłobiczki at the behest of the Hungarian humanist Andreas Dudith of Orehowicze. Zgłobiczki compiled the work in the period from January to March 1569 and incorporated works by Johannes of Glogonia of the University of Krakow, such as the *Canon of the Fixed Stars* and the *Introduction to the Science of Nativities* and similar astro-

[5] Rice, 'The *De magia naturali*' (as in n. 4), p. 26.

[6] On the sources, see L. Pierozzi, 'Le *De magia naturali*' (as in n. 4), pp. 193-194. Brussels, Bibliothèque royale de Belgique, ms. lat. 10875, contains a fragment (one chapter); Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 7454, contains only book I of the *De magia*. A critical edition of the complete *De magia naturali*, based essentially on the Olomouc manuscript, is being prepared by Jean-Marc Mandosio.

nomical works. The *De magia* is at the very beginning, followed by the *Elucidarius Magiae* of Peter of Abano – a work related to, although not identical with, the *Heptameron or Magical Elements* reprinted frequently in the apocryphal *Fourth Book of Occult Philosophy* attributed to Agrippa of Nettesheim. Though Lefèvre took great care to dissociate his treatise on natural magic from talismans, characters and incantations, its immediate context in Zgłobiczki's copy makes it clear that the treatise was seen as standing midway between scientific astrology and nigromancy. This is further reinforced by the Olomouc manuscript from 1538, which contains the *Liber Quadripartiti Hermetis de quindecim stellis fixis, de quindecim lapidibus pretiosis totidemque herbis et characteribus*, followed, next, by the *Liber Thebit Benchorath* (Thabit ibn-Qurra) *de imaginibus astronomie* and, thirdly, by the *Picatrix*. The first page of the manuscript contains a general title or epithet: *Nigromanticus*.

The *De magia*, written in the early nineties, is dedicated to Lefèvre's patron Germain de Ganay (d. 1520), at that time canon of Notre-Dame de Paris and a correspondent of Ficino. De Ganay had a lively interest in astrology and natural magic, but the fact that he was also *conseiller clerc* to the *Parlement de Paris* at a time when court astrologer Simon de Phares was condemned and his books confiscated on charges of demonic magic,[7] should make us aware that the fine distinction between natural and demonic magic did not in practice amount to much. It may be an additional explanation why Lefèvre in later years grew dissatisfied with his earlier Hermetic interests and quite bluntly stated (in 1504) that 'no magic is good magic'.[8] In the first book of his treatise, he makes a distinction between the *fascinationes bonorum* (which should be coveted) and the *fascinationes malorum* (which should be avoided, as one avoids a contagious disease)[9] but the workings of such enchantments are essentially based on natural principles of sympathy, attraction and correspondence. Thus the weeping eyes of a mourner draw tears from the eyes of another person, just as the wise Socrates drew many people to the study of philosophy. Likewise the company of saints will sanctify one, as the company of the perverse will pervert one. The fact that the operative principles of both good and evil enchantments (and in-

[7] On Simon de Phares, see: J.-P. Boudet, *Lire dans le ciel: la bibliothèque de Simon de Phares astrologue du XVe siècle* (Bruxelles, 1994); *Le Recueil des plus célèbres astrologues de Simon de Phares*, ed. J.-P. Boudet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1997-1999); also J. Veenstra, 'By the light of the stars: authorised history and astrology in the *Élucidaire* of Simon de Phares', in *The Growth of Authority in the Medieval West*, ed. M. Gosman, A. J. Vanderjagt, and J. R. Veenstra (Groningen, 1999), pp. 153-171.

[8] Rice, 'The *De magia naturali*' (as in n. 4), p. 26. Lefèvre made these remarks in the preface to his edition of the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitiones Petri apostoli* (1504). See E. F. Rice, *The Prefatory Epistles of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Related Texts* (New York, London, 1972), p. 118: *Primum namque magiae ludificamenta confutat, ne quis postmodum errorum suorum confugia sub alicuius magiae velamento quaerat; nam profecto nulla bona est, et figmentum est ullam esse naturalem ullamve bonam, et eorum qui sub honesto nomine nequitiarum suarum ad multorum perniciem velamenta quaerunt*.

[9] Olomouc, University Library, M I 119, *De magia naturali* II.10, fols. 191v-192r.

cantations) are both similar and natural, can cause the magus quite naturally to decline into the practices of demonic magic and nigromancy. Lefèvre does not say this, but it is a consequence of his argument, which later led him to reject the concept of magic altogether.

The first book of the *De magia* relies heavily on Ficino's *De vita* (as well as on the *Platonic Theology* and the *De amore*) and has been looked upon as a significant first step in introducing Ficinian doctrines in France. Lefèvre postulates a universal sympathetic correspondence between the active and masculine celestial world (which, with a reference to the Chaldaean magi, he imagines to be a gigantic living animal comprising the signs of the Zodiac) and the passive and feminine terrestrial world which absorbs the influences from above. The magus, a practitioner of natural magic, has the knowledge necessary to apply the influences and virtues of the stars to the greatest possible advantage.

The more practical information of medical astrology is supplemented in books three and four by theoretical expositions on the history and contents of classical astrology. Lefèvre comments on the properties and influences of planets and constellations, makes numerous references to classical mythology, and in books five and six provides long and extensive tables detailing the relations between constellations and the Zodiac and their influence on provinces, cities, islands, mountains and forests. All this is done in humanist fashion, as Lefèvre relies heavily on Manilius's *Astronomica*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Pliny's *Natural history*. In a way the contents of these books could easily be read as a treatise on natural philosophy (with a strong emphasis on astrology) written by an erudite humanist, rather than as a book of magic. This issue was addressed by Richard Kieckhefer, who noted that Ficino's *De vita* came to be seen by its author and its readers as a book of magic only after Ficino had added an *Apologia* in which he defended himself against accusations of dabbling in the occult, by vindicating good (meaning natural) magic and rejecting bad (meaning demonic) magic. This redefining of natural philosophy was greatly stimulated by Giovanni Pico, who enthusiastically delighted in making grand claims for magic at the expense of pertinent information *about* the actual contents of magic (for which Pico apparently cared little). Kieckhefer argues that the positions of Ficino and Pico mark the beginning of Renaissance magic (being in that sense distinct from medieval magic) and achieve a significant synthesis in Lefèvre's *De magia naturali*.[10] Lefèvre's book contains the type of natural philosophy and medical astrology that Ficino only in the second instance would have recognised as magic, but it also contains the elevated ideal of the magus that someone like Pico could have implemented on any field of knowledge with the intention of turning it into magic.

The magus is therefore more than a doctor or a physicist: he is also a bearer of wisdom and knowledge and it is especially in the second book of the *De magia naturali* that Lefèvre expounds a Neoplatonic and in part Dionysian

[10] R. Kieckhefer, 'Did magic have a Renaissance? An historiographic question revisited', in: *Magic and the Classical Tradition*, ed. C. Burnett and W. Ryan, Warburg Institute Colloquia 7 (London, 2006), pp. 199-212, at pp. 208-211.

cosmology, where the angelic hierarchies are related to the celestial spheres and where planetary influences diversify the natures of souls. Lefèvre makes a point of emphasising the harmony of the *prisca theologia* and Christian theology, which should consolidate the magus's status as a theologian.[11] The magical theology is a remarkable *potpourri* of Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism, scholastic cosmology and even kabbalah, so that it merits our closer attention. Book two takes the form of a dialogue between Lefèvre and his patron Germain de Ganay – from time to time the reader encounters exclamations such as *o Germane* – with intercessions of someone called Judocus (who is actually Josse Clichtove, an adept of numerology and author of a work *On the mystical Meaning of Numbers* (1513), which he dedicated to Germain de Ganay). The text of book two is derivative, certainly in its more enticing sections, and the main sources for this part of *De magia naturali* are Pico's *Conclusiones* and possibly Reuchlin's *De verbo mirifico*.[12]

About the Christian intentions of Lefèvre there need be no doubt. But, as is generally the case with authors undergoing the strong influence of undiluted Neoplatonism, it is significant to explore the extent of their willingness to embrace Neoplatonic (or Hermetic) doctrine. The logic of the Pythagorean frame that Lefèvre adopts, necessarily and quite naturally imposes on his cosmology the concept of the One. Lefèvre calls it the *mens paterna* or *Monas* or *quies nostra* and insists on its Trinitarian structure: *et hec tria unum sunt et inter se equisona*.[13] He also uses the term *Idea* since it denotes the place where all the prototypes (Lefèvre's word) of the created world are gathered. Of particular interest, of course, is the relationship between the divine Monad and the world. Lefèvre consistently uses images of birth and procreation here, such as *nascens, genitus*, or *natus*. The world of intelligibles is generated by the Mind of the Father. Next to a creational path leading away from the Monad there is also the same path leading back. The sympathetic chains that bind the heavens to the earth, are also the *catenae* through which the human mind can ascend,[14] for the minds of mortals have their origin in the Supreme *Idea*. The wording is distinctly Platonic, but the notions that Lefèvre expresses in them need not be heretical since they seem to stay clear of the pantheism that critics of mysticism have thought to detect in – for instance – the *exitus/reditus* concepts in Meister Eckhart. Lefèvre's overt Neoplatonic statements are not a sufficient cause for his later scepticism and can be found in his later works such as his commentary on Hugh of St Victor's *De trinitate* (1510); we have, therefore, to look further.

The Neoplatonism and Pythagorean number symbolism in *De magia naturali* is supplemented in chapter 14 of book two by some of the basic doctrines

[11] *De magia naturali* (as in n. 9), II.10, fols. 213r-215r.

[12] On the basis of an internal reference in the text of *De magia naturali* (to the dauphin Roland), Renaudet dates its composition to between 10 Oct. 1492 and 6 Dec. 1495 (dates of birth and death of the young prince). Reuchlin's book is from 1494. See L. Pierozzi, 'Le *De magia naturali*' (as in n. 4), p. 195.

[13] *De magia naturali* (as in n. 9), II.13, fol. 217r.

[14] *De magia naturali* (as in n. 9), II.4, fols. 201v-203v.

of the kabbalah, which – so Lefèvre argues – Pythagoras had learned when travelling through Egypt and Syria, and which had afforded him knowledge of everything there is to know.[15] The kabbalah of letters is transformed into a secret magic of numbers. The basis of this hidden doctrine is the Tetragrammaton, depicted by Lefèvre with the numbers 10, 5, 6, 5 and the additions and subtractions thereof, for the efficacy of number magic relies entirely on whether or not there is a relation with the four sacred numbers. Their power is made manifest in several miracles, such as Joshua's commanding the Sun to stand still (which he could not have done without some 10-5-6-5 arithmetic) or the addition of 5 (the Hebrew letter *He*) to the name of Abram (which then becomes Abraham) which enabled the patriarch to produce offspring. On top of that, chapter 16 deals with the all-powerful number 326 which is the sum of 10 + 5 + 6 + 5 with 300 added in the middle. This is a somewhat cryptic though thinly disguised rehearsal of Pico's and Reuchlin's Christian-kabbalistic permutation of the Holy Tetragram. 300 is the numerical value of the letter *Shin*, which, inserted in the middle of the divine name, produces the sequence *Yod*, *He*, *Shin*, *Vau*, *He*, which can be read as the name of Jesus: *Jeshuh*. It is the Name that commands the spirits, cures the sick and raises the dead. This is not theological rhetoric, for it is clear that Lefèvre takes it in a very literal sense when he adds that whoever operates the divine name has great power and is made a 'son of God'.[16]

Although Lefèvre's immediate sources are contemporary, the kabbalistic ideas on the power and potency of the divine name are not. By way of comparison I should briefly like to dwell on what is no doubt the earliest Latin manifestation of kabbalistic knowledge, namely the *Liber Semiforas* or *Shemhamphoras*, a translation of which was commissioned by Alfonso X. The Name, so the text explains, enabled Moses to strike Egypt with a series of plagues, to draw water from the rock, to vanquish enemies, to know the secrets of his peo-

[15] *De magia naturali* (as in n. 9), II.14, fol. 217r-v. See Rice, 'The *De magia naturali*' (as in n. 4), p. 27, and L. Pierozzi, 'Le *De magia naturali*' (as in n. 4), pp. 200-203. Rice provides a transcription of the chapter.

[16] *De magia naturali* (as in n. 9), II.16, fol. 218v-220r. The chapter is entitled *Sacramentum inter divinos numeros benedicti* and discusses how the holy tetragram is transformed into a holy pentagram by inserting a *trecentenarius* (meaning the number 300) into what then becomes the *potissimus quinarius* (the number 5). This is illustrated by two small tables, one with the numerical sequence 10-5-6-5, the other one with the sequence 10-5-300-5-5. The penultimate '5' poses a riddle, as one would expect a '6'. Later on Levèfre explains that the *sacramentales numeri* add up (*in una summa*) to produce 326 ('cccxxvj', fol. 219r, last line), so that even though the 10-5-300-5-5 sequence appears in both the Vatican and the Olomouc manuscripts, it may well be a mistake. A pointing finger in the margin of fol. 220r draws the reader's attention to the following passage: *Adde et insuper quod qui credunt in nomine eius potestatem habent ut filii Dei fiant, et hi credunt qui intelligunt.* On the kabbalistic references, see Reuchlin, *De verbo mirifico*, lib. 3, in: Johannes Reuchlin, *De verbo mirifico 1494; De arte cabalistica 1517*, Faksimile-Neudruck (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1964), pp. 92ff. S. A. Farmer, *Syncretism in the West: Pico's 900 Theses (1486). The Evolution of Traditional Religious and Philosophical Systems* (Tempe, Arizona, 1998), pp. 526-527 (thesis 11>14).

ple and to do whatever he wished, whether good or evil. Likewise, anyone operating the Name can acquire similar powers.[17] Another *Shemhamphoras*-text, in the *Summa sacre magice* by Berengario Ganell, a compendium of magical texts from the mid-fourteenth century, provides an elaborate image of a *tabula schemhamphoras*, in which the tetragram *Yod*, *He*, *Vau*, *He* is in the very centre of a square, the outer edges of which contain the alphabets of four languages: Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Latin.[18] The square has a patterned design with angel names along several lines which connect to the four edges, suggesting that the Name empowers the very building blocks of these languages and makes all incantations in these tongues efficacious. This teaching implies a distinctly 'anti-Saussurian' conception of language: instead of an arbitrary sign system devised for a tentative approach to reality, language (in the sense of letters, words and sentences) here constitutes the very essence of things and is capable of *creating* reality. This is certainly a notion that pervades the *De magia naturali*. Lefèvre combines a theory of magically empowered letters and words with a theory of numbers that is elegantly woven into his elaborate study of the harmony of the celestial and terrestrial worlds. The aim of magic is the study of the *occulti eventus naturae*, the 'hidden effects of nature', that may then be applied to the advancement of the human condition. These applications range from medicine and physics to divine knowledge and ecstatic experiences. Knowledge of numbers, words and sympathetic chains derived from Hermes and the Neoplatonists should sufficiently equip the magus for a grand task.

Lefèvre's later rejection of magic is most likely based on the operative implications of esoteric knowledge, which would place the magus on a par with Old Testament prophets and sages. If Lefèvre's work is a synthesis of Ficino and Pico, it is not so much the knowledge of astrological medicine and Christian kabbalah that would worry Lefèvre, but more particularly the elevated claims of the abilities and powers that this knowledge would impart to its practitioners. It is not Pico's learning that is at issue, but rather his enthusiasm; not Ficino's philosophy, but his apology. In any assessment of Lefèvre's wholesale rejection of magic (which he expressed in the prefatory epistle to his edition of

[17] A copy of the *Liber Semiphoras* can be found in a manuscript in Halle, 14 B 36, fols. 244-249; at fol. 244: *Et Semiphoras dicitur nomen secretum, purum, magnum, antiquum, celatum et occultum, et nomen magne virtutis et potestatis ad complendum et perficiendum omnia que facere volueris.* […] *Dixit Salomon: Ego inveni Semiphoras, cum quo Moyses fecit plagas in Egypto, et cum quo desiccavit mare Rubrum, et cum quo produxit aqua de petra, et cum quo transivit desertum, et cum quo sciebat omnia secreta populi sui, et cum quo devincit reges et principes et potentes, et cum quo perfectus omnia que voluit facere et complere et destruxit omnia que voluit destruere, et cum quo complevit omnia que voluit de bono et de malo.* Cf. J.-P. Boudet, *Entre science et nigromance: astrologie, divination et magie dans l'Occident médiéval (XIIe-XVe siècle)* (Paris, 2006), pp. 196-197.

[18] The manuscript is Kassel, University Library, 4° astron. 3; an edition by Damaris Gehr is forthcoming. My 'Honorius and the Sigil of God: The *Liber iuratus* in Berengario Ganell's *Summa sacre magice*' will appear in Claire Fanger's forthcoming volume on angel magic. The *tabula* is on fol. 38r (L.2.f.15).

the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitiones* from 1504), one should bear in mind that his retraction did not concern his continuing interest in the ancient theology (a year later, in 1505, he would publish an edition[19] of the *Pimander* and the *Asclepius*), but that henceforth he would cease to look upon this body of knowledge as magic. As with many of his contemporaries, vacillation of mind could be imputed to Lefèvre, but his was quite unlike the retraction published by Agrippa of Nettesheim in his *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum*.[20] Lefèvre, of course, had only spoken of natural magic, but even there the very idea of magic had assumed radical implications that Lefèvre no longer wished to support.

The age of radical intellectual inquiry in which Lefèvre lived had distinctly anti-metaphysical and schismatic tendencies: the Reformation with its humanistically inspired *sola scriptura*-doctrine on the one hand and a strong scientific naturalism arising in part from the renewed Averroistic controversy on the other hand, were the final results. In reaction to this, a zealous desire for harmony, a sympathetic bond between heaven and earth, and – probably more to the point – a renewed marriage between theology and science was occasioned by the Hermetic and Neoplatonic theologies of the end of the fifteenth century. It is no doubt the promise or ideal of countering the impending breakdown of the intellectual system that triggered Lefèvre's enthusiasm for natural magic. When one looks at Lefèvre's later works – his editions of Hildegard of Bingen's *Scivias*, the visions of Elizabeth of Schönau, the works of Lull, Ruysbroeck, Dionysius and Cusanus – it is evident that his interest in mysticism, negative theology and the *docta ignota*, were to outlast his interest in Hermeticism, and were probably at the background of this interest in the first place. We can find its reflection in his theory of knowledge (notably in his commentary on Hugh of St Victor) which states that man knows through his senses (like animals), but can supplement and transcend this limited knowledge through his reason and discursive thought, which, in turn, can be transcended by the intellect which man shares with the angels, and which Lefèvre equates with the notion of 'faith' of the later Reformers, since the intellect is open to the divine inspiration of intelligible forms. This is a path of knowledge and development that one can find in Pico's *Oratio* and that is entirely in line with Lefèvre's own humanist educational programme, which, in his own time, was his main claim

[19] See Lefèvre's prefatory epistle in Rice, *The Prefatory Epistles* (as in n. 8), pp. 133-134.

[20] Agrippa wrote his *De incertitudine et vanitate* around 1527, under somewhat desperate circumstances. He explicitly stated in chapter 48: 'But of magic I wrote whilst I was very young three large books, which I called *Of Occult Philosophy*, in which what was then through the curiosity of my youth erroneous, I now, being more advised, am willing to have retracted, by this recantation'. An English translation of Agrippa's retraction of magic was published as an appendix in Agrippa, *Three Books of Occult Philosophy*, transl. J. Freake, ed. D. Tyson (St. Paul, 1998), pp. 689-708, at. p. 706. It is unlikely that Agrippa was entirely serious about his recantation. See the remarks by V. Perrone Compagni, in the introduction to Cornelius Agrippa, *De occulta philosophia*, ed. V. Perrone Compagni (Leiden, 1992), pp. 49-50.

to fame. In this programme Aristotelian metaphysics (Lefèvre's earlier works on Aristotle were all educational textbooks) serves as a stepping stone for the study of Scripture and the theologians, and so should prepare the student for the heights of contemplation in Cusanus and Dionysius.[21]

Hermeticism does not have an important place in this list. Its blind and idealistic faith in the magical power of words and numbers to manipulate the sympathetic chains of creation ceased to enthral Lefèvre. Neither did its practical implications satisfy Lefèvre's contemplative needs. Hermeticism for Lefèvre resembles Wittgenstein's ladder, which after it has been used can be discarded and thrown away. The same would happen with Aristotle and other thinkers, as Lefèvre would move more and more in the direction of a Scripture-based Christian humanism.[22] This radical change of mind is a turning away from articulate scholarship towards a silent knowledge of God.

[21] Rice, 'Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and the medieval Christian mystics' (as in n. 4), pp. 94-103.

[22] This point is made by E. F. Rice, 'Humanist Aristotelianism in France: Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and his Circle', in ***Humanism in France at the end of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance***, ed. A. H. T. Levi (Manchester, 1970), pp. 132-149, at p. 144.

HUMANIST WRITING AND EDUCATION

DUTCH HUMANISTS AND THE MEDIEVAL PAST

Peter Raedts

When present-day Dutchmen meditate on their national past, they usually turn either to the Golden Age, the age of Dutch dominion, or to the Second World War, the years of struggle for freedom and democracy. The medieval past hardly plays a part in Dutch national memory. At first sight that does not seem surprising, because the Dutch state did not come into existence until the second half of the sixteenth century, as a product of the struggle against Spain, and the short moment of glory of that state was in the seventeenth century. So there seems no reason at all why the Dutch should take an interest in the medieval past. Yet, it was not always so. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many Dutch humanists were passionately interested in the medieval past of the lands that would become the Republic of the Seven Provinces. To them it was obvious that the modern nation was deeply rooted in the Middle Ages and that its modern history was incomprehensible without taking the medieval past into account.

The main reason why Dutch humanists studied medieval history was to gain a better understanding of the position of the Church and of the state in their own days. In that, they were not much different from humanist scholars elsewhere. Everywhere in Europe the controversy between Protestants and Catholics and the development of more centralised monarchies heightened the interest in the medieval past, and the latter was ransacked for arguments to support the different positions in the religious and political struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Dutch merely gave the debate a twist of their own. In the Republic, religious controversy was not between Protestants and Catholics, but between liberal and orthodox Calvinists about the right interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of grace. To give a historical perspective to that question, it was hardly necessary to look for medieval precedents. The liberal party, the Remonstrants or Arminians, did sometimes use historical arguments to make their point, but these were usually drawn from the Church Fathers, mainly Augustine. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the orthodox minister Jacobus Trigland (1583-1654) decided to give a historical survey of the controversy, in his polemical writings against the Arminian Johannes Wtenbogaert (1557-1644), but the only medieval theologian he mentioned was the Groningen humanist Wessel Gansfort (1419-1489), who, in some of his writ-

ings, seemed to have anticipated the stricter position in the debate on predestination.[1]

The only one who wrote extensively about the medieval Church in the Netherlands was the Arminian minister Gerard Brandt (1626-1685), in his classical work *Historie der Reformatie* [*History of the Reformation*], the first part of which was published in 1671. A modern historian observed that Brandt did not really manage to come to grips with the medieval past and that, therefore, he could not do much more than give an incoherent summary of the abuses of the Church of Rome.[2] But such a verdict does not do justice to Brandt's narrative skills. It is quite true that in the sixty pages which he devotes to the development of the medieval Church, he pays a great deal of attention to unsavoury practices in the old Church, but the list is far from arbitrary. To discover the logic in Brandt's story, one of his earlier publications must be taken into account. A few years before he started on the *History*, he had published a didactic poem called *De vreedzame Christen* [*The Peaceable Christian*], in which he engaged in an extensive discussion on the relation between Church and state. From the poem it becomes clear that Brandt, like so many other irenical Christians in the seventeenth century, was convinced that only a strong civil government could see to it that all the various churches and sects of Christendom did not try to wipe each other out but should learn to live peacefully together. In other words, tolerance was only possible, in Brandt's eyes, if a strong state, preferably governed by an absolute prince, forced the Christian communities to leave each other alone. Brandt himself was, perhaps unsurprisingly, a great admirer of the English king Charles I and his archbishop, William Laud, who both died a martyr's death for their faith in an all-embracing Christian Church. In our eyes it is a curious concept of tolerance, but in the context of the seventeenth century it makes perfect sense.[3]

We cannot understand the medieval part of the *History* if we do not keep in mind this notion of forced tolerance. Again and again Brandt emphasises that the Church, if left to its own devices, is bound irrevocably to lapse into fanaticism and corruption and that only a paternal, yet firm supervision by the secular authorities can keep the Church and its ministers on the right track. Thus he approves wholeheartedly of bishop William of Utrecht (r. 1057-1076), who during the Investiture Contest remained absolutely loyal to the Holy Roman Emperor, and who in his sermons called the Pope a breaker of oaths, an adul-

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[1] Jacobus Trigland, *Kerckelycke geschiedenissen, begrypende de swaere en bekommerlijcke geschillen, in de Vereenigde Nederlanden voor-gevallen,* [...] *tot nodige onderrichtinge* (Leiden, 1650), pp. 118-119.

[2] S. Zilverberg, "Gerard Brandt als kerkhistoricus", *Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis*, n.s. 49 (1968), pp. 37-58, see p. 49.

[3] J. van Eijnatten, "Lodestar of latitude. Gerardt Brandt's Peaceable Christian, c. 1664, irenicism and religious dissent", *Lias: Sources and documents relating to the early modern history of ideas* 26 (1999), pp. 57-75, esp. pp. 69-70, 74-75, where he contests the view that Brandt belonged to the forefathers of the modern idea of tolerance.

terer and a false apostle.[4] Unfortunately, later bishops of Utrecht proved less principled. They tried to humiliate secular princes and behaved more and more like little popes in their own diocese.[5] One of the first who protested against the abuse of power by the Church was the archdeacon of Tournai, Henry of Ghent, the well-known philosopher, who in 1291 strongly denounced the wealth of ecclesiastical institutions. His accusation gave the count of Flanders, Guy of Dampierre, in 1294 good reason to issue a decree in which he explicitly forbade the clergy to acquire new property in the county of Flanders. In 1328 count William III of Holland issued a similar decree to keep the power of the clergy within strictly defined limits.[6]

City authorities, too, began to take their responsibilities. In 1383 the town council of Zierikzee intervened when a monk in a local monastery stabbed one of his colleagues to death. The whole community was expelled from the town and replaced by new monks, who did not prove to be more virtuous. Maybe the new monks were guilty of the same crime Brandt denounced elsewhere in his book, where he related with obvious pleasure that in another monastery "randy monks" spiced the liturgy with "frisky songs to titillate the senses".[7] In 1462 the Amsterdam town council gave short shrift to the popular preacher Jan Brugman, who wanted to found a new Franciscan convent in the city against all existing rules. When Brugman did not get his way with the council, he stirred up the people with weepy sermons in which he tried to make the crowds feel sorry for his "poor, shabby little brothers" who only wanted to establish a "tiny, humble dwelling" that would cost almost nothing. To his evident satisfaction, Brandt concluded that Brugman "did not finish his life in Amsterdam".[8]

Duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy (r. 1467-1477) was a prince of whom Brandt wholeheartedly approved. He deserved his nickname "the Bold" not just for his bravery in war, but perhaps even more because he was the first prince in the Netherlands who not only put an end to the accumulation of possessions by the clergy, but who also had the courage to demand that even the property of clerics had to be taxed. This caused much outcry and confusion in the land and law suits were filed in all courts up to the Supreme Court in Malines. But the duke was determined to go ahead with his plans, and he would certainly have succeeded had he not died so young.[9]

These are just a few examples of the sort of stories that Brandt collected. But they all have the same bottom line: in the Middle Ages it was the secular government which time and again saved the Church from itself and forced it to take a humane and more moderate course. There can be no doubt that Brandt hoped that with his book and his didactic poem he would be able to convince

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[4] Gerard Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie en andere kerkelyke geschiedenissen in en ontrent de Nederlanden* (Amsterdam, 1677[2]), vol. 1, p. 10

[5] Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie* (as in n. 4), p. 22.

[6] Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie* (as in n. 4), p. 25.

[7] Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie* (as in n. 4), pp. 27, 34 ("veele dertele liederen [...] tot opritsing van 't vleesch").

[8] Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie* (as in n. 4), pp. 43-49, quotations 47, 49.

[9] Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie* (as in n. 4), pp. 50-51.

the Dutch government to give more breathing space to his own Remonstrant movement and to protect it from the hostility of the ruling Reformed Church.

The second reason why humanists discussed the medieval past, despite their professed aversion, was political. The struggle concerning the centralisation of government, the loss of independence on the part of the nobility and the cities, the beginning of a first sense of patriotism, in all of these the history of the Middle Ages could provide valuable arguments and precedents. That was especially true in the case of the Northern Netherlands. The Republic of the Seven United Provinces was a completely new state, an unprecedented, and impossible fact in the sixteenth century. The Dutch state came into existence somewhere between 1581, the year of the proclamation of the Act of Abjuration (*Plakkaat van Verlatinge*), and 1609, the beginning of the Twelve Years Truce. It was not until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that the Dutch State was formally recognised as an independent state. One might wonder, what legitimacy did the new state have? There could be no juridical doubt whatsoever that king Philip II of Spain was the legitimate prince in all the Dutch provinces. He was the rightful heir to the sovereign rights of the dukes of Brabant and of Gelderland, of the counts of Holland and Flanders and of all the other princes in the Netherlands. With what justification had the citizens of these provinces abjured their true prince? Were they not simply rebels who needed to be taught a lesson? These were questions that touched upon the sheer *raison d'être* of the young republic, and they are questions that needed an urgent answer.

Another complication was that the constitution of the new state was peculiar, to say the least. In the years after 1581 the rebellious States General tried everywhere to find a new sovereign. William of Orange was invited to become head of state, but when he refused, the French duke of Anjou and the English count of Leicester were approached. It is certain that the two foreign gentlemen turned down the invitation, because accepting it would have cast doubt on the legitimate authority of their own sovereign princes, which was, of course unthinkable. What other differences of opinion kings might have, on the issue of legitimate government they could never disagree.[10] When all efforts to find a sovereign had finally failed, the States General decided to act as sovereign themselves. The result of that unexpected move was a political and institutional monstrosity that had no equal in Europe, not even in the Republic of Venice. It was therefore crucial for the Dutch to show, first, that the rebellion against the king of Spain had been legitimate, because the king had not respected the ancient liberties and privileges of the Dutch, and second, that the political and institutional structure of the Republic was neither new nor peculiar, but rooted in ancient traditions, which had been trampled upon by tyrannical princes such as Charles V and Philip II. It was essential to develop a correct perspective regarding the medieval past of the young state to prove that it was perfectly able to take its rightful place among the most ancient and venerable realms of Europe.

[10] J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1995), p. 219.

To prove their case, the defenders of the Republic availed themselves of tales that had been circulating for more than a century, tales concerning the ancient Germanic inhabitants of the Netherlands, the Batavians. From the beginning of the sixteenth century humanists such as Erasmus (1469-1536) and Cornelius Aurelius (c. 1460-1531) had described the Batavians, praised by Tacitus for their courage and sense of freedom, as the ancestors of the modern Dutch. That story proved a perfect historical justification when the Dutch rose in revolt against Spain. Just as the ancestors of the Dutch had defended their independence against the Romans, so did their brave descendants throw off the unbearable yoke of the Spaniards. William of Orange and later his sons Maurice and Frederick Henry were repeatedly compared with Julius or Claudius Civilis, the leader of the Batavian rebellion against Rome.[11] But it was Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who really established the Batavian myth as the secure foundation of the new Dutch state. In 1610 he published his *Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae*, translated into Dutch in the same year, in which he showed with a wealth of arguments that the Dutch constitution of his own days had been unchanged since Batavian times.[12] To make things easier, he identified the Dutch state with the County of Holland. Apparently the fact that the States of Holland were more than sixteen hundred years old was sufficient proof for the respectability of the whole of the Republic.

Closely following Tacitus, Grotius argues that the Batavians loved their freedom so much that they could hardly bear to have a king as their leader. Whenever in a case of emergency they did elect a king, he was always answerable to a council of *optimates* which was composed of *principes* and representatives of the people. It was the council, not the king, in which the highest authority was vested. So far nothing new. Like all other northern humanists, who also had their wisdom from Tacitus, Grotius believed in what was usually called Gothic freedom, by which he meant that sense of freedom that distinguished the Germanic peoples so favourably from the tyrannical habits of the Romans. But then Grotius gives the argument an unexpected twist of his own. What made the Batavians different from all other Germanic peoples was that they lived in towns and not in the country, with the inevitable consequence that the representatives of the people were elected from the town councils. So the highest authority in the land was composed of the aristocracy and a select number of town magistrates. By entrusting the care of the state to this exalted body the people themselves were free to till the soil, to put their cattle out to pasture, to go fishing and to engage in trade. It was not unlike Plato's republic *quam*

[11] S. Langereis, *Geschiedenis als ambacht. Oudheidkunde in de Gouden Eeuw: Arnoldus Buchelius en Petrus Scriverius* (Hilversum, 2001), p. 207.

[12] E. Kossmann, "In praise of the Dutch Republic: some seventeenth-century attitudes", in: E. Kossmann, *Politieke theorie en geschiedenis. Verspreide opstellen en voordrachten* (Amsterdam, 1987), pp. 161-175, 171-173. Kossmann doubts whether Grotius took his own treatise very seriously. H. Nellen, *Hugo de Groot. Een leven in strijd om de vrede* (Amsterdam, 2007), pp. 97-99, thinks that Grotius spoke from youthful exuberance, and that he later back-pedalled. Be that as it may, his treatise had an incredible impact on subsequent Dutch historians and on the Dutch public in general.

optimates regunt cum plebis consensione [which is governed by the best with the approval of the people].[13] It is probably not a coincidence that the composition and role of the Batavian council is suspiciously similar to that of the States of Holland in the years around 1600.

A second point that Grotius wishes to make is that the Batavians had always remained independent. They were never subjected by the Romans and had always dealt with them on equal terms. When the Romans tried to conquer the Batavians in the year 70, the Batavians rose in revolt under the command of Julius Civilis to defend their independence. Grotius has no doubt that they succeeded, although Tacitus' story breaks off before he gets to the outcome of the struggle. The sovereignty of the council and independence from all foreign authority are the two points which Grotius deems characteristic of Dutch history from the times of the Batavians till his own day.[14] The history of the medieval period is in his eyes the best proof of that continuity.

The Franks never got any further than Utrecht. All land north of Utrecht remained free and the inhabitants of the coastal regions of Holland succeeded in maintaining their ancient Batavian constitution unimpaired.[15] Even in the days of the Holy Roman Empire, Holland preserved its independence. The counts of Holland were never vassals of the emperor; they were sovereign princes in their own territory. The best proof of that sovereignty was that the house of Holland allied itself in marriage to the most powerful dynasties in Europe, even to the imperial family in Constantinople.[16] The point that Grotius wants to make is clear: Holland may have been small, but it was an ancient state that was treated on an equal footing with all the other sovereign states of Europe. The rebellion against Spain brought nothing new, only the restoration of an ancient sovereignty that had been temporarily lost and had now been recovered.

Just as Holland maintained its independence through the centuries, so it also managed to preserve its ancient constitution unchanged. To prove this, Grotius had to come up with rather tortuous arguments, because even he could not deny that there were no counts of Holland before 900. What he did was to present the counts of Holland as a new version of the Batavian kings. Just as in the old days the council elected a king in times of national emergency, so in the late ninth century, in view of the threat posed by the Vikings, the council once again was to elect a strong leader; this was Dirk I, who was called count of Holland. The reason why he did not receive the title of king was that the council was afraid that he might claim unlimited power for himself and for his successors. Such a step would constitute an infringement of the ancient privileges of the council, and had to be prevented at all cost.[17]

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[13] Hugo Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae*, ed., transl. Collegium Classicum c.n. E.D.E.P.O.L. (Arnhem, 1995), pp. 18-19, 25-28, quotation on p. 29.

[14] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), pp. 38-39; H. Kampinga, *De opvattingen over onze oudere vaderlandsche geschiedenis bij de Hollandsche historici der XVIe en XVIIe eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage, 1917), pp. 121-122.

[15] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), pp. 46-47.

[16] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), pp. 64-69.

[17] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), pp. 50-51, 54-55.

No count could accede to his office before he had sworn to respect and maintain the liberties and privileges of the council. With many examples, Grotius shows that the council, which from this point on he calls the States of Holland, has always held supreme authority in the county, and also that it was the council which called on the counts if necessary. In other words, the claim to authority of the counts was never based on their descent but on their call to office by the States. That also implied that the States could depose the count if he violated his oath or proved unsuitable for the job. When the Countess Jacoba of Bavaria (r. 1417-1433) caused great harm to the country by repeatedly choosing the wrong husband, the States did not hesitate to depose her as countess and to elect Duke Philip of Burgundy to the office instead.[18]

Nevertheless, everything that had happened between the counts and the States proved as nothing in comparison to the conflict that developed after 1555, when Philip II became count of Holland. Without so much as consulting the States he erected new dioceses, introduced the Inquisition, and in the person of the Duke of Alva appointed a governor-general who flouted ancient law and privilege, who had prominent members of the nobility executed, and who introduced new taxes to finance the Spanish occupation and the law courts to deal with heretics. The States were, therefore, more than justified when in 1581 they decided to abjure their prince and to take the reins of government back into their own hands.[19]

Grotius' survey of the political and institutional history of the county of Holland was probably little more than a work composed for the occasion, meant to boost morale in a difficult time and to impress on the honourable gentlemen of the States the truth *penes utriusque ordinis primores curam semper fuisse Batavae rei, quae tandem ad vos perpetua successione delata est* [that the Batavian state has always been ruled by the most prominent members of both estates, which rule has now come down to you through unbroken succession].[20] But the reception proved far more important than the work itself or the occasion for which it was written. The main reason for that was the bizarre constitution of the Republic, which caused permanent unrest and disturbances. The States General were the bearers of sovereignty, but their authority was constantly undermined by the presence in the country of the Orange family. Officially, the descendants of William of Orange served their country as stadtholders, appointed by the States General, but their reputation and authority was such that they must be considered the rivals of the States and not their servants. Many Dutchmen were convinced that a state without a monarch was not quick and decisive enough in difficult situations, and that it would be much better for the country if a prince of Orange were to become king. Moreover, many believed that the leadership of William of Orange in the revolt against Spain had created a special God-given bond between the Netherlands and the Orange dynasty. In that permanent wrangle between the supporters of the States and the

[18] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), pp. 56-59.
[19] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), pp. 70-75.
[20] Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate* (as in n. 13), p. 5.

followers of the prince of Orange, Grotius' pamphlet became a powerful weapon in the hands of the Statists [*staatsgezinden*], whose ideas about God's intentions with the Dutch Republic were distinctly different from those of the Orangists. Moreover, they used that weapon quite successfully. Until the second half of the eighteenth century it was hardly possible to develop a perspective on Dutch history that deviated from that of Grotius. All efforts to write about the medieval past from a different point of view were sabotaged or censured by the authorities.[21] Although the most important Dutch historian of the eighteenth century, Jan Wagenaar (1709-1773), was convinced that Grotius' treatise was not a serious work of history, he nevertheless agreed with its thrust, and he too described the history of the Netherlands as the triumph of Batavian liberty.[22] It was not until 1750, at a time when the Statists were losing their hold on the state, that criticism of Grotius became possible. By then it came from two sides. The Orangists made short shrift of the myth that the States had always been the supreme authority in Holland and the Patriots, who clamoured for real popular representation in the States, denounced the aristocratic character of Grotius' pamphlet.

The second half of the eighteenth century has recently been characterised as the age that saw the rise of a civil society in the Netherlands. The middle class, that so far had been excluded from participation or representation in the government, began to organise itself in learned societies, reading circles and other educational associations which contributed to the formation of a new political consciousness that can best be defined as a first sense of national feeling.[23] In many circles of the bourgeoisie there was a rising feeling that it was no longer safe to entrust the government of what they now began to see as their fatherland to an exclusive class of patricians and perhaps even less to the stadtholder who again and again disappointed his followers. In large sections of the middle class people suddenly began to feel responsible for the running of the country. They began to describe themselves as Patriots and demanded representation in official bodies such as town councils and the States. When in 1780 the Republic suffered a humiliating defeat at sea against England, patience with the existing authorities was exhausted and the Patriots rose in revolt against the States and the stadtholder. And like any other revolt the Patriot Revolution was not just fought with weapons but perhaps even more so with the pen.

One of the most scathing attacks on the corrupt patrician class was a pamphlet, entitled *Aan het volk van Nederland* [*To the People of the Netherlands*], published in 1781 by a member of that selfsame class, Joan Derk van den Capellen tot den Poll (1741-1784).[24] History was not what Capellen wanted to

[21] Kampinga, *Opvattingen* (as in n. 14), pp. 122-123.

[22] L. Wessels, *"Verandering der tyden". Een historiografische studie over de Nederlandse geschiedschrijver en publicist Jan Wagenaar (1709-1773)* (Nijmegen, 1996), pp. 79-80.

[23] N. C. F. van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit 1750-1900* (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 21.

[24] On Capellen, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic* (as in n. 10), pp. 1098-1099.

talk about in his pamphlet in the first place, yet he felt compelled to introduce his demand for a more democratic Republic, with a short historical survey in which he sought to prove that he was not demanding anything new or revolutionary but only a restoration of the medieval privileges of the Dutch people, the most important of which being the right to elect representatives to the States and the right to carry arms. Like Grotius, Capellen believed in the core of the Batavian myth: in the Netherlands princes had always been subjected to the States and they could be deposed if they violated the rights of the people – as, indeed, had happened in 1581.[25] He had, of course, quite different thoughts about the nature of popular representation. Originally, all Batavian men had come together to deliberate about affairs of the state, and not just the best among them, as Grotius had maintained. When later on, in the Middle Ages, the Batavian population had increased so much that it became inconvenient to convene a meeting of all men, the town guilds and civic guards chose representatives out of their midst to be sent to the assemblies of the States. Sometimes even the peasants were allowed to cast a vote. Capellen was also convinced that in the Middle Ages the prince had had no professional army but had relied on the civic guards for the defence of the nation, thus strengthening the democratic character of medieval society. Finally, Capellen reminds his readers that in the Middle Ages the nation was comprised not only of Batavians but also of Frisians; this, perhaps, was an unsurprising observation, but it was clearly a barb directed at the hollandocentric thrust of Grotius' work.[26] The people that Capellen addressed were more than the inhabitants of the county of Holland.

Capellen's vision on the medieval past of the Netherlands can best be described as a radicalisation of the statist position. He believed in the sovereignty of the States General, and in the subordinate position of the prince, but because he also mentioned the Frisians as part of the nation and emphasised that Dutch citizens in the past had always elected their own representatives and defended themselves, his work assumed a more radically national and democratic character. Where Grotius had been the spokesman for the Dutch patriciate, Capellen became the champion of the rights of the citizenry, but both believed fervently that they were doing nothing other than call for a restoration of the medieval rights and privileges of the Dutch people.[27]

Now that the debate on the medieval past of the Netherlands had been thrown wide open by the Patriots, the Orangists, too, began to make their views known. And they were in luck. As more and more medieval documents were being edited and published, it became clear that the story of the sovereignty of the States had no foundation in historical reality. Frans van Mieris (1687-1763), the editor of all the documents relating to the counts of Holland, wondered why he could find no record of the existence of such an institution as the States of

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[25] Joan Derk van den Capellen tot den Pol, *Aan het volk van Nederland. Het democratisch manifest (1781)*, ed. W. Wertheim and A. Wertheim-Gijse Weenink (Amsterdam, 1966), pp. 45-46, 52-53.

[26] Capellen, *Aan het volk van Nederland* (as in n. 25), pp. 44-46.

[27] Van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland* (as in n. 23), p. 55.

Holland before 1418. And even Jan Wagenaar, although he firmly believed in the Batavian origin of the Dutch constitution, doubted if Count Dirk I had been appointed by the States, because he could find no evidence that the States had existed in the tenth century.[28] But all these were mere suspicions. The man who, for the first time, took the original documents seriously, who organised them and came up with a completely new theory of the history of Dutch sovereignty was the Leiden historian, Adriaan Kluit (1735-1807). Unlike others, Kluit was intellectually and emotionally equipped to challenge the myth of Batavian freedom, because he was the first trained medieval historian in the Netherlands and at the same time a zealous Orangist.[29]

Kluit rejected any idea that the history of the Dutch constitution was continuous. The ancient Batavians had nothing in common with the medieval Dutch. The history of the Netherlands began in the tenth century at a time when the country's sovereign was none other than the Holy Roman Emperor. It was the emperor, and no one else, who appointed counts to dispense justice in his name. As the authority of the emperor became weaker, his erstwhile servants, everywhere in the empire, began to behave like princes in their own right and to appropriate sovereign rights which had once been the exclusive property of the emperor. The same happened in the Netherlands, so that in the fourteenth century the territory of the Netherlands became divided into a number of principalities, in which the princes behaved more and more like sovereigns and were recognised as such by the emperor.[30] Kluit has no doubt that, as in the other parts of the Netherlands so also in Holland, all authority rested with the count and that all administrative measures were initiated by the latter. Even the official requests by the count to levy taxes could not be refused by the representatives of the people if they were in the national interest.[31] An institution like the States did not exist in Holland before the early fifteenth century. Its power was purely advisory, and did not infringe on the authority of the count. The first assembly of the States General was even later. Kluit reckons that the first assembly that could be designated as such was the meeting of representatives of clergy, nobility and towns in Bruges in 1477 after the death of Charles the Bold.[32] The conclusion was obvious: in the Middle Ages all legislative, executive and judicial power was invested in the count. Now was the time that these powers were to be returned to the stadtholder. It was a message which the Orangists could turn to their advantage.[33]

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[28] G. Boutelje, *Bijdrage tot de kennis van A. Kluit's opvattingen over onze oudere vaderlandsche geschiedenis* (Groningen and Den Haag, 1920), p. 39.

[29] About Kluit as medieval historian, see F. W. N. Hugenholtz, "Adriaan Kluit en het onderwijs in de mediaevistiek", *Forum der Letteren* 6 (1965), pp. 142-160; for a more general evaluation of his work, see I. Schöffer, *Adriaan Kluit, een voorganger* (Leiden, 1988).

[30] Boutelje, *Bijdrage* (as in n. 28), pp. 42-43.

[31] Boutelje, *Bijdrage* (as in n. 28), p. 47.

[32] Boutelje, *Bijdrage* (as in n. 28), pp. 64-66.

[33] Boutelje, *Bijdrage* (as in n. 28), p. 69; P. de Vries, "The writing and study of history in the Netherlands in the 19th century", in *Geschiedschrijving in Nederland:*

Kluit's exposure of the Batavian myth and his theory of princely sovereignty were no doubt a triumph of historical scholarship. Kluit may have somewhat exaggerated the powers of the count; later research proved that it was more restricted than he was willing to admit, but he was nonetheless on the right track. Victory in scholarship, however, is not the same as victory in politics. In the Dutch struggle for constitutional reform, though the stadtholder and his followers might have had the advantage of history on their side, they lost the political battle. The people who counted were opposed to the stadtholder and in favour of Batavian liberty, even if it was historically indefensible, a sentiment that grew even stronger when in 1787 the stadholder had to ask for military support from his father-in-law, the king of Prussia, to quell the revolution and restore the peace. That was a blow to national pride, and it was not forgotten.[34] When, eight years later, the French occupied the Republic and expelled the stadtholder, there were very few who mourned the passing of the *ancien régime*, and many who welcomed the opportunity to establish a new state founded on true liberty: the Batavian Republic.

Sometimes a passionate argument proves suddenly irrelevant. Such was the case with the discussion about ancient Batavian freedom. To everyone's surprise the new state and its constitution were quickly accepted, and nostalgia for the past proved minimal. This was *a fortiori* so when in 1813 the Orange dynasty returned to these shores, and William I became the sovereign prince in a new kingdom. Now that the country had a free constitution as well as a prince from the house of Orange there was no longer any reason to argue about the position of the prince and the people in the Middle Ages. Batavian freedom had been realised, and had, therefore, become superfluous as a myth.[35]

One man, however, was not at all impressed by the new Netherlands. Willem Bilderdijk (1756-1831) refused to take an oath of fidelity to the new state in 1795, and was as a consequence forced to go into exile, just like his beloved stadtholder. When Holland's independence had been restored in 1813, he had hopes of a university chair in Amsterdam, but that failed to come off. A few years later he became a private tutor in Leiden, where he gathered around him a small circle of young admirers, to whom he taught his own variety of national history. Some have hailed Bilderdijk as a genius, but his historical skills have not stood the test of criticism. Even his enthusiastic pupil Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) had to admit that Bilderdijk was a second-rate historian.[36] His lectures on national history were not much more than a compilation of Wagenaar, of whom he disapproved, and Kluit, of whom as an Orangist he

studies over de historiografie in de nieuwe tijd. Deel II: Geschiedbeoefening, ed. P. Geurts and A. Janssen, Geschiedenis in veelvoud 20 (Den Haag, 1981), p. 160.

[34] Van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland* (as in n. 23), p. 105.

[35] Van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland* (as in n. 23), pp. 31-32, 43, 93.

[36] H. Smitskamp, "Bilderdijk historicus?", in *Mythe en werkelijkheid*, ed. J. Lancée (Utrecht, 1979), p. 147.

approved.[37] But the real reason that Bilderdijk has had no influence on subsequent generations is not his deficient scholarship but his highly eccentric views on Dutch history.

Bilderdijk, who liked to think that he was of noble descent, was a passionate advocate of the so-called *thèse féodale*, an eighteenth-century French theory which implied that the best form of government was a monarchy tempered by the influence of the aristocracy.[38] Even in eighteenth-century France such a theory was hardly practicable, but in the nineteenth-century Netherlands it was so far beyond everyday reality that it could only be met with utter indifference. Not only did Bilderdijk extol the merits of the nobility, a class that had hardly any social or political significance in the Netherlands, he also despised the merchant class, which he accused of crude materialism and the destruction of all moral values. A government of merchants could be nothing else but "an empire of irresistible violence and an inhuman tyranny".[39] It should come as no surprise that with such opinions he did not become the popular historian he wanted to be in the very bourgeois society that was Holland.

Aristocratic-monarchical prejudice dominated Bilderdijk's view of the course of Dutch history. That is why he loved the Middle Ages, the time when the counts of Holland, surrounded by their trusted vassals, administered to an obedient and faithful people in peace. His hero was count Floris V (1254-1296), whose nickname was "the peasants' hero".[40] Things began to go wrong after the extinction of the home-grown dynasty, when counts of foreign extraction assumed the rule over Holland. The burghers became dissatisfied and demanded their share in the government, and when they did not get what they wanted they rose in revolt. For a hundred years Holland was torn between the aristocratic (Kabeljauwen) and the bourgeois (Hoeken) factions, a conflict that foreshadowed the later struggle between Statists and Orangists. Because Bilderdijk was so focused on the legitimacy of monarchical authority, it was very difficult for him to justify the revolt against King Philip II. He defended the king as much as possible, and came up with rather strange arguments to show why the revolt was necessary after all. Nevertheless, he clearly disliked it, and its success certainly did not lead to a restoration of the peaceful and happy country that Holland was in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, the new Republic soon fell into the hands of villainous representatives of the merchant class

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[37] J. Moll, *Bilderdijk's "Geschiedenis des Vaderlands"* (Assen, 1918), p. 51; J. van Eijnatten, *Hogere sferen. De ideeënwereld van Willem Bilderdijk (1756-1831)* (Hilversum, 1998), pp. 537, 540.

[38] Eijnatten, *Hogere sferen* (as in n. 37), pp. 535, 539, 545. A. Kinneging, *Aristocracy, Antiquity, and history. An essay on classicism in political thought* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 24, 237-240.

[39] Moll, *Bilderdijk's "Geschiedenis des Vaderlands"* (as in n. 37), pp. 79-82, quote: 80; Eijnatten, *Hogere sferen* (as in n. 37), pp. 574-579.

[40] Eijnatten, *Hogere sferen* (as in n. 37), p. 538; P. Geijl, "Bilderdijk als geschiedschrijver", in Geurts and Janssen, *Geschiedschrijving in Nederland* (as in n. 33), vol. 1, p. 168.

such as Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619) en Johan de Witt (1625-1672).[41] Despite the fact that the Republic had ingloriously perished in 1795 and that the Netherlands since 1813 had been a monarchy, for the first time since the Middle Ages, Bilderdijk asserted that the struggle was not over. The Netherlands were not the sort of monarchy he liked to fantasise about, since it was far too bourgeois and democratic. Unfortunately he was the only one who thought so, and everyone else in Holland had buried the hatchet that he was still wielding. Bilderdijk was left standing alone as the last witness to a bygone era.[42]

At first sight Bilderdijk's ideas about the Middle Ages seem romantic and innovatory, and they have often been described as such, among others by his Catholic admirer Gerard Brom, but, in fact, those ideas were derived from the faded ideology of aristocratic classicism, that belonged more to the eighteenth century than to his own day.[43] At a crucial time when his fellow countrymen were trying to understand what had happened to them in the revolutionary years between 1795 and 1813 and how these events could be fitted into the course of Dutch history, Bilderdijk, because of his real love for the Middle Ages, had a splendid opportunity to supply the Dutch with a new view of their medieval past. However, he not only failed to do so, but managed to erase the Middle Ages from Dutch national memory altogether, because of his stubborn persistence in presenting that era in the light of past struggles and outdated ideals.

[41] Eijnatten, *Hogere sferen* (as in n. 37), pp. 538-539; Geijl, "Bilderdijk als geschiedschrijver" (as in n. 40), pp. 168-172; Moll, *Bilderdijk's "Geschiedenis des Vaderlands"* (as in n. 37), pp. 41-44.

[42] Geijl, "Bilderdijk als geschiedschrijver" (as in n. 40), p. 178.

[43] Eijnatten, *Hogere sferen* (as in n. 37), pp. 543-545; G. Brom, *Romantiek en katholicisme in Nederland*, 2 vols. (Groningen, 1926), vol. 2, pp. 3 and 13.

"HÖHERE BILDUNG" IM 17. JAHRHUNDERT. DIE *SCHOLA CAROLINA* IN OSNABRÜCK AUF DEM WEG VOM HUMANISTISCHEN GYMNASIUM ZUR JESUITENUNIVERSITÄT

Rudolf Suntrup

Die bildungsgeschichtliche Situation in Osnabrück um die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts, ihre durch die Besonderheiten der Reformation in der Stadt bestimmte Vorgeschichte sowie die durch den Verlauf und die Ergebnisse des Dreißigjährigen Krieges wesentlich mit geprägte Gegebenheit der Schullandschaft in der Stadt sind gut erforscht, wenngleich teilweise an etwas abgelegenem Ort (etwa im Schulschrifttum) publiziert. Daher mag es angezeigt sein, Ergebnisse der bisherigen, durchweg aus Interesse an Lokal- und Schulgeschichte entstandenen Untersuchungen dem an den *studia humanitatis* Interessierten zu präsentieren und in einer kleinen Fallstudie auch auf die ideen- und bildungsgeschichtlichen Interessen einzugehen, die während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges zu einer nur ganz kurzfristigen Erhebung des Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück zu einer von Jesuiten geleiteten Universität führten. Wenngleich es richtig ist, dass die Geschichte der Universität – nicht nur in der Frühen Neuzeit, sondern bis heute – "von ständigen Wechseln der wissenschaftlichen Paradigmata gekennzeichnet" ist, so ist zugleich festzuhalten, dass zu einer Zeit, in der die Theologie noch "unangefochten die 'Leitwissenschaft'" war, das Modell einer Jesuitenuniversität aus der Sicht des sich so verstehenden Reformkatholizismus seit ihren Anfängen (1552 Rom) rund zwei Jahrhunderte lang höchst erfolgreich war und in den katholischen Territorien vielfach umgesetzt wurde.[1]

In besonderer Weise wurden die Forschungen zur Schulgeschichte des Gymnasium Carolinum in der Frühen Neuzeit durch Michael Feldkamp und Benno Suerbaum gefördert.[2] Der Weg des Gymnasiums zur Jesuitenuniversität

[1] H.-A. Koch, *Die Universität. Geschichte einer europäischen Institution* (Darmstadt, 2008), beide Zitate S. 10. Knappe Bemerkungen zu den Jesuitenuniversitäten ebd., S. 92f. Informativ zur Neuordnung des katholischen Universitätswesens nach jesuitischem Modell R. A. Müller, *Geschichte der Universität. Von der mittelalterlichen Universitas zur deutschen Hochschule* (München, 1990), S. 55-57.

[2] M. F. Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität Osnabrück und ihrer Fakultäten 1632-1633", *Osnabrücker Mitteilungen* 91 (1986), S. 85-139 [Untersuchung und Edition]; ders., "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück. Rückblick auf 1200 Jahre Osnabrücker Schul- und Bildungsgeschichte", in *Gymnasium Carolinum 804-2004*, Hg. R. Unnerstall und H. Mannigel (Osnabrück, 2004), S. 13-32; ders., "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück", in *Gymnasium Carolinum 804-2004*, Hg. R. Un-

wird zudem in der grundlegenden Studie von Karl Hengst zu *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten*, seiner Habilitationsschrift von 1981, analysiert und in den größeren Kontext der Geschichte der Universitäten des Ordens im Zeitalter der konfessionellen Auseinandersetzung gestellt;[3] von den genannten Arbeiten haben weitere Untersuchungen auszugehen.

1. DIE DOMSCHULE BIS ZUM FRÜHEN 17. JAHRHUNDERT

Das Gymnasium Carolinum, im Zentrum der Stadt direkt neben dem Dom gelegen, zählt zu den ältesten bis heute ununterbrochen bestehenden Schulen Deutschlands und führt seine Gründung wie das Gymnasium Paulinum in Münster der Tradition nach auf Kaiser Karl den Großen zurück. Für das Mittelalter lässt sich ein ununterbrochener Schulbetrieb aus der spärlichen urkundlichen Überlieferung zwar nicht nachweisen, er ist jedoch plausibel anzunehmen.[4] Karl hat um 800 das Bistum Osnabrück gegründet und ließ zum Zwecke der Sachsenmissionierung eine Griechisch- und Lateinschule errichten. Dass das Gründungsdiplom eine vermutlich von Benno II., 1068-1088 Bischof von Osnabrück, veranlasste Fälschung darstellt,[5] war dem Osnabrücker Bürgermeister und Historiker Ertwin Ertman († 1505) noch nicht bekannt, als er Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts lebhaft darüber klagte, dass das Studium des Griechischen in Osnabrück längst nicht mehr üblich sei und auch kein gepflegtes Latein mehr gelehrt werde.[6] Dabei berief er sich auf die erwähnte Urkunde Karls des Großen, nach welcher dieser für die Ausbildung der künftigen Kleriker die Etablie-

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nerstall und H. Mannigel (Osnabrück, 2004), S. 33-64; B. Suerbaum, "Die Jesuiten und das Carolinum", in *Festschrift zum 1190jährigen Bestehen des Gymnasium Carolinum Osnabrück*, Hg. H. Schmidt-Rhaesa (Osnabrück, 1994), S. 6-16; ders., "Die Gründung der Universität in Osnabrück während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges", *Schola Carolina* 137 (1999), S. 42-52; zu den Handschriftenstudien Suerbaums s.u. Anm. 38.

[3] K. Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten. Zur Geschichte der Universitäten in der Oberdeutschen und Rheinischen Provinz der Gesellschaft Jesu im Zeitalter der konfessionellen Auseinandersetzung*. Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, Neue Folge, Bd. 2 (Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, 1981), zum Carolinum S. 266-284. Vgl. auch A. Schröer, *Die Kirche in Westfalen im Zeichen der Erneuerung (1585-1648)*, Bd. 2 (Münster, 1987), S. 54-105, sowie den Quellenband: *Vatikanische Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reformation und Katholischen Erneuerung in Westfalen. Die Korrespondenz geistlicher und weltlicher Landesherren Westfalens mit dem Heiligen Stuhl*, Hg. A. Schröer (Münster, 1993).

[4] M. F. Feldkamp, "Kann das Gymnasium Carolinum auf eine ununterbrochene 1190jährige Existenz zurückblicken?", *Schola Carolina* 128 (1994), S. 1-3, vgl. S. 2; ergänzend L. Schirmeyer, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum von der Gründung bis 1800", in *1150 Jahre Gymnasium Carolinum Osnabrück. Festschrift* (Osnabrück, 1954), S. 14-25.

[5] Mit der Urkunde, die aus echten und hinzugefügten Urkundenteilen besteht, wollte Benno II. kirchliche Besitzansprüche geltend machen. Zur Urkunde Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 95, Anm. 57.

[6] Feldkamp, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 15, mit Anm. 9.

rung geeigneter Schulen und damit im neugegründeten Bistum die Gründung einer Domschule angeordnet habe: [...] *et hac ea de causa statuimus, quia in eadem loco Gr[a]ecas et Latinas sc[h]olas in perpetuum manere ordinavimus et numquam clericos utriusque linguae gnaros ibidem deesse in Dei misericordia confidimus.*[7] Der Sinn einer Ausbildung in Latein und Griechisch bestand auch darin, dass Karl Kleriker heranbilden lassen wollte, welche die griechische Amtssprache des oströmischen Reiches beherrschten und dadurch für Verhandlungen mit dem oströmischen Kaiser hinreichend befähigt wären.[8] Ertmann wollte offensichtlich die beiden alten Sprachen als Grundlage der Kenntnis der antiken Philosophie und Literatur im Sinne humanistischer Bildungsziele wieder an der Domschule etablieren. Doch konnte dies um 1500 nicht gelingen, weil der Einfluss der westfälischen Nachbarstadt Münster übermächtig war, welche der dort ansässige Dompropst und Humanist Rudolf von Langen (um 1438-1519), ein Studienfreund Rudolf Agricolas, zur "humanistischen Metropole Westfalens" machte.[9] Die Situation änderte sich, als in den 1520er Jahren humanistisch gebildete Geistliche von Münster nach Osnabrück kamen, die auch als Lehrer an der Domschule wirkten und den Wandel der Schule zu einer "humanistischen Bildungsanstalt" beförderten.[10] Mit der Ablösung der mittelalterlichen Scholastik durch das humanistische Bildungsideal wurden diese Lehrkräfte zugleich zu Wegbereitern der Reformation, deren Gedankengut in der Stadt in Predigten seit 1521 verbreitet wurde; die offizielle Einführung der Reformation erfolgte hier jedoch erst 1543.

Die bildungsgeschichtliche Entwickung in der Stadt im folgenden Jahrhundert (bis 1623), die hier nur mit ihren Eckdaten gestreift werden soll, ist im nachreformatorischen Zeitalter der Konfessionalisierung durch entschieden ausgetragene Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Katholiken und den Protestanten der Stadt gekennzeichnet. Unter dem (seit 1534) protestantischen Bischof Franz von Waldeck wurde 1543 in Osnabrück eine evangelische Kirchenordnung approbiert und 1544 vom Rat der Stadt eine evangelische Schule eingerichtet, ohne dass das Domkapitel rechtliche Schritte dagegen einzuleiten vermochte. Die Domschule verkümmerte, weil der evangelische Stadtrat den Osnabrücker Bürgern den Besuch der katholischen Schule untersagte. Nach der Niederlage der Protestanten im Schmalkaldischen Krieg (Schlacht bei Mühlberg 1547) und dem Augsburger Interim vom Mai 1548 wurde durch Bischof Franz von Waldeck die Einführung der Reformation am 12. Mai 1548 förmlich widerrufen, die Kirchenordnung des Stadtrats obsolet und die Ratsschule wie-

[7] Feldkamp, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 13. Abdruck der Urkunde in: Fr. Philippi, *Osnabrücker Urkundenbuch*, Bd. 1: *Die Urkunden der Jahre 772-1200* (Osnabrück, 1892), Nr. 5. Nach heutiger Kenntnis gehört die Gründungsinitiative Karls zu den echten Teilen der Urkunde.

[8] Vgl. Suerbaum, "Die Gründung der Universität in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 44.

[9] Feldkamp, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 15. Zu Rudolf von Langen vgl. auch *1200 Jahre Paulinum 797-1997*, Hg. G. Lasalle *et al.* (Münster, 1997), S. 428-434.

[10] Feldkamp, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 16.

der geschlossen. Bereits 1555 wurden die Regelungen durch den Augsburger Religionsfrieden jedoch wieder zugunsten der Protestanten außer Kraft gesetzt. In einem Vertrag zwischen Rat und Domkapitel wurde nun geregelt, die Domschule als "Simultanschule" für Schüler beider Konfessionen zu führen. Häufiger Rektorenwechsel (nicht weniger als 22-mal im 16. Jahrhundert) erschwerte den Schulalltag. Angesichts einer stärker wieder altkirchlich ausgerichteten Tendenz des Schullebens aufgrund innerkirchlicher Reformen nach dem Abschluss des Konzils von Trient (1563) kam es unter dem angesehenen, toleranten katholischen Rektor Hermann von Kerssenbrock durch den protestantischen Rat der Stadt 1595 zur Gründung des (ebenfalls noch heute bestehenden) Ratsgymnasiums, welche das Bildungsmonopol des Domkapitels in Osnabrück beendete: Es gab nun in Konkurrenz die protestantische Ratsschule und die katholische Domschule.[11] Unterschiede bestanden vor allem in der Konfessionszugehörigkeit der Lehrer und Schüler, kaum im Lehrangebot der beiden Gymnasien: "Der protestantische und katholische Schultyp hatten sich seit dem Humanismus einer gemeinsamen Grundstruktur verschrieben: der aristotelischen (scholastischen) Philosophie und – dank des Humanismus – einer inzwischen weitgehend formalisierten Bildungssprache".[12] Jedoch versuchte die Domschule, sich im Zeitalter des neu erstarkenden Konfessionalismus im Konkurrenzkampf der beiden Schulen zu profilieren; deutliches Anzeichen für ihr Bemühen, eine von der Ratsschule abgegrenzte Identität zu finden, ist die seit dieser Zeit verstärkte Berufung auf den Schulgründer: der Name "Schola Carolina", "Gymnasium Carolinum" oder "Karolingisches Gymnasium" etabliert sich, die Schule wird das "Carolinum".

2. DER WEG ZUR JESUITENUNIVERSITÄT

Hundert Jahre nach dem Einsetzen der humanistisch-reformatorischen Bildungsbestrebungen wird in Osnabrück der Einfluss der Jesuiten deutlich spürbar: Patres aus Münster und Warendorf, Absolventen des Collegium Germanicum, der durch Ignatius von Loyola 1552 gegründeten Universität der Societas Jesu und von Jesuiten geleiteten deutschen Priesterausbildungsstätte in Rom, kommen am 9. April 1625 in die Stadt, übernehmen mit Zustimmung des Domkapitels[13] noch in demselben Monat (21. April) die Leitung der Domschule und beginnen mit 40 Schülern den Unterricht am Carolinum, zunächst in den Räumen des Domportikus. Das weitgehend katholisch gebliebene Domkapitel hatte auf Vorschlag des römischen Kurienkardinals Eitel Friedrich von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen gehandelt, der – selbst ein Jesuitenschüler – 1623

[11] Zu den Anfängen des Ratsgymnasiums vgl. W. Petersen, "Die Gründungszeit des Ratsgymnasiums und das Carolinum", *Schola Carolina* 131 (1996), S. 14f.

[12] Feldkamp, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 19.

[13] Beschluss des Domkapitels vom 23. Dezember 1624, die geistliche Aufsicht über die Domschule den Jesuiten zu übertragen; vgl. Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten* (wie Anm. 3), S. 268, mit Anm. 146.

zum Bischof von Osnabrück gewählt worden war. Erstmals seit Jahrzehnten hatte damit wieder ein katholischer Bischof die Leitung des Bistums inne.[14] Als dieser unerwartet früh verstarb, folgte ihm am 27. Oktober 1625 der Wittelsbacher Kardinal Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg (Abb. 1) im Amt, ebenfalls ein Jesuitenschüler, dessen Name sich mit der rigorosen Durchführung der "Gegenreformation" in Osnabrück verbindet.[15] Er betreibt seit 1626 – in einer für die Stadt und die Schule schwierigen Zeit, als die Dänen Osnabrück besetzen – zielstrebig und mit der ausdrücklichen Unterstützung durch den Jesuitengeneral in Rom, P. Mutio Vitelleschi,[16] den Ausbau der noch jungen Jesuitenniederlassung, schafft 1628 die räumlichen und finanziellen Voraussetzungen für ein Kolleg, lässt gleichzeitig das protestantische Ratsgymnasium wieder schließen, so dass fortan die Protestanten im Bistum von einer höheren Bildung ausgeschlossen waren, und betreibt aufgrund bester Kontakte zur römischen Kurie seit Mai 1628 mit Nachdruck den Ausbau des Carolinums zur Universität.[17] Die Etablierung des Jesuitenkollegs und das Wirken der Jesuiten am Carolinum bedeuteten eine "Wende in der Konfessionalisierung von Stadt und Bistum [...]. Endlich schienen die Reformabsichten umsetzbar. Dass das Reformwerk mit der Übernahme der Bildung begann, macht deutlich, dass die geistige Oberhoheit langfristig nur der erreichen konnte, der auch die Bildungshoheit hatte".[18]

[14] Die Bischöfe von Osnabrück waren zugleich geistliches Oberhaupt des Bistums und weltlicher Landesherr des Hochstifts.

[15] K. Hausberger, "Wartenberg, Franz Wilhelm", in *Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches 1648-1803. Ein biographisches Lexikon*, Hg. E. Gatz und St. M. Janker (Berlin, 1990), S. 558-561. Ein kritisches, auf Quellenanalyse gestütztes Porträt des Fürstbischofs und seiner rekatholisierenden Maßnahmen in Osnabrück gibt Benno Suerbaum, "Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, der Förderer des Gymnasiums Carolinum, die Stadt Osnabrück und der Westfälische Frieden", *Schola Carolina* 135 (1998), S. 20-39, hier bes. S. 23-27 [ohne Anmerkungsteil; der vollständige Beitrag ist über die Redaktion der *Schola Carolina* in Osnabrück zu erhalten]. Zur Rekatholisierung in Osnabrück ab 1628 vgl. auch den Ausstellungskatalog *450 Jahre Reformation in Osnabrück*, Hg. K.-G. Kaster, Osnabrücker Kulturdenkmäler, Bd. 6 (Bramsche, 1993), S. 606-608. Ein kritisches Bild auf diese Zeit aus der Sicht des protestantischen Chronisten zeichnet die *Chronik des Rudolf von Bellinckhausen*, bearb. von M. Tegeder, Osnabrücker Geschichtsquellen und Forschungen, Bd. 45 (Osnabrück, 2002); dazu V. Seresse, "Der Versuch zur Rekatholisierung Osnabrücks 1628-1633 nach der Chronik des Rudolf von Bellinckhausen. Konversion und konfessionelle Identität zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges", *Osnabrücker Mitteilungen* 110 (2005), S. 99-118.

[16] Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 35, mit Bezug auf ein Schreiben des Jesuitengenerals an Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg vom 10. Juni 1628: Staatsarchiv Osnabrück, Rep. 100, Abschn. 340b, Nr. 9, fol. 100r.

[17] Aufschlussreich für diese Kontakte sind die Berichte aus der Kölner Nuntiatur; Quellennachweis bei Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 60, Anm. 9.

[18] Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 34. – Im Bistumsarchiv Osnabrück wird ein Bestand zum 'Jesuitenkolleg Osnabrück' unter der Signaturengruppe 08-51-21 geführt, darunter die Handschrift Blanckenfort,

Auf- und Ausbau des Kollegs, materielle und ideelle Förderung des Carolinums, an dem schon im Herbst 1628 Ordensgeistliche den Vorlesungsbetrieb in Philosophie und Theologie für Priesteramtskandidaten aufnahmen, und die ehrgeizigen Universitätspläne für die Stadt bilden für die Reformanstrengungen der Jesuiten im Sinne der Gegenreformation eine ideelle Einheit.

Bemerkenswert erscheint wiederum (wie mehr als ein Jahrhundert zuvor bei Ertman, s.o.) die "historische Argumentation", derer sich Franz Wilhelm in seinem Gesuch zur Universitätsgründung an Papst Urban VIII. bedient: Schon Karl der Große habe eine Schule in Osnabrück gegründet, an der Griechisch und Hebräisch unterrichtet sowie die ***septem artes*** und Theologie gelehrt worden seien;[19] erst durch die Unruhen der Reformation sei die "uralte Carolingische Universität" eingegangen;[20] die Einrichtung entspreche der einer Universität, die also nicht neu gegründet, sondern nur im Rahmen der nach dem Trienter Konzil anstehenden Reformbemühungen erneuert werden müsse; zudem seien in benachbarten Städten protestantische Akademien etabliert worden, zu denen ein katholisches Gegengewicht fehle.[21] Mit diesem "bemerkenswerten Kniff" (Feldkamp) genügte er den strengen Anforderungen der römischen Missionskongregation ***De Propaganda Fide*** für eine Universitätsgründung: Da sich seit Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts der Sprachgebrauch vom "Carolinum" zur Unterscheidung vom "Ratsgymnasium" verbreitete, konnte die Namensgebung die Herausbildung einer spezifischen Karlstradition der Domschule befördern, derer sich Franz Wilhelm nun in der Situation der "Antragsstellung" geschickt bediente: "Wartenberg instrumentalisierte die Erinnerung an Karl den Großen und band diese in seine politisch-programmatische Argumentation ein": nicht "Neugründung", sondern "Wiederbegründung einer altehrwürdigen Karlsuniversität" (***academia vetus***) wurde beantragt. Dass es sich dabei, wie Feldkamp zu Recht urteilt, um eine "historisch konstruierte Traditionsstiftung" handelte,[22] durchschaute man in Rom offenbar nicht. Die Wertschätzung, derer sich Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg bei der Kurie erfreute, zeigt sich darin, dass der Papst unverzüglich, am 22. August 1629, die Universitätsprivilegien ausstellte, die bei Wartenberg dann im November 1629 eintrafen, und dies, obwohl sich die Jesuiten im benachbarten Münster (welche die dortige Schola Paulina 1588 übernommen hatten) schon seit Jahren vergeblich um eine entsprechende Privilegierung durch Papst und Kaiser bemüht hatten.[23] Die kaiserliche Bestätigung

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Sign. 08-51-21-04 (unten Anm. 50), das ***Compendium Historiae Collegii Societatis Jesu Osnabrugi***, 08-51-21-03 sowie die Statuten der Akademie, 08-51-21-01.

[19] Dass Hebräisch unterrichtet worden sei, ist quellenmäßig nicht belegt, sondern "ein Zusatz der [beim Papst eingereichten] Supplik Franz Wilhelms und findet sich auch in der päpstlichen Stiftungsurkunde": Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 94, Anm. 51. Abdruck der Supplik bei Hengst, ***Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten*** (wie Anm. 3), Anlage 22, S. 377f.

[20] Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 94.

[21] Feldkamp, "Das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 20.

[22] Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 36.

[23] S. unten bei Anm. 30.

erfolgte am 20. Februar 1630. Zum ganzen Vorgang äußert sich Feldkamp abschließend: "Das argumentative Vorgehen Wartenbergs hinsichtlich der Universitätsgründung in Osnabrück ist ein bemerkenswertes Beispiel dafür, wie vermeintlich historische Erkenntnisse als Mittel zur Erreichung von politischen Zielen eingesetzt werden können und wie Geschichte zur Legitimation des eigenen Handelns ge- oder missbraucht werden kann".[24]

Der Lehrbetrieb der *Academia Carolina Osnabrugensis* beginnt (knapp drei Jahre vor der offiziellen Eröffnung[25]) im November 1629 im Gebäude des ehemaligen Augustinerklosters am (heutigen) Neumarkt im Stadtzentrum mit Vorlesungen in Logik und Moraltheologie. Wichtige Dokumente aus der Gründungszeit der Akademie sind a) die erwähnte päpstliche und die kaiserliche Stiftungsurkunde, b) die Osnabrücker Universitätsstatuten und Personalverzeichnisse des Lehrkörpers, c) der Bericht über die einwöchigen Eröffnungsfeierlichkeiten und d) die repräsentativ hergestellte Festschrift zur Eröffnung.

a) Die Stiftungsurkunden vom 22. August 1629 und 20. Februar 1630:[26] Das Privileg Papst Urbans VIII. vom August 1629 greift in einer ausführlichen Einleitung die "historische" Argumentation Franz Wilhelms ausdrücklich auf: Die von Karl dem Großen "vor dem Jahr 800" gegründete Universität solle unter dem neuen Stifter Franz Wilhelm wiedererstehen; die *philosophia et theologia scholastica* solle von Jesuiten oder anderen Dozenten (*professoribus vel lectoribus*) gelehrt werden. Die von Kaiser Ferdinand II. im Februar 1630 ausgestellte Urkunde war in dieser Hinsicht etwas präziser formuliert: Sie sah eine Zusammensetzung des Kollegiums aus Angehörigen des Franziskaner-, des Dominikaner- und des Jesuitenordens vor. Damit war durch die Privilegien zunächst noch offen geblieben, ob eine Jesuitenuniversität – mit einer Studienordnung nach der *Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum* der Gesellschaft Jesu[27] von 1599, ausschließlich vom Orden gestelltem Lehrpersonal und der Verwaltung unter der Aufsicht des Ordensgenerals – oder eine Universität unter Landesherrschaft zu gründen sei; dies sollte durch den Bischof geregelt werden. Da jedoch Bischof Franz Wilhelm bereits in seinem "Gründungsantrag", der Supplik an den Papst vom Sommer 1629, eine Universität unter Aufsicht (*sub cura*) der

[24] Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 36.

[25] Die Eröffnung war zunächst für den 1. Mai 1630 vorgesehen, verschob sich jedoch aufgrund widriger Umstände auf den Herbst 1632 (s.u., Kap. 2c).

[26] Dazu Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 95f. Abdruck der päpstlichen und der kaiserlichen Stiftungsurkunde im Anhang bei Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten* (wie Anm. 3), Anlage 23, S. 379-383, und ebd., Anlage 25, S. 386-389.

[27] Vgl. Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten* (wie Anm. 3), S. 79 und 295. Edition und Übersetzung der *Ratio* in der Fassung von 1599 und 1832 bei G. M. Pachtler, *Ratio studiorum et Institutiones Scholasticae Societatis Iesu*, Bd. 1-4, Monumenta Germaniae paedagogica, Bd. 2.5.9.16 (Berlin, 1887-1894), hier Bd. 2, S. 223-481. Deutsche Übersetzung und ausführliche Kommentierung bei B. Duhr, *Die Studienordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1896).

Jesuiten gewünscht hatte, waren die Weichen für die Jesuitenuniversität klar gestellt und eine Satzungsgewalt des Landesherrn und des Rektors ausgeschlossen; diese lag "letztlich beim Ordensgeneral".[28]

b) Die Statuten (Abb. 2) mit den rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen für die Organisation der Akademie und den Lehrbetrieb wurden wahrscheinlich durch den designierten Universitätskanzler P. Albert Hulso (der am 9. Juni 1632, also schon vor der Eröffnung der Akademie, nach schwerer Krankheit verstarb) ausgearbeitet sowie von dem Leiter der Osnabrücker Jesuitenniederlassung, Rektor Johannes Alting, redigiert und korrigiert.[29] Alting war gegen den Usus der Ordenssatzung von Franz Wilhelm berufen worden und konnte bei der Verfolgung der Universitätspläne als verlässlicher Partner gelten. Diese Partnerschaft war von Franz Wilhelm strategisch geschickt eingefädelt worden; auf sie war er unbedingt angewiesen, weil seine Planungen gar nicht im Sinne der Leitung der Ordensprovinz waren. Diese nämlich hatte mit den seit 1622 für Münster verfolgten Universitätsplänen noch keinen Erfolg gehabt[30] und konnte neben der seit 1616 bestehenden Universität Paderborn und der geplanten in Münster eine dritte Universität in der Rheinischen Ordensprovinz finanziell und personell kaum verkraften.[31]

Die Statuten der Akademie sind in einem redigierten Entwurf erhalten; zu einer endgültigen, ausgearbeiteten "Reinschrift" ist es angesichts der kurzen Existenzzeit der Akademie nie gekommen. Bei der Erstellung der Statuten konnten nur diejenigen der 1586 gegründeten Jesuitenuniversität in Graz und die von Paderborn als Vorbild herangezogen werden. Ein Quellenvergleich hat ergeben, dass die Paderborner Studienordnung als Vorlage für die Statuten der *Academia Carolina Osnaburugensis* gedient hat und den Osnabrücker Verhältnissen angepasst wurde. Kurz vor Ende des Textes, nach der *Formula promovendi baccalaureum biblicum* im Anschluss an die Statuten der Theologischen Fakultät, bricht der Redaktor ab; von da an werden die Paderborner Statuten mit den notwendigen Adaptationen (Ersetzung des Ortsnamens; "Akademie" statt "Universität"), sonst im Wortlaut, übernommen.

Gegenüber anderen Jesuitenuniversitäten zeichnete sich die Akademie in Osnabrück dadurch aus, dass aufgrund einer Urkunde aus der päpstlichen Kanzlei vom 23. Februar 1633 das Lehrangebot um einen Lehrstuhl für Kirchenrecht erweitert werden sollte, um die Rechte der Ortskirche zu erhalten, vor allem aber, weil die Lehre des Kirchenrechts durch das Konzil von Trient vorgeschrieben worden sei.[32] Die Statuten der Jesuiten sahen einen Kirchen-

[28] Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 96.

[29] Diskussion der Autorschaft ebd., S. 102f.

[30] Das Privileg wurde Münster dann 1631 erteilt. Zu Planung und Privilegien für eine Universität Münster zwischen 1622 und 1648 Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten* (wie Anm. 3), S. 238-266.

[31] Ebd., S. 243; Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 36.

[32] Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 106.

rechtslehrstuhl nicht vor; in Osnabrück wurde er aufgrund des jähen Endes der Universität (1633, s.u.) vermutlich nie besetzt.

Im Zusammenhang mit den Statuten der Akademie ist die Frage nach der zutreffenden Bezeichnung für das Carolinum gestellt worden: Bestand 1632/33 in Osnabrück eine "Akademie" oder eine "Universität"? In den *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu* von 1581[33] ist durchweg von Universitäten die Rede; sie sehen vor, dass der Orden seine Tätigkeit auch auf die Universitäten ausweiten und zu diesem Zweck eigene Universitäten gründen könne (*Constitutiones*, pars IV, c. 11,1 und 11,1A).[34] Die Statuten von Osnabrück hingegen verwenden den Begriff der "Akademie", da in Osnabrück nicht die Gründung einer Volluniversität mit den vier seit dem Mittelalter "klassischen" Fakultäten (Philosophie, Theologie, Medizin, Jura) beabsichtigt war (auch der genehmigte Lehrstuhl für Kirchenrecht konnte nicht als Ersatz für eine juristische Fakultät dienen, an der Zivil- und Kirchenrecht zu lehren ist); zudem war es "hochschulpolitisch" geschickt, durch die Benennung ein Konkurrenzverhältnis zu der benachbarten westfälischen Universität in Paderborn und dem Projekt in Münster auszuschließen. Dass das Carolinum 1632/33 "im Range einer Universität" (Suerbaum) geführt worden sei, widerspricht dieser Begriffsbildung nur scheinbar: Es ist zwar nicht an eine voll ausgebaute Universität im modernen Sinne zu senken, sondern eher an eine Lehranstalt für ein Studium generale mit Philosophie und Theologie ("im Rahmen der an den mittelalterlichen Universitäten vertretenen Fächer"[35]), seit Februar 1633 auch mit Kirchenrecht. Dass unter dem Dach der *Academia Carolina* neben der Domschule eine größere Anzahl von Priesterseminaren geschaffen wurden (oder zumindest geschaffen werden sollten, vielleicht auch über die Planungsphase nicht hinausgekommen waren), zeigt, dass das eigentliche Ziel der Jesuitenuniversität in der Förderung und akademischen Ausbildung des Priesternachwuchses bestand.[36] Die vom Papst und vom Kaiser verliehenen Privilegien der Akademie gleichen jedoch denen einer Universität: Sie gewähren das Recht, unbehindert zu reisen, der freien Wahl des Aufenthaltsortes, der Befreiung von Steuern und Abgaben, ausdrücklich auch das vornehmste Recht der Hochschulen, akademische Grade (Baccalaureus, Magister Artium, Lizentiat, Doktor der Theologie) zu verleihen. Insgesamt sahen die Statuten, die ja eng an die der Universität Paderborn angelehnt waren, universitätskonforme Strukturen vor.

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[33] Textkritische Edition: *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu cum declarationibus, auctore S. Ignatio de Loyola* (Rom, 1937); deutsche Ausgabe von M. Schoenenberger und R. Stadler, *Die Regel der Gesellschaft Jesu*, in H. U. von Balthasar, *Die großen Ordensregeln* (Einsiedeln, 1974, 4. Aufl. 1980), S. 337-406. Die Approbation der Satzungen erfolgte erstmals 1558.

[34] Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 100, Anm. 77 und 78.

[35] Suerbaum, "Die Gründung der Universität in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 47.

[36] Zu den Anfängen der Priesterausbildung vgl. K. Schmitt, *Das Bischöfliche Priesterseminar zu Osnabrück zugleich mit einer Darlegung der früheren Ausbildung des Osnabrücker Klerus, Festschrift zum Jubiläum des Priesterseminars 1628-1928, 1859-1929* (Osnabrück, 1929), S. 15, 116-118.

Die Ausbildung der Jesuiten ist in den *Constitutiones* des Ordens (pars. IV, c. 12 und 13) von 1581 inhaltlich in ihren Grundzügen festgelegt: "Schwerpunkt der jesuitischen Ausbildung soll […] neben den humanistischen Fächern, die die Grundlage eines weiteren Studiums bilden, weil sie u.a. die Sprachen zum Gegenstand haben, die Theologie sein, während die Philosophie den Geist schärfen soll. Jura und Medizin gehören nicht zum Lehrangebot der Jesuiten".[37] Einzelheiten zu den Aufgaben der Professoren, den Unterrichtsinhalten und -zielen sowie zu den pädagogischen Grundsätzen bietet der Studienplan, die *Ratio studiorum* von 1599. Quellen zum Osnabrücker Lehrbetrieb (etwa Vorlesungsverzeichnisse oder Matrikeln) sind aus dieser Zeit nicht mehr bekannt. Die etwa 50 Handschriften des 17. Jahrhunderts in lateinischer Sprache, welche das Gymnasium Carolinum heute noch besitzt, stammen nicht aus der Zeit des Hochschulunterrichts von ca. 1630 bis zum Jahr 1633. Suerbaum charakterisiert diesen Handschriftenbestand: "Elf Vorlesungsmanuskripte von Jesuitenpatres ließen sich zwar ermitteln, aber keine dieser Handschriften kann Aufschlüsse über die Tätigkeit der Jesuiten an der Universität geben. [...] Niederschriften von Vorlesungen aus diesen für das Carolinum bedeutungsvollen Anfängen der ersten Osnabrücker Universität fehlen".[38] Erhalten sind einige Vorlesungsmanuskripte von Verfassern, die vor 1630 in Köln, Mainz und Würzburg gelehrt haben,[39] Handschriften, deren Gebrauch in Osnabrück (z.B. durch Ergänzungen, die auf Ereignisse der Stadtgeschichte verweisen) nachweisbar ist. Es handelt sich um Vorlesungen zur Philosophie des Aristoteles und zur Theologie,[40] wie sie für eine theologische Hochschule zu erwarten sind.

Immerhin lässt der Lehrbetrieb sich nach Gegenständen und Studienverlauf rekonstruieren, denn es sind die Personalverzeichnisse erhalten, aus denen die Zusammensetzung des Lehrkörpers des Jesuitenkollegs ersichtlich ist. Auf indirektem Weg, über den "Stellenplan" und seine Besetzung, ist auf diese Weise die Studienstruktur, gegliedert nach den Fakultäten (*Facultas linguarum, Facultas philosophica, Facultas theologica*) und dem Fächerkanon bzw. den Klassen, ablesbar, wie eine Übersicht über die Besetzung von Lehrstühlen in

[37] Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 100f.; vgl. Koch, *Die Universität* (wie Anm. 1), S. 92f., zum Fächerkanon: "Die Fächer der Jesuitenuniversität sind also auf die Artes und Theologie reduziert", zuungunsten des ursprünglichen Vier-Fakultäten-Modells; Römisches Recht und Medizin sind nicht vorgesehen, Kirchenrecht wird nur in der theologischen Fakultät gelehrt, ohne eigenen Lehrstuhl.

[38] B. Suerbaum, "Handschriften des Carolinums aus dem 17. Jahrhunderts berichten über den Bischof Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg und die Jesuiten in Osnabrück", *Schola Carolina* 127 (1994), S. 7-15, hier S. 7. Vgl. ders., *Verzeichnis der Handschriften des Gymnasium Carolinum Osnabrück*, Teil 1-5 (Osnabrück, 1988-2002).

[39] Hs. 101: Köln; Hs. 104/1: Mainz, Würzburg; Hs. 106: Köln; Suerbaum, "Handschriften des Carolinums" (wie Anm. 38), S. 8 mit Anm. 11.

[40] Suerbaum, "Handschriften des Carolinums" (wie Anm. 38), S. 15.

Osnabrück von 1625-1633 zeigt.[41] Für 1632 und 1633 ergibt sich daraus folgendes Bild:

Fakultäteneinteilung	*Klassen/Fächerkanon*
Facultas linguarum	Grammatik 1 (infima) Grammatik 2 (media) Grammatik 3 (suprema) Humanitas Rhetorik Griechisch
Facultas philosophica	Logik Physik Metaphysik Mathematik Ethik
Facultas theologica	Scholastische Theologie I Scholastische Theologie II Heilige Schrift (Exegese) Moraltheologie (Kasus) Kirchenrecht

Damit ist der Studienplan nach jesuitischem Modell inhaltlich hinsichtlich der Fächer in allen wesentlichen Punkten umgesetzt.[42]

c) Über die Eröffnungsfeierlichkeiten der *Academia Carolina Osnabrugensis*, die vom 23. Oktober bis zum 1. November 1632 andauerten, sind wir durch die anschaulichen, jedoch nur noch fragmentarisch erhaltenen Berichte des Jesuiten Johannes Bilstein gut informiert:[43] Konsekration der St.-Ignatius-Kirche, Mess-

[41] Schematische Übersicht bei Feldkamp, "Die Statuten der Jesuiten-Universität" (wie Anm. 2), S. 97, nach dem Personalkatalog des *Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu* (*ARSI*), Rh. Inf. 37.

[42] Vgl. den schematischen Plan des Jesuitenstudiums nach der *Ratio studiorum* bei Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten* (wie Anm. 3), S. 70, ebenfalls bei Müller, *Geschichte der Universität* (wie Anm. 1), S. 56. Im Vergleich wird jedoch ersichtlich, dass die Studien- und Fakultäteneinteilung differiert. Überblick zum Ausbildungsgang nach der *Ratio studiorum* auch bei St. Ch. Kessler, "Ratio studiorum", in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, Bd. 8 (1999[3]), Sp. 842f.

[43] Johannes Bilstein, *Historia Athenaei Carolini Osnabrugensis*, Osnabrück, Staatsarchiv, Rep. 2, Nr. 212, bei Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitäten und Jesuitenuniversitäten* (wie Anm. 3), S. 281, unter dem Titel *Decades tres, in quibus, quid per ipsos decem dies celebratur* [...] *explicatur* aufgeführt. Deutsche Übertragung von C. Riepe, in: ders., *Geschichte der Universität Osnabrück* (Osnabrück, 1965), S. 75-102. Erhalten sind die Berichte vom Verlauf der ersten Tage über die eigentliche Eröffnungsfeier (Inauguration) nebst Festessen und die Gründungsakte sowie auch über die Verleihung der akademischen Grade, insgesamt über die Zeit vom 23. bis 27. Oktober 1632.

feier im Dom, Festzug zur Ignatiuskirche, Eröffnungsakt der Akademie in der Kirche mit Ansprache des Fürstbischofs, Verlesung der Stiftungsurkunden, Übergabe der Universität an den Jesuitenorden, weitere Pontifikalämter sowie Promotionen zum Doktorgrad, zum Baccalaureat und zum Magister sowie eine Theateraufführung zu Ehren des Fürstbischofs ("Sapiens Salomon redivivus"), in welcher dieser wie Karl der Große, *primus institutor* der Universität, als "Apostel des Nordens" und als *Salomon redivivus* gefeiert wird und die Eröffnung der Universität in Allegorien in Szene gesetzt wird, sind die markanten Hauptpunkte des mehr als einwöchigen Festaktes.[44]

d) Anlässlich der Eröffnung wurde vom Osnabrücker Collegium der Jesuiten eine opulente Festschrift herausgegeben, die von Johannes Bilstein und anderen Jesuiten bearbeitet und unter dem Titel *Athenaeum Christianum* bei dem Osnabrücker Buchdrucker Martin Mann in Teilen hergestellt wurde.[45] Die Festschrift in sechs Abteilungen (Hypotyposes), geschmückt mit insgesamt 16 Kupferstichen, darunter einer *corona* zu Ehren des Kaisers Ferdinand II. (Abb. 3), in (aus seinen Teilen) unterschiedlich zusammengestellten Exemplaren überliefert, vereinigt in sich "historische, theologische, philosophische Abhandlungen, Gedichte, Epigramme, Anagramme, Chronosticha usw."[46] und geht damit inhaltlich über eine auf den eigentlichen Anlass bezogene Festschrift offenbar weit hinaus. Nur aus dem Geist der Gegenreformation verständlich ist die panegyrische Darstellung der Rolle Karls des Großen, der von den Jesuiten als der "wirklich Große", "christlicher Kriegsgott" (*Mars christianus*) und "erster Begründer des rechten Glaubens und der Schulen Osnabrücks" (*primus orthodoxae religionis scholarumque Osnabrugis fundator*) gefeiert wird und dessen

[44] Das von Mitgliedern des Jesuitenkollegs bei dem Osnabrücker Buchdrucker Martin Mann in Auftrag gegebene Schauspiel mit dem Titel *Sapiens Salomon* zu Ehren des Fürstbischofs war schon am 1. Mai 1630 zur geplanten Eröffnung der Universität fertiggestellt, kam dann aber doch erst am 26. und 27. Oktober 1632 während der Eröffnungsfeierlichkeiten zur Aufführung; dazu C. Hoffmann, "Buchproduktion im konfessionellen Zeitalter. Der erste Osnabrücker Buchdrucker Martin Mann 1617-1635", *Osnabrücker Mitteilungen* 104 (1999), S. 125-225, bes. S. 158-160, 163-165, 211-213, hier S. 158. Zum Bericht über das Schaupiel Riepe, *Geschichte der Universität Osnabrück* (wie Anm. 43), S. 47-49, Übersetzung der Quelle ebd., S. 99-102.

[45] *Athenaeum Christianum Virtutis et Eruditionis Encyclopediae acquirendae a Carolo Magno Imperatore in Urbe Osnabrugensi ante octingentos annos institutum*. In Osnabrück wurden die Teile 4 und 5 sowie die *corona* gedruckt, Teile 1-3 bei dem Kölner Buchdrucker Johannes Kinckius 1630/31, Teil 6 und der Index zum Gesamtwerk bei Peter Lucius in Rinteln 1631: Hoffmann, "Buchproduktion im konfessionellen Zeitalter" (wie Anm. 44), S. 160, 163-165, zum Autor Bilstein ebd., S. 165. Beschreibung der in Osnabrück gedruckten Teile bei Hoffmann im Verzeichnis der Drucke, Nr. 64f., S. 211-213. Vgl. auch noch H. Runge, "Geschichte des Osnabrücker Buchdrucks. Erster Theil 1617-1707", *Osnabrücker Mitteilungen* 17 (1893), S. 181-370, hier S. 213-221, 328f.

[46] Inhaltsbeschreibung nach Riepe, *Geschichte der Universität Osnabrück* (wie Anm. 43), S. 35.

Sachsenkrieg den Kampf der katholischen Partei im Dreißigjährigen Krieg vorgebildet habe.[47]

Ausdruck der Karlsverehrung ist auch das für die Festschrift von dem Augsburger Kupferstecher Lukas Kilian (1579-1637) gefertigte Wappen der Universität, das Karl als Heiligen zeigt (Abb. 4).[48] Bemerkenswert erscheint, dass in ihm Kaiser- und Papsttum, welche die Akademie privilegiert haben, sowie die Stifterfamilie, aber nicht die Jesuiten als "Hochschulträger" repräsentiert sind.

Schon ein Jahr nach ihrer Eröffnung wurde die Jesuitenuniversität im September 1633 wieder geschlossen, als im Dreißigjährigen Krieg schwedische Truppen die Stadt besetzten. Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg floh mit seinem Weihbischof und mit den Jesuiten aus der Stadt, das Domkapitel bestellte für das Carolinum einen "Schulmeister", damit weiterhin katholischer Unterricht erteilt werden konnte, und das Ratsgymnasium als die evangelische Schule wurde wiedereröffnet. Es wird durch diese Ereignisse deutlich, wie sehr die Stadt während des Krieges an der "Frontlinie" zwischen schwedischen und dänischen Truppen einerseits und kaiserlichen Truppen andererseits lag und dadurch in der frühen Zeit des Konfessionalismus die Stadt eine Scheidelinie zwischen norddeutschem Protestantismus und westfälischem Katholizismus bildete[49] – mit allen misslichen Konsequenzen für das "höhere" Bildungswesen in der Stadt.

Eine zweite, längere Phase jesuitischen Wirkens in der Stadt begann mit dem Jahr 1651. Als Bischof Franz Wilhelm zwei Jahre nach dem Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges nach Osnabrück zurückkehrte, scheiterte er zwar mit seinen Bemühungen, die Universität wiederherzustellen, jedoch betrieb er weiterhin nachdrücklich die erneute Entsendung von Jesuiten; ab 1652 gründeten diese erneut eine Niederlassung in Osnabrück[50] und übernahmen 1656, vom

[47] Vgl. Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 36f., mit Anm. 19.

[48] Links über dem Wappenschild ist Petrus, der auch Schutzpatron der Diözese ist, in der Mitte Maria mit dem Jesuskind, rechts Karl; Petrus und Karl zugleich stellvertretend für Kaisertum und Papsttum; in den Feldern des Schildes stehen sich in zwei Feldern der Doppeladler des habsburgischen Monarchen Ferdinand II. und das sechsspeichige Rad, Zeichen der Stadt und des Bistums Osnabrück, gegenüber, in der Mitte als sog. Herzschild das Familienwappen des Gründers. Beschreibung nach M. F. Feldkamp, "Das Wappen der Universität Osnabrück 1632", *Schola Carolina* 104 (1982), S. 1f. – Die im Jahr 1970 neugegründete Universität Osnabrück verwendete das Wappen anfangs für die Titelseite ihrer Vorlesungsverzeichnisse, bildete die Figuren jedoch ohne Nimbus ab.

[49] Vgl. Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 33.

[50] Von Johannes Blanckenfort (1619-1688), dem langjährigen Superior bzw. Rektor des Jesuitenkollegs, existiert eine Handschrift über die Geschichte der Wiederbegründung der Jesuitenniederlassung in Osnabrück ab 1652, über den Neubau des Schulzweckbaues für das Carolinum und dessen Finanzierung: Handschrift Blanckenfort, p. 8, Osnabrück, Bistumsarchiv, 08-51-21-04. Er war zuvor seit 1656 am Paulinum, dem Je-

Domkapitel dazu beauftragt, wieder die Leitung des Carolinums. Bis zur Aufhebung des Jesuitenordens durch Papst Clemens XIV. im Jahr 1773 wirkten in gut 130 Jahren bis zur Übernahme der Schule durch die Franziskaner 1778 insgesamt über 600 Jesuitenpatres in der Stadt.

1666 war der Ausbau der Schule mit der Einrichtung eines voruniversitären Kurses in Philosophie und Gewissenslehre[51] so weit abgeschlossen, dass die Schulform des "klassischen" Gymnasiums als Vorstufe zur Universität wieder erreicht war.[52] Von der Wiederbelebung eines akademischen Lehrbetriebs kann dennoch nicht gesprochen werden. Dies wird deutlich, wenn man die (oben gezeigte) Übersicht über die Fakultäteneinteilung und den Fächerkanon der Akademie mit den Lehrinhalten vergleicht, die am Carolinum (wie an anderen Jesuitengymnasien) vom 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert unterrichtet wurden. Da die Original-Dokumente über die Ausbildungssituation am Carolinum im Zweiten Weltkrieg vollständig vernichtet wurden, ist man heute auf die Auswertungen dieser Quellen durch ältere Forschung (Iber 1889 und Jaeger 1904[53]) angewiesen, vorwiegend vom Schulpräfekten geführte Protokollbücher (*Fasti scholastici*), aus denen sich der Schulalltag rekonstruieren lässt. Die Auswertung der Forschung[54] ergibt als den wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen den Lehrinhalten eines Gymnasiums und der Akademie, wie sie 1632/33 bestanden hatte, folgendes:

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suitenkolleg in Münster, tätig, hatte dieses zeitweise geleitet und war in dieser Zeit auch Dompredigter in Münster. 1663 wurde Blanckenfort dann an das Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück versetzt, dessen Schüler er seit 1629 gewesen war. Unter anderem war er auch der Initiator des Pilgerwegs von Münster zum 'Gnadenbild' in Telgte, für den er auch das Pilgerbuch konzipierte, dazu R. Suntrup, "Der Pilger auf dem Weg. Konzepte der Gebet- und Andachtsbücher des Johannes Blanckenfort", in *Heaven on Earth / Himmel auf Erden*, Hg. R. Suntrup und J. R. Veenstra, Medieval to Early Modern Culture / Kultureller Wandel vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit, Bd. 12 (Frankfurt am Main, c. 2009).

[51] Der drei-, zeitweise nur zweijährige philosophische Kurs berechtigte die Absolventen zum Studium der Rechtswissenschaften, der Theologie und der Medizin: M. F. Feldkamp, "Abschlußzeugnis eines Carolingers aus dem Jahre 1691", *Schola Carolina* 129 (1995), S. 15f., hier S. 15.

[52] Vgl. Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 41.

[53] H. Iber, "Geschichte des Gymnasium Carolinum zu Osnabrück. Erster Teil: Von dessen Gründung bis 1778", *Programm des Königlichen Gymnasium Carolinum zu Osnabrück* (Osnabrück, 1889), S. 3-30; J. Jaeger, *Verzeichnis der Schüler des Gymnasiums Carolinum zu Osnabrück 1625-1804.* Beilage zum Programm des Königlichen Gymnasiums Carolinum zu Osnabrück (Osnabrück, 1903); ders., *Die Schola Carolina Osnabrugensis. Festschrift zur Elfhundertjahrfeier des Königlichen Gymnasium Carolinum zu Osnabrück* (Osnabrück, 1904), S. 51-84; Auszug wiederabgedruckt in: W. Bogacki, "Der Carolingerbund", *Schola Carolina* 82 (1970) [Sonderheft 50 Jahre Carolingerbund], S. 5-63, hier S. 8-11.

[54] Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 46-48.

– Die Inhalte der 1.-3. Gymnasialklasse (Untergymnasium) sowie der 4. und 5. Klasse (Obergymnasium) entsprechen in allen Punkten einschließlich des Griechischen, das nicht eigens verzeichnet ist, aber fester Bestandteil des Lehrstoffs war,[55] denen der akademischen *Facultas linguarum*;
– Die Lehrinhalte der 6. und 7. Klasse (Logik und Metaphysik, auch Physik [?] im "Philosophischen Kurs") sind Elemente der akademischen *Facultas philosophica*, die das Carolinum als "Gymnasium academicum" auszeichneten; die *Facultas academica* umfasste aber auch noch Physik, Mathematik und Ethik, die auf dem Gymnasium nicht unterrichtet wurden.
– Inhalte der *Facultas theologica* fehlten der Gymnasialausbildung vollständig; insofern konnte das Gymnasium nur auf das Universitätsstudium vorbereiten.

Die wechselvolle Geschichte des Gymnasiums kann gut anhand der Festschrift verfolgt werden, die im Jahre 2004 anlässlich der 1200-Jahr-Feier der Schule herausgegeben wurde.[56] Die *Schola Carolina* erfreut sich bis heute regen Zuspruchs und genießt Anerkennung in der Öffentlichkeit und in der großen "Karolingerfamilie" bei Lehrern und Schülern, Eltern und Ehemaligen.[57]

[55] Die Inhalte des Lehrstoffs des Jesuitengymnasiums nach Stoff, Lernzielen und Lektüre im Lateinischen und Griechischen listet Feldkamp, "Die Jesuiten am Gymnasium Carolinum in Osnabrück" (wie Anm. 2), S. 47, auf.
[56] Hg. Unnerstall und Mannigel, vgl. Anm. 2.
[57] Der Verfasser ist Abiturient des Jahrgangs 1966/2.

IHS
HOC AVSPICIO
R. ET ILL. D. D. FRANCISCVS GVILIELMVS D. G. EPISCOPVS OSNABVRG. MINDENS. AC VERDENS. ETC. S. R. I. PRINCEPS. COMES DE WARTENB. ETC.
ET PATRIA

Abb. 1: Portrait Bischof Franz Wilhelms von Wartenberg im *Athenaeum Christianum* von 1630-1631, Teil 6. Kupferstich von Lucas Kilian, in: *Schola Carolina* 82 (1970), S. 11.



Abb. 2: Statuten der *Academia Carolina* von 1632. Osnabrück, Bistumsarchiv, Sign. 08-51-21-01, fol. 1r, in: Feldkamp 1986, S. 112.


CALLIOPE AQVILAM ROMANAM
IMPERIALEMQVE CORONAM ADORNAT
Audeens Calliope nomen inuictissimi Cæsaris FERDINANDI II ueterem Academiam Osnabrugensem confirmantis, nouisque gratiarum priuilegijs extollentis, nouo impulsa enthusiasmo NOVAM AQVILAM, nouamque IMPERIALEM CORONAM unionibus sacrati nominis eius distinctam, et tribus Laureis stemmatis Sylua nouo artificio circumcinctam CAROLINÆ ACADEMIÆ OSNABRUGIANÆ imposuit
Artificiales CORONÆ IMPERIALIS vniones
sic colligendi
FERDINANDVS SECVNDVS INDVPERATOR SEMPER AVGVSTVS
VSVS
FILVM
Quod euoluendo Diademati Labyrinthæo et Aquilæ Imperiali Ariadne, sed Calliope [illegible]
Sic caput hic, et finis idem: sint cardine gemmæ
Continuusq, metri dux tuus id Artis erit

Abb. 3: Kaiserkrone zu Ehren Ferdinands II. im *Athenaeum Christianum*, Teil 2, in: Feldkamp 2004a, S. 20.



Abb. 4: Wappen der *Academia Carolina* im *Athenaeum Christianum*, Teil 1, in: Feldkamp 2004a, S. 21.



Ubbo Emmius (1547-1625), first rector of the University of Groningen
(Groningen, *Academiegebouw*, Senaatskamer)

UBBO EMMIUS, THE *ETERNAL EDICT* AND THE ACADEMY OF GRONINGEN

Zweder von Martels*

The university and the city of Groningen have done much to keep alive the memory of Ubbo Emmius, founding father and first rector of the academy. An impressive stained-glass window, installed almost a century ago in the grand staircase of the *Academiegebouw*, shows the learned professor in a dignified and magnificent manner surrounded by his five equally distinguished colleagues from the time of the foundation of the university. The city, likewise, contributed to upholding the name of Emmius and his contemporaries. Conscious of the city's historical past, nineteenth-century city-planners and administrators in devising new neighbourhoods named some of the fashionable avenues and streets after Ubbo Emmius, Regnerus Praedinius, the famous rector of the Latin school, Wessel Gansfort, a scholar renowned for his theological writings, and Rudolf Agricola, who excelled as sportsman, musician, orator and Latin scholar. The historical bond between these four commanding representatives of the city's educational institutions was perhaps best expressed in *Effigies et vitae Professorum Accademiae Groningae & Omlandiae*, a volume of lives and portraits of Gansfort, Agricola, Praedinius, Emmius and the other professors of the Academy between 1614 and 1650, published forty years after its foundation.[1]

Despite Groningen's continuing interest in Ubbo Emmius as the driving force behind the foundation of the Academy in 1614, it is sad to have to concede that he has today become a distant figure, chiefly known from the portrait made in the last few years of his life, where he is depicted in all his eminence, in his black cloak lined with a high lace collar, with a worn-out expression and a hoary grey beard – the very image of an exhausted scholar. As a consequence, there exists little interest in his writings. Many of his letters have remained unpublished and few of his writings have been translated into Dutch, and his main work, his colossal, innovative, history of Friesland, has been translated only

* I wish to thank my colleagues Gerda Huisman, Sjef Kemper, Alasdair MacDonald, Jan Veenstra and last but not least Arjo Vanderjagt for comments, counsel and other forms of support contributing to the perfection of this article

[1] *Effigies & vitae professorum Academiae Groningae & Omlandiae: cum historiola fundationis ejusdem Acad.* (Groningen, 1654; facs. ed. Groningen, 1968).

into German.[2] Small wonder that in the winter of 2007, Emmius's tombstone, which had been preserved in the basement of the academy building, was taken away during renovations and was not allowed to return. A plan to reserve a place for it elsewhere in the building was rejected – as rumour has it – on the grounds that this would create a churchyard atmosphere. Perhaps this episode might have ended differently if those involved had taken notice of the text of the inscription on Emmius's stone. It eloquently praises his qualities as the first rector of the University, as a theologian, a true philologist, an excellent historian and as a man of extraordinary practical prudence. Furthermore, he is described as a man content with his own fate, working hard on behalf of Church and State, and as a man who has deserved much from his country.[3] In other words, Ubbo Emmius earns recognition not only as a scholar but also as a man committed to the promotion of shared values and common interests.

As a man of learning, Emmius received much scholarly attention through the years,[4] but as a public figure, as founder of the university, he is perhaps best understood and appreciated through the Charter of Foundation of the University of Groningen, written on 14 July (Julian Calendar) 1614, as a public advertisement of the newly founded academy. More than any other text, this so-called *Edictum perpetuum* (although it was never ascribed to Emmius officially[5]) provides a short, original and arresting statement of Emmius's ideas and aims in founding the university. That these aims to a large extent have a somewhat modern feel to them, makes this document today into a valued possession of the university. Part of its attraction comes from the inclusion by Emmius of certain anecdotes, in setting out the pedagogical ideals incorporated in the resolution of the States of Groningen and Ommelanden. In particular, Emmius turned to a

[2] For a list of Emmius's writings, see G. C. Huisman and J. Kingma, "Werken van en over Ubbo Emmius", in: *Ubbo Emmius. Een Oostfries geleerde in Groningen / Ubbo Emmius. Ein Ostfriesischer Gelehrter in Groningen*, ed. W. J. Kuppers (Groningen and Emden, 1994), pp. 224-237, esp. pp. 226-228.

[3] A. Pathuis, *Groninger Gedenkwaardigheden. Teksten, wapens en huismerken van 1298-1814* (Assen, 1977), p. 854: "Immortali memoriae clariss. et pientiss. senis Ubbonis Emmi Frisii Grethani primi Acad. Groning. Rectoris, theologi sinceri, philologi eximii, historici absoluti, viri prudentiae singularis – qui per omnem vitam sua sorte contentus, labore indefesso de ecclesia ac repub. patria quam optime meritus vere pia demum et placidiss. morte defunctus heic corpore quiescit […]"

[4] Huisman, "Werken van en over Ubbo Emmius" (as in n. 2), pp. 234-237.

[5] Emmius's authorship was first suggested by F. R. H. Smit (in collaboration with F. Akkerman and A. J. Vanderjagt): "The edict can be regarded as a Charter of Foundation. It is in fact an announcement by the States of the City and Province (i.e. 'Ommelanden') of Groningen, of the decision to found a university. The Charter bears the signature of the Secretary of the States, W. Meynardi. It seems likely that it was written by Ubbo Emmius, the first Rector of the university and counsellor to the Committee of States, which was established in 1612 to prepare the foundation of the University". See the introduction in J. M. M. Hermans and M. Nelissen, *Charters of Foundation and Early Documents of the Universities of the Coimbra Group. Second revised edition* (Leuven, 2005), p. 54 (introduction and short bibliography), p. 55 (partial translation of the Foundation Edict by A. J. Vanderjagt), and p. 125 (Latin text, ed. F. R. H. Smit and Z. R. W. M. von Martels).

number of apophthegms ascribed to King Alfonso of Naples and Aragon, who thanks to his felicitous combination of learning and practical experience had become an ideal example fit for imitation. These well-chosen words of Alfonso were not without effect in Groningen. The students went in large numbers from all directions to Groningen, so that there were at least eighty of them at the end of the first year.[6] Even after that, the magic of Alfonso's name continued to attract attention. In 1616, in a philosophical oration, William Makdowell cited the Eternal Edict as setting the students the example of two Spanish kings – namely the famous Alfonso the Wise, King of Castile, and also Alfonso of Aragon – both of whom preferred to renounce their earthly power rather than relinquish the study of philosophy.[7] In 1621, Alfonso was mentioned again in a formal oration in praise of humanist learning (*Declamatio scholastica de laudibus humaniorum literarum*) by Martinus Ioannis, a pupil of the Latin school. The fact that this speech was dedicated to among others the deputies of the States of Groningen and Ommelanden and to the high functionaries of the university may have been the reason for the mentioning of the Spanish king.[8] Subsequently, however, the example of Alfonso seems to have been forgotten until, very recently, attention once again began to be paid to it, especially by Fokke Akkerman and Arjo Vanderjagt.[9] They have been the force behind the many

[6] A. J. Vanderjagt, "Huninga, Johannes Epinus)", in *The Dictionary of 17th-and 18th-Century Dutch Philosophers*, ed. W. van Bunge *et al.* (London, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 467-468.

[7] The latter king is, of course, the Alfonso, King of Naples and Aragon, mentioned in the Edict. Although the latter usually bears the epithet "the Magnanimous", he is somewhat confusingly called "the Wise" in the Edict. See William Makdowell, *De quadruplici nodo philosophico quadruplex cuneus: Oratio habita in publica studiosorum corona cum ornatissimi nonnulli iuvenes, quorum nomina singulis disputationibus praefixa sequuntur, disputationes philosophicas auspicarentur* (Groningen, 1616), folio a3 verso: "Alphonso illos Castellae Aragoniaeque duos amplissimo se regno exui malle accepimus, quam Philosophiae studio privari, ex quo praeclara sui uterque monumenta memoriae consignavit et consecravit". Cf. H. A. Krop, "Northern Humanism and Philosophy: Humanist Theory and Scholastic Practice", in *Northern Humanism in European Context, 1469-1625. From the "Adwert Academy" to Ubbo Emmius*, ed. F. Akkerman, A. J. Vanderjagt and A. H. van der Laan (Leiden, 1999), pp. 149-166, at pp. 156-157.

[8] Z. von Martels, "De Groningse Latijnse school aan de beginperiode van de universiteit. Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van vier *Declamationes scholasticae* uit de jaren 1619, 1620 en 1621", in *Onderwijs en onderzoek: studie en wetenschap aan de academie van Groningen in de 17e en 18e eeuw*, ed. A. H. Huussen Jr. (Hilversum, 2003), pp. 9-30, at pp. 14, 15, 17, 29.

[9] See, for instance, F. Akkerman, "Onderwijs en geleerdheid in Groningen tussen 1469 en 1614", in *"Om niet aan onwetendheid en barbarij te bezwijken": Groningse geleerden 1614-1989*, ed. G. A. van Gemert, J. Schuller tot Peursum-Meijer and A. J. Vanderjagt (Hilversum 1989), pp. 13-29, esp. p. 19; A. J. Vanderjagt, "Practising Continuity. The Academy at Groningen, 1595-1624", in *Scholarly Environments: Centres of Learning and Institutional Contexts 1560-1960*, eds. A. A. MacDonald and A. H. Huussen, Jr. (Leuven, 2004), pp. 33-47, esp. p. 39; Krop, "Northern Humanism and Philosophy" (as in n. 7), pp. 156-157. In fact, this interest in the Edict has emerged slowly in the last half century. E. H. Waterbolk, for instance, paid attention to Emmius's interesting metaphor of the two mili-

studies on Agricola, Gansfort, Praedinius, Emmius and northern humanism that have established themselves as essential for any understanding of the educational ideals in Groningen in the days of Emmius.[10] Such studies have helped to demonstrate that for these northern men Groningen was not merely a remote province of the Dutch Republic of the Seven United Provinces, but part of a much broader, international world without boundaries, thanks to the general spread of Latin and the printing of Greek and Latin literature. For this very reason, it is no surprise that in the Edict, as we shall see, Ubbo Emmius mentioned two famous champions of Italian humanism of the first half of the fifteenth century: King Alfonso and Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini.

There are several arguments to adduce for Ubbo Emmius's authorship of the *Edictum perpetuum*, which will be dealt with in the following sections. In the first place the text of the Edict is part and parcel of the *Natales Academiae*, attributed to Ubbo Emmius. Secondly, there are indications in a letter by Emmius to Johann Witten. Thirdly, there is the work on King Alfonso by David Chytraeus, Emmius's former teacher and life-long friend that served as a source for certain passages in the first part of the Edict. And finally, there is circumstantial evidence in the form of thoughts and formulations in Emmius's writings, echoes of which can be found in the Edict.[11] This Edict is important as a testimony not only of Ubbo Emmius's humanist scholarship, but also of his public career as a teacher and educator, and as such of the international significance of seventeenth-century northern humanism.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE *EDICTUM PERPETUUM*

The author of the Edict that was meant to advertise the foundation of the academy of Groningen in 1614 points to examples of the past which served to incite

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tary services in the Edict, but he passes over the significance of Alfonso. Though he mentions the latter's words about crowned donkeys, the king remains no more than a vague person, mentioned only as "a wise king" (Waterbolk, "Een verwaarloosde samenhang", *Groningse volksalmanak. Historisch jaarboek voor Groningen* (1976/1977), pp. 37-41; reprinted in E. H. Waterbolk, *Verspreide opstellen* (Amsterdam, 1981), pp. 257-262; esp. p. 257).

[10] In particular: *Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius (1444-1485). Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of Groningen, 28-30 October 1985*, ed. F. Akkerman and A. J. Vanderjagt (Leiden, 1988); *Wessel Gansfort (1419-1489) and Northern Humanism*, ed. F. Akkerman, G. C. Huisman and A. J. Vanderjagt (Leiden 1993); *Northern Humanism in European Context* (as in n. 7); Rudolf Agricola, *Letters*, ed. A. van der Laan and F. Akkerman (Assen, 2002).

[11] Other supporting arguments for Emmius's involvement with the Foundation Edict include the meticulous care with which the text of the Edict was printed – a quality characteristic of Emmius's *Rerum Frisicarum historia* and other printed works – and, additionally, Emmius's developed style, and love of Greek terms derived from patristic authors. On his style, see P. Schoonbeeg and F. Akkerman, "De Latijnse stijl van Ubbo Emmius", in *Ubbo Emmius. Een Oostfries geleerde in Groningen* (as in n. 2), pp. 70-71.

the States of Groningen and Ommelanden to found their own academy. In doing this, these bodies were undoubtedly thinking of the two already existing universities of the Dutch Republic, those of Leiden and Franeker, which had both been founded in a spirit of freedom and independence. In the case of the University of Leiden, this emerges clearly in the first letter of William of Orange to the States of Holland and Zeeland on the subject. On 28 December 1574, the prince called for the foundation of a "renowned school or university" in the provinces of Holland or Zeeland, so as to support freedom and legal government in religious matters and in those related to the common good, where the youth of Holland, Zeeland, Brabant, Flanders and other surrounding countries might be educated and instructed. In a second letter (2 January 1575) to the same addressees, the prince mentioned Leiden as a suitable place. This may have been meant either as reward or compensation for the suffering and losses that the town had endured during the siege by the Spaniards in the previous year. It is significant that William of Orange warned the States against any delay; the on-going peace negotiations with Spain might bring these provinces back under the control of Philip II, who would certainly not allow the foundation of a protestant university.[12] This longing for political and religious freedom is also a characteristic of the founders of the University of Franeker and of the self-conscious tone of the Foundation Edict of the Academy of Groningen. Whereas William of Orange advised and encouraged the foundation of the University of Leiden, his nephew William Ludovic, Count of Nassau-Dillenburg, stadtholder of Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe, performed a similar role with regard to the foundation of the University of Franeker, in 1585.[13] This was the second example that the States of Groningen must have had in mind as they drew up the Edict of 1614. Franeker, like Leiden, was being rewarded for its support in the struggle against the Spanish oppressors. The arguments which had been advanced in favour of the new Academy at Franeker were more or

[12] W. Otterspeer, *Groepsportret met Dame. Het bolwerk van de vrijheid. De Leidse universiteit, 1575-1672* (Amsterdam, 2000), pp. 61-63. It is worth comparing the text of William's first letter with the tenor of the Act of Foundation of the University of Groningen: "Alsoe tot een vast stuensel ende onderhoudt der vryheyt ende goede wettelicke regieringe des lants niet alleen in zaeken der religie, maer oock in tgene den gemeynen borghelicken welstandt belanght insonderheyt ende voor alle dynghen van noode is dat hier binnen slandts ende die Graeffelicheden van Hollandt ofte van Zeelante eenen goede, genouchsaeme ende vermaerde schole ofte universiteyt werdde opgericht, aldaer die jeucht soe van der voorgenoemde graeflicheden als van Brabant, Vlaenderen ende andere omliggende landen beyde inde rechte kennisse Godts ende allerley goede eerlycke ende vrye kunsten ende wetenschappen diendende tot die wettelicke regeringe der landen opgevoedt ende onderrichtet werdden, Soo hebben wy voor goet inghesyen aen ulieden desen brief daerover te scrijven […]" (p. 61).

[13] On Franeker, see, for instance: *Universiteit te Franeker 1585-1811: bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Friese Hogeschool*, ed. G. Th. Jensma, F. R. H. Smit, F. Westra (Leeuwarden, 1985); *Academisch onderwijs in Franeker en Groningen, 1585-1843: ijver en wedijver*, ed. E. H. Waterbolk *et al.* (Groningen, 1985); W. Otterspeer *et al.*, *Werkplaatsen van wijsheid, geleerdheid en het ware geloof: of De wisselwerking tussen de universiteiten van Leiden en Franeker* (Franeker, 1985).

less repeated in Groningen a few decades later: it would be cheaper for the local youth to study at home, where one could more easily keep an eye on their behaviour and progress; an academy would benefit the development of the population; and money would not leave the province.[14]

Groningen came to devising a similar institute after the siege of the city by both William Ludovic of Nassau and Maurits of Orange in 1594, as a result of which the city was "relieved" (*reductio*) from Spanish occupation.[15] Almost overnight, a catholic became a protestant town, and a Spanish province became the seventh province of the Dutch Republic. Though churches, monasteries, buildings, lands and other catholic possessions fell into protestant hands, they were not simply confiscated but reserved for better purposes – ***ad pios usus***, as it was called – in harmony with the pious intentions of the benefactors who had once donated them to the church. The Latin school became one of the first beneficiaries, for, soon after the great change in the city, the council started to invest in its reorganisation. This led to the appointment of Ubbo Emmius, who came from Leer to become the new rector of the Latin school, in which position he remained until 1613, when he became the first professor of the new academy. Soon after his appointment, Emmius recast the entire school programme[16] and with great energy he brought the school back to its earlier lustre under the name of Maartensschool, when the famous Regnerus Praedinius had been rector.[17] Emmius's presence created an atmosphere in which Groningen's ambition to have an institution of higher education within its own borders grew steadily. But besides Emmius, others were also active. Proof of this comes from the negotiations which started with Mellaeus Brunsema in 1595, and which soon led to his appointment as professor, with the responsibility for teaching the *Institutes* (i.e. Roman law). However, the small basis of this academy of law meant that it attracted only few students, and the initiative had passed before in the spring of 1601 it formally ended with Brunsema's resignation.[18]

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[14] H. Brugmans, "Een en ander over de stichting der Groningse academie", in *Academia Groningana MDCXIV-MCMXIV. Gedenkboek ter gelegenheid van het derde eeuwfeest der universiteit te Groningen uitgegeven in opdracht van den academischen senaat* (Groningen, 1914), pp. 241-257, at pp. 250-252.

[15] Hermans and Nelissen, *Charters of Foundation and Early Documents of the Universities of the Coimbra Group* (as in n. 5), p. 54.

[16] Concerning this programme – which contains thoughts which continued to play a role in Emmius's life, and also in his ideas about education such as portrayed in the Edict – see Ubbo Emmius, *Programma bij de aanvaarding van het rectoraat der Latijnse School (thans Praedinius-gymnasium) te Groningen in 1594*, ed., transl. A. G. Roos (Groningen, 1951).

[17] F. Postma, "Regnerus Praedinius (1510-1559), seine Schule und sein Einfluss", in *Wessel Gansfort and Northern Humanism* (as in n. 10), pp. 291-324.

[18] The States of Groningen and Ommelanden and later those of the province of Drenthe thereupon appointed Brunsema judge advocate, to oversee how the aldermen were applying the communal finances. See A. J. Vanderjagt, "Brunsema, Melle", in *The Dictionary of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers*, ed. W. van Bunge *et al*., vol. 1 (Bristol, 2003), p. 174; *Oratio pro nova juridicae Facultatis Groningae Instituta Praelectione habita ad VI Julij A.S. MDXCVI a Mellaeo Brunsema Juris Utriusque Doc-*

Three years after the beginning of the Twelve Years Truce (1609), which brought an end to the hostilities between the Seven Dutch Provinces and Spain, the long discussion about the foundation of an academy took a more definite form, as we learn from the first pages of the *Effigies*. This history, under the fitting name *Natales Academiae*, was written by Ubbo Emmius, and it was preserved in the archives of the academy until its publication in the *Effigies* of 1654. The Foundation Edict was part of this historical description of the early days of the university and its function and the circumstances of its creation are briefly touched upon by Emmius. For this reason we shall turn to this document and Emmius's unnoticed letter to Johann Witten.

In his *Natales Academiae*, Emmius first paid attention to the importance of learning in general, by reference to two apophthegms of Aristotle and Aristippus. A little later he came to discuss the decision of the States of Groningen and Ommelanden at the end of November 1612 to add to the ordinary Latin school an institute of higher education, to be called the Academy; he also discussed all the measures by which this decision was accompanied.[19] A committee of eight wise men was charged with the organisation. They had to determine the nature of the tasks of professors and curators, to find a suitable site, and to supervise the necessary building projects and further arrangements. The search for able men for the five chairs to be established was another important part of their work. Yet, most importantly, they had to sound out Emmius's opinion and to test his willingness to occupy the chair of history and mathematics.[20] In the spring of 1614, these preparations ended with the printing of the study programme drafted by the committee of eight in the name of the States of Groningen. This was pinned up publicly, not just in Groningen but also in all the big towns. Finally, Emmius speaks about the Foundation Edict, with the following words: "To the same places the decision of the States has been sent, together with a short survey of the excellent study programme, the moment of the solemn inauguration and the start of the studies. A copy of what we might call the

tore et Professore, introd. T. J. Veen, transl. F. Akkerman *et al.* (Groningen, 1967), pp. xiv-xix.

[19] *Effigies* (as in n. 1), p. 2: "Tandem vero belli feriis anno MDCIX confectis, et Repub. Sumptuum parte levata, iidem illi Proceres, serio iam animis huc versis, id effectum dedere, ut anno MDCXII, vergente mense Novembri, de instituendo hic illustri Gymnasio, quod Collegium Facultatum tunc indigitabatur, in quo Professores quinque (tot enim tunc initiis sufficere putabantur) Theologiam, Iurisprudentiam, Medicinam, Historias, Philosophiam, Methesin docerent […]". These words are based on the Dutch Resolutions of the state which also provide the exact date of 26 November 1612. In their Dutch resolution, the States of Groningen and Ommelanden called their institution a "collegie van faculteiten". Cf. Brugmans, "Een en ander over de stichting der Groningse academie" (as in n. 14), p. 252.

[20] Brugmans, "Een en ander over de stichting der Groningse academie" (as in n. 14), p. 252: "de gecommitteerden ad hoc kregen in last 'om te tenteren offte niet d'heere rector Ubbo Emmen sick int selve collegio als professeur in historiis ende mathematicis mede solde laeten bewegen ende gebruycken ende ook nae eenige bequaeme mannen mede ommetesien'". The fact is also mentioned by Emmius in his *Natales Academiae*: *Effigies* (as in n. 1), p. 2.

Charter of Foundation of the Academy or the Eternal Edict (*Edictum perpetuum*) will follow".[21]

In these words, Emmius is as silent concerning his own role, as he had been modest about his other activities for the young academy.[22] But a letter written in the summer of 1614 does provide some interesting information, when he informed his life-long friend Johann Witten (1558-1614)[23] that once again he (Emmius) had work to do with regard to the educational institution and the programme of the lessons which needed to be distributed in print. He had in mind to add at the beginning or the end Witten's poem on the occupation of Groningen in 1594, and the return of the Muses. But he did not dare to do this without Witten's consent and without knowing whether the latter still agreed to the text of the poem as it was. Furthermore, Emmius would like to have one or two verses changed, in which Witten – more as a friend than in accordance with the truth – had ascribed too much to him.[24]

From the tenor of this letter and from Emmius's remarks in the *Natalis Academiae*, we may draw the conclusion that Emmius soon changed his mind and started to write the Eternal Edict so as to replace Witten's poem. We now

[21] *Effigies* (as in n. 1), p. 4: "Interea et Programma ab VIII-viris, nomine Nobilissimorum et Amplissimorum hujus Provinciae Ordinum conceptum, typisque excusum, et non solum heic sed passim celebribus in oppidis, quo missum fuit, ex eorum voluntate, publicis locis est affixum. Eo et consilium ipsorum Ordinum, optimumque studium summatim expositum, et tempus solennis introductionis, ut vocant, et faciendi laborum initii indicatum. Eius velut sanctionis fundamentalis Academiae, aut Edicti perpetui, exemplar, hic exhibemus". The Foundation Edict was printed in 700 copies (see Hermans and Nelissen, *Charters of Foundation and Early Documents of the Universities of the Coimbra Group* (as in n. 5), p. 55).

[22] H. Brugmans, "Een en ander over de stichting der Groningse academie" (as in n. 14), p. 257, emphasises Emmius's involvement with the appointments of Hermannus Ravensperger, Nicolaus Mulerius, and Johannes Epinus Huninga, but also on other levels. Brugmans describes the history of these appointments and a number of failed attempts.

[23] For Emmius's relation with Witten, see J. J. Boer, *Ubbo Emmius en Oost-Friesland* (Groningen, 1935), pp. 72-73 and *passim*; B. van der Aa, "De stilte doorbroken: een onbekende en unieke brief van Johannes Witten aan Ubbo Emmius uit het jaar 1605", in *Limae labor et mora. Opstellen voor Fokke Akkerman ter gelegenheid van zijn zeventigste verjaardag*, ed. Z. von Martels, P. Steenbakkers and A. J. Vanderjagt (Leende, 2000), pp. 119-126.

[24] H. Brugmans and F. Wachter, *Briefwechsel des Ubbo Emmius. Band II: 1608-1625* (Aurich, 1923), pp. 118-189 (no. 397): Ubbo Emmius to Johann Witten, without date, summer 1614: "Ecce autem quod maxime volebam. Id pene neglexeram. Est mihi rursum aliquid de instituto nostro scholastico, ac lectionum nostrarum ordine typis vulgandum. Ei annectere aut praemittere in animo habui carmen tuum doctissimum quod primum omnium ad me scripsisti de occupata urbe hac et reductis in eam musis. Sed sine voluntate tua id facere non bene ausus fui: et si maxime te inconsulto hoc sumere fuissem ausus, perplexus tamen haerebam in nomine, ferre ne posses id addi an secus, et si addendum qua id forma fieri malles. Deinde uno in versu aut duobus aliquid mutandum putabam, in quibus nimium mihi tribuis: quae si ita ut scripta a te amice magis quam vere sunt, ipse publicarem, agnoscere viderer. Nec tamen id ausus sum facere sine consensu tuo".

to turn to the translation of the text of the Edict[25] by way of introduction to the following sections on King Alfonso the Magnanimous, Emmius's use of anecdotes and examples, and, finally, Emmius and the international dimension of the Eternal Edict.

THE ETERNAL EDICT IN TRANSLATION

The States of Groningen and Ommelanden to the reader: Greeting.

The words and deeds of the very best and wisest princes and governors of state make clear what great value they attach to studies of learning and to the erudition derived therefrom. Here the Spaniard Alfonso, King of Aragon, Sicily, Sardinia and Naples shines above all, as he exceeds all kings of his age in wisdom. For that reason the epithet 'the wise' is attributed to him. When his most important duties allowed it, he devoted himself with heart and soul to good learning, and enjoyed conversation with learned men. For that reason he was outraged when he once heard that one of the kings of Spain used to say that it does not behove a good and noble man to be learned and to touch books. He exclaimed that this was not the voice of a king but of an ox. Yea, he very solemnly swore that, as far as he was concerned, he would rather lose his kingdoms, of which he possessed many, than that he should be ignorant of that learning, of which he had all too little. And in conversation with Aeneas Silvius he said that kings without learning were not much dissimilar to donkeys with crowns. He used to assert that of all his counsellors he most approved of the dead ones – indicating wisely-written books, for he said that they answered his questions and furnished advice without fear, obligation and flattering. At the same time Alfonso was certainly not the person to sit down inert or lazy, content with leisure in the shade, but rather in times of both war and peace he was constantly busy with the most important affairs, and more than once he experienced both sides of fortune. Indeed, in either eventuality he proved how wise, virtuous, constant and moderate his mind was by as it were maintaining the same expression.

And yet, even now people are not lacking that regard themselves as wise, applauding their own ignorance, themselves untrained in each form of learning. They feel no shame when they assert that the study of good learning is useless and that erudition is completely superfluous in the community of the state and alike of the church, and that all who indulge therein are evilly losing time and money.

We, however, are of a different opinion and follow the very wise and very great Alfonso. For, as there are two kinds of military service, we think that the state for its benefit should be equipped with the knowledge of both, namely the arts of weapons and of learning – with the former, so as not to be overcome by the enemy, with the latter, so as not to succumb to ignorance and barbarity and

[25] For the Latin text of the *Edictum*, see the appendix below.

to perish. In our view, good and prudent governors should neglect neither one of these two things.

Now, moreover, war has made room for peace, and our attention is given over to the arts of peace. For that reason we, already incited much earlier by the examples of others and in demonstration that we really have our fatherland at heart, have taken the decision to develop more and more the studies of learning belonging to the second kind of military service here with us. And with regard to this, we have decided to open in Groningen, the metropolis of this province, a famous school, or academy. It is our wish that the three so-called higher faculties shall be publicly taught there: theology, jurisprudence and medicine, with, in addition, all parts of philosophy, logic, ethics, physics, history, mathematical disciplines, the Greek and Hebrew languages – in short, those subjects which are wont to be taught in other public schools or academies, together with exercises in corresponding disputations.

For instruction in these subjects and for chairing these disputations we shall, God willing, appoint professors famous for their knowledge, sufficient in number, and incited to the performance of their office by generous salaries and foretold benefits. We shall do our utmost herein, that nothing established should be lacking in this respect. Moreover, for the common good we shall grant rights and official privileges, suited both to teachers and students alike, and we shall establish a convenient and useful regulation in all matters. Finally, we shall seriously so arrange things, in respect of the charges for those who settle here for the sake of education, that no-one will need to seek from us, either on the basis of either his rights or his merits, anything extra by way of this sort of benefice or generosity.

Regarding these matters, we shall apply, and use for much better purposes, a large part of the funds which our ancestors – generous men that they were, in proportion to their prosperity and with a purpose of mind that may have been good and pious, but ensnared and falling through the darkness of their false beliefs – have accumulated for the training schools of the monasteries.

What incited and impelled us to take this decision, beneficial for both church and state, is not only, as we have shown, the ability to bear this expense, but also the unusual advantage of this place, which may appear destined by nature to be the residence of the Muses. For its attractive situation is immediately apparent, its air is pure and health-giving, its provision of every sort of food is abundant and easy, and there is a great wealth of suitable hostels and of the other things that pertain thereto. At this time, for the good of the school that we call our own, we have in the last months, and at considerable expense, set up classrooms and buildings. We are holding them in readiness in that part of the town which of all is the most suitable for this enterprise, for this training-ground of the Muses, or – perhaps more accurately – the workshop of letters, set apart from the din of men and their activities, and in close connection with a roomy and imposing church. This is the sum of our decision and intention. With the help of Almighty God we hope for success, whose greatest desire it is to serve His glory and also the common good. For our part, and commensurate with our strength, we shall not permit anything to be lacking. At Groningen, on

the 14th day of July in the year of the Lord 1614, according to the Julian calendar.

By order of the States, signed W. Meynard, Secretary.

The commencement of exercises and tasks is determined for the end of the Dog Days, i.e. on 22 August according to the Julian calendar, with the blessing of Christ, the holy God and Man.

Printed at Groningen, by Johannes Sassius, printer. 1614.

ALFONSO THE MAGNANIMOUS

More than forty years before the foundation of the academy in Groningen, there was delivered, at the *paedagogium* in Rostock, a school oration which may have inspired Ubbo Emmius to compose the initial part of the Foundation Edict. David Chytraeus, the rector of this school, recounted in a letter – written on the longest day of 1575 to Duke Albert of Mecklenburg – that two years earlier he had asked a student of his to hold an oration (written by Chytraeus himself) on the life of Alfonso, King of Aragon and Naples, whose life was full of examples of wisdom, magnanimity, justice, fortitude, moderation and other virtues fit for heroic princes. Chytraeus added that the oration, written by him out of love and admiration, was based on authors of Alfonso's age.[26] This was not the last time that Chytraeus would speak of Alfonso's love of letters, his patronage and other great qualities as a ruler. He used the word "hero", and regarded him as a godsend and even as an image of God (*Imago dei*) – in short, as a great example to be imitated.[27] In the following years Chytraeus became more and more acquainted with the Italian renaissance authors around Alfonso. Apart from Antonio Panormita and Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, he mentions Poggio Bracciolini, Bartolomeo Facio, Francesco Filelfo, Giovanni Pontano,

[26] David Chytraeus, jr., *Davidis Chytraei Epistolae ob miram rerum varietatem stylique elegantiam* [...] *nunc demum in lucem editae* (Hanau, 1614), p. 20: "JOHANNI ALBERTO DVCI Megapolitano […] De Alphonso autem, quod Celsitud. Vest. meminit, est omnino Historia rerum illius, plurimis insignibus, sapientiae, magnanimitatis, iustitiae, fortitudinis, modestiae et caeterarum virtutum Heroico principi conuenientium exemplis stipata: Quarum amore et admiratione captus, ex diuersis illius aetatis scriptoribus, Orationem de vita illius, scholastico cuidam in hac schola recitandam, ante biennium praescripsi, cuius exemplum Illustris. Celsitud. Vest. mitto. Nec dubito, si Celsit. Vest. inspicere aut perlustrare eam vel legenti auscultare vacabit, quin aliqua cum voluptate eam cognitura sit. […] Addidi autem Alphonsinae orationi, pagellas ex literis Argentina, Spira et Belgico ad me proximis diebus allatis, […] etc. Datum Rostochii, Die Solstitii, Anno 1575".

[27] Chytraeus, *Epistolae* (as in n. 26), pp. 69 [1580], 190, 227, 253-254, 270, 283 [1575], 326 [1585], 421, 487, 517, 537-538, 557, 654, 785-786, 804, 915.

Leonardo Bruni, George of Trebizond, Platina, Sabellicus, Thomas Fazellius, and Lorenzo Valla.[28] He saw their ideals continued in the northern humanism of Rudolf Agricola and Erasmus, both of whom were highly esteemed by Emmius, who even visited Erasmus's grave on his own way to Geneva.[29]

There is a possibility that the student who delivered Chytraeus's oration on Alfonso was in fact Ubbo Emmius. His father had sent the young man (then twenty-three years old) from his birthplace Greetsiel in Eastern Friesland to Rostock in 1570. There he stayed a little less than three years, in which period he found in Chytraeus a great example for the rest of his life.[30] On the other hand, it is quite possible that Emmius was merely one among the audience when the oration on Alfonso was held. However this may be, Chytraeus did not let Alfonso go from his mind after 1573. Encouraged by his friends, he produced a new edition of Antonio Panormita's *De dictis et factis Alphonsi* together with Piccolomini's collection of response-anecdotes. This was the edition which Emmius later used as his source for the Foundation Edict.

For humanists of the Italian Renaissance Alfonso the Magnanimous was a household name long before his death, and this he remained for long after.[31] It should therefore cause no surprise that Ubbo Emmius made reference to this king of Aragon and Naples, and that he should praise him as an ideal king and Maecenas, not out of flattery, but sincerity. Through long wars this Spanish king had combated the French Anjou's as successors to the throne of Naples. In this, Alfonso appealed to a promise of Queen Johanna of Naples, who had called for his help in 1421. Only in 1442 was the struggle won in favour of Alfonso, but this was not before he had suffered defeat, captivity and every kind of misfortune. Even at that early date his perseverance and passionate love for

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[28] These names occur in Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi regis Aragonum et Neapolis libri quatuor Antonii Panormitae, cum respondentibus Principum illius aetatis, Germanicorum potiss. Dictis et Factis similibus, ab Aenea Sylvio collectis: et scholiis Iacobi Spiegelii, quibus Chronologia vitae Alphonsi et Ludoici XII Gall. Regis, et Caroli V Imp. aliorumque Apophtegmata, et aliae Annotationes historicae recens accesserun*t (Wittenberg, 1585), fols. a3-a4 (This text is nearly identical with Chytraeus's *Epistolae* (as in n. 26), pp. 253-255. These letters were published in the second half of 1614, after the Foundation Edict was published, and could, therefore, not have been Emmius's source for the document.) Chytraeus was also acquainted with Lorenzo Valla's history of King Ferdinand; see Chytraeus, *Epistolae* (as in n. 26), p. 69 [1580].

[29] *Der Reisebericht / Itinerarium des Ubbo Emmius*, ed. E. H. Waterbolk and W. Bergsma, transl. E. von Reeken (Groningen, 1980), pp. 73-74.

[30] If Emmius was indeed 23 years old when he left for Rostock, this must have happened at the end of 1570, as he was born on 5 December 1547. This also means that he must have stayed there until nearly the end of 1573! See *Effigies* (as in n. 1), pp. 39-41. After Emmius left Rostock he remained in contact with Chytraeus and sent some of his writings to him. H. Brugmans and F. Wachter, *Briefwechsel des Ubbo Emmius. Band I: 1556-1607* (Aurich, 1911), pp. 16, 98, 124, 192; cf. Boer, *Ubbo Emmius en Oost-Friesland* (as in n. 23), pp. 43-44.

[31] A. Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous: king of Aragon, Naples and Sicily, 1396-1458* (Oxford, 1990); idem, *The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous the Making of a Modern State* (Oxford, 1976).

literature and wisdom had made him into a living legend, as we find illustrated by a letter of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini to the young King Sigismund of Austria. In 1443, the future Pope Pius II described Alfonso as someone "who had finally won after being defeated many times and who had countered misfortune with success", and he added to this: "this man is never without his book in his army camp. He always carries his library with him, wherever he goes. Whether he is in a house or stays in a tent, each day he reads something or has someone read aloud for him".[32]

Indeed, Alfonso was a great student of Greek and Latin Antiquity. As a sign that his knowledge of letters had been gained by much study, he carried an open book by way of emblem, showing that it was befitting for kings to have knowledge of the arts and to possess book-learning.[33] Whenever, during the devastation of any town, his soldiers stumbled on a book, they would fall to fighting over who would be allowed to present it to the king. They all knew that they could give him no greater pleasure.[34] Alfonso had issued a law to prohibit the export of books without his consent; there could be something in them from which the kingdom might benefit.[35] When the citizens of Naples wished to erect a triumphal arch for their king, they found a suitable place above the stairs of one of the main churches of the city. However, when Alfonso heard that this would be possible only if the house of one of his noblest soldiers were demolished, he immediately issued the following prohibition: "That construction of stone, he said, which would only suffer from wind, rain and lightning, was not prized by him so highly that he could allow the destruction of the house of a good old friend, who had served him bravely and loyally through war and peace and every circumstance". [36] There are hundreds of such stories concerning Alfonso. The imposing group of figures – the king, his councillors and attendants – that stands over the gate of honour in the Castel Nuovo in Naples harbour is but one of many tributes to this exemplary prince.

THE FORCE OF EXAMPLES

The source of Emmius's anecdotes of Alfonso lies in Chytraeus's edition of Antonius Beccadelli, *The Sayings and Deeds of King Alfonso* (*De dictis et factis regis Alphonsi*) of 1585. This remarkable book was written by an equally remarkable man. Beccadelli was born in Palermo in 1394, which gave him the nickname *Il Panormita* (the man from Palermo). He first won fame as a Latin

[32] Letter of 5 December, 1443, of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini to King Sigismund in *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini. I. Band: Privatbriefe*, ed. F. Wolkan (Vienna, 1909), pp. 222-236 (99), esp. p. 227.

[33] David Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi regis* (as in n. 28), p. 48 (nr. 14); Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous* (as in n. 31), p. 318.

[34] David Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi regis* (as in n. 28), p. 48 (nr. 15).

[35] Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous* (as in n. 31), p. 317.

[36] David Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi regis* (as in n. 28), p. 35 (nr. 50).

poet of erotic epigrams, which were collected under the title *Hermaphroditus*. Later he adopted a more serious role, and from 1434 he served King Alfonso as councillor and minister. This was a far from convenient job, for in those years, Alfonso was still struggling for his throne. Beccadelli successfully intervened when Alfonso was held captive by the Duke of Milan in 1436. With his *Sayings and Deeds of King Alfonso* of 1455[37] Beccadelli also became Alfonso's panegyrist. When he had completed this collection of some 250 anecdotes for correction by the friend of his youth, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the latter replied that he was unable to correct such a good Latinist, but that he would react to each of the anecdotes with one of his own, either about Alfonso or about princes he knew from his long experience in Germany. These anecdotes are either serious, witty or funny, full of praise, ironic, or containing a touch of critique.[38] The anecdotal character made both collections popular, so that they were quite often reprinted either in separate or in combined editions. Erasmus, too, used a number of anecdotes about Alfonso in his *Apophthegms* of 1531.[39] This may have served Alfonso's triumphal reception in northern Europe, where the writings of Aeneas Silvius were already popular among humanists. In 1538, a first German edition by Jacob Spiegel appeared. It is not to be excluded that the combined edition (Hanau, 1611), where for the first time Beccadelli's anecdotes and the corresponding ones of Aeneas Silvius were printed side by side, may have played a role in reminding Emmius of Alfonso, but this was certainly not the edition from which he took the anecdotes used in the Foundation Edict. These were drawn from the edition of 1585, compiled by his admired teacher, Chytraeus.[40] The convincing proof of this can be found in the middle of Chytraeus's preface, where he writes that everyone who loves the study of knowledge and letters will love and venerate this King Alfonso.[41] Immediately thereafter he paraphrased a small, carefully selected number of anecdotes out of the total of around 500 in both collections, and among them the very four about Alfonso's love for learning that are found in the Eternal Edict.[42]

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[37] N. Thurn, "Antonio Panormitas *De Dictis et Factis Alphonsi Regis Aragoniae Libri Quattuor* als literarisches Kunstwerk", in *De litteris Neolatinis in America Meridionali, Portugallia, Hispania, Italia cultis*, ed. T. Briesemeister and A. Schönberger (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), pp. 199-219.

[38] F. Tateo, "Pio II e l'aneddotica su Alfonso il Magnanimo', in: *Pio e la cultura del suo tempo. Atti del I convegno internazionale 1989*, ed. L. Rotondi Secchi Tarugi (Milan, 1991), pp. 273-281.

[39] For this and the other editions and translations, see Thurn, "Antonio Panormitas *De Dictis et Factis Alphonsi*" (as in n. 37), p. 199. Erasmus, *Apophthegmata*, introd., transl. H. Philips (Würzburg, 2000), pp. 664-666.

[40] For the full title, see Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi regis* (as in n. 28).

[41] Editions of writings on Alfonso by Chytraeus, Beccadelli and Piccolomini do not appear in the first library catalogue of the academy of Groningen from 1618; see http://syllabus.ub.rug.nl/catalogus/bladeren/transcriptie/index.html1575.

[42] Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi* (as in n. 28), fols. a3r-v: "Omnes etiam, qui doctrinae ac literarum studia amant et colunt, hunc regem Alphonsum amabunt et colent, et studiose illius historiam et apophtegmata legent, quem literarum perstudiosum et apprime doctum et singulari clementia et munificentia doctrinas et homines doctos fovisse ac or-

What made Chytraeus (and Ubbo Emmius much later) feel drawn to Beccadelli's work on King Alfonso? Chytraeus paid much attention to rhetoric at his school, for which the manual of his teacher Philipp Melanchthon was used. This work, however, was made for teachers, not for students, as it lacked good examples. As a practical schoolman, Chytraeus began to collect examples which fitted Melanchthon's theoretical schemes and he published some of them in his rhetorical works.[43] A remarkable feature of Beccadelli's *De factis et dictis Alphonsi* was the division of these anecdotes in categories like "just", "prudent", "witty", "modest", "moderate", "merciful", "courageous", marked in the margin of each individual example. In a letter Chytraeus reminds his correspondent that these categorisations fitted in with Chytraeus's interest in commonplaces, *loci communes*,[44] and with his conviction that whereas rules and laws merely deter by punishment, anecdotes invite us to imitate exemplary behaviour.[45] Emmius took note of this and frequently made use of this experience both in his teaching[46] and in his publications,[47] so that after his death, Mulerius in his life of Emmius compared this characteristic use of instances as mirrors of

nasse, accepimus Ideoque optimos et felicissimos consiliarios suos esse dixit Mortuos, Libros intelligens, a quibus sine metu, sine gratia, sine omni assentatione, quae nosse cuperet, fideliter audire posset". The wording of the four anecdotes used in the Edict is in Chytraeus's version as follows (fols. a3v-a4r): "[…] ac ipse Reges illiteratos, nihil differre ab asinis coronatis, Aeneae Sylvio dixit. […] Denique exemplo suo Hispanos multis seculis a studiis humanitatis adeo abhorrentes, ut qui literis operam impenderent, ignominia propemodum notarentur, ad cultum literarum sic revocavit, ut rudes propeque effrenatos homines doctrina quodammodo reformaverit. Cumque audisset unum ex Hispaniae regibus solitum dicere, non decere Generosum et nobilem virum esse literatum, exclamasse fertur: Vocem hanc non Regis, sed bovis esse. Denique Regna quae plurima quidem haberet et possideret, malle se perdere persancte affirmavit, quam literas, quas permodicas se scire dicebat, nescire". For these anecdotes in the collections of Beccadelli and Piccolomini, see David Chytraeus, *De dictis en factis Alphonsi regis* (as in n. 28), p. 23 (nr. 6), p. 38 (nr. 60), p. 63 (nr. 1), p. 104 (nr. 6).

[43] See the introduction of N. Thurn on Chytraeus's *Praecepta rhetorica inventionis*, in *Chytraeus, Praecepta rhetoricae inventionis. Oratio in funere Henrici Ducis Megaloburgensis. Oratio de oppido Suerino. Oratio de urbe Rostochio*, ed., transl. N. Thurn *et al*., Rostocker Studien zur Kulturwissenschaft 3 (Rostock, 2000), pp. ix-xix.

[44] Chytraeus, *Epistolae* (as in n. 26), p. 269.

[45] Chytraeus, *Epistolae* (as in n. 26), pp. 420, 483 [1583], 785-786, 914 [1596].

[46] Especially in the *chria*, the elaboration of an anecdote. For this, see J. A. R. Kemper, "*Rexte dixit quondam sapiens ille Solon*: Rhetorische Übungsstücke von Schülern von Ubbo Emmius", in *Wessel Gansfort and Northern Humanism* (as in n. 10), pp. 245-266.

[47] With regard to the wording and form of the Edict, the most appropriate example of Emmius's use of anecdotes is the beginning of his early history of the new academy. With the two opening words similar to those in the Edict, it also begins with a similar remark on the importance of erudition, adding an example of Aristotle and a second one of Aristippus: "Quanti sit aut esse in hominum Societate debeat erudition, compendio summus Philosophus Aristoteles ostendit, cum rogatus, quid existimaret." See *Effigies* (as in n. 1), p. 1.

good examples in his historical works with Rudolf Agricola's recommendation that such examples are like mirrors showing us what are good and bad deeds.[48]

EMMIUS AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE ETERNAL EDICT

Modern historians have complained about the formal character of Emmius's letters. Small talk and personal detail that play such an important role in modern biographical descriptions are almost lacking. The examples in the Foundation edict, however, show a different man, closer to us than we might have imagined. In his other writings, we find the same persuasive force of examples, self-consciousness and pride of the good governance, facilities and fine location of the city of Groningen. In short it reflects the same human interest, which occurs in the warm recollection of Nicolaus Mulerius that Emmius frequently spoke about his own teachers, especially Chytraeus and the physician and mathematician Henricus Brucaeus whose skilful teaching and jokes and humour he so much enjoyed.[49] From the many passages that echo Emmius's

[48] *Effigies* (as in n. 1), p. 49: "Denique ita scripsit, ut in ipsius historiam probe quadret praeconium hoc apud Rud. Agricolam; 'Rerum', ait, 'ad actiones moresque nostros pertinentium, ratio ab hujus historia petenda est. Quoniam is et bene facta laudando, et quae contra sint vituperando, non docet solum, sed, quod efficacissimum est, exemplis propositis, quae recte secus-ve fint, velut in speculo ostendit".

[49] *Effigies* (as in n. 1), p. 41: "Erat vero tum temporis prae caeteris Germaniae Academiis celebris Rostochiana, ob clarissimorum in ea docentium virorum copiam, inter quos eminebant duo viri magni David Chytraeus et Henricus Brucaeus, ille Theologus et historicus celeberrimus, hic vero Medicus ac Mathematicus praestantissimus. Utrumque docentem assidue audiebat, utrumque crebro dein in ore habebat; priorem ab insigni in dicento facundia, et multiplici historiarum congnitione, alterum a docendi dexteritate, jocis facetiis, commendans". Boer, *Ubbo Emmius en Oost-Friesland* (as in n. 23), p. 43-44. I have found a few other examples of Emmius relishing laughter and merriment: when travelling to Geneva with friends (*Der Reisebericht* (as in n. 29), p. 79); enjoying conversation on literature and poetry during a dinner with Prince William Ludovic (see Waterbolk, "Met Willem Lodewijk aan tafel", in: idem, *Verspreide opstellen* (as in n. 9), pp. 296-344, esp. 298 (referring to Brugmans, *Briefwechsel* (as in n. 30), vol. I, p. 243, and Emmius, *Guilelmus Ludovicus Comes Nassovius, id est Logos Epitaphios quo genus, res gestae, et mors huiusque comitis […] exposita sunt* (Groningen 1621), pp. 232-234); and at the banquet held on the occasion of the opening of the Academy on 24 August 1614. Effigies (as in n. 1), p. 7: "Ingruente vero vespera, ab Ordinum provinciae Deputatis coena cum lautitia data est VIII-viris et Professoribus novis, et multis viris aliis honratis, qui aut studium, aut autoritatem, aut qualemcunque operam suam contulerunt ad nobile hoc institutum literarium promovendum, aut alioqui Musarum cultores erant: conviviumque hoc non iucundis minus sermonibus et felicibus comprecationibus, quam caeteris quae mensis et convivationibus solita sunt, in multam usque noctem, cum voluptate ac hilaritate extractum traductumque fuit". For a description of these festivities, see J. Wiarda, "De inwijding van de ACADEMIAE GRONINGAE & OMLANDIAE op 23 en 24 augustus 1614 (Juliaanse tijdrekening), d.i. 2 en 3 september 1614 (Gregoriaanse tijdrekening), en de toen gehouden, in 1614 gedrukte, redevoeringen van Hermann Ravensperger (1586-1625) en Johannes Epinus Huninga van Oostwold

views in the Foundation Edict, two stand out. In conclusion of this article, they deserve to be mentioned, as the first one describes the buildings of the new Academy and defines its educational ideals within the context of church and state, and the second one expresses Emmius's concern about political freedom and independence, which he recognised in the people of Groningen and Friesland, and which may help to explain the remarkable self-conscious act of the States of Groningen to advertise the foundation of its own Academy without the consent of a pope, emperor, bishop or king, as was customary in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.

In the edition of his *De agro Frisiae* from 1616, Emmius added a chapter on the recent foundation of the Academy, in which he provided an impression of its splendour and quiet location of this temple of the Muses, in terms very similar to the thoughts in the Edict:

> A space has been assigned to this temple of the Muses at the north side of the church of the Franciscans, an extraordinary suitable place, as it is separated from the noises of the common people. The buildings are splendidly built and equipped, a charming square surrounded on all sides by three magnificent colonnades borders on the lecture halls. The large church of the Franciscans has been rebuilt for a large sum and has been made suitable for the use of the Academy.[50]

Soon after, Emmius emphasised the Christian humanist pedagogy of the new foundation, which sought (in order to prevent unlawful liberty, the cause of many calamities) to instil in its students not only greater knowledge but also greater virtue and piety.[51]

The second example connects Groningen with Frisia (which formed more of an entity for Emmius than for the people of Groningen today). Emmius described Groningen as "a smaller Frisia",[52] and Friesland itself, in his view ex-

(1583-1636)", *Groninger Universiteits Blad* 15 (1964), pp. 17-27; (1965), pp. 129-140; 16 (1966), pp. 10-23, especially p. 136.

[50] Ubbo Emmius, *De agro Frisiae inter Amasum & Lavicam flumina. Deque urbe Groninga in eodem agro: et de jure utriusque* (Leiden, 1616), p. 71: "Locus huic Μουσείῳ datus juxta fanum Franciscanum in latere ejus boreo, regione inprimis commoda, ab omni vulgi strepitu semota. Aedificia praeclare structa et adornata, area amoena auditoriis cohaerens, porticibus latis et magnificiis tribus a lateribus cincta: ipsum fanum Franciscanum luculentum in Academiae usum magnis sumptibus reparatum".

[51] Ubbo Emmius, *De agro Frisiae* (as in n. 50), p. 72: "Hoc vero studii habemus habemus ex voluntate optimorum curatorum procerumque nostrorum, ne pro libertate legitima ac honesta exlex licentia, multorum malorum causa, apud nos inolescat, regnumque sibi paret, utque ii, qui literarum studiosos apud eosdem nos se profitentur, non solum doctiores, sed etiam virtute ac pietate meliores reddantur".

[52] Emmius, *Rerum Frisicarum historia, autore Ubbone Emmio, Frisio; distincta in decades sex. Quarum postrema nunc primum prodit, prioribus ita recognitis & locupletatis, ut novae prorsus videri possint* (Leiden, 1616), p. 17: "Hanc ego regionem a Lavica in Amasum et Dullartum minoris Frisiae nomine interdum affectam avorum nostrorum memoria reperio. Iam usus dudum invaluit, ab urbe insigni, atque omnium

tended between the rivers Vlie and Weser. His *Rerum Frisicarum historia* provides a remarkable characterisation of the people of Groningen as

> friendly, pleasant, always ready with an answer, inventive, industrious, and interested in culture and understanding of learning. The people of Groningen have no low opinion of themselves and their eating habits are luxurious. They long eagerly for power, for which they are prepared to undertake and endure everything. Still they cling very tenaciously to their rights and liberty against oppressors. They would rather endure everything than subject themselves to slavery.[53]

With this final remark, Emmius, in fact, ascribes the most valuable *Frisian* quality to the people of Groningen. It should namely be understood in the context of what he had written about the Frisians in general. Trying to give a deeper meaning to this idea of freedom, he traced its roots to earlier historians. So his *De Frisia et frisiorum re publica* begins with a page-long quotation from Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini's pronouncement on the Frisians. This was the same Aeneas Silvius, whom we encountered as admirer of King Alfonso, and as author of the answer-anecdotes. Emmius, however, selected three lines from Aeneas Silvius's comments, which were printed in large capitals. These lines convince us that we should read the earlier characterisation of the people of Groningen in the wider perspective of Frisian ideals of freedom and they help us to understand the international dimension of the Eternal Edict, which conveys a similar message of independence to the world:

> Truly, *Frisia* is a free country with its own habits; it will not bend to the will of foreigners and does not recognise anyone as its superior. For their freedom, Frisians are prepared to face death.[54]

Frisicarum amplissima, sive quod in solo ejus haec sit ad austrinum limitem, (id quod in litem trahi a nonnullis video), sive quod foederibus antiquitus connexa, Groninganam vocitare".

[53] *Rerum Frisicarum historia* (as in n. 52), p. 19. " Populus oppidanus moribus comis, blandus, dicax, solers, industrius, a literarum cultu et captu non abhorrens, neque abjecte de se sentiens, ideoque in veste et victu sumptuosus, imperii cumprimis avidus, ac ejusce gratia quidlibet suscipiens et perferens: pertinacissimus vero in tuendo jure suo et libertate contra oppressores, et cuncta potius quam servitutem perpetiens". For Emmius's changes in this passage, see Z. R. W. M. von Martels, "Between Orosius and Ubbo Emmius: on the Tradition of Geographical Descriptions in Historical Writings", in *Northern Humanism in European Context* (as in n. 7), pp. 268-283, esp. p. 283.

[54] Emmius, *De Frisia et Frisiorum re publica Frisiorum inter Flevum et Visurgim* (Leiden, 1616), *Laus Ex Pio II Pontif. Rom.*: "Revera libera Phrisia est, suis utens moribus; exteris nec parere sustinet, neque dominari cupit. Haud invitus Phriso pro libertate mortem oppetit". Cf. Boer, *Ubbo Emmius en Oost-Friesland* (as in n. 23), p. 121; H. Feenstra, "Ubbo Emmius, een Oostfries patriot in Groningen. Enige aspecten van de betrekkingen tussen Oost-Friesland en Groningen in de tijd rond 1600", in *Ubbo Emmius. Een Oostfries geleerde in Groningen* (as in n. 2), pp. 11-30.

APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE *EDICTUM PERPETUUM*, 1614[55]

Ordines Groningae et Omlandiae Lectori salutem

Quanti semper fecerint literarum studia ac eruditionem, quae hinc existit, optimi et sapientissimi quique principes et rerumpublicarum gubernatores, ex multis eorum dictis et factis claret. Praefulget heic ALFONSUS HISPANUS, ARAGONIAE, SICILIAE, SARDINIAE, NEAPOLIS rex, sui saeculi reges omnes sapientia superans, unde et Sapientis cognomen ei tributum. Is ipse impense literis bonis deditus, quantum per gravissima regnorum negocia licuit, et literatorum consuetudine delectatus, cum audisset aliquando aliquem ex Hispaniae regum numero dicere solitum, non decere generosos ac nobiles viros literatos esse, et libros tractare, exclamavit commotus animo, Vocem istam non regis, sed bovis sibi videri. Quin etiam persancte testatus est, ad se quod attineret, malle se regna sua, quae multa haberet, perdere, quam literas, quas permodicas sciret, nescire. Et cum Aenea Sylvio cum sermocinaretur, dixit, literarum expertes reges non multum dissimiles esse asinis coronatis. Ex omnibus autem consiliariis suis affirmare solebat, maxime se probare mortuos, sapienter scriptos libros designans, quos sine metu, gratia, assentatione sibi respondere, et consilia suggerere dicebat. Nec sane iners aut deses rex fuit Alfonsus, umbra et otio gaudens, sed negociis maximis pace belloque perpetuo occupatus, et utramque fortunam non semel expertus. In utraque vero fortuna eundem velut vultum retinens, quanta esset sapientia, virtute, constantia, animi moderatione demonstravit.

Et tamen non desunt etiam nunc homines, qui sibi sapere videntur, plaudentes inscitiae suae, omnis literaturae ipsi expertes, quos dictitare non pudet, literarum bonarum studium inutile esse, et eruditionem in societate civili pariter et ecclesiastica rem plane supervacaneam, omnesque, qui his se dant, tempus ac sumptus male perdere.

At nos longe aliter sentientes, et hac in re cum sapientissimo ac maximo rege facientes, cum duo militiae genera sint, existimamus utriusque disciplina instructam rempublicam esse oportere, ut ei bene sit, armorum scilicet, et literarum; illa, ne ab hoste opprimatur, hac, ne inscitiae et barbariei succumbens pessum eat, arbitramurque neutrum genus bonis ac prudentibus gubernatoribus negligendum esse.

Quam ob causam nos etiam his belli feriis ad pacis artes curis nostris versis, ut fortunam patriae vere nobis cordi esse ostenderemus, non ita nuper aliorum exemplis stimulati statuimus heic apud nos quoque literarum studia, quae alterius militiae sunt, magis et magis excitare, decrevimusque eam in rem Scholam illustrem seu Academiam in provinciae huius nostrae metropoli GRONINGA aperire. In ea volumus tres superiores quas dicunt facultates, Theologiam, Iurisprudentiam, Medicinam, dein philosophiae partes omnes, logicam, ethi-

[55] For the Latin text, see Hermans and Nelissen, *Charters of Foundation and Early Documents of the Universities of the Coimbra Group* (as in n. 5), p. 125.

cam, physicam, historias, disciplinas mathematicas, Graecam Hebraeamque linguam, denique ea, quae in aliis publicis scholis, seu Academiis tradi solent, cum disputationum convenientium exercitiis, doceri publice. Atque his docendis, regendisque disputationibus Professores doctrina insignes, numero sufficientes, liberalibus stipendiis ornatos, ac ad diligentiam in faciendo officio monitis beneficiis excitatos, favente DEO, adhibebimus, erimusque in eo toti, ne quid in hac parte instituto desit. Iura quoque, et privilegia instituto idonea, et bono publico congrua docentibus pariter et discentibus tribuemus, ordinemque omnibus in rebus commodum atque utilem dabimus. Id denique agemus serio, ut levandis sumptibus eorum, qui studiorum causa sedem heic ponere volent, ratio huiusmodi habeatur, ut in hoc beneficii ac liberalitatis genere iure ac merito nemo a nobis quicquam requisiturus sit amplius. In has res bonam eorum censuum partem, quos maiores nostri homines liberales pro modo rerum suarum animo quidem bono et religioso, sed errorum tenebris implicito ac lapsante, in ἀσκητήρια monastica quondam contulerunt, convertemus, atque in usus impendemus longe meliores. Invitavit vero nos, atque adeo incitavit ad capiendum hoc Ecclesiae simul ac Reipublicae consilium utile, praeter istam, quam monstravimus, ferendorum sumptuum facultatem, loci quoque huius singularis commoditas, qui Musarum sedi destinatus esse a natura videri potest. Nam et amoenitas eius insignis est, et aër purus ac salubris, et annona omnis generis uber ac facilis, et hospitiorum commodorum magna copia, et quae alia istuc pertinent. Iam et in illius nostrae scholae usum auditoria aedificiaque non parvo impendio his proximis mensibus instruximus, parataque habemus ea urbis regione, quae huic rei, Musarum ἀσκητηρίῳ, sive literarum officinae est omnium aptissima, seiuncta ab hominum et negociorum strepitu, peramplo et egregio templo cohaerens. Haec consilii et instituti nostri summa. Successum a DEO optimo maximo cuius gloriae cum bono publico servire potissimum nobis mens est, speramus. Et nos a nobis pro viribus nostris nihil deesse patiemur. GRONINGAE, pridie Eidus Iulii Iuliani, Anno Christi M.DC.XIV.

Mandato Ordinum subscripsit W. Meynardi Secretarius

Initium exercitiorum et laborum destinatur fini dierum Canicularium ad diem scilicet X. Kal. Septembris Iuliani, adspirante Christo θεανθρώπῳ.

Groningae excudebat lOANNES SASSIUS Typographus. Anno 1614.

JOHN MAIR'S *DIALOGUS DE MATERIA THEOLOGO TRACTANDA* INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Alexander Broadie

THE CONTEXT OF JOHN MAIR'S *DIALOGUS DE MATERIA THEOLOGO TRACTANDA*

In general it is easier to defend a position if you accept it than if you think it plain wrong. Students in the medieval schools were trained to defend positions they thought wrong. The acquisition of such a skill was bound to be an important weapon in their armoury. John Mair (c. 1467-1550) was a logician trained in the scholastic way and at the University of Paris during the first decades of the sixteenth century, and during these decades there were few arguers tougher than he.[1] Some of the logical skills he had honed are in evidence in the *Dialogue* that he published as a preface to his 1510 *Commentary* on Book One of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (hereinafter *In 1^{um} Sent*). In a sense there are three *dramatis personae* in the *Dialogue*: Gavin Douglas (c. 1476-1522), David Cranston (c. 1479-1512) and John Mair. Mair does not actually say anything but he is there throughout since (apart from the trivial fact that he wrote every word) Douglas and Cranston are in dispute about Mair, one of them in favour of the kind of theology that Mair writes in his *In 1^{um} Sent* and the other against it. In effect therefore, the piece is a picture of Mair both attacking and defending himself. As a preface to my edition-with-translation of the *Dialogue*[2] I offer here some background information and comments that have a bearing on the role of the *dramatis personae.*

Mair was born into a farming family in the village of Gleghornie in south-east Scotland. He possibly attended first a school in that village but certainly went in due course to the grammar school in the nearby town of Haddington. He was later to write with affection of the "sweet milk of grammar" that he imbibed there. Subsequently he stayed in Cambridge for one year, at God's

[1] See A. Broadie, *The Circle of John Mair: Logic and Logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland* (Oxford, 1985).

[2] Another edition of the text (though without translation) of the *Dialogue* is to be found in John Mair, *A History of Greater Britain as well England as Scotland*, ed., transl. A. Constable (Edinburgh, 1892), a translation of Mair's *Historia Majoris Britanniae tam Angliae quam Scotiae* (Paris, 1521).

House,[3] a community noted for its literary studies, where he was taught by John Thorn and must have got a grounding in Priscian's grammar and the Latin poets. Thereafter Mair went to Paris. He entered the Collège de Ste Barbe and studied under Jean Bolu, through whom he probably learned something of the Italian humanists, including Angelo Poliziano, whom Mair quotes. He also studied Lorenzo Valla and deeply disapproved of his anti-scholastic message. Mair subsequently transferred to the Collège de Montaigu where he associated with a number of Scots including John Annand, who later became principal of St Leonard's College in St Andrews, Robert Walterson, who later founded an altar to St Fiacre in his native town of Haddington, George Lokert, who was to become in due course rector of St Andrews University and then dean of Glasgow,[4] Ninian Hume and David Cranston.

David Cranston (c. 1479-1512), a priest of the Glasgow diocese, arrived in Paris in 1495, enrolled at the Collège de Montaigu, studied under Mair, and began teaching at Montaigu in 1499. He edited two works by Mair, the *Termini* (Paris, 1502) and the *Quartus Sententiarum* (Paris 1509), and also wrote several philosophical works. One of these was his *Insolubilia*, two editions of which appeared in 1512. The second of them, edited by William Manderston and Antoine Sylvestre, contains an elegy *De immatura magistri nostri Davidis Cranston Scoti morte* [On the premature death of our master David Cranston]. Cranston was in many ways close to Mair, particularly in respect of their deep commitment to the scholastic tradition in logic and theology. Despite this commitment they were both sufficiently open-minded about the encroachment of humanist values to be willing to benefit from the presence in Paris of the great Italian humanist scholar Jerome Aleandro. It was Aleandro who introduced the teaching of Greek into Paris. He records: "There are many Scottish scholars to be found in France who are earnest students in various of the sciences and some were my most faithful auditors, the Scot John Mair, doctor of theology, and David Cranston, my illustrious friends".[5]

The first edition of Mair's *Quartus Sententiarum* (1509), which had been edited by Cranston, was dedicated to Alexander Stewart, a son of James IV, who died, alongside his father, at Flodden. A subsequent edition, published in 1516, and therefore four years after Cranston's untimely death, was dedicated to two people, one of who was Robert Cockburn, Bishop of Ross. The other was Gavin Douglas (c. 1476-1522), son of Archibald Douglas, fifth earl of Angus.[6] If, as is likely, he was born in Tantallon Castle, a seat of the Douglases,

[3] God's House (in 1505 re-established as Christ's College) was in St Andrew Street in the parish of St Andrew. It is not known why Mair chose to attend God's House but it cannot be ruled out that the nominal connection with Scotland's patron saint may have played some part in the decision.

[4] See A. Broadie, *George Lokert: Late-Scholastic Logician* (Edinburgh, 1983).

[5] A. Renaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie* (Paris, 1953), p. 614.

[6] For biographical information on Gavin Douglas, see P. Bawcutt, *Gavin Douglas, A Critical Study* (Edinburgh, 1976), and P. Bawcutt, "New light on Gavin Douglas", in *The Renaissance in Scotland: Studies in Literature, Religion, History and Culture Of-*

then his birthplace was just a few kilometres from that of Mair – hence Douglas's reference in the *Dialogue* to Mair in these terms: "For I am linked to him by friendship as by fatherland. I think that you well know the stretch of land between Tantallon and Gleghornie from where he comes". That Douglas is one of the dedicatees of the new edition of the *Quartus Sententiarum* is noteworthy in view of the fact that he is represented in the *Dialogue* as strongly hostile to Mair's way of doing theology. Admittedly the dedication to Douglas came six years after the *Dialogue* was first published, but there is no reason to think that Douglas had changed his mind in the least on that point. Quite the contrary – he remained firmly of an anti-scholastic persuasion, this despite the fact that he was both provost of the collegiate church of St Giles in Edinburgh (hence Cranston's opening words "Greetings, most worthy provost") and also bishop of Dunkeld.

Douglas was much more a representative of renaissance humanism than Mair ever was. His references in the *Dialogue* to Valla and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pius II) are friendly and we should recall that one of those to whom Douglas was closest in terms of real friendship was the Italian humanist Polydore Vergil. Douglas's fellow *dramatis persona*, David Cranston, is a man of a very different stripe. Though admittedly in the *Dialogue* he invokes the support of the Italian humanist Gian Franco Poggio Bracciolini (1380-1459), who was however a bitter anti-Valla polemicist, and though, as already mentioned, he attended Aleandro's Greek lectures in Paris, Cranston was all the same a man of the Old Order much more than of the New.

Douglas went up to St Andrews University in 1490 and graduated Master of Arts there in 1494. It is not known whether he attended the University of Paris, nor therefore whether he was ever a pupil of Mair's – Mair's affirmation in 1516 that he had enjoyed Douglas's friendship both at home and in Paris does not permit a conclusion on this matter. In any case Douglas was in Paris from time to time, and since Mair was a fellow East Lothian man as well as being the most distinguished Scot at the University of Paris, Douglas was almost bound to arrange to see him on his visits to Paris. One visit was in 1509. In that year a move was made to bring Mair back to Scotland as treasurer of the Chapel Royal at Stirling and Gavin Douglas had a hand in the negotiations. They failed. Both Douglas and Robert Cockburn were active on the diplomatic front. For example, both were in the Scottish team in France in 1517 that was seeking a renewal of the Auld Alliance. The negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Rouen (1517). The following year Mair did at last return to Scotland, to take up the Principalship of Glasgow University, and it cannot be ruled out that, this time also, Douglas had a hand in persuading Mair to return.

We shall probably never know whether the *Dialogue* is the report of an actual conversation between Cranston and Douglas but Mair was as well placed as anyone could be to represent the contrasting views of the two men on the question of the merits and demerits of scholastic theology. Even if the two did

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fered to John Durkan, ed. A. A. MacDonald, M. Lynch and I. B. Cowan (Leiden, 1994), pp. 95-106.

not have this conversation they certainly could have done. But whether or not the *Dialogue* is a report of an actual conversation, it would have served a useful purpose for Mair in that, at a time of tumultuous change associated with the gradual encroachment of renaissance humanism into the universities, it would have sent out the message that Mair, far from living blindly in the past, was well aware of the new developments, even if he was not sympathetic to them. On this interpretation, Mair was getting his retaliation in first. In anticipation of the charge that he was ignorant of what was going on around him, he demonstrated, immediately after the liminary letter, that he was well aware of the intellectual basis of the New Order. In the *Dialogue* Mair gives strong arguments to both sides, and there is no declaration at the end as to who has won. But Mair may have thought that the best way to persuade others that his was the right way to do theology was to leave them to read his *Commentary* and to see that it made a valuable contribution to our understanding of deep issues in matters of religion.

DIALOGUS DE MATERIA THEOLOGO TRACTANDA[7]

Dialogus inter duos famatos viros: magistrum Gawinum Douglaiseum, virum non minus eruditum quam nobilem, ecclesiae beati Aegidii Edinburgensis praefectum, et magistrum Davidem Crenstonem in sacra theosophia baccalaureum formatum optime meritum.

[D]. Salve, praefecte dignissime.

G. Salve et tu, vir charissime. Sed quae te huc afflavit aura? Saepe enim oratum, ut de re literaria tecum comminiscar, exorare, ut nos visas, non potui.

D. Non voluntas, sed facultas parendi defuit, verum eam ob rem nunc ultro advenio.

G. Optata loqueris. Hoc triduo primum *Sententiarum* magistri nostri Maioris legi, quem iamiam emisit in auras. Quem permonitum velim, ut relictis scholicis exercitiis natale solum repetat, atque illic vineam dominicam colat, et concionando semina evangelica, unde optimos fructus animae fidelium demetant, late longeque dispergat.

D. Id quidem se aliquando facturum proponit, sed interea temporis ab hoc munere non segniter desistit. Nam qui praedicanda decenter scribunt, non suo tantum ore, sed omnium quos erudierunt praedicant, nec uno tantum saeculo, sed quotquot eorum doctrina steterit.

G. Accipio, sed ut Flaccus ait: “Mortalia facta peribunt. Debemus morti nos nostraque”. Et Aeneas Sylvius (postea Papa Pius dictus) de situ Minoris Asiae loquens: “Aristotelis scripta” inquit “aliquando temporis edacitate absumenda sunt”; ideoque bonum fuerit eum operari cibum, qui non perierit.

[7] In the edition of the Latin text, the interpunction and use of capitals have been adapted to modern usage, as have the letters u/v/w. Abbreviations have been silently expanded. Titles of Latin works mentioned in the text have been italicised. E-caudata and ae are always printed as ae.

D. Quo tempore peritura sint Aristotelis aliorumque scripta nec definitum est a Pio, neque, si definitum fuerit, omnino pro concesso recipiendum fuerit.

G. Totum assentior, sed tanta est nunc librorum congeries, ut quorsum se divertat, ignoret quilibet.

D. In quolibet libro aliquid frugiferum invenies, et opus ab aliquibus neglectum in magno precio est apud alios propter varias materias occurrentes. Unde ut *Ecclesiastes* ait: "Scribendi libros nullus est finis".

G. Contra illud non multum reluctabor, sed de isto genere scribendi plerique obloquuntur, et rugata fronte theologos apparenter subsannant. Et id causae est quod pluries Aristotelem in *Physico auditu* et *Prima philosophia* cum eius commentatore allegatum invenies, quam doctores ecclesiae.

D. Secundum materias occurrentes nunc philosophum nunc doctores ecclesiae scribentes introducunt, unumque facientes aliud non omittunt, ut theologiam scientiarum deam a vera philosophia non deviare ostendant, et ut parvulos per manuductiones in fide alant, secundum beati Petri eloquium: "Parati semper ad sanctificationem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est spe".

G. Pace tua non satisfacis. Videre enim nequeo, quantum theologiae conducat tot frivolas positiones de relationibus, intensione formae, an sint ponenda puncta in continuo, et de caeteris id genus prodigaliter pertractare; siquidem aditum ad theologiam haec non ministrant, sed obfuscant et obtenebrant. Non sic autem ad Spartiatas Ionathas, et Machabaei scriptitarunt. Libros enim sanctos, quos pro manibus habuere, sibi solatio esse affirmarunt. Et Timotheo apostolus inquit: "Tu permane in his quae didicisti et credita sunt tibi, sciens a quo didiceris, et quia ab infantia sacras literas nosti, te possunt instruere ad salutem". Hoc ipsum ad Titum scribit. In prologo quarti illius *Sententiae* noster Maior (ut in lumine patet) erat; nunc suorum dictorum immemor ad ea, quae tunc floccipendit, utriusque oculi aciem convertit.

D. Hunc modum scribendi in *Sententias* a trecentis annis scriptores observavere, et si praeter rationem id factum esse censeas, ius (ut vulgariter aiunt) communis error facit. Bibliam et faciliores theologiae partes nonnulli exoptant; absconsa et intricatas calculationes alii, modo (secundum apostoli sententiam) Graecis et barbaris debitor est theologus. Eae autem, quas existimant quaestiones futiles, crebro scalam intelligentiae ad sacras literas capessendas praestant. Quinetiam in fronte huius primi Maior noster eiusdem est mentis cum exordio quarti, sicut frequenter ab eius ore accepi, et accipio. Quod vero aliorum opinationes peregrinas nonnulli recensent, et eas multiplici genere argumenti exuberanti verborum dicacitate confutant, nunquam approbavit. Talium enim caducarum positionum succincta recitatio, earundem est sufficiens explosio. In materiis vero utrinque apparentibus maiori mora opus est, et hunc modum tenere ratus est magister noster.

G. A theologo haec praesupponi habent, et prius in philosophia videnda, et si ita factum fuerit compendiose non improbaverim.

D. In theologia haec consulto scribentes interserunt. Tum primo ut philosophos ad hoc sanctum studium more Origenis inducant et alliciant, tum secundo quia vix iactis in philosophia solidis fundamentis provectae aetatis viri ad theologiam advolant, qui manum supponere ferulae in artibus erubescerent, et

tamen hi sub theologiae umbra minutatim haec colligunt, et si in his eruditi fuerint sapientiores evaserint, quia secundum sapientem, audiens sapiens sapientior erit. Rursus non ab re relicto aratro oblectamenti gratia murem arator nonnumquam prosequitur. Et in vitis patrum memoriae proditum est plerosque nulla spe lucri perlectos, sed vitandi otii causa rebus mechanicis operam navasse non modicam.

G. Non sic institutum istud laudas, sed errores sub quodam velamine veri tueri satagis et id paucis tibi detegere enitar. Postquam enim magnam partem ocii literarii in philosophia aristotelica sententiarii consumpsere, non modo eius scripta, sed et modum scribendi usurpant, ut in praeludio primi libri *Dialectices* Laurentius Vallensis, quaerens an plura quam alius quispiam Aristoteles composuerit, sic inquit: "Sed et plura compilavit, in quo improbitatem eius licet cognoscas, quod quae compilat, non illis refert accepta a quibus sumpsit, sed sibi vendicat, et eosdem ubicunque peccasse opinatur citius ardentem flammam ore continere posset quam non nominare". Sicut Aeneas Sylvius de Palaescepsi Minoris Asiae de Aristotele loquens sic asserit: "Sed melius cum eo actum est quam cum reliquis, quorum opera funditus periere, et ipse causa extitit cur multa perirent, quia aliorum gloriam ad se traxit". Sicut in secundi libri capite de logica Valla recitat, sic de theologia *Sententiarum* invenies, cum rursus ait: "Quicquid infinitis libris tradiderunt, id omne paucissimis tradi praeceptis potuisse animadverto. Quid igitur aliud causae tantae prolixitatis credas fuisse nisi inanem arrogantiam eorum, qui dum vites longe lateque diffundi sarmentis gaudent, uvam in labruscam mutaverunt? Adde, quod indignissimum est, cum captiones cavillationes calumnias video quas et exercent et docent, non possum eis non succensere, quasi pyraticam non navalem rem, sive (ut mollius loquar) palaestrae pro militia disciplinam tradentibus. Erat enim dialectica res brevis prorsus et facilis, id quod ex comparatione rhetoricae diiudicari potest", et paucis interiectis dicit: "Nulla doctrina mihi brevior faciliorque quam dialectica videtur, ut quae aliis maioribus servit; quam non intra plures quis menses quam grammaticam intra annos perdiscet. Sed videlicet huius puellae parens, dum timet ne filia sua, quod fusca, quod strigosa, quod pusilla est, nullos inveniat procos, magnae dotis specie et ambitu commendandam putavit, ut multos sollicitaret ad contubernium eius. Multi itaque sine dubio spe divitiarum concurrunt, sed non fere alii quam plebei, obscuri, ignobiles, omnium rerum inopes, et qui alias facultates ad veras divitias desperarent". Id idem rectissime modo nunc theologicam tractanti contingit. Optimatum et locupletum liberi et logica et theosophia relicta ad leges ocyssime post auditas *Summulas* ruunt. Magnam affluentiam ad *Summulas* in Navarrae Collegio vel Burgundiae facile est reperire, sed ob poenuriam licentiandorum in fine cursus cum bursa vacua regentes discedunt, et totus error est quoniam tritico relicto ad paleas curritur. Quid de theologis neotericis in dialogo *De libero arbitrio* idem Valla dicat, quaeso, considera.

D. Fallaciam non causae ut causae in medium affers, dignissime praefecte. Multa veritati consona recitasti. Quoniam in iuvenili aetate quae studio accommoda, omnes finem statuunt ut in maturioribus annis tranquille vivant, optimatum filii omni studio praetermisso favore parentum ad honores passim con-

scendunt. De te tuique similibus minime loquor, sed de iis quos vulgo vidimus. Non enim multi Parisienses de opulenta domo orti ad gradum in artibus vel theologia ascendunt, sed legibus operam raptim navant, ut demum palatini evadant. Et qualitercunque theosophia tractaretur id idem fieret. Ad dicta Laurentii respondere inopportunum est. Nulli hominum generi (ut nosti) vir ille pepercit, et in eius *Dialecticae* (potius in deliramentis philosophiae) plura errata inseruit quam maculae in pardo reperiantur. Quia modum theologorum in *Dialogo*, quem recitas, imitari noluit, omnem libertatem ab animo inscite eripuit. Pro eo cum Pogio consulito; ad alia de Aristotele inpraesentiarum subticeo.

G. Haec igitur missa faciens ad aliud me converto. xxiiii distinctione noster Maior modum illum menti Aristotelis conformem putat, quod minus idoneo beneficium conferens perperam agit. Id multipliciter oppugnavi, sed responsionem habui ab eo nullam.

D. Hoc ab ipso intellexi. Succincte et subtiliter in quodam codicello a te misso hoc impugnasti. Sed ipsius negligentia codex ille amissus est procul dubio; quocirca (si placeat) veniam dabis amico. In materia enim problematica utramvis partem, ut nosti, tueri sciret si vellet, sed illam rationi conformiorem putavit.

G. Pro eo veniam implorare noli. Quam enim coniunctus est mihi patria, tam coniunctus est amicitia. Intervallum inter Tentalon et Glegornum de quo oriundus est, bene nosti, opinor.

D. Optime novi. Iter sabbati in lege Mosaica vix haec intercapedo suscipit.

G. Temporis angustia me premit. Discedere operae pretium est. Bene valeas, et me nostro Maiori commendatum facito.

D. Bene valeas, generose praefecte. Faciam id ac lubens.

TRANSLATION

DIALOGUE ON THE SUBJECT MATTER THAT SHOULD BE TREATED BY A THEOLOGIAN

A dialogue between two men of note, master Gavin Douglas, provost of St Giles's Church, Edinburgh, who is at least as learned as he is noble, and master David Cranston, a most worthy bachelor *formatus* in sacred theology.

David. Greetings, most worthy provost.

Gavin. Greetings also to you, dearest sir. But what breeze has blown you here? For I have often asked for discussion of literary matters with you, but have not been able to prevail on you to come to see us.

David. It was not the will but the power to obey that was missing. But it is for that very purpose that I arrive unbidden.

Gavin. What you say is just what I desired. For the past three days[8] I have been reading our master John Mair's *Commentary* on Book One of the *Sentences*, which he has just published. I should like to advise him to abandon school exercises and to return to his native soil, and there cultivate the Lord's vineyard and by his preaching scatter far and wide the Gospel seeds, from which the souls of the faithful may reap excellent fruit.

David. That is what he himself proposes to do one day, but meanwhile it is not through any lack of zeal that he steps away from this service. For they who fittingly write what is to be preached, do not preach by their own mouth, but by the mouth of all those whom they have taught and not just in one century but in as many centuries as their doctrine has stood.

Gavin. I agree, but as Horace says: "Mortal deeds will die.[9] We and that which is ours are bound to death".[10] And Aeneas Silvius, later as Pope named Pius,[11] speaking of the geographical position of Asia Minor, says: "Aristotle's writings must one day be consumed by time's voracity". [12] And therefore it may be good to produce the food which does not perish.

David. Pius did not say definitely by what time the writings of Aristotle and of others will perish and if a definite date is given it may certainly not be received as conceded fact.

Gavin. I totally agree, but there is now such a pile of books that anyone, in whichever direction he turns, disregards it.

David. In any book you will find something that is fruitful and a work that has been neglected by some people is much esteemed by others on account of the variety of points that present themselves. Hence, as Ecclesiastes says: "There is no end to the writing of books".[13]

Gavin. I shall hardly contest that but many people condemn that kind of writing[14] and with furrowed brow they openly parody the theologians. The reason for this is that you will find Aristotle more often cited in his *De physico*

[8] *hoc triduo*: this might simply be a reference to three consecutive days, whichever they are, but *triduum* is also a term used standardly to refer to the three days of Easter, Easter Friday to Easter Sunday, in which case we are being told when exactly Douglas was reading Book One of Mair's *Commentary*.

[9] Horace, *Ars poetica*, 68.

[10] Horace, *Ars poetica*, 63. Note that our text has the less common "Debemus morti nos nostraque" instead of "Debemur Morti nos nostraque".

[11] Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Pope Pius II (1458-1464).

[12] This is not a literal quotation from Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *Historia de Asia Minori*, in *Opera quae extant omnia* (Basel, 1571), p. 352D as is the case in note 25, but should be ascribed to the author of the dialogue.

` [13] Eccles. 12:12 reads": "his amplius, fili mi, ne requiras; faciendi plures libros nullus est finis frequensque meditatio carnis adflictio est".

[14] Probably a reference to the sort of work exemplified by Mair's commentary on Book One of the *Sentences*.

auditu and *Prima philosophia* along with his commentator[15] than the doctors of the Church.

David. According to the topics that present themselves as they write they at one time introduce Aristotle, at another one the doctors of the Church, and doing one they do not omit the other, in order to show that theology, goddess of the sciences, does not deviate from true philosophy, and by leading little children by the hand that they may nourish them in the faith, according to the word of St Peter: "[Be] always prepared to sanctification, for anyone requiring a reason for that hope which is in you".[16]

Gavin. Forgive me, but your reply is not satisfactory. For I cannot see how it benefits theology to go on and on about so many trivial topics, such as relations, intension of forms, whether one should posit points in a continuum, and other things of like sort, because these things do not serve as an approach to theology, but they obfuscate and darken. This was not how Jonathan and the Maccabeans wrote to the Spartans.[17] For they affirmed that the holy books which they had to hand were a solace for themselves. And the apostle says to Timothy: "You stay within these things that you have learned and which have been entrusted to you, knowing by whom you have been taught, and because from infancy you know the holy books, they can instruct you towards salvation".[18] He wrote the same to Titus.[19] In the Prologue of his *Commentary* on the *Sentences* Book Four, our Mair held this,[20] as is clear when light is shone on his words.[21] Now unmindful of what he himself has said he turns his piercing gaze of both eyes on what he then thought to be not worth a straw.

David. For three hundred years writers have adhered to this way of writing on the *Sentences*, and, if you think this is done unreasonably, then, as is commonly said: "Error shared makes law". Some prefer the Bible and easier parts of theology, others obscure and complicated calculations. Now, in the judgment of the apostle the theologian is indebted to the Greeks and barbarians. But those

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[15] This could be a reference to Avicenna, known as "The Commentator" because of the authoritativeness of his commentaries on Aristotle.

[16] The author of the *Dialogus* does not quote correctly. Compare 1 Peter 3:15: "Dominum autem Christum sanctificate in cordibus vestris, parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea, quæ in vobis est, spe".

[17] 1 Macc. 12:9.

[18] 2 Tim. 3:14-15.

[19] That there is a need to "stay within the things you have learned" is the burden of the whole of Paul's letter to Titus, though the burden is not encapsulated in any one sentence.

[20] "held this" is speculative. The text has *erat*. Either there is something missing or *erat* was printed in error.

[21] In the Prologue to Book Four of his commentary on the *Sentences*, *In quartum Sententiarum* (Paris, 1509), Mair contrasts the holy writings with the writings of the theologians. He affirms that while the writings of St Jerome and St Augustine are received by the church as useful and salvific (*utilia et salutifera*) not everything in them is received as true, as contrasted with the holy bible and with the determinations of the holy mother Church which are true and contain no falsehood. See especially fol. 4r, col. 1.

questions which the Greeks and barbarians judge futile often provide the understanding with a stairway towards grasping the sacred writings. Indeed, at the start of his Book One our Mair is in agreement with the introduction to Book Four, as I have frequently heard him say and still hear him say. But, that some recount the exotic opinions of others and refute them with many sorts of arguments and exuberant raillery, that Mair has never approved, for a succinct recital of such feeble positions is sufficient to destroy them. But in matters where there is evidence on each side [of the question] more time is required and our master has decided to adhere to this way forward.

Gavin. These things [*sc.* intension of forms, etc.] have to be presupposed by a theologian, and they have to be seen first in philosophy, and, if that is done in a compendious manner, I should not disapprove.

David. In theology, writers add these things deliberately. First, then, in the manner of Origen, in order to draw and attract philosophers to this sacred study and, then, secondly, because men of advanced years, after having scarcely laid down solid foundations in philosophy, run to theology, though they would be ashamed to submit their hand to the rod in the arts faculty, and they yet acquire these foundations [*sc.* intension of forms, etc.] bit by bit under the protection of theology. And if they are instructed in these things, they may become wiser since, according to the Wise Man, a wise man who listens will be wiser.[22] In addition, and not irrelevantly, sometimes a ploughman abandons his plough and goes hunting after a mouse for fun, and in the *Lives of the Fathers* it is put on record that many, not allured by hope of gain, but for the sake of avoiding idleness, have brought about no small things in mechanical matters.[23]

Gavin. With these words you are not praising this undertaking but are doing all you can to keep errors safe under a sort of cloak of truth, and I shall try to uncover the cloaked errors briefly to you. For, after those working on the *Sentences* have spent a good deal of their study-time on the Aristotelian philosophy they appropriate not only Aristotle's writings but also his way of writing, as Lorenzo Valla thus says in the preface to *On Dialectic* Book One, when he asks whether Aristotle wrote more than anybody else: "But he also compiled more, in which one may recognise his lack of probity, because he does not refer to those from whom he took what he compiled, but claims their ideas as his own; yet wherever he considers those very sources to have been in error he could have sooner held a burning flame in his mouth than not name them".[24] Just as Aeneas Sylvius, speaking about Palaescepsis in Asia Minor, asserts about Aristotle thus: "But it worked out better for him than for the others whose works have perished in their entirety. And he himself was the reason why many things

[22] Solomon is meant: Prov. 9:9.

[23] The passage could mean that writings, e.g. on mathematics, that were originally studied for no material profit, later bore fruit in terms of mechanical inventions.

[24] L. Valla, *De dialectica libri III*, in L. Valla, *Opera omnia*, ed. E. Garin, 2 vols (Turin, 1962 [= facsimile edition Basel, 1560]), vol. 1, pp. 643-761, at p. 645. There may be an intended contrast with the live coal [of divine wisdom] laid upon the mouth of the prophet: Isaiah 6:6-7.

perished, as he drew to himself the glory of others"[25]. Just as Valla says at the start of the second book of *On Dialectic*, so too will you find him saying as regards the theology of the *Sentences*: "Whatever it is that they handed on in infinite books, I note that it could have been passed on in a very few precepts. So what else do you believe to have been the cause of such prolixity, if not the vain pride of those thinkers, who, while they rejoice at the fact that the vines are spread far and wide by the vine branches, have changed the grape into a wild vine. In addition, and this is the most despicable thing of all, when I see the fallacies, sophistries and deceits which they perpetrate and teach, I cannot not be angry at them for teaching piracy rather than legal naval business or, in words less harsh, teaching the discipline of the gymnasium in place of military service. For dialectic was a brief, straightforward and easy matter, as can be judged by comparison with rhetoric"[26] – and after a few other remarks he says: "No subject seems to me to be more brief and easier than the dialectic, as it serves other and greater subjects of study. The number of months a person needs for the thorough study of dialectic is no greater than the number of years needed for the thorough study of grammar. But of course since the parent of this girl [sc. dialectic] fears that his daughter as she is dusky, skinny and puny will find no suitors, he has decided to commend her with a dowry that is large in appearance and extent, in order to prompt many to seek companionship with her. And doubtless many come running in hope of riches, but almost none except ordinary people, obscure, of humble birth, who lack everything and would despair of other faculties leading towards true riches"[27]. The same thing quite rightly happens just now to one who deals with theology: the children of aristocrats and of the rich leave logic and theology behind, and after hearing lectures on the *Summulae* rush off as swiftly as they can to law. At the College of Navarre or the College of Burgundy it is easy to find a large attendance at lectures on the *Summulae*, but because of the penury of those in the licenciate course, at the end of the course the regents depart with their purse empty. And it is a complete mistake since the students are abandoning the wheat and running to the chaff. Please consider what that same Valla says about modern theologians in his dialogue *On free choice*.[28]

[25] Piccolomini, *Historia de Asia Minori* (as in n. 12), pp. 351C-352D.

[26] Valla, *De dialectica* (as in n. 24), vol. 1, p. 693.

[27] Valla, *De dialectica* (as in n. 24), vol. 1, p. 694.

[28] Lorenzo Valla, *De libero arbitrio*, ed. M. Anfossi (Florence, 1934). Another modern edition of *De libero arbitrio* is to be found in *Prosatori latini del quattrocento*, ed. E. Garin (Milan, 1952), pp. 522-65. English translation in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller and J. H. Randall (Chicago, 1948), pp. 155-182. The point which Gavin Douglas ascribes to Valla is in effect spread throughout *On free choice*, but is also the particular burden of the opening paragraph where Valla affirms: "I would prefer [...] that other Christians and, indeed, those who are called theologians would not depend so much on philosophy or devote so much energy to it, making it almost an equal and sister (I do not say patron) of theology [...] They of whom I speak [sc. the theologians] consider [philosophy] a tool for weeding out heresies, when actually it is a seedbed of heresy" (p.155).

David. You have brought out into the open the fallacy of "a non-cause as a cause", most esteemed provost. You have said many things which accord with the truth. Whereas in youth, the time of life well suited for study, everyone sets up the goal of living in tranquillity in their maturer years, with parental approval the sons of aristocrats omit all studies and on all sides rise to honours. I am not saying this of you or of those who are like you, but of those whom we commonly see. For not many Parisians from wealthy homes rise to the level of a degree in arts or theology, but hurriedly throw themselves into the study of law, with a view to arriving eventually at becoming courtiers. And no matter the way in which theology [?divine wisdom?] is dealt with, the outcome will be the same. This is not an opportune moment to reply to what Lorenzo Valla says. As you know, that man spared no branch of humanity, and in his *On dialectic*, or rather in the ravings of his philosophy, he has included more errors than there are spots to be found on a leopard. Since in the dialogue which you cite[29] Valla refused to imitate the theologians' method, he stupidly snatched all freedom from the mind. On this matter go and consult Poggio.[30] As to the other things concerning Aristotle, I shall be silent for the time being.

Gavin. So, dismissing these things, I turn to another matter. In distinction twenty-four our Mair thinks that the rule that he who confers a benefice on a less suitable person does wrong is conformable with the mind of Aristotle.[31] I have attacked that in many ways but have had no reply from him.

David. So he has told me. You wrote a brief, subtle attack on it in a pamphlet that you sent him but due to his negligence the pamphlet is doubtless lost. On this matter, will you, please, forgive a friend? For, as you know, on a problematic matter he would, if he wished, know how to defend each side. But he thought that position of his more in conformity with reason.

Gavin. Do not seek forgiveness for him. For I am linked as much to him by friendship as by fatherland. I think that you well know the stretch of land between Tantallon and Gleghornie from where he comes.

David. I know it well. This intermission hardly takes up a Sabbath journey according to Mosaic law.[32]

Gavin. I am under pressure of time. I should leave. Farewell and commend me to our Mair.

David. Farewell, noble provost. I shall be pleased to do this.[33]

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[29] *On Free Choice*.

[30] Gian Francesco Poggio Bracciolini (1380-1459), Italian humanist noted for his polemics against Valla.

[31] Mair, *In quartum Sententiarum* (as in n. 21), distinctio 24, quaestio 3.

[32] According to the Rabbinical interpretation of the Mosaic law (Exodus 16:29), on the Sabbath it was not permissible to walk further than within the limits of any city, which could be interpreted as extending to a distance of not more than 2000 cubits therewithout. I am obliged to Prof. dr. W. J. van Bekkum (Groningen) for this clarification.

[33] My thanks to Sarah Broadie for criticism of a draft version of this paper.

RUDOLPH AGRICOLA'S ADDRESS TO INNOCENT VIII

Adrie van der Laan

"Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness".
T. S. Eliot, *Burnt Norton*

CONTEXT

The year 1484 witnessed the death of Pope Sixtus IV, "a hard, imperious, implacable character" who "achieved nothing for the institution he had headed except discredit".[1] His successor was Cardinal Giovanni Battista Cibo, who chose the name Innocent VIII. From all over Europe delegates came to the Vatican to congratulate the new pope on his election. On behalf of Philip, Count of the Palatinate, it was Johann von Dalberg, the Bishop of Worms, who presented himself at the papal court in July 1485. Among his retinue was Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius (1444-1485), an old friend of Dalberg's from their student years at Pavia. The year before, Agricola had settled in Heidelberg in order to become Dalberg's private academic tutor. It was Agricola who had written the speech which Dalberg was to address to Pope Innocent VIII.[2]

Agricola was a humanist, i.e. a scholar of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy. His profession was the *studia humanitatis*. During Agricola's lifetime, Italian humanism crossed the Alps into the West and the North of Europe. Partly this happened because young men came to Italy in order to

[1] B. W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly. From Troy to Vietnam* (New York, 1984), pp. 62, 65.

[2] For detailed biographies of Agricola, see H. E. J. M. van der Velden, *Rodolphus Agricola (Roelof Huusman): Een Nederlandsch humanist der vijftiende eeuw* (Leiden, 1911); P. Mack, "Agricola, Rodolphus", in *Die Deutsche Literatur zwischen 1450 und 1620. Autorenlexikon. Band 1*, ed. H. G. Roloff (Bern, 1990), pp. 582-626; *Rudolf Agricola 1444-1485 Protagonist des nordeuropäischen Humanismus zum 550. Geburtstag*, ed. W. Kühlmann (Bern, 1994); and the six *vitae* written by his (near) contemporaries. For a summary with references to primary and secondary sources concerning Agricola's life and works, see *Rudolph Agricola: Letters*, ed., transl., annot. A. van der Laan and F. Akkerman (Assen and Tempe, 2002).

study in one of its famous universities. When they returned home, they brought humanism back with them. Not so, however, in Agricola's case. Well before he arrived at Pavia in 1468, he had become acquainted with the ideas of Italian humanism. As early as the 1460s he was a member of a group of men who convened regularly in the Cistercian abbey at Aduard (near Groningen) and who cherished the ideas of Italian humanism.[3]

In a number of ways, humanists significantly resembled the Greek sophists of the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Like sophists, humanists were teachers of rhetoric, thinkers, writers, moral philosophers, and political theorists.[4] Like sophists, humanists taught how to speak, how to reason, how to make decisions – all things that citizens would be expected to do throughout their lives. Like sophists, humanists contributed to the professionalisation of society by teaching its citizens the skills they required *qua* citizens. Like sophists, humanists came to maturity amid the developments in society which set an increasingly high value upon human beings and their faculty of reason, causing a turning of society's attention to problems concerning ethics, law, war, and peace: the problems of the city state. Like sophists, humanists entered the stage after a long period of time in which the aristocracy – and its cult of the body – was prominent in society (feudalism) and metaphysics the dominating factor in philosophy (scholasticism). Like sophists, humanists differed from their intellectual predecessors by not being theorists in quest of metaphysical truths.[5] The teaching of both sophists and humanists had a practical side to it and was designed to be just as useful in life as any other professional skill or *techne*. Their aim was for quality and the greater well-being of human beings. Both were teachers offering, or selling, an intellectual education – first and foremost through rhetoric – for use in practical life, and designed to improve their aptitudes in every domain of life, not just in one. This is what the Greeks called *arete*, the Romans *uirtus*, and what we call *excellence*. It is a concept which implies, to quote the words which so thrilled Robert Pirsig's narrator, "an efficiency which exists not in one department of life but in life itself".[6]

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[3] The Aduard group is best portrayed by the contemporary letters of Antonius Liber and Rodolphus Langius, and by a letter written some fifty years later by Goswinus Halensis. See Agricola, *Letters* (as in n. 2), pp. 4-5, with further references.

[4] My characterisation of the sophists is based on J. de Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens* (Oxford, 1992), especially pp. xiv-xv, 6, 10, 24-33, 46, 55, 92, 186, 205-211, and 232-237.

[5] In his *Oratio in laudem philosophiae* Agricola writes: "Inde praecipuam quoque ductam Socratis laudem, quod primus evocatam coelo Philosophiam in urbibus atque in hominum coetu collocarit" [ed. H. Rupprich in *Humanismus und Renaissance in den deutschen Städten und an den Universitäten* (Leipzig, 1932), p. 178]. Erasmus writes to Peter Zutphenius: "stellas obseruent alii, si lubet; ego in terris quaerendum existimo quod nos felices aut infelices reddat". (*Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, ed. P. S. and H. M. Allen, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1922), p. 41 (*Epistola* 1005, 5-7).

[6] Quoted from H. D. F. Kitto, *The Greeks* (edition unidentified), in R. M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. An Inquiry into Values* (New York, 1999), p. 377.

Jacqueline de Romilly's characterisation of the sophists in relation to the presocratic philosophers might well be used for characterising the humanists in relation to the scholastic philosophers: "all were innovative as teachers and all were harshly critical of all kinds of transcendentalism, making a more or less clean sweep of the values of the past and replacing them, also more or less uncompromisingly, with new values founded on the needs of human life and city life". Nor should the parallels between the teachings of sophists and humanists come as a great surprise. The sophists' legacy, after all, had passed into Athenian classicism first and foremost through the representation of Isocrates. His moral philosophy and type of politics developed out of the theories upon which the sophists' moral and political ideas were founded. As it happens, Isocrates was a favourite of many a humanist, and certainly of Rudolph Agricola.

Ironically, humanists even resembled sophists in that they, too, bred degenerate pupils who turned their teachings into a farce. Angelo Poliziano chastised such pupils in a letter to Paolo Cortese. Desiderius Erasmus ridiculed them in his *Ciceronianus*. Unfortunately for both sophists and humanists, their place in history became that which their opponents granted them, which is why they are mostly remembered by their worst representatives. Consequently, a sophist is now defined as "a person who uses clever or quibbling arguments that are fundamentally unsound",[7] and a humanist is still by many considered to be someone who is obsessed with words and form at the expense of content.

An important aspect in which humanists did not resemble sophists is religion. Although some sophists established a connection between human virtues and morality, on the one side and the gods on the other, it can be said that for sophists generally the gods did not constitute the basis of their moral philosophy, whereas for humanists, God did. To all humanists – Italians as well as non-Italians – God was what water is to fish: a *condicio sine qua non* which is taken for granted. Little surprise, then, that faith and God are distinctly present also in the writings of Rudolph Agricola. His address to Innocent VIII, together with his oration on the nativity of Christ, might well be considered its culmination.

TRANSMISSION

Nine sources have transmitted Agricola's text. The eldest are two editions printed in Rome by Stephan Plannck and Eucharius Silber shortly after Dalberg had delivered the address.[8] Neither edition mentions Agricola's name, nor is it

[7] *Collins Dictionary of the English Language*.

[8] Plannck and Silber each also printed the gratulatory orations for the new Pope delivered by Titus Strozza, Hector Fliscus, Bartholomaeus Scala, Guillermus de Pereriis, Guilelmus Caorsin, Robertus Guiba, Franciscus Patritius, Petrus Cadratus, Philippus Chevrerius, and Johannes Marlianus.

clear which was the first to be published. Containing a mere four errors,[9] Plannck's edition is all but immaculate. His errors are obvious inaccuracies, three of which are present also in Silber's edition. The nature of these joint errors suggests that they arose out of misreading words in manuscript. Silber, too, provides a good text. It contains twelve differences from Plannck's. All but one are mistakes. Their nature suggests that Silber's text was constituted by someone with little knowledge of Latin, who struggled reading a manuscript. In one single instance does Silber provide a better text than Plannck. All considered, it seems probable that Plannck had at his disposal a manuscript in Agricola's own hand, or a direct copy of it. Silber used either this very same manuscript or Plannck's text. At any rate, Plannck's edition offers the best text, and it must have been very close to the source, both in space and in time. Plannck is undoubtedly our best source for constituting Agricola's address as it was actually delivered.

In 1490, the Nuremberg patrician and zealous text collector, Hartmann Schedel, copied Agricola's text into a manuscript. Apart from having its own new mistakes, it is identical to Plannck's text including the omission of Agricola's name. Schedel clearly used Plannck as his source.

On January 31, 1511, Thierry Martens at Antwerp printed an anthology of Agricola's work which included the address to Innocent VIII. The editor of this book was Pieter Gilles, a close friend of Erasmus.[10] Gilles's version is littered with inaccuracies and errors. It also has many readings different from Plannck and Silber which are not mistakes per se, but which are clearly inferior and which Gilles would not have retained, had he known either Plannck's or Silber's version. Conspicuously absent are many references to the actual situation in which this speech was delivered. All of this suggests that Gilles used an inferior manuscript containing an earlier draft into which Agricola had not yet fully incorporated the actual situation of delivery.[11] This also explains the numerous errors in Gilles's text which are obviously due to misinterpretation of a badly or

[9] §21 *actruerit* instead of *attriuerit*; §23 *dictu* instead of *ductu*; §26 *Arioiusto* instead of *Ariouisto*; §29 *prȩfecit* instead of *perfecit*. The first three errors are made by Silber, too.

[10] We may owe this entire publication to Erasmus, since as early as 1505 he was encouraging Gilles to collect whatever writings of Agricola he could find; see Erasmus, *Opus epistolarum*, ed. P. S. Allen, 12 vols.. (Oxford, 1906-1958), *Epistola* 184. Agricola was one of Erasmus's lifelong heroes. For Gilles's edition, see also Agricola, *Letters* (as in n. 2), pp. 44-46.

[11] Even without textual evidence, we would be safe to assume that Agricola would have kept licking his text into shape and in the process producing more than one version of the text. All humanists took the advice of Horace to heart. Apart from specific references to the actual delivery, the re-editing of this address on the part of Agricola is evidenced by the minor and major variants between Plannck/Silber on the one hand and Gilles/Cratander/Alardus on the other; these cannot be termed mistakes, but rather surely reflect the later and former stage of this address respectively. The variants occur throughout the text. It is inconceivable that all changes were made by Gilles or Alardus, and it is most likely that they reflect subsequent stages of Agricola's text.

carelessly written manuscript. Gilles's letter of dedication supports this assumption. To Martin Dorp he writes that he has recently acquired some of Agricola's writings. From the wording of his letter, it would seem that his acquisitions were handwritten.[12]

In 1518, Andreas Cratander at Basel also published an anthology of Agricola's work. It has already been established that this edition was all but entirely derived from Gilles's edition.[13] The address to Innocent VIII confirms this. Yet this edition does have its significance in the line of transmission, for Alardus of Amsterdam used it as a source for his edition of Agricola's *lucubrationes* published in 1539. Collation of the texts shows that Alardus used Cratander as his primary source for this address. The two have distinct mistakes in common. Also, many of Gilles's mistakes have been emended in Cratander, and Alardus has these very same emendations. Undoubtedly, Alardus knew Gilles's edition, too, and he may well have used it.[14] But sometimes it is hard to see why Alardus would have preferred Cratander's reading to that of Gilles, if he had the latter at hand. However, as a textual critic Alardus was no Bentley or Housman, so perhaps we should not press this point. In all fairness, we should state that Alardus did correct many mistakes which Cratander had copied from Gilles's text. Sometimes the result is satisfying or even ingenious, though rarely in agreement with Agricola's text as witnessed by Plannck and Silber. Alardus clearly did not know either of these editions. Had he done so, he would also have emended Cratander, or Gilles, on those occasions where they are incomplete or wrong, but where the resulting Latin is not flawed per se.

Finally, Agricola's address is also transmitted by three printed editions, which were published even later than 1539. These have no significance for constituting the text, however, since it can be shown, or reasonably assumed, that they were based on one of the printed editions, already mentioned above. For example, the text in *Orationes gratulatoriae* [...] (Hanau 1613) is evidently derived from Silber's edition.

EDITORIAL REMARKS

Since he clearly constitutes the principal source for this address, Plannck is the basis of my edition. I follow his orthography except for capitalisation, which I have adapted to modern usage. The punctuation is entirely mine. I have created paragraphs in order to structure the text, and paragraph numbers to facilitate references to the text. Although it is my personal view that any edition of a Latin text made today should come equipped with a translation, circumstances unfortunately preclude my offering such a translation here. A selection of variant readings is offered in footnotes. For the present occasion, comprehensiveness is not an option. I have selected most substantial variants, and also some

[12] See Agricola, *Letters* (as in n. 2), p. 45.
[13] See Agricola, *Letters* (as in n. 2), p. 49.
[14] See Agricola, *Letters* (as in n. 2), p. 55.

that illustrate well the character of the principal sources and their interrelationship.

SIGLA

P *Io. Camerarii Dalburgii Vormaciensis Episcopi oratoris Ill. principis Philippi Comitispalatini Rheni Innocentio octauo pont. Max. dicta gratulatio Anno Mcccclxxxv pridie Non. Iulii* (Rome: Stephan Plannck, 1485).

S *Ioannis Camerarii Dalburgii Vormaciensis Episc. Ororis Ill. Princ. Philippi Comitispalatini Hreni Innoc. VIII Pon. Max. dicta gratulatio* (Rome: Eucharius Silber, 1485).

M *Rodolphi Agricole Phrysii Viri utriusque Literaturae peritissimi nonnulla opuscula* (Antwerp: Thierry Martens, 1511), fol. k3v-l1r.

C *Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii, Viri Vtriusque Literaturae Peritissimi, Nonnulla Opuscula* (Basel: Andreas Cratander, 1518), fol. l3v-m4r.

A *Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii Lucubrationes Aliquot Lectu Dignißimae, in hanc usque diem nusquam prius aeditae, caeteraque eiusdem uiri plane diuini omnia, quae extare creduntur opuscula, plusquam deprauatißime ubique iam olim excusa, nunc demum ad autographorum exemplarium fidem per Alardum Aemstelredamum emendata, & additis scholiis illustrata* (Cologne: Johann Gymnich, 1539), fol. Y1r-Y4v.

OTHER SOURCES

Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 461 (Hartmann Schedel, anno 1490), fol. 106 sqq.

Orationes clarorum hominum, vel honoris officiique causa ad Principes, vel in funere de virtutibus eorum habitae (Venice, 1559), fol. 14v-18r.

Orationes Gratulatoriae in electione, coronatione, nativitate, nuptiis, triumphis, &c. Pontificum, Imperatorum, Regum, Principum, &c. Habitae a Legatis Virisve suae aetatis doctissimis (Hanau: Typis Wechelianis apud haeredes Ioannis Aubrii, 1613), pp. 34-42.

Orationes procerum Europae, eorundemque ministrorum ac legatorum, ut et virorum celeberrimorum, in multifariis, tam laetitiae, quam tristitiae casibus, nec non belli ac pacis negotiis, itemque religionis causa, ab aliquot seculis, usque ad annum 1713, Latina lingua habitae, ed. J. Ch. Lünig (Leipzig, 1713), vol. 1, pp. 64-77.[15]

[15] I thank dr Anton van der Lem (Leiden) for informing me of the exact location of Agricola's text in the editions Venice 1559 and Leipzig 1713.

TEXT

Ioannis Camerarii Dalburgii Vormaciensis Episcopi Oratoris illustrissimi Principis Philippi Comitispalatini Rheni Innocentio Octauo Pontifici Maximo dicta gratulatio anno MCCCCLXXXV pridie Nonas Iulii.[16]

[1] Venimus, beatissime pater, iusto uenerationis officio recens hoc celsitudinis tuę fastigium prosecuturi. Quod ut faceremus gratularemurque cum sanctitati tuę tum fęlicitati uel, si rectius est ita dicere, saluti uniuersę reipublicę christianę, misit nos summo religionis, summo pietatis et in Sanctitatem tuam et in sacrosanctam Romanę ecclesię sedem prędditus affectu uir illustrissimus, Philippus comes Palatinus Rheni, Bauarię dux et sacri Romani imperii princeps elector. [2] Videtur autem prędfandum esse mihi, quod prędfari res ipsa me cogit, hoc est, optandam esse mihi et ante omnia huic qualicunque dictioni meę ueniam petendam a Sanctitate tua et ab hoc amplissimo ordine Senatus Cardinalium, qui diuinum tuum participant consilium. Arbitror autem orationis gratiam et quemuis eloquendi cultum atque splendorem ex homine Germano expectari magnopere neque posse neque debere. Et mihi quidem aduersus hanc sollicitudinem ęquitas est animi uel eo constantior, quod persuasum habeo Sanctitatem tuam de Philippi in te officio studioque non ex hac, quęcunque ea fuerit, oratione mea, sed ex rebus illius operibusque facturam ęstimationem.

[3] Quod nisi districtus ipse teneretur multiplici magnorum negotiorum cura nec illum necessaria quędam ratio rerum suarum reuocasset ab instituto tanto, laborioso quidem, sed tamen illi uotis omnibus expetito, non ille legatis ad Sanctitatem tuam mittendis aut alienę uocis uteretur ministerio, sed hoc quamuis longum difficileque suscepisset iter et, quantum pietas sua gaudium, quam uoluptatem ex hac publica cunctorum percepisset lętitia, prędsenti tibi prędsens ipse declarasset; credidissetque sic quoque[17] tenui se tamen indicio perfunctum, quanta quamque intenta[18] teneretur erga Sanctitatem tuam sacramque sedem deuotione, quod illi christiani nominis studium, qua religionis nostrę cura sollicitudineque duceretur; nec satisfecisse officio se putaret, sed solum pignus hoc obsidemque mentis dedisse, quo perspici posset nihil tantum esse tamque arduum susceptu, modo incrementis id tuis usibusque ecclesię Romanę conduceret, quod non ipse prompto esset animo alacerque subiturus. [4] Accepit hanc a maioribus suis persuasionem, quam protinus a primis comprehensam annis et cum successu deinde ętatis auctam altius subinde pectori suo altiusque semper infixit, ut nihil in rebus humanis sanctius grauius uenerabilius putaret quam sacrę apostolicę sedis maiestatem; nec posse quicquam utilius ecclesię,

[16] Ioannis Camerarii Dalburgii Vormaciensis Episcopi Oraroris illustrissimi Principis Philippi Comitispalatini Hreni Innocentio VIII Pontifici Maximo dicta gratulatio *S* : Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii gratulatoria oratio pro Ioanne Camerario Dalburgio Vormaciensi Episcopo ac Oratore illustrissimi Philippi Comitis Palatini Rheni dicta Innocentio Octauo Pontifici Maximo *MCA*

[17] credidissetque sic quoque *PS* : credidisset si quoque *M* : credidisset quanquam *CA*

[18] quanta quamque intenta *PS* : quanta quamque *MC* : quantaquaque *A*

quicquam hominum generi salubrius contingere quam ut summa Dei benignitate daretur illi prudentissimus gubernator, sanctissimus rector.

[5] Equum est profecto principes omnes hanc tenere sententiam, ut in Romanę sedis salute contineri suam arbitrentur salutem. Et nedum principes, uerum cunctos, qui in christianam militiam nomen dederunt,[19] sic animatos esse oportet et credere pro sua cuique portione excubias agendas esse pro sedis huius incolumitate et magnitudinem eius, quibuscunque possint rebus – si cui sunt opes, opibus; cui prudentia, consilio; cui robur, uiribus – prouehere; quod si cui nihil aliud sit, precibus saltem piisque ad Deum uotis nuncupandis illam iuuare. [6] Si nanque maiores nostri Romam communem generis humani esse patriam uolebant nec intelligi potuisse in exilio fuisse eum, qui undecunque ueniens Romę fuisset, hacque ratione uelut sacro quodam affectu animos omnium beniuolentiamque urbi terrarum principi obligabant, quam ergo necesse est esse nunc mentem, quod studium cunctis erga hanc urbem et sanctissimum illius atque adeo orbis terrarum antistitem et rectorem, cum nedum terrena cunctorum ea iam sit patria, sed quicunque bona fide ciues illius fuerint facti et legibus eius paratas in omnia dederint manus, eos cęlestis quoque patrię faciat ciues.

[7] Huius in Romanam ecclesiam deuotionis, qua[20] omnes christiani nominis principes esse spero et opto, Philippo possum locupletissimus esse testis, ut facillimum sit tibi, beatissime pater, perspicere, quo necesse fuerit illum cumulari gaudio, quantę se compotem credere fęlicitatis, cum audiuisset nauiculę Petri gubernaculis esse manus tuę Sanctitatis admotas[21] et ab optimo Deo optimam rerum humanarum ecclesiam esse optimi tui prouidentię commissam. Adductus est in eam spem, in quam uideo cunctos in hoc nouo tuo pontificatu concessisse: rem christianam, si quando alias, tuo certe ductu, tuis auspiciis illustrem fęlicissimamque futuram. [8] Quid enim non credemus uel Sanctitatem tuam posse impetrare a Deo ad hominum fęlicitatem? uel uirtutem efficere apud homines ad Dei placationem? Quid non prudentia tua instituere? magnitudo animi peruincere? constantia consummare? Vigilantia uero tua, quod institutum, peruictum consummatumque fuerit, quid non confirmare poterit ac tueri? Nihil lapsum est aut quassum in christianę religionis cultu cerimoniisque, quod non integritas diligentia pietas tua erigere rursus et stabilire possit. Si quid usquam desiderabitur, si qua in parte labanti succurrendum erit fidelis populi tutelę, tua sollicitudo sufficiens in omnes usus pręsidium pręstabit.

[9] Tu publicas priuatasque res, tu sacras, tu prophanas, tu temporalia[22] ęternaque bona nostra immenso prouidentię tuę sinu complecteris, exactissimo moderationis tuę formabis exemplo et clementissima in omnes dispensabis benignitatis tuę manu. Dirigis tu quidem, beatissime pater, uitam hominum et actiones eorum moresque in saluberrimum habitum componis auctoritate iubendo,

[19] qui in christianam militiam nomen dederunt *PS* : *om. MCA*

[20] eos cęlestis quoque patrię faciat ciues huius in Ro. ecclesiam deuotionis qua *PS* : eosque coelestis patriae faciat ciues huius in R. ecclesiam deuotionis qua *MC* : eosque *A*

[21] manus tuę S. admotas *PS* : tuę Sc. admotos *M* : tuae Sc. admotus *C* : Sc. admotam tuam *A*

[22] temporalia *P* : temporaria *SMCA*

monitis hortando, seueritate castigando, sed ante omnia exemplo uirtutum tuarum ducendo eos et tanto iam tempore prętentatum a te iter uelut digitis indicando. Quis non prouidentię consiliisque tuis se salutemque suam committi tutissime putabit? Cuius cum summa sit prudentia, tum exploratissima semper in omni uita fuit naturę immensa bonitas et nunc propensissimus in subditos omnes perspicitur amor. [10] Quicquid iusseris, nemo erit, qui recusare cupiet. Certatim in hoc contendetur ab omnibus, ut quammaxime dictis tuis audiens quisque conspici possit. Est tibi quidem a Deo rerum omnium tradita potestas. Non tu tamen, quod multis usu uenit, potestatem iusticię titulis inanibus exornas, sed iusticiam pridem tuis conceptam pręcordiis, potestate nunc instructam expeditamque tenes adeoque nunquam, quid possis, semper, quid uelis, ostendis. Vis autem uoluistique semper omnibus quamplurimum prodesse. Assecutus es itaque (uel nos potius per te sumus assecuti), ut, quantum ante prodesse uolueris, tantum nunc possis, tantum etiam et prosis.

[11] Video me, beatissime pater, in amplissimum campum tuarum laudum esse perlatum, quanquam initio mihi censuerim abstinendum ab eis, ut quę non meam modo, sed pręstantissimi cuiusuis facundiam et ingenium uincant, satiusque duxerim[23] modesta eas taciturnitate uenerari quam oratione, quae longe esset[24] inferior futura, perstringere. [12] Egypti sacerdotes accipimus[25] olim inter sacra solitos sonum tantum uocalium litterarum decantare; id illis pii gratissimique Deo concentus loco fuisse. Credebant, puto, nullum se posse dignum Deo carmen inuenire.[26] Fuso itaque muto illo et sine mente (ut ita dicam) sono, cum pro rerum dignitate nihil possent, hoc ipsum (ut arbitror) significabant nihil se posse, sed[27] plurimum uelle. [13] Germanos item nostros proditum est priscos illos, priusquam sacrę christianę fidei mysteriis essent initiati, quicquid id erat, quod Dei colerent loco, nullis sustinuisse simulachris effingere, quod crederent falsa Deo non conuenire, uera se reperire non posse. Adeo uisum est utrisque his rectius esse pudenter[28] quenque secum reputare, quid possit, quam impudenter[29] conari, quod nequeat. Sic mihi commemorandis laudibus tuis plenum insolentię uidetur, si quis uel conetur eas extollere, quę per se sunt amplissimę, uel recensere, quę sunt innumerę, uel quouis modo demonstrare, quarum lumen et splendor omnium oculos iam mentesque perstringit.

[14] Illa, beatissime pater, illa quidem mallem, si commode possem, commemorare, quę protinus cum nouo pontificatu tuo fęlicitati publicę prouenere: pax gentium, fęcunditas terrarum, salubritas uitę. Fremebant armis omnia. Arx ipsa orbis terrarum, Italia, bellis grauissime quatiebatur. Gallię uelut omine lętiore tuum[30] excepturę pontificatum tum primum respirabant. Hispanię, Britannia, Sarmatę aut externis aut domesticis concitę motibus erant. Iam uero per-

[23] duxerim *PSA* : dixerim *MC*
[24] esset *PS* : *om. MCA*
[25] accipimus *PS* : accepimus *MCA*
[26] inuenire *PS* : *om. MC* : canere *A*
[27] sed *P* : et *SMCA*
[28] pudenter *PS* : prudenter *MCA*
[29] impudenter *PS* : imprudenter *MCA*
[30] tuum *PS* : tum *MC* : *om. A*

petua bellorum comes, caritas annonę, iam sicubi quies ab armis erat, crudelior armis pestilentia sęuiebat. Quin etiam ex aliorum comparatione tolerabilius miseri sibi uidebantur, qui una tantum aut altera cladium istarum et non omnibus simul[31] urgerentur. Hęc cuncta tam grauia, tam acerba pontificatus tuus protinus uelut salubre quoddam affulgens rebus humanis sydus repressit, dispulit, abegit.

[15] Agitatus est magnis bellorum motibus uir sacrę memorię, Xistus pontifex, Sanctitatis tuę pręcessor; quę ille summo consilio suscepta prudentissime administrauit, constantissime pertulit. Magni hoc uel summi potius[32] hominis est tot undique circumfrementibus tempestatibus armorum non moueri animo, non concuti, sed rectum in omnia constantemque dirigere uultum. Summi hoc, ut dico, sed hominis. At hęc cum noua tua dignitate rerum omnium prolata tranquillitas non hominis solum habet laudem, sed de hominis laude uirtutibusque plenum diuini fauoris prę se fert iudicium. [16] Coniunxit quippe Deus in tua ad pontificatum uocatione suum cum hominum sententia iudicium nec id dubiis utique colligendum coniecturis. Homines enim pręficiendo te rebus humanis rectissime se facere ut uolebant, sic et sperabant. Deus uero, quam recte fecerint, signis maximis eisdemque lętissimis indicauit. Tam fęlices enim successus, tantam prosperitatem, copiam, salubritatem nouę tuę circumfudit dignitati, ut, cum ad eam cuncti te prouehi plurimum uellent, immenso plus tamen gauderent esse[33] prouectum.

[17] Quod itaque uulgo de principibus dici audimus aut legimus – Dei hominumque consensu ad principatum uocatos eos esse – id unius tui uocationem proprie signantissimeque[34] definit. Quis potuit enim maior esse consensus? Volebant homines pontificem te fieri et fecere, quod uolebant. Idque ipsum ut uellent, ut facerent, Deus instinxit. Et quod instinxerat, summa rerum omnium fęlicitate cumulauit et incommodis cladibusque terrarum omnibus serenissimum hunc tuum et plenum natiuę benignitatis opposuit uultum. [18] Cum uero uultum tuum dico, Latine tantum loquor et non, ut aurium tuarum[35] ineam gratiam. Nec enim in cuiusquam suspicione relictum uelim hoc me non ex integra animi sententia dicere. Vidimus enim proximis his diebus corporis tui uires pondere curarum iniquius affectas et, ut publico te conspectui subduceres, necessaria ualetudinis tuę ratio coegit. Quid ergo? Nonne statim uultus tuus ab omnibus est desideratus? Nonne senserunt continuo mala publica deesse sibi domitorem suum? Nonne rursus pestilentia, rursus arma prorumpunt? [19] Quin tu, beatissime pater, diligenter omnique cura ualetudinem tuam confirmas. Redde te fruendum rebus humanis et uidendum tantum te prębe simulque cuncta conspectui tuo incommoda cessisse uidebis. Potuit aditus pontificatus tui mala hęc uetusta et actis altissime radicibus iam firma dissipare.

[31] simul *PS* : *om. MCA*
[32] potius *PS* : *om. MCA*
[33] esse *PS* : se *MC* : te *A*
[34] signantissimeque *PSMC* : significantissimeque *A*
[35] tuarum *PSMC* : *om. A*

Poterit certe hęc eadem tenera adhuc et uelut in herba reprimere dignitas tua iam stabilita.

[20] Hinc ergo uenit uenietque maior indies publica per omne christianum nomen lętitia. Hinc omnium in te affectus, non qui in rectorem aut dominum (quę nomina per se inuidię plerunque obiacent),[36] sed qui in autorem salutis, datorem fęlicitatis, parentem bonorum omnium aut si quod his aliud arctioris pietatis excogitari uinculum poterit aut nomen. Hinc[37] quoque spes omnium iam subit mentes – in qua magis ipse quotidie confirmor futurum – ut, si quando,[38] nunc certe imperio ductuque[39] fęlicitatis tuę perpetuus ille et pernicio-sissimus christiani nominis hostis Turcus[40] retundatur. [21] Cum sit enim malis nostris hactenus abusus et dissensiones armaque christianorum suam crediderit occasionem, quis dubitet, quin, quorum creuit aduersis, eorum rursus sit fęlicitate pręceps iturus? Vidimus quidem, quam grauiter multos iam annos Deus immissis in christianos principes bellis mutuis eos certaminibus attriuerit[41] et profligarit. Nec licet dissimulare nobis, quorsum pertinuerit tantum in nos effundi malorum, modo uidere uelimus, quid sit ea secutum. [22] Infestissimus ille latro, qui pridem boni consulebat, ut intra angustissimum Asię angulum liceret tuto sibi latere, quique sępe sine christianarum uirium pręsidio se non satis munitum intra regni sui fines putabat, is tandem tot regnis, prouinciis, rebus publicis expugnatis et in ditionem execrandam redactis eo magnitudinis processit, ut, quorum ante perhorrescebat mentionem, illis nunc sit ultro timori. Parum dico. Immo quibus antea ne nomen quidem illius satis fuerat notum, apud eos nunc omnia ferro illius uastentur,[42] flammis colluceant, sanguine redundent! Atqui iam tandem placatioris animi signa nobis dat Deus. Reddita cum pontificatu tuo quies est temporum, ęstus armorum resedit. Scire cupimus, an temere hęc lętiora contingant? Respiciamus, quare contigerint tristiora.

[23] Quod ergo reliquum est: non expergiscetur omne nomen christianum, non arma cuncti rapient, non obuiam ibunt crudelissimo hosti, immanissimo tyranno, dum tu, beatissime pater, innocentia sanctitate religione pietate prees peculiare quoddam pręsidium terris! Orabis tu quidem et sacris precibus militum tuorum mouebis ac animabis arma. Nullius tuo ductu[43] in hostes irritum decidet telum, nullius frustra gladius uibrabitur, nullum sine uulnere iaculum mittetur. Omnium uulnera torrens sanguinis, omnium sanguinem perfidorum anima sequetur dumque tu castas, ut Moyses, ad Deum leuabis manus, nullus erit metus, ne aut impius hostis impetum nostrorum perferat aut pius noster exercitus illius cęde lassetur. Oportebat quidem[44] tales bellorum exitus de cuiusuis

[36] obiacent *PSMC* : subiacent *A*
[37] aut nomen hinc *PSM* : aut hinc *C* : noua hinc *A*
[38] confirmor futurum ut si quando *PS* : infirmor futurum ut si *M* : firmor unquam futurum ut si *C* : firmor ut si unquam futurum *A*
[39] ductuque *PS* : ductu *M* : et ductu *CA*
[40] Turcus *PSM* : Turca *CA*
[41] attriuerit *MCA* : actruerit *PS*
[42] uastentur *PS* : nascentur *MC* : misceantur *A*
[43] ductu *A* : dictu *PSMC*
[44] oportebat quidem *PS* : oportebat *M* : oportet *CA*

pontificis pietate sperare. Cum uero tuę dignitatis initiis tanta bene gerendarum rerum affulserint omina, cessare ultra et occasiones perdere non iam cunctantium, sed segnium, ignauorum et indormientium fęlicitati suę potest uideri.

[24] Possum quidem, beatissime pater, hoc tuę Sanctitati de Philippi principis nostri promittere deuotione: nihil esse, quod ille cupiat ęque quam, quicquid est opum armorumque sibi, in hanc tam piam conferre militiam. Non ille laboribus aut periculis, non sanguini aut uitę suę parsurus erit, modo profundere hęc in aliquos christiani populi sibi contingat usus. Nec uero hac in re solum, sed ubicunque posset aliquid Romanę ecclesię tuęque Sanctitati uel dignitati adstruere uel fortunis. [25] Id illi tam gratum esset futurum, ut immensi muneris[45] duxerit loco suum hac in parte[46] officium studiumque deposci. Hoc ille cum iustum religiosumque putet, tamen uelut hereditate a maioribus susceptum propemodum necessarium esse sibi persuadet. Nullum est adeo genus uirtutum aut ullius illustrioris rei, sed ne cultus quidem et obseruantię in sacram Romanam sedem, cuius non ipse domi suę plurima sit clarissimaque reperturus exempla.

[26] Qua in re si ad institutum orationis huius id pertinere putarem et nisi pręterea uererer, ne hac tua abuterer audiendi benignitate, maxima mihi nasceretur copia dicendi. Possem ab Ariouisto illo[47] litterarum monumentis insigni initium facere, qui, cum Bauarię pręesset, fidei et uirtutis ergo a Senatu rex est et amicus populi Romani appellatus; uir fortissimus et ab omnibus inuictus pręterquam ab uno, sed eo, a quo non tam turpe fuit uinci quam gloriosum cum illo decertare, et eo quidem, cuius uiribus et armis orbis terrarum et urbs hęc, orbis uictrix atque domitrix, cessit! [27] Dicerem Karolum, qui gloria rerum gestarum magnus cognominatus Germanis primus imperii habitus est autor. Commemorarem Henricum, qui cum coniuge sua Romanorum pontificum decreto inter sanctos est relatus. Recenserem alios itidem Henricos, Ludouicum etiam et Ropertum, Philippi proauum, omnes Romanos aut reges aut imperatores eosdemque ingentibus in uniuersam rempublicam christianam et in sacram hanc sedem beneficiis illustres! [28] Fuit Ropertus item auus principis nostri, cuius quę ueneratio[48] fuerit in Romanum antistitem, uel uno illius facto licet ęstimare. Erat ei collocata[49] in matrimonium filia ducis Subaudię eius, quem Felicem nominatum plerique Romani pontificis specie ambiebant. Erant id temporis plena erroris omnia aliis alio, quocunque spes aut fauor rapuisset, inclinantibus. Ropertus tamen posthabitis charissimę sibi coniugis affectibus et omni affinitatis iure neglecto[50] priuatis necessitudinibus suis publicam Romanę ecclesię pręferendam tulit dignitatem. Pater autem Philippi Ludouicus ea religionis et uirtutum omni-

[45] muneris *PMCA* : numeris *S*
[46] parte *PS* : pietate *MCA*
[47] Ariouisto illo *ed. Hanau 1613* : Arioiusto illo *PS* : illo arioiusto *M* : illo Ario iusto *CA*
[48] cuius quę ueneratio *PS* : cuiusque ueneratio *MC* : qui cuius ueneratio *A*
[49] collocata *PS* : collata *MCA*
[50] neglecto *PS* : relicto *MCA*

um iecerat fundamenta, ut, nisi pręmatura foret morte defunctus, nullius prę eo in Romanam sedem merita laudarentur.

[29] Huius frater Fredericus, Philippi per ętatem tutor, difficile diiudicatu est, prudentior, fortior an fęlicior fuerit, qui crebro admodum collatis cum hoste signis, cum pręsens ipse dimicauerit, uictoriam, quę natura incertissima est, ut ubique industrię suę certa esset, uirtute perfecit.[51] Quindecim Germanię principes bellum illi uno eodemque tempore cupidissime indixerunt. Id cum acerrime gererent inferrentque, tres ex eis una acie uictos cępit eoque res perducta est, ut conditiones pacis a nullo acciperet, omnibus daret. [30] Primus is ueterem rei militaris disciplinam, quantum temporum ratio passa est, renouauit. Primus Germaniam post Augustum Cęsarem purgare latrociniis est adorsus. Fuit tempus, quo simultate et factione[52] hostium coactus est de se prębere alienioris animi in sacram hanc sedem opinionem.[53] Paruit[54] tempori et urgenti se necessitati cessit. Postea uero quam datus est liberior de omnibus cognoscendi locus, tum quidem est illius accepta excusatio pręstititque deinde, quod semper ante pręstiterat, ut ecclesiam Romanam nullo in loco fidei obsequiique sui pęniteret.

[31] Horum uestigia clarissimorum uirorum cum Philippus sectanda sibi uirtutibus omnibus et recte factis instituerit, adsumus, beatissime pater, illius nomine et omne obsequium, studium pietatemque illius et quicquid id[55] est, quo obedientia sacrę Romanę sedi a christiano principe debita pręstari uberrime amplissimeque potest, id illius iussu tuę proferimus dicamusque Sanctitati. Putes, si quid est[56] opum illi, si quę sunt fortunę, si que uires, nec ea modo, quę sua sunt, sed quibuscunque gratia, meritis, necessitudine deuinctis pro suis utitur, ea omnia ante tuę Sanctitatis esse deposita pedes; et hanc deuotionem suam ut clemens atque benignus accipias, pręcatur. [32] Orat quoque, ut[57] se, liberos, familiam domumque et quicquid est ditionis sue Sanctitas tua ea uelit indulgentia humanitateque complecti, quam semper ipse maioresque sui ab hac[58] sacra sede petiuerunt semperque sunt assecuti. Ipse dabit operam proque uirili enitetur, ut, quoniam munificentia meritisque in Sanctitatem tuam perferendis, quantum cupit, pręstare non potest, quod potest, cultu certe et obsequio omnia pręstet; cumque deuotione erga Sanctitatem tuam alteri quidem cesserit nemini, tum ipse quotidie secum omni obseruantię genere decertet.[59]

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[51] perfecit *SMCA* : prębecit *P*

[52] simultate et factione *PS* : simulate et factione *MC* : simulate et fictione *A*

[53] de se prębere alienioris animi in sacram hanc sedem opinionem *PS* : alienioris (alienoris *A*) animi in sacram hanc sedem de se opinionem praebere *MCA*

[54] paruit *PS* : *om. MCA*

[55] id *PS* : *om. MCA*

[56] est *PS* : *om. MCA*

[57] ut *PS* : *om. MCA*

[58] hac *PS* : *om. MCA*

[59] Dicta anno post natum Christum M.CCCC.LXXXV. Pridie No. Iul. *add. SMCA*

SOLITUDE AND THE INACCESSIBLE LIGHT IN THE SERMONS OF ISAAC OF STELLA

Just Niemeijer

The notions of humanism and medieval monasticism seem to be contradictory. Since the former is usually seen as a secular development in the Renaissance, one is not immediately inclined to associate humanist anthropology with the writings of monks. However, when one browses through the writings of monastic authors such as Bernard of Clairvaux and his disciples, or Isaac of Stella, who will be the main subject of this contribution, one does encounter a type of humanist discourse that gives man pre-eminence in creation, that extols the ideals of Christian instruction and that can quite justifiably be termed 'Christian humanism'. This contribution focuses on the key concepts of solitude and the longing for God in what can arguably be looked upon as a man-centred anthropology and a Christian humanist discourse in the theology of Isaac of Stella, especially as exemplified in his ninth sermon.[1]

R. W. Southern identifies three distinguishing features of medieval humanism in the period from 1100 to 1320.[2] First, there is a sense of the dignity of human nature. In spite of theology's stress on the fallen nature of man and the consequent inability to acquire immediate knowledge of God, monastic authors always retained the idea that man is the noblest of God's creatures and that he has the instruments to look into himself to catch a glimpse of God. Secondly, according to Southern, there is the awareness of the dignity of nature. This is, of course, linked with the first point, because man has a central position in nature. Thirdly, there is the understanding that the whole universe is intelligible and accessible to man. It is possible for man to understand the laws of nature and to know himself as part of creation. These humanist traits, however, are embedded in a deep conviction that humanity is a vehicle for divine activity. Man was expelled from paradise and only through prayer, penance and the protection of the saints is there hope of salvation. Yet, nevertheless, this awareness

[1] On Isaac, abbot of Stella, see esp.: B. McGinn, *The Golden Chain. A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella* (Washington D.C., 1972). There are several editions of Isaac's sermons: Isaac of Stella, *Sermons*, ed., introd. A. Hoste OSB, 3 vols., Sources Chrétiennes 130, 207, 339 (Paris, 1967-1987); id., *Sermons on the Christian Year*, vol. 1 (sermons 1-26), transl. H. McCaferty OCSO (Kalamazoo, 1979); and id., *Letter on the Soul*, transl. B. McGinn in: *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology* (Kalamazoo, 1977).

[2] R. W. Southern, *Medieval Humanism* (Oxford, 1970), p. 31.

of human abilities and man's central position supports and underscores the great emphasis that monastic authors such as Isaac of Stella placed on instruction, introspection and reading. Man understands creation and Scripture through symbols and allegories in which he can glean knowledge of the divine.

There are several places in the sermons of Isaac where the importance of allegorical readings is emphasised and elaborated upon, especially in the fields of morality and epistemology. In his sermon on the first of the Beatitudes (from the sermon on the mount), Isaac states: "Although the literal sense, beloved, makes reference to an earthly mountain and an exterior crowd, it is upon the allegorical sense that I wish to focus attention, especially upon that which will most teach us how to live and build us up on the one foundation".[3] In the sermon on the wedding-feast at Cana he writes: "The book of wisdom written on the inside of the page and on the outside enables both those who seek within and those content with what is without to find pasture. On the outside you find the story; the secret moral meaning is inside".[4] Humanity knows Scripture and creation by using symbols and allegories, but how does mankind know that these symbols and allegories say something about the truth of creation and Scripture? In Sermon sixteen, the first sermon for Septuagesima, Isaac deals with this question in his interpretation of Matthew 20 ("Here is an image of the kingdom of God") when he draws this pericope on the image of the kingdom into the field of epistemology: "In any case, whatever may be said of anything with wisdom and truth, no matter what form it takes, exists from ***eternity***, totally contained at once and forever in every possible way in ***eternal*** wisdom and truth" [italics mine, JN].[5] The temporal and the eternal are brought together by the Spirit of God, so that any truth that we think, speak or write must of necessity be guided by the Holy Spirit. Isaac goes further and connects a frame of mind with a condition of the heart: "Take any exegete you like who takes the same text in different ways at various times: as long as he agrees with truth and love, he can claim the approval of the Holy Spirit".[6] In Isaac's thought love can become a principle of verification: "What goes against love must not be passed off as truth; what is contrary to truth cannot be called love".[7] Isaac's motives for preaching take him beyond the principles of simple exegesis and he seems to be consciously aware of his wider range of moral and theological concerns:

> These few remarks, brothers, are a sort of preface so that should you hear something unusual or something that differs from what you have elsewhere read (I may be somewhat bold) you will not think that I am altogether unaware of the fathers or despise their opinions or that I am foolishly rejoicing in my own ideas. […] My purpose is not so much to explain the readings of the holy Gospel as it is to take the op-

[3] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 1.4, in ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 4.
[4] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 73.
[5] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 16, in ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 129.
[6] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 16, in ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 130.
[7] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 16, in ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 130.

> portunity they offer to say something towards the building-up of the brethren and of ourselves, making all due allowance for time, place and persons.[8]

From passages such as these it is clear that the abbot of Stella wanted to bring his theological knowledge to bear on the more immediate concerns of the Christian life notably in the fields of instruction and the promotion of human understanding. Hence I would argue that the theology of Isaac can best be understood in two ways: a vertical or mystical way, aimed at the unification with God, which is commonly symbolised by the ladder of Jacob, and a horizontal way, qualified by the idea that man is the ***image*** of God and that human nature has its own self-contained though limited existence. This vertical, theological interpretation is the more obvious object of study and features prominently in, for instance, ***The Golden Chain*** by Bernard McGinn;[9] the second, the horizontal reading, can be looked upon as an important supplement to the former. In a paper on the question how medieval texts should be read, Arjo Vanderjagt in a way vindicates this horizontal reading by arguing that medieval authors can be better appreciated if one tries to understand them not only by studying their thoughts, but also by taking into account their feelings and emotions (in as far as these are expressed in their writings). He illustrates this with the ***Proslogion*** of St. Anselm of Canterbury, a philosophical as well as a devotional and confessional text with a long history of interpretation by various philosophers and theologians. Yet, readers of these interpretations only seldom learn something about the intentions with which Anselm wrote his work, even though Anselm is quite explicit about his state of mind and the devotional sentiments in which his philosophical exercises are embedded.[10] For modern critics, the interpretation of the interpretation seems more important than the text ***an sich*** and the ideas of the author. In this paper I wish to focus on the devotional and pedagogical motives of the abbot of Stella in order to do justice to his humane concerns, which in no small measure contribute to the Christian humanist dimension of his work. A treatment of the confessional and theoretical aspects of his sermons, however, should be preceded by a brief sketch of his life.

Isaac, abbot of Stella (a filiation of the Cistercian abbey of Pontigny), was a scholar before he left the world to bind himself to the white monks of Cîteaux.[11] He arrived in France around 1130. Isaac was a schoolman and his sermons and letters show some familiarity with the writings of the masters of Paris and Chartres, especially with Hugh of St. Victor. Around 1140 he became a Cistercian monk and probably entered in the house of Pontignac, near Aux-

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[8] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 16, in ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 130.

[9] McGinn, ***The Golden Chain*** (as in n. 1), pp. 93-94.

[10] A. J. Vanderjagt, "Een geleerde gelijkenis", ***Madoc*** 17 (2003), pp. 21-27. Teaching philosophy at a secondary school in the Netherlands, I discuss this paper every year with fifth grade students, who enthusiastically correspond with the author.

[11] See F. Bliemetzrieder, "Isaac von Stella, Beiträge zur Lebensbeschreibung", ***Jahrbuch der Philosophie und Spekulativen Theologie*** 15 (1904), pp. 1-34; G. Raciti, "Isaac de l'Étoile et son siècle", ***Cîteaux*** 12 (1961), pp. 178-198; McGinn, ***The Golden Chain*** (as in n. 1), pp. 1-50.

erre. In 1147 he was made abbot of Étoile, near Poitiers. In 1167 he moved to the abbey of Notre Dame des Châteliers on the island of Ré, near La Rochelle. Why he moved to this island is not entirely clear, but it is possible that it had something to do with the Thomas à Becket controversy within the Cistercian order. The Archbishop of Canterbury had sought refuge in the Cistercian abbey of Pontigny in 1165, but only a year later he had to leave this great abbey at the urgent request of the General Chapter of the order. The reason for this was Henry II's threat to close down the abbeys of the white monks in England if they refused to send the archbishop away from their monasteries. Isaac was one of the defenders of Thomas and his concern over the primate of England was probably the reason for his departure from Stella to Notre Dame des Châteliers. In one of his sermons he laments his exile:

> And now, dear friends, we must break off at this point for today. Work and words have made us weary. Such is the food we eat in the sweat of our brow while exiled from God's house, from its cries of joy and thanksgiving and all the bustle of feasting. May he conduct us safely there, he for whose sake we live, exiles in the world, on this island and in this monastery.[12]

The date of Isaac's death is unknown. According to tradition it was around 1167, but G. Raciti[13] points out that Isaac wrote many sermons in the years he spent at Ré, so that 1167 is not a very likely date; elsewhere he mentions the year 1178.[14]

A main theme in the writings of the abbot, as in those of many other Cistercian authors, is the notion of solitude. Most of the monastic reformers in the eleventh as well as in the twelfth century saw solitude as the most perfect form of monasticism. Although Bernard was an admirer of eremitism he objected to taking the notion of solitude and seclusion too literally. Guerric d'Igny, for example, was attracted to the hermit's life, but under the influence of the abbot of Clairvaux he stayed within the community, became master of the novices, and later second abbot of Igny.[15] Bernard had good contacts with the Carthusians, but it seems that he did not propagate any kind of literal solitude. In his first sermon for the feast of All Saints, Isaac, speaking about the text from Matthew 5 ('Jesus seeing the crowds, went up to the mountain'), stresses the importance of solitude: "so brother, 'escape far away', do not run back to the crowd".[16] Isaac teaches his monks to run away not only in the literal sense, but also, more importantly, in the allegorical sense. 'Run away' is a key concept: to run away

[12] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 19, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 163.

[13] Raciti, "Isaac de l'Étoile" (as in n. 11), pp. 176-189.

[14] G. Raciti, "Isaac de L'Étoile", in: *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire*, vol. 7.2 (Paris, 1932-1995), pp. 2011-2038.

[15] Guerric of Igny, *Liturgical Sermons*, transl. monks of Mount Saint Bernard Abbey, vol. 1 (Cistercian Publications, 1970), p. xiv. Guerric was sensitive to the limitations of solitude: "Alas for him that is alone: for if he should fall he has none to lift him up".

[16] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 2.4, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 4.

from the crowd to the *clôture* of the monastery and within the monastery to the inner chamber of the heart, or, in the words of St. Bernard, to paradise. This movement illustrates the life of the monk, not only in the literal, but also in the symbolic sense.[17] In his famous letter to Alexander, Bishop of Lincoln, St. Bernard writes that the young canon Philip, having come to Clairvaux on his way to Jerusalem, made the right choice when he decided to stay there. In a figurative sense, he had entered Jerusalem and therefore paradise.

> Your Philip has taken a short cut to Jerusalem. […] right now his feet are standing in the courts of Jerusalem, and he willingly adores the spot. […] he is a devout inhabitant and an enrolled citizen of Jerusalem, not of this earthly Jerusalem, […] but of that free Jerusalem, which is above and the mother of us all. […] And if you insist, this is no other than Clairvaux. She herself is Jerusalem, affiliated to the Jerusalem which is in heaven. […] His promise to stay implies that it is here that his rest will be for ever more. He has chosen this spot for his dwelling because there can be found, if not yet the vision, then certainly the expectation of that peace of God which surpasses all our understanding.[18]

Literally, solitude refers to an important aspect in the daily lives of monks. Allegorically, it instructs monks to run from the turbulence of the crowd to the *cubiculum* of the heart. Anselm opens his *Proslogion* with the words: "Enter the inner chamber of your mind; shut out all else except God and whatever is of aid to you in seeking him; after closing the chamber door, think upon God".[19] And Bernard of Clairvaux, in his homilies on the Song of Songs, gives a similar allegorical reading of the young man who runs to the *cubiculum* of the bridegroom. Isaac calls on the monk to climb the mountain and tell the crowd: "Where I am going you cannot come".[20] He compares the monks with the disciples who followed Jesus to the mountain. They were, like the monks, spiritually stronger than other people in the crowd, and Jesus, going to another mountain, left his disciples to pray.

One can find this notion of movement from the crowd to silence or solitude not only in the sermons of Isaac, but also in his *Letter on the Soul*. On the stairway to heaven (the *scala* is a central notion in the medieval theories about the soul, and especially in Cistercian anthropology) the soul stays midway on this ladder. Due to the grace of God, there is within the soul, in its higher faculties, the longing to see the Light:

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[17] The idea of movement is derived from B. Pranger, *Bernard of Clairvaux and the Shape of Monastic Thought: Broken Dreams* (Leiden, 1994), p. 51: "The short text *Introduxit me rex* is expanded both on a literal and on a spiritual level. The story of the 'letter' runs as follows. The bride and her friends are running to the storerooms of the bridegroom. Driven by their ardent love the bride arrives first and is the only one to be admitted. Her friends trailing behind, are not allowed in".

[18] Bernard, *Epistola* 64.1, quoted from Pranger, *Bernard of Clairvaux* (as in n. 17), pp. 32-33.

[19] Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, ed., transl. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson (Toronto, 1974), c. 1, p. 91.

[20] John 8:21.

> […] the light which departs from God illumines the mind, though remaining in God, so that the mind may see first of all that very blazing forth of light without which nothing can be seen, and in that may see other things. On this account the soul, stretching out the understanding to the very source of light, itself finds and beholds it through light's own being.[21]

McGinn states that Isaac uses the symbol of the Golden Chain of Being which (deriving from Homer's *Iliad* 13.18-27) is the key to his theology of man.[22] The notion of a chain of being (or ladder of Jacob) is, of course, an important and common medieval symbol,[23] but I am of the opinion that McGinn overstresses this symbol a little. Next to this idea of a vertical chain, one should also recognise a horizontal line denoting the creaturely limitations of human nature and the proper condition of the human soul. The following lines from Anselm's *Proslogion* 16 seem to tone down the emphasis that Isaac laid on the mind's merging in the light, and, although they stress the likeness of the soul to God, they also emphasise the impossibility for the soul to be part of Him: "Truly, O Lord, this is the inaccessible light in which You dwell. […] My understanding is not able to comprehend this light, which shines forth so brilliantly. My understanding (*intellectus*) does not grasp it; and the eye of my soul (*oculus animae meae*) cannot bear to gaze at length upon it".[24] At the end of that chapter Anselm describes the struggle of the soul: "How far removed You are from my sight though I am so present to Yours! You are wholly present everywhere, and yet I do not behold You. In You I move and exist, and yet I cannot approach You. You are within me and round about me, and yet I do not perceive You".[25]

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[21] Isaac of Stella, *Letter on the Soul* (as in n. 1), p. 90.

[22] McGinn, *The Golden Chain* (as in n. 1), pp. 21-22; W. Meuser, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Isaak von Stella. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des 12. Jahrhunderts*, Inaugural Dissertation (1934), p. 5: "Die ganze Welt is ihm [Isaac (JN)] eine Stufenleiter von Existenzformen die entsprechend dem Grade ihrer Teilnahme am Urprinzip [archetype (JN)] mehr oder weniger volkommen sind. […] Dieser ganze reichgegliederte Makrokosmos spiegelt sich im Menschen wieder". Meuser underlines the idea of the Chain of Being, but also stresses the Platonic and Augustinian dualism of, on the one hand, body and soul, and, on the other hand, God and soul. Man has only knowledge of God through Christ and through the church. Meuser, id., p. 52: "Ohne Christus kein Gottschauen. Zu Christus aber kommen wir nur durch den Helfer Geist, der in der Kirche waltet und sie zu Christus erzieht. So werden wir in der Kirche durch den Hl. Geist mit Christus unserem Haupt vereint".

[23] On the role of the symbol of the staircase to heaven *in magicis*, see J. Veenstra, 'The Holy Almandal', in: *The Metamorphosis of Magic*, ed. J. N. Bremmer and J. R. Veenstra (Leuven, 2002), p. 191: "The general idea was that if there is a stairway to heaven, or at least a passage to a numinous beyond, one should venture to climb the ladder or explore it without allowing oneself to be put off by institutions or authorities claiming to dominate that access".

[24] Anselm, *Proslogion* (as in n. 19), c. 16, p. 104.

[25] Anselm, *Proslogion* (as in n. 19), c. 16, p. 104; cf. also Anselm, *Opera omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 113: "Te video. In Te moveor et in Te sum, et ad Te non possum accedere. Intra me et circa me ea, et non Te sentio".

Similar ideas are expressed by Isaac in his *Letter on the Soul*: "Rather he (God) is the light that is inaccessible unless he himself draws near to someone by his natural gift, that is by his illumination. Since he is the light, he indeed shines, that is by his illumination".[26] In these passages from Anselm and Isaac the tension between the vertical and the horizontal line becomes clearly visible. The vertical line shows the longing of the soul for the Light, the illumination of the soul by the Light and the running of the disciple or monk from the crowd to the *clôture* of the cloister, or to the *cubiculum* of the heart. The horizontal line, however, underlines the inaccessibility of God. There is a gap between God and man that cannot be closed by man.

In Sermon 9 Isaac instructs his monks on the different modes of reading and understanding the Scriptures; he explains that when the Word became Flesh, Christ, as it were, became a book. The apostles saw this book in the flesh and this book is "with us today in the scriptures, palpable in his mysteries. [...] We can see him in his work".[27] In passages like these Isaac is not only a monk, but also a scholar. In leading the monks to solitude and the paradise of the cloister, he uses words, books and techniques to interpret the Bible. He was longing for God, but aware of the impossibility for man to reach the inaccessible light of God. In Sermon 8 the abbot deals with body and soul: "Rationally, souls are purely spiritual, second only to God. The spirit whose image they bear they cannot equal".[28] In the next paragraph he continues with some remarks about virtues and vices of the soul and he concludes that Jesus as a child had the mind of a grown man.[29] In these the horizontal line becomes visible. The soul is only accessible by the grace of God and man can only know God through the life and teachings of Christ.

The themes of solitude, remoteness, reading, meditation and prayer recur repeatedly. Isaac urges the monks from Stella as well as from Ré to study and to pray: "We must consider three practises; reading, meditation and prayer".[30] Such exhortations are necessary, for in the first part of Sermon 48 (which in several manuscripts has been called: *ysaac abbatis stelle apologia*[31]) Isaac complains that occasionally his brethren seemed 'unenthusiastic and lax listeners'. Studying, reading and preaching are necessary for Isaac the scholar, but for the Cistercian abbot of Stella it is more. To read and to study Holy Scripture is running away from the crowd to the mountain. It is not only an intellectual un-

[26] Isaac of Stella, *Letter on the Soul* (as in n. 1), par. 23, p. 176.

[27] Isaac of Stella, Sermons 9.7 and 9.8, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 66.

[28] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 8.3, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 66.

[29] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 8.4, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 66.

[30] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 5, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 39.

[31] On the basis of some references in this sermon, Gaetano Raciti inferred a cause for his movement from Stella to the Island of Ré. Raciti argues also from many references from Sermon 48 that Isaac speaks about Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers. He deduces from these references that Isaac had followed lectures by these masters. McGinn, *The Golden Chain* (as in n. 1), p. 26; for Sermon 48, see *Sermons*, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 3, pp. 150-162.

derstanding of God but a spiritual understanding as well. From this viewpoint, I believe one should interpret the sermons and letters of Isaac of Stella. In what follows, I propose to analyse Sermon 9 along these lines.[32]

Sermon 9 is written for the first Sunday after the octave of Epiphany. It belongs to a series of two: Sermon 9 and 10. The subject of the Sermon 9 is the wedding-feast at Cana. The text can be divided into three parts:

1. §§ 1-7: God has given us six books of instruction. In this part Isaac explains what these books are and what is in them.
2. §§ 8-13: This part deals with the vertical/mystical way to God. Here the monk and mystical author Isaac speaks about the wedding-feast in Cana.
3. §§ 13-19: Here Isaac deals with the unity of the Trinity and the duality and brokenness of man after the Fall. In the duality of man (body and soul) the horizontal line becomes visible. Without the grace of God it is impossible to see the light of God or to become one with the Trinity.

J. Leclercq calls most monastic sermons a form of "written rhetoric" since they were never actually delivered by the author in the Chapter of the monastery. Instead, the sermons were written and sent to other houses, where they were read aloud to the members of the community. Most sermons have reached us in collections compiled by pupils or auditors.[33] In the case of Isaac there are two types of sermons. First, there is a series of sermons in which he develops a theology that he is not likely to have actually preached to the monks of his community.[34] Secondly there are the sermons which were actually preached, but later re-worked. The Sermons 9 and 10 belong to the latter category.[35] Regarding Holy Scripture as the Word of God, Isaac, like many medieval exegetes, followed the traditional scheme of the four senses: the historical, the moral, the allegorical and the anagogical sense. Cassian gives an example of these four senses in an explanation of the name Jerusalem. In the literal or historical sense, Jerusalem stands for the name of the city of the Jews. According to the moral sense it is the soul of man. In the allegorical sense it is the Church of Christ, and in the anagogical sense Jerusalem directs man to the heavenly City.[36] A similar pattern of moral, allegorical and anagogical readings can be found in Isaac.

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[32] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in *Sermons*, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 204-221; and *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), pp. 73-81.

[33] J. Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire of God* (New York, 1962), pp. 168-176; McGinn, *The Golden Chain* (as in n. 1), pp. 24-31; G. Salet, "Introduction", in *Sermons*, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 1, pp. 26-35.

[34] Salet, "Introduction" (as in n. 33), p. 32.

[35] McGinn, *The Golden Chain* (as in n. 1), p. 27 n. 119: "There are other series of Sermons for a single Feast which exhibit less unity of content and therefore leave the question open whether they were originally planned as units […] Sermons 9-10 (first Sunday after Epiphany)".

[36] Jean Cassien, *Conferences*, 11.8, ed. E. Prichery, Sources Chrétiennes 54 (Paris, 1958), pp. 189-191. On the four senses, compare also Godfrey of St. Victor's poem

An important notion at the beginning of Sermon 9 is the idea of the "Image of God".[37] In this phrase both the vertical and the horizontal line are present. The image of God can never be the same as God himself. It is possible for the soul to climb up to paradise, but the soul cannot merge with God. The best way to know God is in the Word. In Sermon 1 Isaac states that, of the mountains to which Jesus went for seeking solitude, the first mountain signifies the preaching of Jesus to the crowd, the second the revelation of his glory and the third the prayer to the Father. These allegorical readings Isaac supplements with anagogical ones, for he wonders whether we should not interpret these mountains as three heavens. The first stands for the holiness in our present life, the second for the angelic life, but the last is, as it were, "the heaven of heavens to which he climbs upon the sunset... Here dwells the glorious Trinity, known only to itself and to the Man who was taken up to God and who dwells in the unapproachable Light".[38]

In this sermon on the wedding-feast at Cana, Isaac is not merely interested in the miracle, but also in the hidden meaning of the miracle: the former is aimed at edifying the unbeliever, while the latter goes further and reveals a hidden mystery to the believer. Isaac here uses the Latin verbs ***aedificare*** and ***superaedificare***, both of which aid us in our spiritual life.[39] According to the abbot of Stella there are six books to instruct man.[40] The books can be read in an outer and an inner sense, the former containing the story, the latter the secret moral meaning (***foris historia – intus tropologia***).

The primal book of wisdom is written within the Deity and is therefore the most important of the six books. From this book is copied (***transcripta***) the text of the second book of wisdom, namely the rational mind. All is written for

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Fons Philosophiae: "This stream has four different features; / In some parts it can be crossed, in other parts it is deep. / Here it is more pleasing to the taste, sweet and delightful, / Nor does it flow back to the heights from which it has sprung. / When it is more clearly history, it is easy to cross, / Whereas it is hard to swim the deep waters of allegory, / It is easy to drink the savoury waters of morality, / While anagogy is regurgitated and does not stay down". See Henry de Lubac, ***Medieval Exegesis***, vol. 1, transl. M. Sebanc (Michigan, 1998), p. 2 n. 14, p. 272.

[37] J. Javelet, ***Image et ressemblance au douzième siècle***, vol. 1 (Paris, 1967), p. 91.

[38] Isaac of Stella, ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 5.

[39] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in ***Sermons***, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 1, p. 204: "Nuptiae factae sunt in Cana Galileae, etc. Istud enim fidem ***aedificat***, illud ***superaedificat***. Istud infelibus signum, illud fidelibus sacramentum. Urtumque tamen utile, utrumque delectabile, utrumque magnum, utrumque divinum". Id., ***Sermons***, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 73: "There was a wedding-feast at Cana, in Galilee. As I reflect on this wedding-feast, I am captivated not so much by the great and obvious miracle as by the hidden meaning of the miracle. The former goes to building up one's faith, the latter does something even ***greater***. While the first is a sign for the unbelievers, the other has a mysterious message for the believers. Both help our spiritual life and delight us: each is great and divine".

[40] For the theme of the six books, see Salet, "Introduction" (as in n. 33), p. 342.

eternity and can be read by the blessed.[41] The created minds have copies of the first, eternal book written on the inside. In the second book one can find the *imago Dei*. The rational mind has the capacity for all wisdom, but the Fall of man has darkened it. It is for this reason that the rational mind uses his abilities to look to other sources of information. The angels were satisfied with these books of wisdom, so they dedicated themselves entirely to the vision of God. The idea that the rational mind has the capacity to contemplate the inside pages of the primal book is common in the texts of twelfth-century monastic authors. Nevertheless, the notion of the mind as *imago Dei* epitomises the horizontal line, and the inaccessibility of God. Hence one should recognise both lines in phrases such as the following: "The second (book) is the likeness of all things since the image of God is found in the second book".[42] The third book, written on the outside and the inside, is the material and visible creation. Man can find divine wisdom here, but it is difficult to read. The Fall of man impairs man's vision and makes it impossible for him to see God in this book. Man grieves (*plangit*) about his blindness and his inability to see God with the eye of the rational soul (*ut videre non possit oculis intelligentiae intus Deum*). The fourth Book is given to the people of Israel who became blind to the words which are written inside ("The Lord your God is one"[43]). "Worshipping many deceitful demons", Isaac writes, "it went its own blind and deaf way".[44] The fifth book refers to "God's very Word that became flesh". This Word is with us in the Scriptures, which is the sixth Book.

In the second part of the sermon the tone becomes different. While the first part is pedagogical, the second is more mystical. The vertical line is dominant in this second mystical part of the sermon. Isaac introduces the story of the miracle at the wedding at Cana and concludes at the same time the first section. "So now let us try to grasp what the word of God has said to us through the external miracle we read about in the sixth Book. This particular work of the Word himself is itself a word".[45] He then distinguishes three types of wedding: an inner, an outer and a higher (see table below), which he develops in the whole second part. The vertical or mystical line becomes clearer and clearer as does the longing of this Cistercian monk to see the glory of the Light of God. The goal of man is to be one with God. Through the grace of God there is a mysterious marriage whereby the Word and our nature, Christ and the Church

[41] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in *Sermons*, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 1, p. 206: "Primus Liber sapientiae totus scriptus intus. […] Pater omnia scripsit ab aeterno. […] secundo liber in mente rationali […]".

[42] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 74; and *Sermons*, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 1, p. 206: "Ibi simul omnia, hic similitudo omnium in isto si quidem imago illius".

[43] Deut. 6:5.

[44] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 75.

[45] Isaac of Stella, Sermon 9, in *Sermons*, transl. McCaferty (as in n. 1), p. 75; id., *Sermons*, ed. Hoste (as in n. 1), vol. 1, p. 210: "Videamus itaque quid in hac sexti libri lectione per hoc exterius miraculum locutus sit nobis Dei Verbum, nam ipsum opus Verbim verbum est".

are joined. Finally, there is a fourth and most exalted marriage: the marriage between God and the mind of man. The last part of the sermon deals with the soul of man. Man without God was divided in duality, while God without man was united in his Trinity. God is one nature in three persons. Christ, the new man, is in three substances Word, soul and body. Man should come from the old self through the new self to the eternally real self; from vanity to virtue by way of the truth; from waywardness by the straight way to true life.

	First sense of wedding	*Second sense of wedding*	*Third sense of wedding*
1.	Outer	Inner	Higher
2.	External	Internal	Intimate
3.	Between human beings	In human beings	Above human beings
4.	Union of the flesh	Union of flesh and spirit	Union of spirit and spirit
5.	Union of two persons becoming one flesh	Union between rational soul and flesh	Highest possible union of incorporeal beings

It is clear that, as the ninth sermon develops, the mystical tendencies gain the upper hand. Isaac's longing for God is consummated in his theology of a mystical union of God and the mind of man. However, this theology of union and mystical ascent should not be allowed to absorb the exhortative and pedagogical aspects of Isaac's writings. The awareness of the inaccessibility of the divine light, coupled with a strong emphasis on the innate capabilities of the mind of man (the second book) to decipher the allegorical and anagogical dimensions of nature and Scripture, allow Isaac to look upon his homiletic labours as essentially instructive and pedagogical. His appeal to solitude and seclusion, and his invitation to symbolic readings are as much part of a devotional and confessional frame as his mystical theology. For this reason, I have attempted in this essay to draw out the former from the domineering shadow of the latter, thereby bringing Isaac's confessional and educational ideals in line with Southern's notion of medieval humanism. The writings of Isaac of Stella are solidly embedded in Cistercian literature; it is – as the case of Isaac shows – a literature that should not only be appreciated for the content of its theology, but also for the Christian humanist dimension of its instruction.

ANSELM, CALVIN, AND THE ABSENT BIBLE

Burcht Pranger

INTRODUCTION

One of the least challenged assumptions in the history of Christianity is the presence of the Bible in all its manifestations. Admittedly, many explanations may be given such as the longevity of the book going back to archaic times, its status in Jesus' self-perception as having come to fulfil the Scriptures, its incorporation into the life and rites of the church, its subsequent self-deliverance from ecclesiastical bonds in the ***sola scriptura*** of the Reformation culminating in the utterly unconstrained reading- and preaching-practice of the modern day evangelical preacher. Yet in more than one respect Scripture's presence throughout history can be called as enigmatic as it is self-evident. Of all possible enigmas, one stands out for being inherent to Scripture itself, and that is its potential for becoming superfluous. Its being intrinsically time-bound, far from suggesting that it be devoured by time, is to be seen as the very source of temporality proper. It ***is*** time, and as such performs time, not by encircling the course of history from the outside, but, rather, by acting out time and history. Thus Scripture functions as an explosive, a bomb that may go off any time. Jesus's claim to have come to fulfil Scripture, Paul's view that in Jesus the fullness of time has come as well as the message of the Apocalypse concerning the end of history may seem to make a point ***about*** time and history. However, in fact, the medium being the message, the end and fulfilment of history squarely depend on the right reading and handling of the explosive material at hand. In other words, there is nothing reassuring in introducing the reader at this point as the keeper of a precious museum piece.

At no time – at least, at no time until the rise of the devotional subject – have Scripture and the reading of Scripture functioned in terms of a relationship between subject and object. For that the status of the object, the book, has been too powerful, including and absorbing (as, for instance, in allegory) the act of reading as part and parcel of the object proper. This being so, another dimension of the same enigma comes to the fore. Given the potential superfluity of Scripture, one is faced with the problem of its undeletable presence. Right from Scripture's arrival in the Hellenistic world, its very bookishness has been in the way of its potential superfluity, or, to put it differently, has raised questions both with regard to its substance and form ***and*** to its self-proclaimed temporal status. Thus Augustine's famous handling, in his ***De doctrina Christiana***, of the entire complex of Scripture's status inside the world of the liberal arts, in par-

ticular *les arts du langage*, has not only produced respectability from a rhetorical point of view. At the same time it has, over and against the claims of timelessness on the part of the Hellenistic culture of rhetoric, relentlessly put the spotlight on the temporality of language, including the language of Scripture, to the point of the latter becoming superfluous:

> Therefore a person strengthened by faith, hope, and love, and who steadfastly holds on to them, has no need of the scriptures except to instruct others. That is why many people, relying on these three things, actually live in solitude without any texts of the scriptures. They are, I think, a fulfilment of the saying: "If there are prophecies, they will lose their meaning; if there are tongues, they will cease; if there is knowledge that too will lose its meaning".[1]

Reading Scripture, then, rather than becoming absorbed by mystical silence detached from any articulation and focus, or, for that matter, the end of history, pinpoints the explosive effect of time in the guise of full possession as the moment at which language and knowledge have run their course and are being abridged and condensed to the holding on to (*tenere*) a word that is no longer spoken and taught but lived to the full, transformed into a "love" that, having done away with past and future, faith and hope, will prevail; "for when one reaches eternity the other two will pass away and love will remain in an enhanced and a more certain form".[2] For Augustine, the accomplished reader who has appropriated and fulfilled the scriptural sayings to the point of the latter losing their meaning, has indeed turned into Scripture himself.[3] That being so, one big question remains: what is the visibility of this particular manifestation of Scripture, this *Lied ohne Worte*, this song without words? Since simplicity is in the air, no duplication can be intended here. If then Scripture has "lost its meaning", what is left of its undeletable nature as linguistic corpus the possibility of whose absence should be put, in Christian terms, into the category of the unthinkable?

CALVIN

Making a little jump in time, I now turn to Calvin whose *sola scriptura* seems to be the most comprehensive expression of Scripture's undivided presence. In Calvin too the issue is not so much the relationship between a reading subject and the object to be read as, rather, the "objectivity" of Scripture itself, that is, its self-revelatory and self-referential nature, the epitome of which is its *perspicuitas*: the epiphany of Scripture. As far as objectivity is concerned, Scripture is as carved in stone as the words dictated by God to Moses on the mountain. Dis-

[1] Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.39.43 (93), ed., transl. R. P. H. Green (Oxford, 1995), pp. 52-53. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:8.

[2] *De doctrina Christiana* 1.39.43 (94) (as in n. 1), pp. 52-53.

[3] As I will discuss below, Anselm's *sola ratione* might be said to perform a similar action by merging Scripture's superfluous nature and fulfilment.

cussing Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch, Calvin does not only claim the same auctorial status for Moses as for Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, each of them a material author of material books. Moses' law is also to be appreciated in its continued, material presence: "And although, through negligence of the priests, this law has laid buried for a short while, it has, in the successive periods, been continuously and uninterruptedly in the hands of men, ever since pious king Josia rediscovered it".[4]

Now in his zeal to disown the (Catholic) church as the rightful possessor and interpreter of Scripture, Calvin refrains from transferring those rights to the reader. Such a move would have replaced one church with another, the collective with the individual. Both the *sola fide* and the *sola scriptura* are in the way of any possible turn to subjectivity and, indeed, to any extension whatsoever, whether internal or external. For, to be sure, regardless of its reception, it is God's word that is being spoken to man with the stated purpose to be received and listened to, not "handled" and appreciated. "For just as God alone is a sufficient witness with regard to Himself in his Word, so that same Word will not find faith in the hearts of man unless it be sealed by the internal testimony of the Spirit".[5] Since it is this very same Spirit that has spoken "through the mouths of the prophets", the right reading of Scripture cannot but be performed by the author of Scripture himself through the act of sealing the Word. In the Calvinist tradition this act of sealing by the Holy Spirit has become known as the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum* providing Calvinism, among other things, with a kind of hermeneutics on the part of the reading subject (confidence, faith, experience), in other words, extensions which I have a moment ago brandished as contrary to the razor of the *sola scriptura*. Yet as soon as we try to apply that razor, Calvin's text starts moving, displaying a considerable degree of slippage as coined by John Jones with the help of the opening line of Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*: "Nevertheless he [Stepan Verkhovensky, "the professor in a provincial town"] was a most intelligent and gifted man, even, so to say, a scholar, though his scholarship didn't amount to much, to nothing at all, I think".[6] Similar shifts arise once we start pinpointing the presence of Scripture as presented to us by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. For, once we realise that Scripture, its appearance as a *nature morte* notwithstanding, is in fact a living object, we face the question as to its sustained presence *as* Scripture. No need for worry, Calvin assures us, since the Spirit itself does not, in a sense, transcend scriptural bounds:

> It is not the task of the Spirit which is promised to us, to invent or forge a new kind of doctrine, which could lead us away from the doctrine we have received, but precisely to seal in our hearts that doctrine which is recommended to us through the gospel.[7]

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[4] Calvin, *Institutes*, 1.8.9 in *Joannis Calvini opera selecta*, vol. 3, ed. P. Barth and W. Niesel (Munich, 1958).

[5] Calvin, *Institutes* (as in n. 4), 1.7.4-5.

[6] J. Jones, *Dostoevsky* (Oxford, 1983), p. 270.

[7] Calvin, *Institutes* (as in n. 4), 1.9.1: "Non ergo promissi nobis Spiritus officium est, novas et inauditas revelationes confingere, aut novum doctrinae genus producere,

As a matter of course, the next question arises: if this is true, is not the Holy Spirit somehow dependent on Scripture, on a text, that is, which for all its stone-like materiality, basically suffers from the constraints of time? Here the real slippage sets in:

> [Opponents of this view] argue that it is unbefitting to subject the Spirit of God to whom all things are subjected, to Scripture; as if it would be inappropriate for the Holy Spirit to be equal to and in uniformity with himself throughout, to be identical with himself in everything and not to suffer any change anywhere. Surely, if measured according to the criteria of man or an angel or measured against any external criterion, the conclusion should be drawn that He is humiliated or, if you will, reduced to bondage. However, if compared with Himself, or considered in Himself, who can argue that injustice is being done to Him by doing so? But you will object: in that manner He will be subjected to scrutiny. Yes, that may be true albeit to such scrutiny through which He has wished that his majesty be reinforced in us. It should be more than enough for us as soon as He reveals himself in our hearts. However, lest Satan creep in under His name, He wants to be recognised by us in his image which He has impressed on Scripture. He is the author of Scripture. He cannot be different and unequal. He is bound to remain in eternity just as He has once revealed himself.[8]

So much is clear that Calvin's *testimonium Spiritus internum* is about liberty; the freedom of the divine gift revealed in the Word. That at least is the traditional view in which the emancipatory nature of the Reformation is emphasised as the delivery from the constraints of the church including its fixed reading methods (such as the prescriptions and hermeneutics of allegory). However, in order to maintain its free status the gift of Scripture seems to be deprived of its reader as well. This process of deprivation is what slippage is about and it works as follows. Just as Dostoevsky's opening line of *The Possessed* diminishes the learning of "the professor" reducing it in the end to nothing, so the hard core presence of Scripture as well as its distinct features of bookish temporality fade into the faceless presence of the Spirit, not by an act of spiritualising reading but by the Spirit himself. That Spirit, in its turn, wants to be "recognised by us in his image which he has impressed in Scripture". One is reminded here of Hamlet's father, whose ghost is hovering over his son – and over the

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quo a recepta Evangelii doctrina abducamur, sed illam ipsam, quae per Evangelium commendatur, doctrinam mentibus nostris obsignare".

[8] Calvin, *Institutes* (as in n. 4), 1.9.2: "At verum indignum esse causantur, Spiritum Dei, cui subiicienda sunt omnia Scripturae subiacere. Quasi vero sit hoc ignominiosum Spiritui sancto, sibi esse ubique parem et conformem, sibi per omnia constare, nusquam variare. Equidem si ad humanam, vel angelicam, vel alienam quamvis regulam exigeretur, censendus tum esset, in ordinem, adde etiam si placet, in servitutem redigi: sed dum sibi ipsi comparator, dum in se ipso consideratur, quis ideo dicet irrogari ei iniuriam? Atqui ita ad examen revocatur, fateor, sed quo suam apud nos maiestatem sauciri voluit. Nobis abunde esse debet, simulatque se nobis insinuat. Verum ne sub titulo suo Satanae spiritus obrepat, in sua imagine quam Scripturis impressit, vult a nobis recognosci. Scripturarum auctor est: varius dissimilisque esse non potest. Qualem igitur se illic semel prodidit, talis perpetuo maneat, oportet".

play – in such a manner as to absorb – or, in any case, to threaten to absorb – the latter in the process and rob him of his identity. Slippage can be seen at work precisely in the invisible shift from Word to Spirit and from Spirit to reader alias believer:

> For the Lord has made a mutual connection between the certitude of his Word and his Spirit, one with the other so that a well founded reverence for the Word may be rooted in our hearts, when the Spirit which makes us see the face of God meets our gaze, so that, conversely, we embrace the Spirit without any fear of errors when we recognise Him in his image, in the Word, that is. Truly, that is the way it is. God has not introduced the Word among men to show it for a short while just to have it all of a sudden vanish out of sight at the appearance of the Spirit. But He has sent the same Spirit through whose power he had provided the Word, to complete His work through the powerful confirmation of the Word.[9]

In this passage a paradox comes to the fore. Of course, the Holy Spirit is supposed to be free and immutable, pure identity. But what exactly does He do when He is said to "complete his work through the powerful confirmation of the Word?" If the Spirit is not caged in doing so, what does his liberty as well as the liberty He brings to life in the hearts of the faithful look like? In other words, if the Spirit is as immutable as depicted here and as identical to Himself, can any dividing lines be drawn and sustained between Scripture, Spirit and reader, and, if not, how can both reader and Scripture avoid being absorbed by this "middleman" so as to be turned into ghosts themselves?

One might object that I am over-emphasising the gap between text and Spirit and that, moreover, Calvin himself emphasises their mutual intertwinement. But, then, what is so striking about Calvin and Calvinism is the supreme confidence with which Word is exchanged for Spirit without any urge to explain how one gets from one to the other, and how, if at all, the Word survives being confirmed by the Spirit. Of course, there is Calvin, in his *Institutes* and commentaries, tirelessly explaining and summarising Scripture. But can all that be called an act of reading? Not, in any case, the reading manner of the early-Christian and medieval period. However wordy, underlying the endless meanderings of the pre-Reformation ways of reading, that is, underlying the presence of Scripture, was a sense of falling short in handling the Word: ***das Wort das mir fehlt***/the word that is eluding me. "Return, Sunamite, return […] stay with us for evening will fall: that is why, when the Word goes away, the interval consists of one protracted sound, one protracted desire for him, as one protracted ***Return*** until he comes".[10] Of course, Bernard is describing here the vi-

[9] Calvin, *Institutes* (as in n. 4), 1.9.3: "Mutuo enim quodam nexu Dominus Verbi Spiritusque sui certitudinem inter se copulavit: ut solida Verbi religio animis nostris insidat, ubi illum in sua imagine, hoc est in Verbo, recognoscimus. Ita est sane. Non Verbum hominibus subitae ostentationis causa in medium protulit Deus, quod Spiritus sui adventu extemplo aboleret, sed eundem Spiritum, cuius virtute Verbum administraverat, submisit, qui suum opus efficaci Verbi confirmatione absolveret".

[10] Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Canticum*, 74.II.7 in *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, vol. 2, ed. J. Leclercq, C.H. Talbot and H.M. Rochais (Rome, 1957), pp. 243-244.

cissitudes of the coming and going of the Word which is Christ. But that in itself fits in, as we have seen above, with a long Christian tradition as formulated by Augustine in the preface to his *De doctrina Christiana* about the reason why God, who could have dispensed with verbal communication has deigned to communicate with men, through Christ, through words: "the human condition would be really forlorn if God appeared unwilling to minister his word to human beings through human agency".[11] And is it in and through Scripture that this administration of words and the Word has come to us and, consequently, with Scripture that we have to deal in our efforts to catch truth and reality. But if we leave aside the rather fluent and flexible presence of Scripture in the allegorical reading which has been predominant up to Calvin's time and stick to the more hard-core and practical dealings with Scripture as in Augustine's *De doctrina*, even then an element of shakiness is left in Scripture's presence that seems to be lacking in Calvin. Nor could Calvin ever be imagined to allow for the potential superfluidity as proposed by Augustine. In that passage, quoted above, about "prophecies that will lose their meaning" Augustine does not so much talk about the end of times, but, rather, about people such as the desert fathers, who have succeeded here and now in living "without any texts of the scriptures". Paradoxically, this virtual superachievement, though increasingly unlikely actually to materialise from the perspective of Augustine's bleak view of the human condition, keeps underlying his reading of Scripture. And although it could be argued that Calvin's *testimonium internum* is designed to accomplish precisely this act of superachievement, Scripture's immovability stands in the way, keeping the Spirit and Word frozen as it were in their "mutual connection". For Calvin the Word is never lacking, it never fails one, because its being confirmed by the Spirit means that it is self-referential, the perfect gift, one and the same, uninterruptedly present always and every way: "God has not introduced the Word among men to show it for a short while just to have it all of a sudden vanish out of sight at the appearance of the Spirit". For all his reading and summarising of Scripture, the price Calvin pays for this infallibility, for this seamless and all-pervasive presence of the Word, is its absence. Like Hamlet's father, the Word has turned into a ghost whispering to the reader who is at once a shaky sinner and a blissful elect that its life and substance has been unlawfully taken from it. As such it is, indeed, transformed into a voice from the grave.

ANSELM

I now want to discuss someone with a supreme confidence of his own in sealing and confirming the Word, with no urge to "invent or forge a new kind of doctrine", yet with no need for Scripture either. It is Anselm of Canterbury's *sola ratione* and *Christo remoto* that is supposed to do that trick. Coined in the opening sentence of the *Monologion* the *sola ratione* claims to prove the exis-

[11] Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, Prologue 13 (as in n. 1), pp. 6-7.

tence of a supreme being, and, in an even bolder fashion in the *Proslogion*, to prove the existence of God with the help of one single argument (*unum argumentum*).[12] In a similar vein, Anselm, in *Cur deus homo*, sets out to prove the necessity of the incarnation with Christ thrown out of the picture.[13] It will not come as a surprise that Anselm's effort has been a one-off never to be repeated, while later theologians have done their utmost to save this saintly theologian from the radical, too radical, implications of his own stance. Doing so they went out of their way to assure us that, from the beginning to the end, Scripture survived this rational experiment untouched and unharmed. In the words of John McIntyre: "St Anselm may forswear the authority of Scripture, but nevertheless moves within the limits which Scripture defines. To allow St Anselm freedom beyond these limits is to assign him a freedom which he would himself be most unlikely to accept".[14] For McIntyre Anselm's use of Scripture could still be assessed within a broad, cultural setting. For Karl Barth, on the other hand, Anselm's focus was much more explicitly biblical and theological. In Barth's view, Anselm's entire intellectual manoeuvre is faith- and Scripture-based and bound. Faith being its own limit, it excludes all other presuppositions including claims of the intellect. All intellectual activities take place within the *credo* either as a game or as an elucidation of what is believed. Consequently, whosoever thinks does not leave the realm of faith for one moment. This religious a priori being accepted, it is possible to assess the role of the intellect. Within the reality of faith issues (parts) which need clarification are analysed in a rational way: *sola ratione*. Covered by the totality of faith one single issue is isolated, turned into an unknown x, the rational sense of which is to be proven by rational means. In that process other elements of faith which at that moment are not under rational discussion can be used as arguments. To give an example: as mentioned above, in *Cur deus homo* Christ is isolated from his religious context and considered as x, as an unknown quantity. Using the other articles of faith (God's sense of justice, man's obligation to give satisfaction for sins committed, the structure of creation etc.) it is possible for Anselm to prove the necessity of the incarnation, to provide by strictly rational means the missing link in the chain of articles of faith.[15]

In a recent book David S. Hogg summarises this Barthian stance in even broader terms: "What this means for the reader is that the *Cur Deus Homo* is thoroughly rooted in Christian presuppositions. Its arguments, its progression of thought, its content, are intended to be criticised and studied from within that

[12] *Monologion*, c. 1, *Proslogion*, Preface, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi opera omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Stuttgart, 1968), pp. 7, 93.

[13] *Cur deus homo*, Preface in *S. Anselmi opera* (as in n. 12), p. 42. "Christo remoto quasi numquam aliquid fuerit de eo […] quais nihil sciatur de Christo" ("with Christ removed as if nothing about Him had ever been the case, as if nothing about Him were known").

[14] J. McIntyre, *St Anselm and his Critics: A Re-interpretation of the* Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh [1954]), p. 17.

[15] K. Barth, *Anslem: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, transl. I. W. Robertson (London, 1960), pp. 53-67.

same context".[16] Those "Christian suppositions" are thoroughly biblical, albeit not always in so many words. If there is, admittedly,

> "a dearth of overt biblical references" in Anselm this fact need not worry us. Never ever does "an insufficient number of explicit biblical references (as judged by the modern interpreter) imply an absence of biblically derived authority. In fact, lest the aforementioned reasons be denied, we have the words of Anselm himself who proclaimed that the truth into which he and Boso have been looking is found in "Holy Scripture". The language is very interesting here. Anselm has written that "nos ubique sacra Scriptura docet, quae super solidam veritatem, quam adjuvante Deo aliquatenus perspeximus" ("it [the means of salvation achieved through the death of Christ] is taught to us everywhere in Holy Scripture, which is based upon the solid truth, which, by God's help we have examined to some degree").[17]

What is so amazing about Barth's and Hogg's – and, more generally, the theologians' – view of the *sola ratione* and the *Christo remoto* procedure is the assumption that Scripture's presence is apparently so easily distinguishable. And so is the presence of faith. This very broadness, in my view, runs counter to the fact that for the medieval exegete the teaching of Holy Scripture (*sacra Scriptura docet*) never ceases to be teaching and, as a consequence, never comes to rest in the shape of Christian suppositions. Admittedly, Anselm's is an extreme case in this respect; all the more reason, it would seem, why Barth's view about the sustained presence of other articles of faith during the creation of a missing link is utterly untenable. If there is one missing link, all is missing. One cannot wipe out Christ and seriously believe the resulting gap to be protected by surrounding left-overs. The same principle obtains for the *sola ratione*. One cannot seriously argue by reason alone while at the same time keeping up an escape route in the guise of the authority of faith. As a result, it would seem even less plausible to claim that Scripture's support is further supposed to carry the entire operation. Here Henry James' dictum about his heroine in *The Wings of the Dove* applies: "She'll have it all or she'll miss it all".[18]

As for Scripture, Anselm misses it all. Any other option would spoil his argument, his *unum argumentum* including the option, of course, of unbridled rationalism. Only on this condition, the next question is going to make sense, so much so, perhaps, that it can be seen as *the* question as to what Anselm is up to: what exactly is going on in this gap, this moment of suspense where reason reigns supreme and Scripture and Christ fall silent?

A proper answer to this question would involve an assessment of "Christian humanism" which, for the sake of convenience, we take here in its minimal sense as representing the presence of Antiquity's *outillage mental* inside specifically Christian-religious discourse. In dealing with that presence one is tempted to take a historical anomaly for granted, and that is the fact that "hu-

[16] D. Hogg, *Anselm of Canterbury: The Beauty of Theology* (Aldershot, 2004), p. 159.
[17] Hogg, *Anselm* (as in n. 16), p. 165.
[18] Henry James, *The Wings of the Dove* (Oxford, 1984), p. 255.

manism" may have been all-pervasive throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, but that precisely the indistinctness of its omnipresence makes it impossible to pinpoint it. Yet this is precisely what historians indefatigably have been trying to do and continue to do, acting on the – often unspoken – assumption of a certain bipolarity between more humanistically inclined authors on the one hand and more narrowly religiously focused writers on the other: Hildebert of Lavardin versus Peter Damian, Bernard of Clairvaux versus John of Salisbury. This hidden bipolarity, in its turn, presupposes a historical stance in which authors were at liberty to use their *outillage mental*, that is, the combined forces of the liberal arts and Scripture, to choose a position vis-à-vis those forces, a third option in a sense. For all the *otium* underlying medieval religious literature, such a third option is out of the question, cutting off the possibility of assuming either a more religious or a more humanistic position. And not even Augustine's "methodological" reflections on the use of the liberal arts in his *De doctrina* could be read in such a way. Nor does it make any sense to argue at this point that there is nothing in the Middle Ages that is not tainted with religion. For such a statement would never hold if it were not supplemented with its corollary that everything is tainted as much with humanism as with religion – which would make the entire exercise pointless from a historiographical point of view. Anachronistically confusing medieval religion with the absolute and confessional religion(s) of pre-modernity while benignly branding medieval humanism as the "not yet" of Renaissance humanism or the tainted vestiges of Antiquity which are supposed to be traceable as such, one would block a simpler and more authentic access to the medieval religious text. That being as it is, a third option of sorts is indeed required if we are to get a grip on Anselm's language, not to be used for making external judgements but to lay bare the intrinsic "grammar" of his thought.

Now it is back to the absent Bible in Anselm, and to the moment at which reason reigns supreme. For it is through an analysis of that absence that some hints can be given as to the structure and effects of a discourse that keeps functioning under the regime of a book while displaying the workings of temporality in the process; this is also the reason why the reflections on humanism in this article were introduced as an intermezzo rather than as an overarching structure: the humanist aspects of Anselm's – and, for that matter, Calvin's – texts are part of a problem, they are not the problem itself.

For Anselm the operations of reason start doing their job within the realm of language as it is spoken or written without any theoretical awareness, the so-called *usus loquendi*. As yet Scripture does not necessarily play a specific role there – it can even be seen to function as part and parcel of un-reflected language. Let us turn to the *Proslogion* to see this *usus loquendi* at work. There we come across the fool as he figures in the book of Psalms, who "says in his heart: 'there is no God.'"[19] At this point the machinery of reason is set in motion. In his famous *unum argumentum* Anselm proves the fool to be wrong to such an extent that God is not only demonstrated to exist both in the intellect

[19] *Proslogion*, c. 2 in *S. Anselmi opera* (as in n. 12), p. 101.

and in reality, but also to be truly in such a way as "not being able to be thought not to exist".[20] That being so, Anselm resumes his confessional mode and gratefully addresses God who, by being the way He is, had made this proof possible at all: "And are you that, Lord, our God. For you are truly in such as way, Lord my God, that you cannot be thought not to be. And rightly so". As for the fool, he is not only proven to be wrong. His "linguistic" behaviour shows in the fulness of his silliness:

> Why then does "the fool say in his heart: 'there is no God,'" since it is so evident for the rational mind that of all things you exist in the highest degree? For what other reason than that he is fool and stupid?[21]

Yet all this is not sufficient to account for the *sola* of Anselm's *sola ratione*. Just as Calvin's Scriptural focus would have provided an outlet for the "humanistic mind" were the *sola scriptura* to have functioned minus the *sola* thus avoiding the problem of the "voice from the tomb", so Anselm's *sola ratione* would have been much more harmless had it been applied minus the *sola* as well, as a "civilised" rational enterprise. But precisely at this point the net closes:

> Truly, how did he [the fool] say in his heart that which he could not think? Or how could he not think that which he said in his heart since to say in one's heart and to think are the same? For if he truly, yea, because he truly both thought it because he said it in his heart and did not say it in his heart because he could not think it, then there is not one single way in which something is said in the heart and thought. For it is one thing for a thing to be thought when the name that signifies it is thought and another thing when that it is understood as that which it is in reality. In the one instance God can be thought not to be, in the other, certainly not. For no one who understands what God is, can think that God is not, although he may say those words in his heart, either without any meaning or with some external meaning. For God is that greater than which cannot be thought. And whosoever understands that rightly, understands precisely that [greater than which cannot be thought] to be in such a way that it cannot be thought not to be. So whosoever understands God to be in that way cannot think that He does not exist. Thank you, good God, thank you, that I now understand thanks to your illumination that which I first believed thanks to your gift, so that, even if I did not want to believe that you exist, I would not be able not to understand it.[22]

Before trying to assess the implications of this passage for the absence or presence of the Bible, let us first remember the opening passage of the *Proslogion* with its lament about the misery of the human condition characterised by the fact that man was made after God's image and likeness so as to see his maker face to face. Reality, however, looks quite different. All of that is poignantly expressed by Anselm with the help of a directly Biblical vocabulary: "Well,

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[20] *Proslogion*, c. 3 in *S. Anselmi opera* (as in n. 12), pp. 102-103.
[21] *Proslogion*, c. 3 in *S. Anselmi opera* (as in n. 12), p. 103.
[22] *Proslogion*, c. 4 in *S. Anselmi opera* (as in n. 12), pp. 103-104.

now, may you, Lord, my God, teach my heart where and how it can find you. Lord, if you are not here, where then do I have to look for you in your absence? If, however, you are everywhere, why then do I not see you in your presence? But, surely, you live "in an inaccessible light". And where is that inaccessible light? Or how can I come near to that inaccessible light? Or who shall be my guide and bring me there so that I may see you in it?"[23]

Now, conventional wisdom has it that Anselm switches, after the opening chapter of the *Proslogion*, from one type of discourse (the religious-affective) to another (the rational-philosophical). And, of course, there is no denying, that the tone and shape of chapter 1 of the *Proslogion* is quite different from chapters 2 to 5, the discourse on the *id quo maius nihil cogitari potest*. Yet, if we take the outcome of the *unum argumentum* seriously, the mere statement that Anselm uses different types of discourses will be found insufficient. Precisely the fact that the outcome is not to be restricted to a philosophical or rational conclusion makes that we have to account for the following *poetical* problem: if Anselm has indeed succeeded in wiping out all gaps, all empty spaces between the possibility of the denial of God's existence and his existence itself, he has hit on a certitude which must have been in the mind all along. In fact, the being "in the mind" of the *id quo maius* is one of the pillars of the argumentation: the point is now that after the argument has run its course, this "being in the mind" is proven never ever to have been "just being in the mind". It has always carried, not just the potential, but, due to the forward *and* backward effect of the *unum argumentum*, reality itself inside itself. Admittedly, Scripture and Scriptural language can be reintroduced after the argument has been established. But things will never be the same, as they, of course, never have been. Another lament about the misery of the human condition may be started up. Yet, right from the beginning, it is bound to be intricately connected to the fact that language about God, spoken correctly, does not allow for gaps, holes and hesitancies, whether Biblical or not. That being so, it is precisely Biblical language and faith that has been momentarily absent when in the guise of the *unum argumentum* (empty) room was created for its own effectiveness. As a result, that very same language was set free in order to make sense, by lending itself for use to the contemplative monk. The latter, made after the image and likeness of the same God who cannot be thought not to be, is called upon to lament his broken and scattered existence knowing full well that there is no gap between the invisible God and his existence, and, by implication, between the lamenting monk and his very own self. That is what the intrinsic grammar of Anselm's thought is about, his *sola ratione*, his removal of Scripture and faith. Doing so, he does not make room for an independent rational subject; for that the act of the intellect is too much rooted in reality, the *esse in re* of the divine. What Anselm tries his hand at is to be called neither humanistic in the sense of independently human, nor faith-bound. He rather has been building a discourse that, Joyce-like, contains and operates its own epiphany, its own moment at which language and thought do what they ought to do, to use Anselm's own

[23] *Proslogion*, c. 1 in *S. Anselmi opera* (as in n. 12), p. 98.

phraseology, and knit thought to reality and vice versa. Temporality comes in when one becomes conscious of the abysmal and the seemingly paradoxical nature of this act, since one is knitting that which is inextricably bound together. That is where, in the context of monastic poetics, time and eternity meet and the repetitious lamentations about the inaccessibility of God make sense, world without end.

CONCLUSION

No ghosts, for Anselm, so much is evident. Unlike Calvin's *sola scriptura*, Anselm's *sola ratione* is in no need of any reassurance of sealing, not even when it is disguised as a guarantee of the Holy Spirit. No *testimonium Spiritus internum* here. If that is true, it becomes a matter of some urgency to know what exactly is going on during Scripture's absence. What we face here, is the fact, insufficiently realised so far by historians, that Scripture, precisely because of its omnipresence, is the least known and most elusive "object" of medieval and early-modern culture. It is a golden bowl, a gift of God, yet untouchable and undivided. As such it can neither be opened or read in a cursory manner: "she'll have it all or she'll miss it all". In that sense, Anselm and Calvin follow the same pattern: Calvin by appointing the Holy Spirit not only to be the author but also the reader and keeper of Scripture by jealously guarding it in its immutable and untouchable integrity and unity; Anselm by having only one go at it, *unum argumentum*, thus also maintaining its integrity. In that respect both authors can be called exceedingly eschatological, carrying Scripture as the explosive it is. For, were Scripture not all in one piece, it could not be effective in the explosive manner. Of course, from the point of view of cursory and sequential reading, all this is very silly and uncalled for. From the viewpoint of the notions of gift and grace that determine Christianity's outlook, things are different to the extent that self-referentiality is to be seen as the beginning and end of each proper reading and thinking act. Admittedly, failure is inevitable here – even intrinsically so, as I have tried to demonstrate for Calvin, whose spiritual duplications in my view turn Scripture into a language from the tomb. What about Anselm? Of course, he is bound to fail as well, albeit elegantly so. The great and unsolved question underlying not only the enormous expansion of medieval reading and thinking techniques but also their condensation – as in Anselm's, and to some extent in Calvin's case – is the temporality of language, which, far from invading us from the outside, is wrapped in Scripture and at the same time, in the view of both the users of and commentators upon this language, touches upon eternity, the undeletable Word whose integral presence and speech fails man into absence and invisibility.

THE WORLD AS SIN AND GRACE
THE THEOLOGY OF MELANCHTHON'S *LOCI COMMUNES* OF 1521

Rob Pauls

Melanchthon's use of *loci communes* as a didactic method of organising disciplinary material in an accessible way, and its contribution to the transformation in the sixteenth century of ways of approaching, presenting and representing reality, has been the subject of historical investigation in recent years.[1] In this paper I examine the impact of Melanchthon's method of the *loci* on the substance of his Reformation theology. Melanchthon's use of rhetorical and dialectical *loci* in the sense of 'places', the structuring of these *loci* as arguments and the use of propositional *loci communes* based upon Scripture and didactically and devotionally applied within an argumentative setting affects Melanchthon's theology in the sense that his is a theology in which straight articulation and communication are of a primordial importance. Everything which is not 'said' is eradicated from the texture of this theology. It is neither silently present nor silently absent. Further, the wording itself substitutes for what is worded; it refers to itself. There is a rock-like quality in Melanchthon's language, not allowing for any semantic proliferation and extension. The wordings are put into didactic and devotional use. Melanchthon's theology has an eminently practical character. It is not the outcome of a preceding or ongoing process of theological thinking but the starting-point of a religious education.

The *Loci Communes* of Melanchthon of 1521, as well as all subsequent editions, may be seen either as a theological handbook or as a *kontroverstheologisches* pamphlet or as a kind of hermeneutical companion to the study of Scripture or as a practical devotional manual, or even as all these simultaneously within an educational setting. Melanchthon aims, in good humanist fashion, at a transformation of the religious mind of the student, to be accomplished by reading Scripture.[2] This explains the prominent role of human affects in the *Loci Communes*. It has often been observed, especially with respect to the obvious spiritualism in the *Loci* of 1521, that Melanchthon articulates the transformation

[1] See A. Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford, 1996); F. Goyet, *Le sublime du "lieu commun": l'invention rhétorique dans l'Antiquité et à la Renaissance* (Paris, 1996); C. G. Meerhoff, *Entre logique et littérature: autour de Philippe Melanchthon* (Orléans, 2001).

[2] *Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl. Band II, Teil I: Loci Communes von 1521, Loci praecipui theologici von 1559*, ed. H. Engelland, R. Stupperich *et al.* (Gütersloh, 1978[2]), p. 17 "[…] nihil perinde optarim, atque si fieri potest christianos omnes in solis divinis literis liberrime versari et in illarum indolem plane transformari".

of the Christian mind in terms of a dynamics of human affects. In this respect he parts ways with Luther. Hence the *Loci* are not meant as a substitute for reading and studying Scripture, but they should enable students to read the Bible with the theological outlook offered in them serving as a hermeneutical tool. Melanchthon insists that he has written the *Loci* in order to induce the student to read Scripture and not to keep him away from it.[3] In fact, the *Loci* can be read without having to turn to the Bible continuously in order to understand what is said and meant. And this is what Melanchthon intended. For in the letter of dedication prefacing the *Loci Communes* of 1521 he justifies the edition by referring to the preliminary works on Paul's letter to the Romans published without his consent in the previous year. He does not reject the argument of the *Paulina disputatio* as elaborated by him in these notes for use in his private school but he deems them not proper and suited for publication because of their sheer incomprehensibility without the accompanying Scriptural text.[4] As for the *Loci*, they are sufficiently concise, and the successive arguments deployed in them sufficiently succinct, for Scripture not to be eclipsed by Melanchthon's work.[5] Above all, the effectiveness of the method of the *loci* as wielded by Melanchthon results not only in telescoping the *Loci* into the Bible but at the same time in telescoping the Bible into the *Loci Communes*.

The effectiveness of Melanchthon's method for the transformation of the Christian mind is by no means in doubt. Reformation faith in the sense of trust and confidence is very much based on knowledge of what it is in which (and who it is in whom) one should put faith in the beneficial menaces and promises of a merciful and trustworthy God. It belongs to the essence of Melanchthon's *loci* that they transform the mind by cognitively propounding the image of God or the essence of Christianity as revealed and expressed in Scripture.[6] The Reformation concept of faith in its Lutheran guise corresponds to Melanchthon's method, to such a degree that it is safe to say that it originates partly in Melanchthon's theological method itself and is shaped by it. However, as for the human affects which are propelling man into sin or spontaneously flowing out of faith and salvation, their relation to Melanchthon's *loci* in the *Loci Communes* is far less clear. Melanchthon had made himself vulnerable in 1520/21 by giving in to the rampant spiritualism of his day, and even in the *Loci* of 1521 he still equates religious knowledge (*cognitio sacrarum rerum*) with *prophetia et afflatus quidam*.[7] Such saving knowledge can, of course, be found in Scripture as the writ of the Holy

[3] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 17: "ut […] ad scripturas invitem […] tantum abest, ut ullo meo longiore scripto velim quenquam a canonicae scripturae studio retrahere".

[4] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 17: "[…] ita scripsissem, ut sine Pauli epistola non satis intelligi posset, quid in toto opere secutus essem".

[5] *Melanchtons* (as in n. 2), p. 17: "Parce vero ac breviter omnia tractamus, quod indicis magis quam commentarii vice fungimur […]".

[6] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 17-18: "[…] in illis [scil. divinis literis] absolutissimam sui imaginem expresserit divinitas, non poterit aliunde neque certius neque propius cognosci. […] Fallitur, quisquis aliunde christianismi formam petit quam e scriptura canonica".

[7] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 18.

Spirit (*per quod illabitur spiritus*). In the *Loci Communes*, however, there is more than merely spiritualism dominating the discourse. 'Prophecy and divine inspiration' is translated in and restricted to the terms of human affects. Besides, the spiritualism, thriving on the basis of all kinds of Scriptural interpretation, is limited and contained by the hermeneutical tool of the theological *loci*. What, one may ask, is the relationship between religious human affects and *loci communes*? The question is all the more real in view of the fact that the theological *loci* not only direct the student of the *Loci Communes* towards reading Scripture but may also be seen as constituting a well-ordered system of theology and organising a critical and even polemical discourse directed at the theology of the schools dominant at the universities. The theological *loci* are used as 'places' and 'containers' of Scriptural *loci* functioning as either authoritative arguments for theological truths (or against those of adversaries) or as rhetorical devices used against those who maintain theological opinions declared to be 'impious' or 'contrary to Scripture'.

That the *Loci Communes* are a theological handbook is revealed by the fact that Melanchthon follows the traditional order of the *loci* according to the sequence of salvation history, from the unity, then the trinity of God, then God's creation, introducing thereby man and man's history from sin to salvation through grace, God's means of distributing grace and upholding order (Church, society and government), through eschatological judgment and beatification. Melanchthon has woven the dialectics of God and man, sin and grace, law and gospel, letter and spirit into this traditional texture of salvation chronology and eschatological history. In this respect, the *Loci Communes* of 1521 are not only a devotional manual but a theological treatise as well.[8] The *Loci Communes* are remarkable in that the different ways of reading and using them do not result in questions about the possibility of a multivalent use of the *Loci* or an appreciation of the dominant use. An educational classic such as Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* has led to many different interpretations which do not contradict or exclude one another but, pointing to and basing themselves upon the bewildering variety and richness of the text, rightly claim that it does make a difference which interpretation one decides to defend, if only because of the inevitable neglect of other approaches. In Melanchthon's *Loci*, however, no such confusion or conflict arises. On the contrary, there is not even a question of a juxtaposition of different interpretations and ways of reading. The *Loci* do not bring about a clash, not even a silent one, of different interpretations and applications of the book. Nothing is at stake, and it does not make any difference whether one uses the book as a theological hand-

[8] The chapter on law (*de lege*) in the *Loci Communes* is the best example of Melanchthon's commitment to the traditional order of theological *loci*. The exposition distinguishing different kinds of law (natural, divine, and human) and proceeding historically is heavily based upon tradition; the influx and organisation of the material is not conditioned by either the opposition of law and gospel or the relation between law and sin. In this respect, the "evangelical" structure of the *Loci Communes* is thwarted by the traditional division of salvation history. Elsewhere in the *Loci*, if the traditional sequence of *loci* makes an appearance, tradition is blocked and ousted by the functional argument of the *loci*.

book, a devotional manual, a hermeneutical tool, or an instance of *Kontroverstheologie*. In the end, all these possibilities coincide and are indistinct: because all end up with the same *loci*. Essentially, the *Loci Communes* are *loci communes*, and nothing else. They may be used for different purposes; that is what they are made for, and they succeed in doing this to an amazing degree. But exactly because of this effect, they are, in a tautological way, nothing more than the *loci* they are, in whatever context they are found and put to use.

To all appearances, the *Loci Communes* of 1521 are, if controlled by method, pervaded by a spiritualist theology determining, at least in part, the way that Melanchthon describes the workings of law and gospel, the reality of sin and grace, and the authority of Scripture. In fact, however, the Holy Spirit as well as human affects are allowed to reign freely only so that they may establish the regime of law and gospel. This is brought about by the method of the *loci* in two ways. First, as I will show in the following, human affects are part of the argument proving a theological *locus*. Second, because they serve as arguments, human affects are contained and checked, even neutralised, by these selfsame theological *loci communes*. The affective movement itself is limited and not allowed to transgress and pierce through the regime of law and gospel, the limits being set by the *loci*. All affects are also ultimately constituted and determined intrinsically by the theological *loci* they are meant to support and demonstrate. Through the argumentative regime, the repetitive and rigid way of arguing about a *locus* along the same compelling lines, following the same blown trails, 'sin', for example, is systematically described and elucidated by human affects which are introduced and presented in a standardised way. The affects themselves are, in their turn, absorbed into and in the end identical with the *locus* of 'sin', serving as an argument to prove 'sin'. Even with respect to human affects, so prominently present in the *Loci Communes* of 1521, Melanchthon's *Loci* do not give rise to different ways of reading which compete for precedence. Human affects too are *loci communes*, intrinsically and by way of argument, thereby turning the theological, controversial, hermeneutical, devotional and practical discourse into one numerically identical discourse. Moreover, in this way it is clear how human affects are integrated into faith. The Christian mind is cognitively conditioned by God's word of threat and promise, and like faith (as trust, confidence and reassurance) is cognitively induced and effected by the words of God invoking trust and confidence. Hence not only this transformation of the Christian mind but also the human affects is indistinguishable from the *loci communes* they are related to.

Only once in the *Loci Communes* of 1521 does Melanchthon speak of God who visits his people in a frightening way, God who arrives and reveals Himself as a devastating storm raging against unjust men and wiping out whatever He hates. In the chapter on the power of the law (*De vi legis*) such strong passages are precluded by the argumentative rigour which forces God's anger and wrath to function within the argument of the law condemning as sin everything pervaded by human self-love (*caput omnium malorum, amorem nostri*).[9] Here too (in the exposition of the *vis peccati et fructus*), the passage is exceptional, being an ex-

[9] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 93-99.

cess within the argumentative structure of the paragraph. Melanchthon denies the possibility, defended by the schoolmen, that man can love God by virtue of his natural powers only. Human love is by nature always self-interested and inspired by the expectation of some comfort and benefit of one's own. Such love, if directed to God, is servile and sinful, arising out of a bad and perverted affect (*pravo perversoque affectu naturae*). Besides, such love for God cannot even exist. God's benevolence can be perceived and grasped only by virtue of the operation of the Holy Spirit. Without God's help and the operation of the Spirit, man abhors and hates God for castigating man and inflicting punishments.[10] Such a God cannot possibly be loved by man from his natural powers. So much for the argument, based upon self-love and self-interest as the root of all natural human affects which are battered and purified, so to speak, until nothing is left of them but self-love which, in its turn, becomes synonymous with sin. The spirited outburst against the scholastic theologians contains another argument, but one of a very different order, which is not part of the argumentative strand of the *loci*: a raging God, sweeping away all useless and powerless arguments and devices invented by man in order to hold his own with God and so vindicate himself. This is an argument indeed, and a quite different one at that: "What, sophists, can those elicited acts of yours achieve here, that fine will which you have contrived? Will that day of wrath, that [divine] fire not reveal those human justices of free will to be merely lies and make-believe and all glory of the flesh to be as the glory of debt? Did Israel not shudder at the [divine] fire and cloud, even at the face of Moses when the law was promulgated? Was the earth not shaken and did it not tremble and were the foundations of the mountains not turned upside down and shaken because God was angry with them?"[11] This is a different argument and also affect, even if expressed by way of the rather shallow rhetorical figures of question and repetition. Melanchthon breaks off and drops the appearance of God burning down man's defences (*Sed hac de re infra*), and returns to God who judges and condemns sin and who appears and works in the guise of argumentative affects.

Of course, there is no question of denying that affectivity and spiritualist presuppositions figure prominently in Melanchthon's theology in the *Loci Communes*. On the contrary, the *Loci* pour out into a clear, if sketchy (*hypotyposes* being an excellent title connoting both aspects of clarity and sketchiness) theological anthropology based on God's grace and human sin exhaustively defined in terms of affects. This exhaustiveness is revealed by the fact that, whereas Luther distanced his theological discourse on sin and grace and the religious world

[10] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 46: "Atqui ubi conscientia perculit animum, iam ita adversatur et exhorret deum ut carnificem crudelem et vindicem et […] iniquum".

[11] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 46: "Hic, sophistae, quid illi vestri actus eliciti, quid illa egregia vestra voluntas, quam finxistis, efficiet? Annon ille irae dies, ille ignis declarabit nihil nisi mendacium et cerussam esse humanas illas liberi arbitrii iustitias et omnem gloriam carnis esse velut foeni gloriam? Nonne ignem ac caliginem, immo ipsam etiam Mosi faciem reformidabat Israel, cum lex promulgaretur? Nonne commota est et contremuit terra et fundamenta montium conturbata sunt et commota sunt, quoniam iratus est eis deus"?

of his gospel from non-theological discourses about man, thereby creating more and richer possibilities of speaking about man in more than one meaningful register, Melanchthon, in his early work of 1521/22, identifies natural necessity and theological predestination and equally the moral value of human acts as judged by man on the basis of shared opinion and as judged by God as revealed in Scripture. Contrary to Luther, Melanchthon does not allow for any goodness in any act of man. The presence of affectivity and spiritualism in Melanchthon is part and condition of what is peculiar to Melanchthon's *Loci*. For it is within the discursive movement pouring out into affectivity that at the same time a reverse movement is taking place, turning affects of sin and grace into *loci communes* and arguments and changing affects into doctrine (which is not to be believed but to be lived in faith, confidence, and consolation, and which is also controlled and contained by the *loci* the affects are identical with). There is affectivity in abundance in Melanchthon, but transposed into *loci*. In consequence, the chapter on sin (*De peccato*) can be read in both directions. Sin is defined by Melanchthon as *pravus affectus, pravusque cordis motus contra legem dei*. (Here the *locus* of God's law is introduced and argumentatively tied in with sin). If affect is emphasised, sin is ultimately affect, just as grace results in spiritual affects. If sin is emphasised, affects are prominent and functional because of their argumentative use; which means that natural affects are ways of articulating sin and ultimately are sin. Sin is identified as affect. This means that at the same time human affects are rooted in and identical with sin (or, for that matter, the gifts of the Spirit, the consequence of grace). In the end Melanchthon's world is composed of sin and grace. No reality is to be found outside the *loci* or the *compendium* in which Melanchthon contracts and tautologically imprisons reality. Here the 'said' has become identical with the thing to which it refers.

The chapter on sin starts with a polemical remark on scholasticism (*omnia omnium somnia*), which Melanchthon opposes to his own *compendium*, in which the term 'sin' is taken only *scripturae more*. Sin is one of the *loci* which are relevant for man's salvation and is revealed by God and meant to be known by man. That is why it is limited to the ambit of Scripture, a collection of *loci*, which itself is reduced to those *loci* "which Christ wanted to be known to all Christians. We should better adore than inquire into the divine mysteries. However, I do not see how I might call a Christian someone who does not know the remaining *loci*, the power of sin, the law, and grace".[12] But the polemical intent does not prevail. The impression given by the *Loci Communes* of being a predominantly positive book can easily be explained by the presence of the ubiquitous *loci* which are per se positive. More important is the fact that the constricting of the discussion to Scripture and to salutary *loci* only is not merely a formal decision on Melanchthon's part. Nor does his restrictive method stop here. It rather continues in the treatment of the particular *loci* themselves. Within a *locus*, a potentially or actu-

[12] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 19-20: "[…] [loci], quos universo vulgo christianorum compertissimos esse Christus voluit. Mysteria divinitatis rectius adoraverimus quam vestigaverimus […]. Reliquos vero [sic] locos, peccati vim, legem, gratiam, qui ignorarit, non video quomodo christianum vocem".

ally defined or circumscribed content is exhaustively constitutive for the meaning of the *locus*; possible sources of significative prolificacy and polysemy are erased. Thus Melanchthon starts the discussion with a definition of original sin bringing to the fore the affective character of sin: "an innate inclination and inner urge and energy by which we are drawn to sin".[13] This is a logically flawed definition, of course, even if Melanchthon would not explicitly deny the possibility and legitimacy of distinguishing original from actual sin. However, since the *Loci Communes* are written as one long extended tautology, even the *petitio principii* can be seen as meaningful. Next, Melanchthon explains *unde peccatum originale*. This fits into the traditional exposition of the historical reality of sin. But in the *Loci Communes*, it is clear that the historical 'facts' are deprived of any real or historical meaning or denotation. History is absorbed here by the function it has in the argument, which narrows down to the observation that man, bereft of God's spirit, can only love himself.[14] The permanent predicament of natural man is that all his affects are ridden by self-love and for that reason sinful. The introduction of the Pauline opposition between flesh and spirit is effective only in securing and fixing the basic truth that flesh as absence of spirit implies sinful affects.[15] To the definition of sin as affect is added the reason why sin is affective and carnal affects are sinful: self-love. Self-love as the link between sin and affect is not a full-blown psychological reality. Even the "creature which God's love does not absorb",[16] and God as a "consuming fire",[17] which concludes the whole section is used within the argumentative setting and is itself part of the argument. God is a 'consuming fire' because of the hate of God and the law originating in man out of his carnal inclinations and self-love. God and law are introduced in view of and related to the self-love which defines and articulates sin.[18] So far we have not proceeded beyond the notion that sin is essentially the affect of self-love, and that carnal affects are sinful. And although the argument will be stretched and continued for many pages to come, each new step will be nothing but an affirmation and re-affirmation of the theological truth of the topical *locus communis* of sin, viz. the propositional *locus communis* that sin is affect and natural affect is sin.

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[13] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 31: "Peccatum originale est nativa propensio et quidam genialis impetus et energia, qua ad peccandum trahimur […]".

[14] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 32: "Ita fit, ut anima luce vitaque coelesti carens excaecetur et sese ardentissime amet, sua quaerat, non cupiat, non velit nisi carnalia […]. Fieri enim nequit, quin sese maxime amet creatura, quam non absorpsit amor dei" – one of the rare places, by the way, where Melanchthon approaches man from the perspective of God as subject.

[15] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 32-33: "[…] ubi non est originalis iustitia seu spiritus, ibi esse revera carnem, revera impietatem, revera contemptum rerum spiritualium. Primus itaque affectus et summus naturae hominis est amor sui, a quo rapitur […]".

[16] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 32: "[…] creatura, quam non absorpsit amor dei".

[17] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 33: "[…] ignis consumens deus […]".

[18] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 33: "Hinc in homine dei et legis divinae odium oritur, hinc homini, ut mox latius explicabimus [!], ignis consumens deus est".

After having dealt with sin, law and carnal affects, Melanchthon continues with the gospel, grace, faith and justification, which he envisages as being symmetrical to the first part of the *Loci Communes*: "Just as the nature of sin can be comprehended only through the rules of the law, so the meaning of grace can be known only from the description of the gospel".[19] The definition of the gospel, like the definition of the law based on its theological function,[20] is plain: "Just as right things are prescribed and sin is revealed through the law, so the gospel is the promise of God's grace or mercy and the remission of sin and the testimony of God's benevolence toward us".[21] In order to secure the functions of law and gospel Melanchthon distinguishes law and gospel from the historical periods of the Old and the New Testaments. (It is obvious that Melanchthon stresses the Testaments more as historical periods than as revelatory and authoritative texts). He denies unambiguously the legal character of the gospel as a new law laid down by Christ.[22] At the same time, resuming his previous exposition of sin and law, Melanchthon reasserts that the law, notwithstanding the scholastic interpretation of the law prescribing only the refraining from *external* works prohibited by the law, requires proper affects more than external works and is to be interpreted affirmatively.[23] Up to that point Melanchthon is still preparing the way for the gospel, grace and justification to be set against sin and law. Next, in *De vi legis* Melanchthon elaborates on the view on law as seen by human reason (law as *emendatio vitiorum et doctrina vivendi*) and as seen by Scripture (law as *virtus peccati, virtus irae*). It is remarkable how much this paragraph too continues the discourse about sin and law. In view of the law demanding affective fulfilment, sin is sin, so the conclusion runs, because love of oneself pervades all acts of natural man. The false opinion of carnal man, not discerning his carnal self-love,[24] that God only

[19] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 82: "[…] ut peccati ratio nisi ex legum formulis non intelligitur, ita nec gratiae vis nisi ex evangelii descriptione cognosci potest".

[20] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 82: "Lex peccatum ostendit, evangelium gratiam".

[21] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 83: "Sicut lex est, qua recta mandantur, qua peccatum ostenditur, ita evangelium est promissio gratiae seu misericordiae dei adeoque condonatio peccati et testimonium benevolentiae dei erga nos […]".

[22] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 87.

[23] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 63f.: "Et sicut prius praeceptum affirmativum est, exigens fidem et amorem, ita et hoc affirmativum est exigitque, ut celebremus nomen et gloriam dei […]". Melanchthon argues that scholastic theologians "de externis tantum operibus praecipi arbitrantur" (p. 63) and "leges […] exposuerunt de externis tantum operibus" (p. 64). The same reason is used to explain the deficient view on original sin: "Quis enim tum philosophorum, tum scholasticorum theologistarum propriam virtutis aut vitii formam vidit? Metiebantur theologastri peccatum originale non nisi externis operibus […]" (p. 51, cf. p. 45). Here Melanchthon inserts the observation that reason cannot gauge the inscrutable human heart and the unfathomable malevolence of man ("[…] interim animi malitiam et velut intercutem morbum non videbant", p. 51) in order to account for the fact that scholastics, if they do talk about the love of God, fail to relate this adequately to the law because of their recourse to concepts contrary to Scripture (e.g. "actus eliciti", "meritum de congruo", "attritio", pp. 45-51), and claim the divine commandment to love one's neighbour to be a counsel only (pp. 64ff.).

[24] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 92: "[…] non videant morbum animi sui".

demands external works prevents the law from doing its work of judging and condemning.[25] The works of the law are done "with a carnal affect because of either fear of punishment or love of comfort".[26] In the chapter the terrifying and crushing effect of the law is once called the work of God[27] and (more often) referred to as the work of the spirit.[28]

The spiritualist appearance is part of the argumentative structure of *De vi legis*. The frequent mentioning of self-love, *philautia*, *amor nostri*, the *caput omnium malorum* and similar terms relates the law (demanding affects) to the discourse on sin, previously being identified as self-love. Being part of this discourse, the law reveals sin by way of the repetitive argument. Thus the spirit and its workings are effective not only by means of the argument but in the guise of the argument and therefore indistinguishable from it. First, the spirit is introduced in order to distinguish carnal and spiritual interpretations and knowledge of God's dealings with man: it is an epistemological argument that Melanchthon uses. Second, faith (like the self-accusation of the sinner crushed by the law) is the gift of the spirit. However, faith as the gift of the spirit again implies the unbridgeable gap between carnal and spiritual knowledge of sin and grace. On the one hand (*Ex primo genere* […]), there are those who have a carnal opinion of the law and pretend to fulfil the law.[29] On the other hand (*Ex altero genere*), there are those to whom God reveals His law and their own sinfulness.[30] But even if real fear of God is not possible *nisi per spiritum sanctum*, and there is no such thing as a *timor servilis* and *attritio* as *poenitentiae initium*,[31] carnal law not only leads to self-righteousness and hypocrisy but is effective in arousing in man hate of God and fatal despair.[32] This is not related in any way to a spiritual understanding of God, law and sin. But it is the (carnal) law which is "the author of nothing but hypocrisy, when it compels those who are unwilling and grumble at God, and of anger, when He condemns us for being guilty".[33] The gap is unbridgeable. Here the condemnation is not saving; it is ultimate because it is 'simulated'.[34] Yet it is judgment and damnation: *damnat nos reos*.

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[25] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 92: "Nam e falso et carnali intellectu legis vivunt, quare in iis efficere id non potest lex, quod debebat […]".

[26] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 92: "[…] carnali quodam affectu vel poenae metu vel commodi studio".

[27] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 93: "[…] in quibus per legem deus operatur... In his vere ac proprie lex agit, quibus ostenditur peccatum. Quod quia vere fit, a deo fit […]".

[28] See, e.g., *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 98: "[…] spiritus dei terrere ac confundere conscientias solet". Compare p. 99: "[…] quae fit a spiritu dei per legem […]".

[29] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 91: "[…] qui legem carnaliter intelligunt nec sentiunt exigere impossibilia […] suis operibus conantur se iustificare […]".

[30] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 93: "[…] quibus legem deus revelat ostenditque corda, et quos sensus peccati sui terret deus et confundit".

[31] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 97-98.

[32] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 94, 96, 100, 108.

[33] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 94: "[…] ut lex hypocrisis tantum auctor sit, cum coërcet invitos et frementes adversus deum, et irae, cum damnat nos reos".

[34] *Werke* (as in n. 2), pp. 92, 99.

Preceding the decisive exposition on justification and faith (*De iustificatione et fide*), the chapter on grace (*De gratia*) defines grace as *favor dei*. This complicates the discourse in the second part of the *Loci*. Sin and natural affects are both to be found in man whereas grace is the benevolent attitude of God. The 'fruits of the spirit' (*fructus spiritus*, joy, consolation, and similar affects) are to be found in man: the perceptible effects of the *donum spiritus*. If natural affect is the argumentative ground and essence of sin, spiritual affects are a sign, a symptom and a reminder (but no less an argumentative one) of God's mercy (as may be most clearly observed in the uses Melanchthon makes of consolation as a *locus communis* in all editions of the *Loci Communes*). Melanchthon himself calls the works of faith not only 'fruits' but 'signs' and 'testimonies' of the Spirit.[35] But in the *De iustificatione et fide* this does not prevent Melanchthon, while keeping the workings of the spirit at bay, from structuring the discourse on justification by faith in a similar way as the one on sin and law. Melanchthon wants his reader to understand the Scriptural stories exemplifying justification by faith and thereby to inculcate God's promises in order to practice his faith. The greater part of the chapter (apart from the refutation of the scholastic view on faith as an historical opinion or as faith informed by love) is a concatenation of promises made by God in Scripture, historically as well as theologically gathered in the proto-evangelical promise of Christ in Genesis 3:15 and the fulfilment of all promises in the coming of Christ.[36] Melanchthon presents God's promises as propositions to be accepted and believed: faith is not an inner experience like consolation or joy but a response to God's offer of salvation.

In the *Loci Communes* of 1521 the exposition of sin and law takes up more space than the exposition of the gospel of God's mercy and justification by faith. The essential parts of Melanchthon's explanations of the gospel and justifying faith amount to only half of the number of pages that he devotes to sin and law. Yet the *Loci* impress the reader by their well-balanced presentation of law and gospel, sin and grace. Melanchthon is giving each their due as he intended to do. In my opinion, this impression is the direct consequence of the fact that in the *Loci Communes* Melanchthon constructs a religious argument in which sin and grace, as parts of the same argument, imply and illuminate one another. In the end, sin and grace constitute the argument in the *Loci*. The argument is all that there is. It is reality itself. It is not a world *of* sin and grace but a world *as* sin and grace.

[35] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 131: "ut fructus, ita indicia, testimonia, signa spiritus".

[36] *Werke* (as in n. 2), p. 144: "Nam corporalia illa ideo populo promissa sunt, ne interiret, dum promissum semen nasceretur [the historical reason], et ut interim corporalibus rebus indicaret deus misericordiam suam et populi fidem exerceat [the theological reason]".

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